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THE OLD TESTAMENT AND AFTER



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THE OLD TESTAMENT
AND AFTER

BY

CLAUDE G. MONTEFIORE

M.A. (OXF.), HON. D.D. (MANCHESTER)

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THE OLD TESTAMENT
AND AFTER

CLAUDE G. MONTGOMERY

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
TO

RABBI ISRAEL I. MATTUCK

MINISTER AND LEADER

OF THE LIBERAL JEWISH SYNAGOGUE

IN GRATITUDE AND AFFECTION



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PREFACE

SOME five years ago I published a small book entitled *Liberal Judaism and Hellenism*, which is now out of print. The present volume, though an entirely fresh work, and written from a somewhat different point of view, yet partially replaces a portion of that earlier book. The first three chapters of my new book go over the same ground as the first three chapters of the old one, but Chapters I. and III. are much longer and fuller. Chapters IV. and V. of *Liberal Judaism and Hellenism* are not represented here, while Chapter IV. of the present work had no equivalent there. The fifth chapter here corresponds, to some extent, with the last chapter there, but the treatment is different.

My present object is to set forth as clearly as I can the religious foundations of Liberal Judaism as they may be gathered from the Old Testament. To me, a Liberal Jew, such an object is nearly (though not quite) equivalent to setting forth those elements or doctrines of present religious value which (as I believe) the Old Testament contains. It also incidentally involves an indication of what to me are the rough edges of the Old Testament: where it is religiously deficient, and what had, or has, to be, if

it can be, supplied from subsequent Jewish religious developments. I attempt to deal with these actual or possible supplements or expansions as they are (in my opinion) found in the New Testament, the Rabbinical Literature, and in some of the Jewish Hellenistic works (especially Philo). I include the New Testament, because its central hero was a Jew, and several of its writers were Jews. I stop where I do, because my knowledge of the later Jewish literature is inadequate. In my last chapter I try to state very briefly the religious progress which Liberal Judaism has actually made, and to glance at the problems which it has still to tackle, and at the further advance which (so far as one can see to-day) it has yet to achieve.

My friend, Dr. I. Abrahams, read the manuscript of the third chapter, and made certain criticisms, some of which I silently adopted, while others are mentioned in footnotes. The magnificent work of Strack and Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch: Erster Band, Das Evangelium nach Matthäus* (1922; 1055 pages) reached me too late for me to make any use of the wealth of material which it contains.

As this book is intended for the general reader and not for scholars, I thought it desirable, in Chapter III., to omit the constant references to Talmud and Midrash, which would otherwise have crowded the pages. For it is unlikely that the general reader would look up the passages either in the original or in a crib, while ceaseless footnotes and indications of footnotes

rather bother and disturb him. It may, however, be stated that the very large number of passages from the Rabbinic literature which are either quoted or alluded to have all been carefully verified in the original texts ; and where I have used translations, I have always checked, and often revised, these translations by reference to their sources.

I ought, perhaps, to add that the title of my book was suggested to me by the addition which a well-known monthly made to its name at the opening of the present century.

The Index is the work of my old friend Miss Bloxam, of Miss Petherbridge's Secretarial Bureau.

C. G. M.

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THE OLD TESTAMENT AND AFTER

CHAPTER I

THE OLD TESTAMENT

SECTION I

INTRODUCTORY

THE Old Testament is perfect. Perfect, that is, morally and religiously. Such, I take it, is the doctrine or view of Orthodox Judaism.

The Old Testament is imperfect. Such is the doctrine or view of Liberal Judaism. And such, too, is the doctrine or view of both orthodox and liberal Christianity.

Nevertheless, the position of the Old Testament in Liberal Judaism is very different from its position in Christianity. And this for two main reasons.

Christianity, both orthodox and liberal, if I am not misinformed, regards the New Testament as morally and religiously perfect, or as containing perfect moral and religious teaching. The imperfection of the Old Testament is preparatory to the perfection of the New.

Liberal Judaism ascribes perfection neither to the one Testament nor to the other. It does not believe that perfection—moral and religious perfection—can be the attribute of, or contained in, any book, for it believes in moral and religious

progress. And this *a priori* view of the necessary imperfection of any book, before either Old Testament or New Testament is opened, it finds confirmed when the one or the other particular book has been opened and examined.

Secondly, Liberal Judaism places the Old Testament on a higher level than it is placed by Christianity—at least by modern Christianity. It is true that Liberal Judaism does not regard it as perfect. It maintains its imperfections. But, within the limits of imperfections, it is yet possible to reach immense heights of nobility, value, and truth. And this is what Liberal Judaism considers that the Old Testament has done.

Moreover, the position of an imperfect book, which is preparatory to a perfect book, must be clearly very different from the position of this same book when there is no one perfect book to which it is a preparation. It stands more firmly. It is more independent.

Doubtless, too, there is a certain subjectivity in this matter. Great sentences and sayings in the Old Testament are, for Jews, charged with an emotion and a history and a meaning which they can never possess for the Christian. At the best, the Christian interprets them in their noble, original sense ; he is inclined rather to underestimate than to overestimate their meaning. But the Jew (and, in virtue of a special paradox, of which more will soon be said, the Liberal Jew perhaps even more than the Orthodox Jew) reads into them, or rather draws out of them, all the richer and fuller signification which the words bear for him, and for his present, developed, modern Judaism. Precisely similar is the procedure with Jew and Christian as

regards the New Testament. The unprejudiced Jew admires diverse noble sayings and teachings in the New Testament ungrudgingly. He may even (as we shall see) hold that some of them develop certain doctrines of the Old Testament. But he interprets them strictly in their original sense. To the Christian they are charged with all that emotion, history, and meaning which the words of the Old Testament have for the Jew. He reads into them, or draws out of them, what they mean for him to-day. The Jew has got his present developed religious conceptions mainly from the Old Testament. The Christian has got his mainly from the New Testament. And even if there be a considerable measure of agreement between their present religious conceptions (more agreement than either would be disposed to allow), the main source is, nevertheless, not the same for the one as for the other.

It is often said that Rabbinic Judaism was not without a certain feeling or premonition of the conception of development. In Liberal Judaism this feeling or premonition has become fully conscious. The implicit is made explicit, and the principle of development is more thoroughly and widely applied. If there be some principle of development at work in Rabbinic Judaism, then Liberal Judaism may be considered as the offspring of Rabbinic Judaism. It is, at any rate, much more akin and sympathetic to Rabbinic Judaism than it is to Karaite Judaism. But clearly, if the principle of development be admitted, then the Old Testament cannot be perfect. Rabbinic Judaism, which lays down the dogma of this perfection for the Old Testament, or even for a part of it, is then really inconsistent with itself. For even if the work of

Rabbinic Judaism was only to draw out, yet the undrawn-out is incomplete, and if incomplete, imperfect. Perhaps, however, a resuscitated Rabbi might reply that what had to be drawn out was law, not doctrine. Doctrinally, religiously, and morally, the Old Testament *was* perfect, and in this respect there is no conflict between the Karaite and the Talmudist.

However this may be, and whether Liberal Judaism may regard itself as, in any way, the heir of Rabbinism or not, there is a real sense in which the paradox above alluded to seems true. When we are not hampered by having to accept everything in the Old Testament as good, or equally good, we seem able to exalt what we do put into the first class in a special and peculiar way. The first class is all the greater, because there is a second and a third; it is all the greater because there are some absolute failures !

And when we recognise degrees, we become so delightfully free. We can collect the good and the great and the fruitful, and we can make our own system of it ; we need not pretend that it is the system of the Old Testament itself. We can sift and combine at our pleasure. We can lay stress upon a casual utterance, and place it in the highest rank. We can make it central, and pour into it without hesitation whatever emotion we please. We can draw out of it whatever fulness of meaning it has come, either slowly or suddenly, to possess. Our religious purpose in doing all this is quite distinct from exegesis. And because we emphasise the distinctions, we are able to draw developed senses out of immature terms. We are in no way tied down to the original meaning or to the meaning

at any one stage of its development. Yet are we not in conflict with exegesis. For we are not playing the exegete at all. We have not to contend that our fuller meaning, or any fuller meaning, was in truth the original signification. And yet, if, as in a great poem, certain words mean more to us than they meant to their author, it is, nevertheless, the words which have not merely suggested the meaning, but which have actually caused it. The consummation (that is, the relative consummation, the consummation for us to-day) was, in a sense, contained in the beginning; we have only enlarged and developed a greatness which the words of the Old Testament both started and contained.

Studying the Old Testament from this free, liberal, religious point of view, it is wonderful how much we can find in it. Once more the paradox suggests itself whether we cannot, and do not, find more in it than can be found by Orthodoxy. For we seem to pass from a cruder acceptance to a more sifted and more religious acceptance; or we pass, perchance, after a season of doubt and negation and difficulty and pain, to a higher and deeper acceptance, a more profound valuation, a more exalted appreciation and love.

Take the Old Testament for all in all, we still do not look upon its like in any other book, just as we still find that it starts and helps us, and often takes us far, in all, or in almost all, of our religious needs.

Yet, once more, the Old Testament is imperfect. And this small book has been written because of those two ideas, and with those two ideas in mind: the greatness of the Old Testament; the imperfection of the Old Testament. Or, perhaps, to use another and, in some respects, more fitting word:

the greatness of the Old Testament and the incompleteness of the Old Testament.

I want to bring prominently forward what religious value the Hebrew Bible contains for us at the present time ; what we may find in it ; what we may draw out of it. And then I also want to show where it is incomplete. Furthermore, I should like to consider how far we, and by "we" I mean Liberal Jews of to-day, may find developments and supplements of religious value for *us* in at least three directions outside and beyond the Old Testament: first, the New Testament ; secondly, the Rabbinic literature ; and thirdly, the Hellenistic writings. My book, at the best, will be inadequate and incomplete, for not only is greater first-hand knowledge needed than I possess, but also the chosen limits are arbitrary. The right thing would be to show what are the new, supplementary or complementary Jewish religious contributions, not only to the close of the Talmudic era, but right up to the present time. This larger work must, however, be left for others.

I have spoken of drawing out to the full all that, for us, an Old Testament passage may be found to contain. But such a procedure must be conducted with tact and caution. We are not to read into Old Testament utterances what is certainly not to be found in them, or even what is actually opposed or contrary to their meaning. Nor must we attempt to bring up all Old Testament teaching to the level of the highest and the best. Though our aim is not exegetical, we must not violate exegesis. We must not try to make the Old Testament speak with a single voice, or ignore its inconsistencies, its varieties of grade, its gaps, its ragged edges. If it were not for the existence of these, this book would and could

not have been undertaken ; our inquiry would be still-born. It will be part of our duty to point out these gaps and ragged edges, and to ask how far they have been filled and smoothed by the New Testament and by Rabbinic literature, or how far they still, perchance, need filling and smoothing. Again, a casual or secondary idea of Prophet, Psalmist, or Sage may be central for us, and if so, we have to ask how far it had become already of greater importance and frequency, or how far it had already been elaborated and drawn out, by the Rabbinic or New Testament teachers.

It by no means follows from such a method of treatment that he who uses it considers either the Rabbinic literature or the New Testament to be greater than the Old Testament ; still less, as I have already indicated, that the Old Testament is "preparation," the New Testament "fulfilment." For though, in this doctrine or in that, the New Testament or the Rabbinic literature may show a development over the Old Testament, the religious value or originality of the Old Testament as a whole may well be greater than that of the other two. And, again, while there are imperfections in the Old Testament, there are other imperfections in the New Testament and in Rabbinic literature, while the very fact that Liberal Judaism finds different developments (as well as retrogressions) in both, proves that for us there can be no question of preparation, on the one hand, or of fulfilment, on the other. From our point of view, just as there is no completion and no perfection, so is there also, and can there be, no fulfilment.

We have to take separate doctrines, separate conceptions. Doctrine A, conception B may be as

fine, as pure, as highly developed, as central, in the Old Testament as in the New, or as in Rabbinic literature, or not only as fine and as pure, but finer, purer. Doctrine C, conception D, on the other hand, may be more or better worked out either in the New Testament, or in Rabbinic literature, or in both. There is, indeed, notoriously, no Old Testament religion as a whole. Nor is it even possible to say that there is throughout an upward chronological development. Each doctrine, each conception, does not move forward, expand, and deepen from, say, 900 to 150 B.C. We cannot say, here, at the earliest date, it is at its crudest; here, at the latest date, it is at its best. A doctrine may even go forward in some respects and go back in others. It may develop, but in its very development it may also acquire fresh imperfections. And as there is no religion of the Old Testament as a whole at any period, so is there, at every period, variety. There is, very roughly, the religion of Prophets, Psalmists, Sages; more accurately, there is the religious teaching of this particular Prophet, or of that particular "wisdom" book, and the religion of the latter may, likely enough, be lacking in unity and consistency. The ragged edges, again, of one writer are not the same as the ragged edges of another. A prophet's ragged edges may not be the same as the ragged edges of a sage; but yet the former's ragged edges may represent the defects of his quality, the smoothness of the latter the quality of his defect. All these various considerations must, at any rate, be at the back of our minds in conducting our inquiry.

The Old Testament is a common basis both for New Testament and for Rabbinic literature. In both of these there is (as we believe) some real

development as well as some real retrogression—retrogression, that is, from the Old Testament at its highest, its purest, and its best. The development appears to be of two different kinds. We shall find some common advance in certain religious conceptions both in the New Testament and in Rabbinic literature, though even in such cases the accent and the manner will probably be different. Hence, both may be of value. In other matters the advance may be limited to the New Testament, or limited to Rabbinic literature. So, here too, we may profit from both. And sometimes, when there is no real advance, there may be fresh, happy, vivid restatement, reformulation, which can only be neglected at our religious loss.

The inquiry as a whole has mainly an historic interest. But not exclusively. It is surely good to know where we stand, what religious treasures we do or could possess, and to whom we really and truly owe them. We may also observe what development we have made since the era of the books and the literatures which we are to deal with, and, perhaps, too, more dimly, the sort of development which we have yet to aspire to or to undertake.

SECTION II

THE CONCEPTION OF GOD IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

It may be pertinently asked: Is not the very title of this section an absurdity? For has it not been emphatically stated that the Old Testament is not homogeneous; that there is no *one* coherent religious doctrine to be found in it? At the best the title

should run: The conceptions of God in the Old Testament ; the plural has a truth, the singular has none. The criticism would be valid if my purpose were exegetical ; if I sought to set forth all the statements and views about the Divine Being which the Old Testament contains. These statements and views can never be collected together, and then presented as a coherent and harmonious whole. They spring from many ages ; they are various in nature and in value. They are inconsistent with each other.

But what we have now to ask is not: What are the different doctrines and ideas about God which we can find within the length and breadth of the Hebrew Bible, but what is the outcome, what is the achievement, which is of value for us to-day ? It is true that we shall have to notice ragged edges and inconsistencies, but we may, nevertheless, also put before ourselves a more or less harmonious conception of God by piecing together various Old Testament teachings and utterances, by dropping what is no longer of value for us, and by combining and uniting what is.

Yet even when we do this, when we range freely among the Old Testament Scriptures, picking and choosing and combining at our own sweet will and pleasure, we can get nothing like a rounded or complete, still less a philosophic conception of the divine nature. But does religion need such a conception ? Have the greatest religious teachers ever attempted or desired it ? On the other hand, though a good deal can still be added, we can obtain a conception adequate even for our developed religious requirements to-day. The New Testament may add this, the Rabbinic literature may add

that, but the fundamental features of our *religious* conception of God to-day seem to rest securely upon an Old Testament basis, and, indeed, to be mainly made up of Old Testament constituents.

It has to be remembered that the writers of the Hebrew Bible are rarely, if ever, concerned to set forth at length their full and definite conceptions of the divine nature. Systematic statements on this subject form no part of their message. In the case of the prophets, for instance, it has been not untruly said by Mr. Binns: "Whilst it may be confidently asserted that the conception of the character of Jehovah which each prophet held was the basis of his teaching, yet, paradoxical as it may sound, what that conception was in each case can only be gathered from incidental allusions. The mark of the pre-exilic Hebrew writings was *life* rather than thought; the writers had known Jehovah and felt His influence in their souls; they had not yet been able to find for such knowledge a systematic and ordered expression, nay, they had hardly felt the need for it. Life comes before thought in the spiritual, as in the natural world, and experience must ever be the forerunner of reflection; as Aubrey Moore has well put it, 'Religion in its earliest stages is instinctive, not reasoned.'"¹ It was not so very different, except in one or two cases, even after the exile. Moreover, what Aubrey Moore said does not go far enough. It is not merely that religion in its earliest stages is instinctive, not reasoned. It is that religion, even in its highest stages, is always very

¹ Binns (L. Elliot), *The Book of the Prophet Jeremiah*, pp. 44, 45. Cp. the quotation from Dr. Temple: "It is possible that the man who has the most vital communion with God will be least able to make a scientific theory of that experience. I suppose that Shakespeare knew very much less about the method on which he constructed his plays than either Coleridge or Professor Bradley."

different from theology. The Psalmist, in his moments of loftiest and most spiritual rapture, does not argue about God ; he feels Him, and he expresses that feeling in such metaphors and images as were familiar to him, or as were suggested to him by the nature of his experience. He does not attempt, for he has no need, to set forth in articulate sentences, the full nature, as he can conceive it, of the God whom he feels and loves. But we, nevertheless, might occasionally like to add the philosopher, or even the essayist, to the poet and the mystic and the seer.

That there is one God, and that there are not many gods, not even many subordinate gods with a single captain or chief, is for us an obvious commonplace. Yet we know that this obvious commonplace was not reached without spiritual travail, prolonged conflict, painful experience. Hence, much of the Old Testament is taken up by teachings which have for us to-day an historic interest only. We need no denunciations against idolatry ; we need no assertions that Yahweh is the only God. For us that ancient name, survival of a time when the Israelites, like their neighbours, were ready or obliged to give a name to their God so as to distinguish Him from other gods, no less existent, if less powerful, conveys no longer any meaning ; it is no longer even surrounded with mystery ; it no longer stimulates awe. We have risen above Yahweh to God. It was a fortunate superstition that made the Jews give up using the word in speech or prayer, and substitute for it the colourless term Adonai, the Lord. And yet it was round Yahweh, and not around Elohim or God, that the noblest and highest conceptions of the divine nature

clustered and grew. And later on, in the Rabbinic literature, it was Yahweh, and not Elohim, who seemed to conjure up, and almost even to produce, the best and most gracious aspects of divinity. It is curious that an inadequate, and even discardable, medium may be the trailing stick up which will grow most precious and abiding truths.

We have not to trace the process and efflorescence of Old Testament monotheism. It is sufficient for our purpose to note that the movement did not cease till it was complete. The author of Isaiah xl.-lv. was no less a monotheist than ourselves, and our monotheism derives directly from his. And his words, with their parallels elsewhere, are enough for us even to-day. "Is there a God beside Me? Yea, there is no Rock; I know not any." "I am the first and I am the last; and beside Me there is no God." "The Lord He is God; there is none else beside Him." That is emphatic, definite, clear. No more is needed. It suffices.

What is the nature of this one God? To the Jew the first thing that comes into his mind and even into his heart to say about Him is that He, the only God, is One. The divine unity means much to every Jew. If ever a dogma could be charged with emotion, this dogma of God's unity is so charged to the Jew. For all the long martyrdom of his brotherhood seems connected with it. And the unity signifies, I think, much more to us than a mere metaphysical assertion. Its religious value for us, I take it, is not that God is one in some mysterious, ontological, or philosophic sense, but that He is ethically one. His *character* or being is harmonious. We with our human needs split up that character or being into attributes or qualities;

we speak of His justice, His mercy, His righteousness, His love. But the unity of God makes us believe that all these qualities are essentially one. There is no opposition between justice and mercy, between righteousness and love. The whole harmonious divine being of God is operative in all His actions. Something like this is the main religious signification *to us to-day* of the dogma of the divine unity.

It is, however, interesting to remember that in the Old Testament itself this divine unity is rarely, if ever, alluded to. One God ; yes. But that this One God is One was a further refinement of thought, for which in the Old Testament period men's minds were not prepared, to which they did not rise, or for which they had no need. And yet how strange such an assertion sounds when the very phrase in which, to the Jew, the dogma of the divine unity is for ever expressed and enshrined is taken from the Pentateuch. "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One." How definite ! How emphatic ! How precise ! And, indeed, this is one of the cases in which the fuller and newer meaning has ousted the older and original meaning, if that older and original meaning can ever be recovered and ascertained. Here is one of the cases, here is the greatest of the cases, in which we have drawn out (and, it must probably be admitted, put in) a vast quantity of fresh signification, of which the Hebrew text is innocent. Still, if we realise what we are doing, if we do it consciously and deliberately, our procedure is fully justified. It is almost as if Providence itself had directed the very framing of the words so that they might lend themselves to the needs of every age, and that they might

be capable of being enlarged and developed, so that they might be adequate for the child and the adult, for the simpleton and the sage, for the plain man and the mystic, for poet and saint, for martyr and seer. It is almost as if Providence itself had dictated the motto for all Jewish history, for every Jewish heart; as if Providence itself had given the inscription for the flag of the brotherhood, had suggested the device for the banner of the witnesses throughout the roll-call of the ages. Nevertheless, it is quite doubtful whether the original meaning of the verse has any reference to the *unity* of God; its meaning may be merely: "Hear, O Israel, Yahweh is our God, Yahweh only."¹ Or if unity is referred to at all, it is rather in contradiction to the many manifestations of the Baalim. "Hear, O Israel, Yahweh, our God, is one Yahweh." There are not many local Yahwehs; there is only one Yahweh. Any reference to the unity of the divine nature itself was probably outside the original author's intention and beyond the range of his thought. It is therefore the fact that for more explicit teaching about the divine unity we must go outside the limits of the Hebrew Bible.

What is the next feature or aspect of the divine nature on which we are accustomed to lay stress? I suppose it would be the spirituality of God. But it is doubtful what an average, or even deeply religious Jew, whether orthodox or liberal, really understands by this term. Negatively he covers by it, I presume, the statement in the Third Article

¹ For the unusual force of the word "Echad" (one), if this be the meaning, cp. 1 Chronicles xxix. 1. Ibn Ezra adopts this interpretation. Zechariah xiv. 9 only refers to Yahweh and his name becoming one in the Messianic future by virtue of all nations acknowledging his sole divinity, and paying to him exclusive worship.

of Maimonides' creed : God is "not a body, and is free from all the accidents of matter, and He has no form whatever." We should all, I imagine, agree with this proposition ; indeed, it is, at the present time, a mere commonplace for every one, whether Jew or Christian.

It is not within our purpose to trace the growth of, or the approaches to, the statement in the Old Testament Scriptures. It is an interesting history. For many generations the common belief clearly was that Yahweh *had* a body and a shape : and this shape was probably conceived as very similar to—only larger and grander than—man's. Traces of this belief, ending up with mere metaphor, are scattered throughout the Hebrew Bible. It is needless to bring them together. They are incontestable. The famous revelation in Exodus xxxiv., constantly revised and re-edited, had originally no metaphorical sense. To the original story-teller, God's hand, His back parts, His face, which no man should see, were all real. The passage from material body to immaterial spirit lay largely in the prohibition of idol-making or idol-worship. If Yahweh was not to be worshipped under any material image or form, the thought gradually spread and grew that He *had* no such form. The writer of Deuteronomy iv. is at pains to point out that the Israelites at the foot of Sinai heard the actual voice of God, but that they saw no "form." It would be very interesting to know what the spiritually minded Isaiah, or Micaiah, really meant when they tell us that in vision they "saw" Yahweh upon His throne. We may conclude that to Micaiah and Isaiah it was a much less real "seeing" than to the writer of Exodus xxxiv. or of the story of Moses,

Aaron, Nadab, Abihu, and the seventy elders. We may believe this all the more in the case of Isaiah, because it is from him that we get the significant utterance: "The Egyptians are men, and not God, and their horses flesh, and not spirit." In this passage it is clearly implied that the essence of the divine nature is spirit, as opposed to flesh, which comes near to, though it is not identical with, spirit as opposed to matter.

What do we mean to-day when we repeat the solemn statement of the Fourth Gospel, and say, "God is spirit" (*πνεῦμα ὁ θεός*). I presume that ordinary people mean that, in some mysterious and to us incomprehensible sense, God is (*a*) wholly immaterial and yet real, (*b*) not localised in or confined to a particular spot, and yet self-conscious. That is, we combine the doctrine of the divine spirituality with the (religiously more valuable) doctrine of the divine omnipresence.

Whether any Old Testament writer believed in the absolute immateriality of God is difficult to say and doubtful. "Spirit" did not necessarily imply to them or to early Christian writers complete immateriality. "Some of the early Christian Fathers, such as Tertullian, fancied that God possessed a form; yet they denied it to be material."¹ Dr. Kohler says not unreasonably: "A conception of pure spirit is very difficult to attain, even in regard to God. The thought of His omnipresence is usually interpreted by imagining some ethereal substance which expands infinitely, as Ibn Ezra and Saadia were inclined to do, or by picturing Him as a sort of all-encompassing Space, in accordance with the Rabbis." "The New Testament writers," he

¹ Davidson, *Theology of the Old Testament*, p. 83.

adds (always glad, I fear, to give a little poke to these), "and the Church Fathers likewise spoke of God as Spirit, but really had in mind, for the most part, an ethereal substance, resembling light, pervading cosmic space."¹ It was this ethereal substance which, I imagine, many Old Testament writers believed to be one aspect of the divine glory. The divine light was not a pure metaphor.

Though the doctrine of the *absolute* immateriality of God hardly rests upon any Old Testament basis, that is not the case as regards His omnipresence. It is a remarkable achievement which we may fitly notice here, and the steps of the development would, if this were the fitting occasion, be very interesting to trace. We have Old Testament passages in which the primitive conception is expressed that God's knowledge as well as His presence are distinctly localised and limited. It may be that the omnipresence idea was helped by two more or less contradictory opinions, which gradually became general and dominant. God "dwelt" in the Temple at Jerusalem; God "dwelt" in heaven. If He "dwelt" in both places at once, was it not, perhaps, because He dwelt everywhere? Perhaps, too, a third cause for the result was the tendency to magnify everything which had relation to God. If He were in more places than one, the mind of the worshipper was inclined to increase the number of places to infinity. However this may be, the final fact is assured. The doctrine of the divine ubiquity is magnificently taught in the Old Testament, and modern faith need not go elsewhere for definite pronouncements. The point of the doctrine is, moreover, always what we too require. The omni-

¹ *Jewish Theology*, p. 97.

presence is not declared as a mere metaphysical or theological principle ; it is a *religious* principle in close connection with the needs of the religious life. Jeremiah, perhaps, has the earliest statement. "Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off ? Can any hide himself in secret that I shall not see him ? Do I not fill heaven and earth ?" Most important and highly valuable is the saying put by a later writer into the mouth of Solomon at the dedication of the Temple, a saying all the more significant and interesting when it is remembered that the same chapter states again and again that God's dwelling-place is heaven (only God's name being "in" the Temple), while Solomon is yet also made to declare, "I have built Thee a house to dwell in, a settled place for Thee to abide in for ever." This is the saying: "Will God indeed dwell on the earth ? Behold the heaven and heaven of heavens cannot contain Thee ; how much less this house which I have built !" We may compare with this noble utterance the more prosaic repetition in Chronicles: "Who is able to build Him a house, seeing the heaven and heaven of heavens cannot contain Him ? Who am I, then, that I should build Him a house, *save only to burn sacrifices before Him ?*" (As much as if we should say: A synagogue is only the house of God in the sense that in it we worship Him.) It is in dispute whether the opening verse of the last chapter in Isaiah indicates some antagonism to any material temple. "The heaven is My throne, and the earth is My footstool: what manner of house will ye build unto Me ? And what manner of place for My rest." In the Psalms the divine glory is revealed by the heavens, God's handiwork, but it reaches beyond the heavens.

“His glory is above the heavens.” He dwells so high that He has to look down low to behold what passes in the heavens and on the earth. The culmination of such thoughts (which include the divine nearness — “the Lord is nigh to all who call upon Him” ; “the Lord is at my right hand”—as well as the divine remoteness) is the famous 139th Psalm, which unites together omniscience with omnipresence. “Whither shall I go from Thy spirit? Or whither shall I flee from Thy face? (Here “face” is a pure metaphor: one may also translate the Hebrew by “presence.”) If I were to ascend up into heaven, Thou art there: if I were to make Hades my bed, Thou art there. If I were to take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost sea, even there would Thy hand lead me and Thy right hand would hold me.” We hardly need more than this from any later source, and we can hardly obtain it.

The all-knowledge of Deity is often combined in the Old Testament with His all-power. Divine Omnipotence is not for us either as obvious or as satisfactory a doctrine as it was for the best Old Testament teachers. For us it suggests more difficulties than for them. But I cannot dwell upon it further in this place.

Modern and Liberal Judaism is hardly concerned to maintain any particular doctrine as regards the relation of God to nature—to the universe as distinguished, and as apart, from man. At one time in the history of Judaism the conception of God as Creator seemed peculiarly important, and this conception included the doctrine that while God was eternal in both directions, the universe had a definite beginning in time. Therefore for an infinite period

backward God was, and was alone. Alone perhaps He would be when His creation ended. "The heavens are the work of Thy hands. They shall perish, but Thou shalt endure : yea, all of them shall wax old as a garment, but Thou art the same, and Thy years shall have no end." The religious and metaphysical difficulties of such a conception were not fully realised any more than they would be realised by a simple believer to-day. At the present time, and for more reflective minds, the conception is hardly tenable ; but none the less do we believe in God as the sustainer of the world, as its controller, even as its creator in the sense of being the spiritual power behind phenomena, as the source of its immanent life, its order and its law. And it is this sense of creatorship which we partly find in, and partly, I suppose, add on to, the various Biblical statements as to the relation of God to the world. We interpret the Biblical doctrine of creation in some such semi-philosophical fashion. And we also, I think, interpret it to mean the still valid and valuable doctrine that God is not one with the universe, that He is not even merely its unconscious and immanent purpose, but that if in the world, He is also above and beyond and other than the world, as its reason, its soul, and its sustainer. Far removed is the Old Testament, far removed are New Testament and Rabbinic literature from pantheism. Far removed, too, is modern Judaism. It would boldly clasp the difficulties of a modified dualism rather than abate its conviction that God is other than the world, just as, in another sense, He is other than man.

God as creator in the old simple sense of the word, God as eternal, backward as well as forward,

and therefore prior to the world, is magnificently portrayed in Isaiah xl.-lv. and in Job, while the power and effect of His creative word are described with dignified simplicity in the opening chapter of Genesis. The starry host of heaven are worthy of the One God's will and power. "Lift up your eyes on high, and behold: who has created these?" "I am the first and I am the last: mine hand laid the foundation of the earth: My right hand spanned the heavens." "I form the light and create darkness: I make peace and create calamity: I am Yahweh that do all these things." Both in the physical and in the moral sphere the difficulties of creation are as yet unrealised.

More important for us than the sheer creative fiat is God's *purpose* in His creation and His constant sustainment of it. If the universe exists to proclaim and be filled with His glory, we may interpret this to mean that it has a moral and rational purpose: it is a real cosmos, not a chance collection of odds and ends. So far as earth is concerned, which to the Old Testament (as to the New Testament) writers, with their very limited knowledge, occupied a much grander and more central position in the universe than this one small planet out of perhaps countless millions occupies for us, it was formed to be the seat of man, who himself was formed to be the conscious worshipper of God. "He made it not for a waste, but formed it to be inhabited." Nature is the sign manual of the divine wisdom, and all that in nature is instinct with life has received, and can only maintain, that life through the will and the grace of God. "Thou sendest forth Thy spirit: they are created; Thou renewest the face of the earth." The divine wisdom is as eternal as its Possessor.

Before creation it was ; and in creation it was alert and active, rejoicing in its work, which was God's work, and especially in its culmination, man. We may no longer be able to use all these conceptions in a literal sense ; but they were themselves the product of poets, and were intended from the first to be more or less spiritually and poetically interpreted. It is doubtful how far the Psalmist really thought that God covers Himself with light as with a garment, and it is tolerably certain that he did not believe that He really makes the clouds His chariots, and that He walks upon the wings of the wind. But what he did mean was that God was intensely alive, and that all nature is instinct with His wisdom, His power, and His will. In some real and vital sense He is *in* the world as well as beyond the world. He is at once near and far ; the soul and spirit of the universe ; its constant source and sustainment ; immanent, but also transcendent. Such ideas, however we may philosophically justify, co-ordinate, and expound them, are ideas of Judaism (whether Liberal or Orthodox) to-day, and for their religious expression we may go first and foremost to the Old Testament, even though we can gather valuable gleanings elsewhere.

We have seen that while the drift of Old Testament thinking was to the effect that God's nature or essence was spirit as opposed to "flesh," perhaps, too, as opposed to matter, for the actual pronouncement that "God is spirit" we have to wait for the Hellenistic Fourth Gospel. On the other hand, the Old Testament has a good deal to say about the Divine Spirit—the Spirit of Yahweh, the Spirit of God—which in three famous passages, and in three only, is called the Holy Spirit. As its

etymology implies (for Ruach in Hebrew means wind or breath), the Spirit of Yahweh had originally a material signification. It was the divine breath or afflatus, which could, and did, pass out from God, and enter into man and beast. Even in the 104th Psalm it is this divine spirit which constitutes the vital principle, not only of men but also of the animals. More especially and prevailingly, however, the divine spirit is thought of as the source of special gifts,—high courage, artistic skill, intellectual wisdom, prophetic inspiration, moral goodness, the realisation of the divine presence. How far in any of these cases there was any idea of a *physical* intermingling of the divine spirit with the human spirit, of a physical entry of the divine into the human, it is impossible, I take it, to say. But I should imagine that in most of the later passages, at any rate, any physical reference or implication had ceased. The divine spirit becomes a means of expressing the divine activity—God in relation to the world. “The term expresses the fulness of vital power, and all the activities of vital energy, whether, as we might say, emotional, or intellectual, or moral—whether temporary or permanent.”¹

In this somewhat loose manner of speech the usage of the Old Testament and its thought are not merely the source of, but closely akin to, our own usage and thought to-day. For by our employment of the conception of the Holy or Divine Spirit in relation to the world and to man we intend to signify first that life itself is a gift from God, but more especially that reason and goodness and the capacity for religion are derived from Him. And, secondly,

¹ Davidson, *op. cit.* p. 119.

we signify by our usage of the term that there is a kinship between our reason and our spirit and God's reason and God's spirit. And, thirdly, we signify by it that, over and above this general kinship, there can be a special and extra influence from God upon our minds and souls. We can be helped and "inspired" by God. All these three lines of usage derive directly from the Hebrew Bible.

But as Professor Davidson, I think correctly, states, "the spirit of God is not an influence exerted by God at a point from which He is Himself distant. God is always present in the spirit of God. The spirit of God is God actually present and in operation."¹ When the prophet Haggai states: "My spirit remains among you," he means no less and no more than when Zechariah says: "I will dwell in the midst of thee, O daughter of Zion." A less important part is played in the Old Testament by God's word, but it, too, is only an aspect of God, a way of expressing or looking at the divine activity. Distinguished from, and yet closely associated with God is Wisdom in the famous eighth chapter of Proverbs. But here the personification of Wisdom appears to be consciously imaginary. The writer did not believe, and did not intend his readers to believe, that there really had existed from of old, or that there still existed, a separate semi-divine power or spirit or being called Wisdom. Wisdom is a divine attribute, an aspect of the divine nature, which the writer does not mean us to regard as distinct from God. Nor in spite of verse twenty-two was there ever a time when God was and Wisdom was not. Nevertheless, the daring and poetic personification was not without its subsequent effects,

¹ Davidson, *op. cit.* p. 127.

as the history of Hellenistic and Christian theology can show.

The conception of the divine spirit or the divine word in the Old Testament, and the use made of those conceptions and terms, cause no infraction of the monotheistic idea or of the divine unity. In that respect, too, conception and usage are on a level with our own. Into the hidden mysteries of the divine nature as it really and fully is, into the inner recesses of God's being, the conceptions of the Spirit or of the Word do not enable us to enter. We do not, as Judaism holds, see further into the divine nature, or know more of it, by the use of those terms than if we limited ourselves to the simple vocable God. Hence it is that what to Christian theologians appears as an immaturity or as a "preparation" seems to us a distinction and an advantage. Indefiniteness is safe. Hard and fast distinctions are dangerous.

Judaism does not venture to deal more closely with the nature of God. It does not venture to say that there must be a society within the divine unity. It does not venture to say that a "bare" unity must leave God lonely, or that apart from, and prior to God's relations to the world, there must be, even within the depths of the divine nature itself, the possibility of Love. It does not venture to say how many are the "aspects" of Godhead, or the "*hypostaseis*" of Deity, whether three million or three. I am well aware that in the purest and most philosophic presentation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, no infraction of the divine unity is intended. Nor does it follow that because the doctrine has been, and even is, in frequent danger of degenerating into Tritheism, or has often so degenerated, it is, there-

fore, not true. The subtlety and difficulty of a doctrine are no argument against its truth, especially when the subject of it is God. Judaism, however, remains content with the unqualified doctrine of the Unity. Nor is that unity "bare" or "abstract" to those that cherish it. It did not prevent the rapture of the Psalmist; it has not prevented the glad realisation of God's nearness and His presence in generation after generation of Jewish believers, or the full consciousness of His love. We, too, can speak of the richness of His nature. We, too, from *our* conception of Him, as the great apostle from *his* conception of Him, could repeat those noble words: ὦ βάθος πλούτου καὶ σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως θεοῦ. "Oh the depth of the richness and the wisdom and the knowledge of God."

Judaism seems now to teach a double doctrine, which forms an apparent contradiction only. God can be known; God cannot be known. God is like man; God is unlike man. Both these pairs of statements run up to Old Testament origins, though the second limb of each pair is naturally far less frequent than the first. We, too, should say with Zophar, "Canst thou find out the depths of God; canst thou reach the limits of the Almighty? Higher than heaven, what canst thou do? Deeper than Sheol, what canst thou know?" We, too, might say with Job, "Lo, He goes by me, and I see Him not; He passes on, and I perceive Him not." Or with the Sage: "Who has ascended up into heaven and then descended? What is His name, and what is His son's name, if thou canst tell?" God's thoughts are not man's thoughts, nor God's ways man's ways. Nevertheless, however much we may believe, and however we do well to

remember, that God is not like man (and not only in that He does not need to repent), it is still more essential to theistic religions and to Judaism to hold that He *is* like man, and that there is such a thing as the knowledge of God.¹

In what is God like man? Judaism, I fancy, would still in the first place, answer in that He is not less than self-conscious, in that He possesses not less than, though much more than, all that is best and most precious in personality. There is no hesitation about all this in the Old Testament writers and teachers. They indeed were, on the whole, unaware of the difficulties which such assertions involve, and they carry the likeness between man and God further than we can accompany them. Yet the likeness of God to man is even for them essentially limited to two main points: first, the divine wisdom; secondly, the divine goodness. The self-consciousness and the personality are but implications from these. And does not the doctrine that God is spirit involve something to the same effect? For spirit, in its highest form, is not merely life, but conscious life, and not merely conscious life, but what we know as reason. And the divine reason cannot for us be dissociated from goodness and love. A Supreme Mind is the essence of the highest Old Testament doctrine about God, and a Supreme Mind is the essence of our Jewish belief about God to-day. A supreme mind is, indeed, the essence of theism — “a supreme mind upon whom nature and finite minds depend. The term ‘mind,’ thus used, does not imply an exact similarity

¹ Contrast 1 Sam. xv. 29, God is “not a man that he should repent,” with Jonah iv. 2, “Thou repentest thee of the evil.” The latter is a more religious truth than the former.

with mind as we are aware of it in our own life; but it does indicate that intelligence, will, and goodness are a less inadequate expression for that which we wish to name than any other expression."¹

It is, naturally enough, not God as He is in relation to Himself, but God as He is in relation to man, whom the Old Testament teachers believe to have revealed Himself unto them and unto Israel; it is this God whom they think that men can know and ought to know; it is this God with whom they have communed, and who in communion has (as they believe) made Himself known to them. Supplementary to God in His relationship to man and to Israel is God in His relationship to nature. These two fundamental relationships reveal that God is good, that God is wise, and that God is mighty. They reveal even more; that He is perfect in righteousness, perfect in knowledge, perfect in power. God's power we may, perhaps, conceive otherwise than the Old Testament teachers, but as regards the other two fundamental points we stand where they stand, and we believe what they believed. To us, too, God is perfect in knowledge and in goodness. He is the Supreme Mind, and the Supreme Mind must be supremely good. There is, we hold, an inseparable connection between goodness and reason.

The divine revelation to Moses upon Mount Sinai as revealed in the 33rd and 34th chapters of Exodus has, we may justly believe, been worked over and re-edited again and again. Two, even three, separate stories may have been welded together. Note that in xxxiii. 13 Moses asks to be shown God's "ways." (In verses 15 and 16 his request is rather that God Himself may accompany

¹ Sorley (W. R.), *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 383.

the people in their journeyings.) In verse 18 he asks to be shown God's glory. In reply God declares that He will make all His "goodness" pass before him, while in the next four verses we get the famous reference to the divine face and back, which looks more like the original answer to the request for the revelation of the divine glory, which itself may be a softening down of a demand to see God's veritable form and countenance. In the next chapter, however, the face and the back, and the cleft of the rock, and the covering with the hand, are all ignored. God does, indeed, descend in the cloud, and stands near or with His prophet, but He does not cover him with His hand, He does not "pass by," He does not show His back. But He does something infinitely more valuable and lasting. He proclaims His name, and with this proclaiming of the name, or as involved in it, He reveals His nature, or that part of His nature which alone it is permitted for man to know. And what is it that He says? "Yahweh, Yahweh: merciful and gracious God, long-suffering and abundant in loving-kindness and truth, keeping loving-kindness unto thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin." These words are fundamental in Judaism, and of gigantic influence and importance. Over and over again, with slight variations and additions, are they quoted or repeated in the Old Testament writings. They are more important than the solemn words which follow, and certainly (as it may safely be averred) much more important than the second half of those words, which, as is also one portion of the earlier statement, are borrowed from the Second Commandment: "That will by no means absolve the guilty; visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the

children, and upon the children's children, unto the third and fourth generation."

"Yahweh, Yahweh! Merciful and gracious God, long-suffering and abundant in loving-kindness and truth, keeping loving-kindness unto thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin, but that will by no means absolve the guilty." Here, if we add perfect in wisdom and knowledge, is the essence of the divine nature, so far as man can grasp it, and here, it might be said is, in one sense, the essence of Judaism.¹ Almost every word is of import and is significant, and two of the words are peculiar, and very difficult to render into English with due regard to their fulness and precise shade of meaning. These two terms are Chesed and Emet, which have been translated by loving-kindness and truth. There is one other attribute which, with loving-kindness, truth, and pity as well as with wisdom and knowledge goes to make up the list of jewels in the divine carcanet according to Old Testament teaching, and that is Zedakah, which may now be fitly translated by justice and now by righteousness. The spectrum of the divine goodness may be split up into these fundamental colours. But they form a unity and a whole.

It has been customary to speak of the ethical monotheism of the Hebrew Prophets. Yahweh became the only God, not by the way of philosophic reflection, but by the way of morality. The other gods sank into insignificance and unreality, not so much because Yahweh was more powerful than they, but because He was more moral than they, because He had a nobler character. And in His character lay Yahweh's value. We should have no use for

¹ God is said to be "perfect in knowledge" in Job xxxvii. 16.

One God if He were not the God of goodness. The marked personality and individuality of the Old Testament God would even be objectionable, if He were not the God of justice and loving-kindness, of compassion and of truth. We should prefer τὸ θεῖον to ὁ θεός, if it were not that only in a being who is not less than self-conscious or "personal" can we conceive love and righteousness to subsist. We partly ignore and forgive, we partly accept and employ, the anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament teachings about God, for the sake of its fundamental conceptions about His pity, His justice, and His holiness. This ethical monotheism has been the characteristic of Judaism throughout the ages. It may be said to have impressed its stamp upon the theism of the world. The word God stands to-day everywhere for a single Divine Being who, whatever else He may or may not be, is at least exceedingly or perfectly good.

The essence of the divine nature, according to the revelation vouchsafed to Moses in the thirty-fourth chapter of Exodus, resides in His moral character. It may even be noticed that the statement in Exodus xxxiv. 6, 7 says nothing about the divine unity or His omnipotence or His eternity or His immateriality or His wisdom or His omniscience or His ubiquity ; it speaks solely about His moral qualities or attributes : His pity, His graciousness, His justice, His loving-kindness, and His truth. For even this last quality hovers, throughout its Old Testament usage, on the confines of ethical and intellectual virtue. It may more often be more accurately translated by fidelity than by truth. What Yahweh has to tell man about Himself is concerning those aspects of His nature in which

man is more especially concerned. That is true. Still man is also much concerned in God's power, His eternity, His omniscience ; the statement is, however, also silent about these. And, indeed, if He were not loving, just, and true, it would be better for us that He were not powerful, everlasting, and omniscient. But I suppose that something more is involved. It is not merely that for us, and as regards *our* relations with the divine being, the most important thing about Him is His goodness. We feel that whatever else in God may be hidden from our ken and our imagination, yet, nevertheless, this goodness is, indeed, if not the very essence, yet of the very essence of His nature and His being. He is spirit, doubtless ; He is wisdom, assuredly. But above all, He is goodness.

Hence it is that one has to speak of the divine goodness twice over, in two connections, and some repetition seems inevitable. First one has to speak of it in dealing with our conception of the divine nature, with God as in Himself He is. Secondly, one has to speak of it in dealing with God's relations with man, and more especially with Israel.

The Hebrew terms employed in Exodus xxxiv. 6, 7 are all significant and important. It will be noticed that the attribute of justice or righteousness, in Hebrew *Zedakah*, is wanting. But when it is said that God will by no means absolve the guilty, or that He visits the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, this may be regarded as equivalent to justice, as if it had been said that God is *Zadik*. (That, from a later point of view, to visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children would be, not just, but unjust, does not affect the accuracy of the observation.) Yet it is also to be noted that the

meaning of righteousness, or Zedakah, is very far from being exhausted in the conception of retribution or of retributive justice, still less in that of retribution towards the wicked as excluding retribution to the good. According to the use of the word in the Psalms and elsewhere, Zedakah and Zadik are often nearly equivalent to goodness, and often almost synonymous with loving-kindness. In Exodus xxxiv. 6, 7, however, Zedakah and Zadik find no place. But the "justice" of God, as *contrasted* with His pity, or loving-kindness, is implied by what is said of His action towards sinners, or rather towards some sinners, or by part of His action towards sinners. The adjectives and nouns that are directly used about Him are all variants or illustrations of that predominant aspect of His nature which the Johannine theology, and Christianity after it, would call His "love." We are told that God is—

- (1) Compassionate.
- (2) Gracious.
- (3) Long-suffering.
- (4) Rich in loving-kindness.
- (5) Rich in truth or fidelity.
- (6) Forgiving.

Of these the last is only a paraphrase. God "removes" or "takes away" transgression, iniquity, and sin. An adjective or participle "forgiving" is only occasionally found in the Old Testament (*e.g.* Psalm lxxxvi. 5).

All the terms used are of great importance; they are not only very frequent, but have become charged with emotion. They are repeated over and over again in the liturgy. They have stamped themselves upon the Jewish consciousness; they are written on the Jewish heart. The word "God"

immediately sets up the ideas of pity, graciousness, long-suffering, loving-kindness, fidelity (or truth). And as regards these conceptions there is something to be said for the advisability, or, at any rate, for the immense advantage, of the Jew knowing Hebrew. I am not sure that it is much advantage for the Christian to know the Greek original for "love." Does the great word *ἀγάπη* suggest much more than the great word "love"? I am doubtful. But in the case of the terms which we are now considering, the original has, in two instances at least, and perhaps in more, a *nuance* or shade of meaning which cannot be accurately or fitly translated into English, and, in all the instances alike, there is a wealth of historic emotion which it would be a thousand pities to lose, and which can only be associated with, or produced by, the Hebrew originals.

God is Rochum or pitiful. He is Chonun or gracious. He is Erech apayim or long-suffering. He is abundant in Chesed or loving-kindness. He is abundant in Emet or fidelity (or truth). Of these terms the most important, the most comprehensive, and the most untranslatable, is undoubtedly Chesed. It is to be observed that it is twice repeated. For God is said to be abundant in Chesed and to keep Chesed unto thousands. The word is variously translated in the Authorised Version. In our Exodus passage it is in verse 6 rendered by "goodness," in verse 7 by "mercy." In Psalm lxxxix. 33 it is rendered by "loving-kindness." The prevailing translation is "mercy," but that is certainly too narrow. "Loving-kindness" is more accurate, but cumbersome and formal; "kindness" without the "loving" is inadequate and feeble. The most literal equivalent would, on the whole, perhaps, be

benevolence (the German *Güte*, which is benevolent kindness, gracious goodness). But benevolence is too cold, too formal, and too degraded in its association with mere almsgiving. The simplest, and often the most adequate rendering is "love." In any case we observe that in the description of God's character in Exodus xxxiv. 6, 7 the weight is thrown upon what comes first, and is most fully dealt with: God's gracious pity, His loving-kindness and tenderness. It is only as if to prevent misunderstanding, or as if the other side of the divine character, or the other side of goodness itself, were suddenly recalled to the writer, that it is added: "Nevertheless, remember that in spite of His pity and loving-kindness, God will not absolve the guilty: in certain instances He punishes with much severity." Perhaps, however, it is going too far to say that it is as if the other side of goodness itself were remembered. That harmonisation belongs to a later stage of thought. To the Biblical writers God's severity or justice was one aspect of His character; His pity or loving-kindness was another. They did not clearly see that the very doctrine of the divine unity compels us to believe that His justice and His loving-kindness are merely human modes of making distinctions in the oneness of His character, and in the consistency of His deeds. They did not fully realise that love punishes in order to redeem, and that the punished sinner, and not merely the forgiven sinner, is within the orbit of the divine goodness.

But essentially, as it seems to me, the revelation in Exodus xxxiv. 6, 7 with its many parallels, complements, and fillings out in other Old Testament passages, takes us nearly as far as we have yet gone, or as we can go. The root of the matter is achieved.

It is implied, it is even definitely laid down, in Exodus xxxiv. 6, 7, as it is in countless other passages, that the essence of the divine nature is its goodness. There may be something to add to the terminology, some improvement in the words to be used in order to sum up and to imply all that there is to be conveyed. There may also be a good deal to add as to what divine goodness means and includes in its relations towards man, but so far as the fundamental conception itself, the Old Testament teaching and statements appear to be adequate. The essence of the divine nature is goodness, and this goodness is displayed towards man in the virtues of pity, justice, fidelity, and benevolence.

It has been observed that the righteousness of God is less often mentioned in the Old Testament than His mercy and His loving-kindness. The adjective *Rochum*, compassionate, and the substantive *Chesed*, loving-kindness, are more often used about God than the adjective *Zadik* or the substantive *Zedakah*. Yet it has also been noticed that when these latter terms are used, they are by no means limited to the retributive action of God. A Psalm (cxlv.) which became intensely popular—and which may be regarded as a simple exposition of average Jewish theism—uses both adjective and substantive, not in opposition to, but in parallelism with, goodness and benevolence. The author of Isaiah xl.-lv. employs the term in a manner peculiar to himself. God's righteousness is manifested in His providence, or rather in the salvation of Israel, and through Israel, of the world. (It is also manifested, no doubt, in the overthrow of Israel's foes.) As Dr. Davidson says: "The antithesis which in (Christian) dogmatics we are familiar with is a righteous or just

God, and *yet* a Saviour. The Old Testament (and especially the author of Isaiah xl.-lv.) puts it differently—a righteous God, and therefore a Saviour.”¹

In modern times, and in opposition to Christianity, a peculiar stress has been laid by Jewish teachers upon God’s righteousness. Instead of insisting that Chesed is virtually much the same as love, they have taken the line that both for God and man love is a less excellent and all-round virtue than righteousness. Christian theologians commonly aver that the highest thing which can be said about God is that He is Love, and this highest note was, they point out, first sounded in the New Testament. And a tendency exists to depreciate Old Testament doctrine, and to concentrate attention upon the divine justice and awfulness as there taught and displayed, rather than upon the attributes of pity and loving-kindness. Jewish theologians retort not merely by emphasising the pity and loving-kindness passages, as seems both legitimate and accurate, but by a certain depreciation, in their turn, of Christian doctrine for its emphasis on love. They incline to hold that justice and love are fused together in the higher and more inclusive attribute of righteousness. Hence Judaism, in its insistence upon righteousness as the essence of the divine character, and as the supreme virtue for man, teaches a grander doctrine than Christianity.

I do not think that these opinions will permanently hold water or win the day. I doubt whether an Old Testament prophet, or even a Rabbinic doctor of the second century, would have agreed that Zedakah was a higher or more comprehensive virtue in God or man than Chesed. I

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 144.

fancy they would have been more inclined to vote for Chesed than for Zedakah. But perhaps they were wrong? In the latest presentment of Jewish theology by the distinguished American scholar, Dr. Kohler, the author takes up a somewhat halting and undecided opinion. On the one hand, he says of Hosea: "Upon the crown of God's majesty which Amos had beheld all effulgent with justice and righteousness, he placed the most precious gem, reflecting the highest quality of God—His gracious and all-forgiving love." And again he observes that "the Rabbis came to regard *love* as the innermost part of God's being." On the other hand, he declares that "Judaism does not proclaim love, absolute and unrestricted, as the divine principle of life. Love is unworthy of God unless it is guided by justice." Again, "The divine love is an essentially moral attribute of God, and not a metaphysical one. If we wish to speak of a power that permeates the cosmos and turns the wheel of life, it is far more correct to speak of God's creative goodness. . . . Divine love may have pity upon human weakness, but it is divine goodness that inspires and quickens human energy. After all, love cannot be the dominant principle of life. Man cannot love all the time, nor can he love all the world; his sense of justice demands that he hate wickedness and falsehood. We must apply the same criterion to God. But man can and should *do good* and *be good* continually and to all men, even to the most unworthy. Therefore God becomes the pattern and ideal of an all-encompassing goodness, which is never exhausted and never reaches an end."¹

Much of this criticism resolves itself into a

¹ *Jewish Theology*, pp. 115, 129, 130, 132.

question of words, and it is probable that in a non-Christian environment it would never have arisen. There would have been no bias against love. Righteousness, which Dr. Kohler, however, preferring "goodness," does not champion against love, can indeed be made, if a group of men so choose, to include much which most people would not imply by it. I myself have been so taught to see in it the sum of all goodness that the term may convey to me a good deal more than it conveys to average English-speaking persons. To them righteousness is the special quality of the judge, or of the giver of punishment or reward. It does not imply, whether in human nature or in the divine nature, a yearning to save, or to redeem, or to cherish, or to care for, or to tend. It does not include pity. It does not include any desire to have constant dealings or communion with the objects towards whom you exercise your righteousness. Those whom you love you want to be with; you want to help them in every possible way; you want them to enjoy you, and you want to enjoy them. Righteousness involves none of these feelings. Love is the acme of friendship, but friendship is not implied in righteousness. Yet the last thing you would wish to do to those you love is to be weak towards them, and falsely forgiving, to their own detriment and hurt. Love can be very stern, very severe, just because it is love. For love is not weak, but strong. It does not seek to avoid present discomfort, or for the sake of ease to escape the disagreeable. The love of a father for a son seeks the son's good, not the father's pleasurable sensations. Thus, to oppose justice to love, as is done by Dr. Kohler, seems to be a false opposition. He says: "The highest principle of

ethics in Judaism, the cardinal point in the government of the world, is not love, but *justice*. Love has the tendency to undermine the right and to effeminise society. Justice, on the other hand, develops the moral capacity of every man. . . . Nor does justice stop with the prohibition of evil. The very arm which strikes down the presumptuous transgressor turns to lift up the meek and endow him with strength. Justice becomes a positive power for the right; it becomes *Zedakah*, righteousness or true benevolence, and aims to adjust the inequalities of life by kindness and love. It engenders that deeper sense of justice which claims the right of the weak to protection by the arm of the strong." Here, first of all, love is depreciated by being falsely described; for true love does not undermine the right, or effeminise (whether society or the individual). But then justice is made to include love.

Yet is it not a too violent stretching of the proper or actual signification of "justice" or "righteousness" to make it include love? We have, moreover, seen that in the Old Testament the highest attribute of God is not *Zedakah*, not, therefore, either justice or righteousness, but *Chesed*, which, whatever its exact and complete meaning may be, is, at any rate, very similar to love. I am inclined to think that love may be more fitly said to include justice or righteousness than justice or righteousness may be said to include love. And I would go further. There is, I think, a certain danger in declaring that the essence of the divine nature is righteousness rather than love. This danger is increased when righteousness rather than love is regarded as the ideal human, as well as the ideal divine, excellence. For however much we may attempt to deepen and

enlarge the ordinary meaning attached to righteousness, the word seems to have one important defect. It is not instinct with emotion. It is not dynamic. And it is just possible that a certain defect in some phases of modern Jewish ethics, and even of modern Jewish religion, may be ascribed to the substitution of Zedakah for Chesed, of righteousness for love, as the highest principle in the divine and in human nature. The righteous man does his duty ; even more, he does the best that can be done on every occasion that arises, in every " case " that comes or is put before him. The loving man goes *out of* his way, and *seeks* opportunities, for the exercise of love. The passion for helping, for caring, for saving is characteristic of love rather than of righteousness. The same may perhaps be said of the eagerness to go forth and do battle for the sake of human souls. And, as regards God, it is by His quality of love rather than by His quality of righteousness that we think of Him as drawing all humanity to Himself. God and man are both lover and loved. He loves them and they love Him. Professor Sorley is, therefore, I fancy, not wrong when he declares that " theologians have reached no more profound definition than that God is love." Let us not be afraid because the definition was first achieved by the author of the First Epistle of John (iv. 8). And perhaps the most vital point about love, in its superiority to, or rather in its *beyondness* over, righteousness, is also clearly, soberly, and even dryly stated by Dr. Sorley, when he adds : " It is true that love as used of God does not connote all that it habitually does in its human manifestations, while on the other hand it must at the same time connote much more. But it does in

both cases mean the will to the good of others and the will to communion with them. . . . Love is possible as a one-sided relation only, but the communion in which it finds satisfaction is a reciprocal relation.”¹ If the essence of God is love, His nature or will is to have relations with His world, which, in the case of beings, who, like Himself, are self-conscious and rational, means that He has communion with them and that they have communion with Him. But such a reciprocal communion involves the gradual education and redemption of every human soul, whether saint or sinner. It involves also, as we dare to believe, the education of souls beyond the grave.

If, then, the Old Testament writers who laid such stress on Chesed as the fundamental attribute of God were correct, they would recognise in the author of the First Epistle of John a kindred and not an alien spirit, and his statement that God is love, *ὁ θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν*, may be accepted as on the right line of Jewish development, and as the consummation of, and not opposed to, the divine revelation in the thirty-fourth chapter of Exodus. He who is abundant in Chesed may be fitly described as love.

The divine pity and forgiveness as well as the divine justice (“He will not absolve the guilty”) will be spoken of in another connection, but something must still be said of two attributes, one of which is mentioned in the Exodus revelation, while one (though enormously important) is not.

The first of these two attributes is that in virtue of which God is said to be “abundant in truth.” We have already stated that the Hebrew word *Emet* as used in the Old Testament means fidelity as

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 499.

much as, or perhaps even more than, truthfulness or truth. But fidelity implies truthfulness, and truthfulness involves truth. The virtue is a combination and synthesis of the intellectual and the moral. Jewish theism had, from its Old Testament origin, a marked intellectual element. Yahweh was very wise as well as very good. The sages, who finally passed over into the Scribes and the Rabbis, were only less important a branch of formative Judaism than the Prophets. The Jewish conception of God may be said to rest upon the triple basis contributed by Prophet, Psalmist, and Sage. Now to the Sage, though God was also righteous and loving, He was first and foremost the source and seat of wisdom, just as for men, though righteousness and loving-kindness were great virtues and great duties, the sovereign virtue and duty was wisdom. God is omniscient; He is the giver of knowledge and wisdom unto man. And He is trustworthy, faithful, truthful; He is changeless. One can depend on Him. His nature remains ever the same. "O Lord God of Truth"; "Yahweh is the God of Truth." The words sank deep into the Jewish mind as well as into the Jewish heart. And I think we may say without exaggeration that the two great Platonic canons about God, "He is good," "He is true," are both characteristics of Old Testament teaching. God is as much the source and guarantee of knowledge as He is the source and guarantee of love. We know through Him, we love through Him. And, further, all our knowledge is the knowledge of God; all our love is the love of God. Moreover, the unity of truth and goodness is guaranteed by their issuing from, and depending upon, the one divine source, who is

Himself perfectly and ineffably One. Between science and religion there must not, and cannot be more than temporary misunderstanding ; there cannot be permanent opposition or contrariety. God is as much the God of truth as He is the God of righteousness. Here, too, then, for one of the deepest convictions about God which we cherish to-day, we go back to, and start from, an Old Testament foundation. The God of Truth is its description of God, and it still is ours.

There remains to be considered one further attribute of God—if indeed attribute it can rightly be called—which not only plays an important part in Old Testament literature, but which has had important effects in the whole subsequent history and development of the Jewish religion. I refer to the conception of holiness. Now it is perhaps still true to say what Dr. Davidson said many years ago, that “the holiness of Yahweh is a very obscure subject,” about which “the most diverse views have prevailed among Old Testament scholars.” It would be quite out of keeping and relation with the purpose of this book to enter into any full discussion of this “obscure subject.” It will suffice to observe that the terms holiness and holy, and the verb to sanctify and to be sanctified, have both lower and higher significations in the Old Testament. We cannot say, “They start low ; they end high.” Rather must we say, They start low ; and gradually the higher, more ethical, and more spiritual meanings emerge, and run parallel or concurrently with, the lower meanings. And we may even say that there is a third sense of holy which is neither high nor low, but where the word means little more than “divine,” or “of or belonging to the divine,”

“that which is marked off from all that is not divine.” In this sense it does not concern us here. Nor does it concern us in the lower sense by which holiness can become inherent in things, because such things are used in the worship of God, or are regarded as His special property. The connection of holiness with the ideas of ritual cleanness and uncleanness is also outside our interest. We are only concerned with the divine holiness, as also with human holiness, when there enters into this holiness something ethical or moral—some antithesis to iniquity and sin. Holiness becomes interesting to us when it becomes spiritual. Precisely the same development occurs in holiness as in purity, and only when it has taken place does the word acquire a religious importance for ourselves. Moreover, holiness then becomes almost a synonym for purity. That which is morally pure has a certain antagonism to, a certain repulsion from, sin. It is this antagonism and repulsion which characterise the higher holiness. They are a development from the lower, almost physical, reaction which Yahweh displays, at an earlier stage of His history, against any encroachment upon His prerogatives, any infringement of His rights, or any violation of His divinity by unclean or unqualified agents. The higher association of holiness with purity is indicated in the famous words of Habakkuk: “Art thou not from everlasting, O Lord my God, mine Holy One? . . . Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look upon iniquity.”

It was Isaiah who, apparently, gave a distinctively moral and spiritual tilt to the conception of the divine holiness. When he calls Yahweh, as he frequently does, the Holy One of Israel, it is in

virtue of Yahweh's moral purity that he so describes Him. The teaching of the Holy One which the Israelites have despised is a moral teaching, the provocation with which they have provoked His holiness is a moral provocation. And when the Seraphim declare in that famous cry of theirs, "Holy, holy, holy, is Yahweh of hosts," they mean that He is ineffably pure; the unclean lips of man which are contrasted with the holiness of God is not a physical, but a moral uncleanness.

Great was the importance of the conception of the divine holiness in the history of the Jewish religion. This importance, in accordance with the signification of the term in the Old Testament itself, had both a lower and a higher side. We might almost say also a bad and a good side. It was in and round the idea of holiness that was started the notion, which was to be so rich in consequences, of the Imitation of God. It was not at first said, "Be good, for God is good," or "Be just, for God is just," or "Be loving, for God is loving," or "Be pitiful, for God is pitiful," but "Be holy, for God is holy." And the question, therefore, arises: In what is the divine holiness displayed? The priestly law contains a mixture of the physical and the moral. Israel is to be holy because it belongs to God, and is to display or reflect God's glory. "Ye shall be holy unto Me: for I the Lord am holy, and I have severed you from other peoples that ye should be mine." Hence any contamination with idolatry, any practice or rite which has anything to do with the worship of other gods or spirits, is intensely taboo and utterly forbidden. Israel belongs exclusively to Yahweh, and must show its "holiness" in its exclusive worship of its one and only God.

E

Again, according to old priestly conceptions, certain animals, certain bodily conditions, are unclean ; hence Israelites must avoid those animals, and, so far as they can, avoid, or quickly cleanse themselves after falling into, those bodily conditions. Israel is to be a peculiar people ; “ a peculiar treasure above all peoples ” ; they are to be unto Yahweh “ a kingdom of priests and an holy nation.” But even the Law did not stop there. It definitely associated the idea of moral purity with the idea of holiness ; it united physical and moral purity together ; it made the imitation of the divine holiness a moral, as well as a physical, ideal. It is no mere accident that the great command, “ Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy,” is set at the head of a chapter of predominantly moral commands. And it may be truly said that it was the fact that the injunction to be holy because God is holy is set in the forefront of this great chapter (Leviticus xix.), which, more than any other fact, gave to the Jewish idea of holiness, whether in God or man, its pre-vaillingly ethical implications. If the Law says that the Israelites are to be holy because God is holy, the Talmud and the Rabbis will explain this order to mean, “ Be just, because God is just ; be pitiful, because God is pitiful ; be loving, because God is loving.” So, too, we find the issue of the history in the First Epistle of Peter : “ As He who has called you is holy, so be ye holy in all manner of behaviour ; for it is written, Be ye holy ; for I am holy.”

The whole corpus, as it were, of the divine goodness is summed up in, and, in a sense, glorified and transfigured by, the conception of holiness. Divine holiness is a sort of sublime synonym for divine purity. And the conception (as we shall see

again later on) was reached that any sin on the part of any Israelite tarnishes, and inflicts a stain upon, the purity of both Israel and God. No religious conception has had a greater ethical potency. And we still feel that potency, and still perceive in it value and validity and truth.

Not only the Old Testament use of the adjective formed one root or source of this conception, but also the use of the corresponding verb. Yahweh by His actions sanctifies Himself. And in the second place man, or more especially Israel, can and should sanctify Yahweh. This divine sanctification is not always brought about by distinctively moral actions, though an ethical idea is not usually far distant. By the exercise of His power Yahweh may compel heathen nations to recognise His divinity; by punishing Israel's foes, by delivering Israel, He is sanctified, because these foes, who saw in Israel's fall or exile a mark of Yahweh's weakness and impotence, will see in Israel's redemption a mark and proof of His power. His name, polluted by Israel's sin and its necessary results, is sanctified by Israel's triumph. It is even necessary for the sake of this sanctification supernaturally to bestow upon Israel a new heart, so that Israel may, in a sense, be *capable* of redemption, and may, by new obedience and goodness, show forth God's glory and sanctify His name. So, too, lack of faith in God's power profanes His name: adequate faith would sanctify it. This twin idea of the desecration and sanctification of God's name, or of God, is only started in the Old Testament, and does not yet reach a high level of ethical and religious development. That was left for the Talmudic age in which it became a splendid motive for the highest ethical actions and the most exalted self-

sacrifice. And one more use of the idea of holiness was also begun in the Old Testament, which was to have startling developments, and even more outside Judaism than within it: namely, the ascription of holiness to the Spirit of God. The holy spirit, or rather the spirit of His (*i.e.* God's) holiness, only occurs three times in the Hebrew Bible, two of which occurrences are in successive verses of the same chapter of Isaiah (lxiii.). The Israelites, it is said, "rebelled and grieved his holy spirit." And then, in an obscure, and partly corrupt, sentence there is a lament, "Where now is He that brought them up out of the sea? Where is He that put His holy spirit within them?" Akin to this latter phrase is the usage in the great penitential Psalm: "Cast me not away from Thy presence; take not Thy holy spirit from me." Once more, then, man too can be holy with a holiness akin, if much inferior, to the holiness of God, but here that holiness, which before was to be acquired by man through his own effort and will, is prayed for as the gift of God. It is God who must inspire man's holiness, just as it is God who must give him (though he must also himself seek to acquire it) a new and regenerate heart. And these ideas too, half the issue of the conception of holiness, and half the issue of the conception of the divine spirit, were to be fruitful in the future. The spirit of God which sustains, regenerates, and inspires is the outflow of His holiness. It comes from holiness, and it makes its recipients holy. It is this spirit which the Hellenistic Jew of the first century before the Christian era identifies with wisdom. And of that heavenly or divine wisdom he says: "She is a breath of the power of God, and a clear effluence of the glory of

the Almighty: therefore can nothing defiled find entrance into her. For she is an effulgence from everlasting light, and an unspotted mirror of the working of God, and an image of His goodness. And she, being one, has power to do all things; and remaining in herself, reneweth all things: and from generation to generation passing into holy souls, she makes them friends of God and prophets." In his noble words we may see the confluence of the conceptions of wisdom and of the spirit with the conception of holiness. We may still, I think, use this confluence of the three conceptions for our own edification and profit.

SECTION III

THE RELATION OF GOD TO MAN ACCORDING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT

We have seen that the Old Testament advances to, and rests in, the conception of a supramundane and spiritual God, who is the creator and sustainer of the universe. The universe is looked at according to a view of it which has for ever passed away, in virtue of which the earth occupies a very different position from that which, in our religious, theological, or metaphysical systems, it occupies for us to-day. Creation, even perhaps to the latest and most developed Old Testament writers, culminated in humanity. Sun and moon and stars may be almost said to lead up to earth and man. It is true that God was not, I imagine, conceived as absolutely alone even before creation. At all events, before stars and sun and moon and earth were formed, there existed the angels and the sons of God, though these,

too, doubtless, even though we have no Old Testament statement about it, were supposed to have been created at some very distant epoch by God. But putting the angels aside, creation forms a whole, all made together at one and the same time, and consisting, so far as rational and moral life is concerned, of man and man alone. It is important for more than one reason that to the prevailing Jewish view, and certainly to the priestly author of the first chapter of Genesis, the sun and the stars are not animated beings: they are just "things," even as they are things to us. Where in the Psalms the sun and moon and all the stars of light are called upon to praise God, this is no more than a poetic personification. They are no more, I fancy, conceived to be alive and rational than are the trees and the fire, the snow and the wind, which are also bidden to join in the universal worship of God. And if man be the only moral and rational being in creation, there is a very real and justifiable sense in which creation culminates in him. We, too, should hold that, big as may be the sun, yet if there is no rational and moral life within his huge circumference, any human being is greater and more important than he.

Such, then, being creation according to Old Testament ideas—a great number and mass of material things, with man alone possessed of the divine image, with man alone able to know the difference between good and evil, with man alone able to know and to worship God—what was the purpose of creation? Why did God create it?

No definite answer to these questions can be gathered from the pages of the Hebrew Bible. There are indeed adumbrations of answers which we can find made explicit and full-bodied in the

Rabbinical literature. The earth was formed for man, and for him, too, we may even add, were fashioned sun, moon, and stars. But then, why was man created? Was it for God's sake or for man's sake? From one point of view we might, perhaps, say for man's sake. God was self-sufficient even before man was formed. "Can a man be profitable unto God?" asks Eliphaz, and to him the reply was, "No, he cannot." Man was created for man's own happiness, though he could only be happy if he worshipped the one God and obeyed His laws. But, from another point of view, man and all creation were formed to increase the glory of God and for the divine satisfaction. God rejoices in His works, for they are very good. The whole earth is to be filled with the divine glory. Everywhere it shall be known and realised that the sole God is Yahweh; that He is One and His name One. All flesh shall worship Him. It is almost implied that for this worship of God man was created. Man's destiny is the cause of his existence. The earth shall be full of the knowledge of Yahweh as the waters cover the sea. But this recognition and declaration of God's glory, this knowledge and worship of Him, if pleasing to Him, are also profitable to man. They are man's true end, not merely in the sense that they are the purpose of his creation, but also in the sense that they constitute his true satisfaction. If God desires and likes that man should proclaim the divine glory and know God, so far as man can know Him at all, the same human deeds and knowledge which give "pleasure" to God give even more than pleasure to man. Without the true knowledge and right worship of God, man is bereft of true happiness and joy. Thus, to say that man was created for his own

sake or for God's sake, for God's satisfaction or for his own satisfaction, is to say the same thing. The one implies and involves the other. We can hardly say that the Old Testament definitely states all this, but it does not do its teaching violence to draw all this out of what it states.

There is, however, something more which has thus far been omitted. In some of the Psalms (*e.g.* the 104th), as in the Book of Job, we have set before us God and man; these two and nothing between them. But that is not the usual view, which is rather God and man and Israel, or even God and Israel. It would go too far to say that Israel is the purpose of creation, but Yahweh is hardly conceivable without His people, and if all mankind is to recognise His divinity, it is to recognise more especially that He is, and remains, the God of Israel, in whom and by whom and through whom He is specifically glorified. Israel is God's peculiar treasure, the object of His special love. He declares of them: "The people which I have formed for Myself, they shall show forth My praise." God rejoices in all His works, but His great love is for Israel. There are touches of a wider conception, but the main doctrine is rather particularistic than universal. Yet it is none the less, as we shall see, of value, and mainly because it is capable of universalisation without losing its beauty and its truth.

It has already been observed that the essence of the divine nature, according to the best and highest teaching of the Old Testament (and according, too, to the teaching in which it rested, and which became permanent), was goodness. The divine goodness is displayed in justice, pity, loving-kindness. The elements of severity and fierceness in the original

character of Yahweh became drawn up into the conception of justice. God is not only creator, but also king, and not only king, but judge. As judge He punishes. Again, Yahweh is, as we have seen, a self-conscious personality, and as such the Old Testament writers conceive Him as possessed of emotions, which are modelled upon the emotions of man. God is grieved or glad ; He is irritated or appeased ; He is angry or pitiful ; He loves and He hates. It is highly curious, as I have already said, that in the course of history, the sterner, severer sides of His nature and of His dealings with man were conceived as more closely associated with that aspect of Him which was called God, while the more gracious and tender and loving sides were more closely associated with that aspect of Him in which He revealed Himself as Yahweh. One would have thought that it would have been otherwise ; that the term God would have absorbed all the noblest and best elements ; the term Yahweh the remainder. And this for two reasons : first, because to our thinking, " God " is greater than " Yahweh," and means for us much more. Secondly, because Yahweh starts with a very high degree of fierceness and severity. That the development took place along the lines on which it did is due especially to the " middle term." It was Yahweh rather than God which had specially to do with Israel, and it was with Israel that the divine love and pity were so closely and peculiarly associated. Hence God as lover and pardoner became more identified with Yahweh.

Putting for the moment the distinction between Israel and non-Israel aside, we may say that God, being good, desires the well-being and the happiness

of His creatures. "O Yahweh, Thou preservest man and beast," says one Psalmist. And a second: "Yahweh is good to all; and His tender mercies are over all His works." A third: "He gives to the beast its food, to the young ravens when they cry." God wants and wishes man to "live"; as righteous judge He may have "to destroy all the (unrepentant) wicked," but He takes no delight in doing so. He takes delight in man's repentance, so that He may pardon him and let him "live." "As I live, saith Yahweh, the God" (so runs the fundamental and far-reaching statement of Ezekiel), "I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and live: I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith Yahweh, the God."

All good comes to man through God, the giver. Calamity comes to man also through God, but it is the fault of man and his punishment; while good is something more than man's reward; it is the overflowing and unmerited gift of God. Such, on the whole, may be regarded as the main and permanent drift of Old Testament teaching. In punishments God bestows what, or less than, we deserve; in rewards He bestows more than we deserve.

The God of the Old Testament is throughout active. He is the ruler of nature and man. He is a king who governs. He is no *roi fainéant*. Above all, He is no distant God. If deism means a belief in a God who, having created the world, has no further care for it, influences it no longer, "interferes" in it not at all, and does not help and guide and reward and punish, and enter into communion with, and cause Himself to be felt and experienced by, the rational beings whom He has made, nothing

less resembles deism than ninety-nine per cent of Old Testament doctrine. I need hardly press this point further. It is so obvious and so certain. The God of Ecclesiastes is perhaps little more than the God of deism, but Ecclesiastes is a sort of Old Testament freak, which was only included in the Hebrew Bible because of its supposed Solomonic authorship, and which even then required much "editing" before it could be allowed admittance. Ecclesiastes is the exception which proves the rule.

Fundamental is the conception that God is both far and near. "Thus saith the high and holy One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is holy: I dwell in the high and holy place, but with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit." Of the very marrow of the most permanent and highest Old Testament teaching is the verse: "The Lord is near unto all that call upon Him." Because He is near, He is findable. Because He is near, He can be felt. He upholds and raises up; He comforts and heals; He cleanses and inspires; He helps and He guides. Thus, even as a judge, He shows interest in and cares for man, and is not distant. But He is much more than judge. For He is living stronghold and tender shepherd as well.

Let us, however, specially consider those relations of God to man, or of God to Israel, in which He manifests Himself as judge, or as the giver of just punishments and just rewards. The Old Testament lays great stress upon these relations; greater stress, perhaps, than we. Justice and righteousness are represented by one and the same word, and the idea of righteousness merges into the idea of justice. Moreover, justice means for Old Testament writers retribution or proportional justice; on wickedness

should follow punishment ; on goodness, reward. That outward prosperity is, or should be, the concomitant of virtue may be regarded as a canon of Old Testament religion. And the bestowal of reward and punishment by God may be considered as it befalls Israel, as it befalls the "nations outside," and as it befalls the individual.

It is well known how we are always told that in the earlier Biblical periods the individual made smaller claims upon God's interest and care. He sank himself in the nation, and conceived Yahweh as dealing with the people as a whole rather than with each separate unit. He shared with joy in the general prosperity; he shared without grumbling or puzzling or indignation in collective calamities. Such at least is the usual critical view of the ancient Israelite's feelings ; a view which makes the matter a good deal more simple and uncomplicated than it probably was. It is, however, true that in our surviving literature of the earlier age we hear more of Yahweh's dealings with, and relations to, the nation than of His dealings with individuals. The individuals, unless they are leaders and princes and patriarchs and prophets and priests, may, perhaps, have taken themselves less seriously than was the case in later times, or than would be the case to-day. And, perhaps, what is now known as the value of every individual soul in the eyes of God was not yet grasped. There is a sense in which the current critical view that individualism hardly awoke before the seventh century is probably true.

We are not concerned with the old pre-prophetic view of Yahweh's relation to Israel. So far as that relation implied partiality and favouritism it has no value for *us*. Nor can we legitimately claim that the

pre-prophetic view was ever entirely transcended. Moreover, it may be said to recur with a new and peculiar strength at the close of the Biblical period. The relation of God to Israel is more impartial and ethical according to Amos than it is to Malachi. It reaches its high-water mark in the conception of the Servant, but the latest pieces in the Old Testament literature are three or four hundred years later than the servant prophecies.

The general prophetic idea that rebellious, idolatrous, and immoral Israel or Judah must suffer punishment for its sins remains of value to this day. Upon national sin shall follow national calamity. In this calamity the innocent will doubtless suffer as well as the guilty. But each member of the nation must bear his share of responsibility for national crimes. This point of view was only challenged when it involved the further consequence: a second or third generation must suffer for what its fathers and grandfathers have wickedly done. A special *nuance* was given by Amos to the general prophetic doctrine of national punishment and ruin, following by God's decree upon national apostasy and wickedness, when he makes Yahweh say: "You only have I known of all the families of the earth: *therefore* will I visit upon you your iniquities." This theory of special responsibility, following upon or connected with special privilege, removed the taint of partiality from the doctrine of election. Israel was, indeed, specially chosen by God, but the result of that choosing must be a more severe testing and trial, a harder judgement, a more terrible punishment. This statement of Amos, though never repeated in so many express terms by subsequent prophets, was yet never wholly lost sight of. It reappears, as we

shall see, in Rabbinic literature, and in a more general form we still make use of it to-day.

With the destruction of the Temple and the overthrow of Jerusalem and of the Judæan state in 586, the first division of prophecy closes. Retributive justice as punishment had now fallen upon both Israel and Judah. There was, in one sense, nothing further for punishment to do. The nation as a nation was overthrown ; it had ceased to exist. The next step could only be restoration. But would restoration conflict with justice ? That partly depended upon the people. Would they repent of their sins and *deserve* God's favour ? The result in prophetic teaching is a peculiar blend of old and new. The divine mercy has to be brought into play to supplement or correct the divine justice. That in the first place. But, in the second, retributive justice is still maintained against a *section* of the people ; even as Isaiah of old had spoken of a remnant who should escape the judgement, or who should be morally purged by it, so now a distinction was made between the good and the bad : the former should enjoy God's favour ; the latter should feel His wrath. Thirdly, the retributive justice of God is deflected upon Israel's foes, and upon them are now concentrated prophetic and psalmic malediction, enmity, and denunciation. Upon them, partly for their conduct to Israel, partly for their idolatry, are to be poured out the punishments of God. But, in the fourth place, other considerations emerge. Israel is not worthy of the divine favour. It does not deserve restoration or prosperity. But Yahweh, in despite of strict justice, will, nevertheless, bring about an era of happiness and national well-being in the ancestral land. He will do this partly for

His own name's sake, for His honour and His glory, which are inseparably bound up with Israel, inasmuch as, though the God of the whole world, He remains, in a peculiar sense, the God of Israel. And partly He will do it because He *loves* Israel, even more than they deserve, with an unalterable and inextinguishable love. Yet, in order to let the nations perceive and recognise His power by the salvation of Israel, in order to display and manifest His love and satisfy its cravings,—in order to do all this without too grossly violating justice, He has to do one thing more. He has Himself to make Israel not too unworthy of the divine love. He has to give unto the people a new heart and a new spirit, so that they may worship Him more purely, and live lives less inconsistent with the divine favour. He redeems them inwardly as well as outwardly for His name's sake.

These conceptions, of which the last group are mainly taken from Ezekiel, were not only in themselves significant, but bore fruit. They showed themselves capable of development and enlargement. We shall meet them again.

As regards the enemies of Israel and the "nations around," the doctrine of God's retributive justice contains little to interest or to detain us. For here it is mainly a case of national passions and hatreds clothing themselves in a religious, or what we should now call a pseudo-religious, guise. The enemies of Israel are simply turned into the enemies of God, and the only justification for such identification that may be detected by us is their idolatry or wickedness. This lower aspect of prophecy is too often a riot of particularism. Certain exceptions will come before our notice in another connection.

When the individual in the seventh century B.C. began to crave to be more separately dealt with by God, divine justice had to concern itself with him as well as with the nation as a whole. He, too, must be punished and rewarded, and find in such punishments and rewards the evidence of God's rule and care. It is hardly fair to say that reward in the shape of material prosperity was passionately desired as such. It was desired as the guarantee and mark of God's rule and care. It was desired as the expression of His justice. Whether for the community or for the individual no more fundamental canon of God's providence was recognised than that of reward for righteousness and punishment for sin. And this reward was largely conceived all through the Old Testament period as external to the righteous deed and the righteous character ; it was added on to them by the interposition of God. So, too, with punishment. This, too, did not flow naturally out of sin. It was affixed to it separately and subsequently by the divine judgement.

There can be little doubt that we have here one of the weaker aspects of Old Testament religion. It is one of the less satisfactory aspects of the relation of God to man and of the methods of His rule. We shall deal with certain puzzles which arose in regard to it in a later section. Meanwhile, however, it may be noted that the doctrine seems still to enshrine certain general truths, still valid and still valuable. First, the truth that wickedness will somehow be ultimately overthrown. "Verily there is a God that judges in the earth." To this hope we still cling. We cling to it for nations and, in a lesser degree, or in a special form, we cling to it for individuals. Right shall in the long run prevail

against wrong. Next, we still believe in the ultimate connection, in the propriety of an ultimate concomitance, between goodness and happiness. It is true we do not interpret happiness to mean mere external prosperity. Yet we do not wholly exclude such prosperity. We do not look forward as an ideal even upon earth to a condition of things in which everybody should be *both* righteous *and* miserable; inwardly righteous and outwardly miserable. On the contrary, we look forward and work for a time in which men shall be both righteous and happy, yes, even both righteous and prosperous. Still less, or at least as little, do we look forward to a combination of exceeding righteousness and exceeding infelicity beyond the grave. I quite admit, and Judaism can well admit, that the problem of evil and the hypothesis of God prevent our supposing, to use Dr. Sorley's words, that "the creative purpose must have been to provide the maximum of happiness for conscious beings, or to distribute that happiness" among them according to their deserts. If we assume that, we cannot make the facts fit with our theistic hypothesis. We could not then regard "the world order as a moral order." "If mind is really the master of things, then that mind cannot have framed the order of the world with a view to happiness alone."¹ But that is not to say that though God framed it mainly with a view to the production of moral values, He did not also frame it with a view to the preponderating and prevailing conjunction of righteousness and felicity. The felicity may be mainly inward and spiritual; yet on earth, at any rate, we do not *wish* it to be exclusively so, and we do not believe that

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 344.

a complete divorce of outward felicity from righteousness would be within the will and intention of God. That is why social justice, which includes even outward felicity, is so great a feature of Judaism. That is why we regard social justice, with all which the words may imply, as so marked a constituent of the Kingdom of God upon earth. And the nature of this kingdom, the injunction to work for it, the yearning for its fulfilment, have partly grown out of the conception of God's justice, and of the union, in the issues of that justice, of righteousness with happiness and even with prosperity.

What is the method and what is the proof of divine justice in operation? The simple rule obtained great credence and popularity among Old Testament teachers, and among the people generally, that God renders unto every man according to his works. But the rule caused many difficulties, and it was productive of many defects. The difficulties were chiefly felt as regards the prosperity of the wicked and the misfortunes of the good. If God renders to every man according to his works, why do the bad flourish and the righteous suffer? This problem with the tentative solutions offered will come before us again. The defects might be called the obverse of the difficulties. If the rule is really true, then a prosperous man can argue that he is a virtuous man; whereas he who is plagued by misfortune and calamity may sink into despair. Or he may be heavily misjudged by his neighbours, even as Job's friends misjudged Job. Self-righteousness, cruelty, contempt, pride, or despair may all be the direct ethical consequences of the doctrine that a man's outward circumstances are the God-willed result of

his character and his deeds. It was at any rate important that a supplementary or qualifying doctrine should be established, in virtue of which a man should recognise and feel that he never wholly *deserved* the mercies of God. In this way even if calamity was still supposed to betoken sin, prosperity was not the proof of righteousness—at all events, not in the sense that he who experienced the prosperity thought and believed that he was only receiving the exact requital of his goodness. Such avoidance of self-righteousness and pride was, on the whole perhaps, successfully attained in Old Testament times. The danger was, however, there. Not all could or did feel with Jacob: “I am not worthy of all the mercies which Thou hast showed unto Thy servant.” Of this weakness several of the Psalms bear witness, even though some of these should be interpreted rather nationally and collectively than personally and individually.

If God “renders unto every man according to his work” (Psalm lxii. 12, Prov. xxiv. 12), He can only do so in absolute strictness by the method of tit for tat. So tit for tat, or measure for measure, became another religious snare. We now perceive that, if there is to be retributive justice in the narrower sense at all, it must be paid as the result of character and not of deed. Character is expressed in deed, and deeds are the issue of character, but yet character is more than deed. Though it changes, it is a whole; it is the self. Yet it is too subtle a thing to be weighed in ordinary scales. Who would like to estimate the measure of prosperity or of misfortune which that complex and delicate whole, a human character, deserves? Could even God Himself, in this truer sense, *really* render to

every man according to his work? Could He render to every man according to his character? Moreover, not only is character very subtle, but it changes. It was easier, therefore, to cling to the clumsy and outward method of deeds. Let a man's actions decide his lot. But suppose some of a man's actions are "good," and some are "bad"? Is his prosperity due to a balance of the good over the bad, his calamities to a balance of the bad over the good? Endless are the pitfalls into which the strict and *visible* application of the rule would lead. And from these pitfalls Jewish doctrine found it difficult to keep free. It often tended to consider a man's deeds rather than his character, or to suppose that for the assessment of his character God resorted to the clumsy expedient of a balance between his deeds. It often seemed to think that tit for tat or measure for measure, applied to outward and visible "works," was indeed the best rule for the justice of both God and man; that goodness could be measured by a scale, and wickedness assessed in the balance, because they were to be fully summed up, expressed and counted by a long series of deeds. And if character changes, and good deeds may succeed to bad ones and bad ones to good, then tit for tat is in further difficulties, and the only expedient may seem to be that God's justice and apportionment of prosperity and calamity should be postponed till the very moment of death! A happy end becomes the proof of righteousness; a fearful, a painful, a sudden, or a calamitous death becomes the proof of sin. There is no end to the difficulties of tit for tat, and no bottom to its moral and religious inadequacies. In another chapter we shall see how the hero of the Gospels attempted to attack the

doctrine, and to escape the pitfalls of tit for tat and measure for measure.

Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties and inadequacies of the doctrine, it represents a religious achievement. That God renders unto every man according to his work still enshrines a truth. The recompense may not be outward happiness for virtue or outward calamity for sin. But it *will* be a recompense of some sort, and it will be according to the work. The development of the doctrine in the Rabbinical literature will be noticed later on. Meanwhile, the mere acknowledgement or conviction that each man must obtain the recompense of his own work and not of another's was itself an advance. In the older era the solidarity of nation and family and tribe still prevented the right emergence of the individual. "These sheep, what have they done?" complains David, but he thinks it legitimate that his sin should affect in punishment not only himself, but also his "house." The second commandment expresses the old point of view. God visits the sins of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation. It was the recoil from this improper solidarity which produced the stiff individualism of Ezekiel. "The soul that sins shall die." "The son shall not share in the iniquity of the father, and the father shall not share in the iniquity of the son." In spite of the fresh difficulties which it produced, that was a noble achievement. How far the Rabbis attempted to reconcile the Commandment doctrine with that of the Prophet we shall shortly see. In the Old Testament itself the tit for tat teaching, whether in its older or in its later form, according to the conception of solidarity or of individualism, is tempered and modified by the

doctrine of forgiveness. God, in the greatness of His compassion and loving-kindness, forgives the repentant sinner and cancels the punishment of his sin. As to the meaning of forgiveness, something more must be said later. Here, where we are concerned with the various aspects of God's relation with man, it is enough to point out that even more predominant than God as judge, and as the vindicator of the moral order, is God in His capacity as the gracious forgiver of iniquity, as the pardoner of sin. To the higher thought of the Old Testament teachers there is no condition precedent for God's forgiveness except repentance. And even repentance itself may be waived. God may, as we have seen, for His own purposes, create the new heart. He may pardon first, and cause the moral regeneration after. But this is not the usual conception. If, however, God were to judge human wickedness according to its true deserts, who could "stand," who could live? Forgiveness may lead to gratitude and piety, and thus, though undeserved, become morally profitable. "There is forgiveness with Thee that Thou mayest be feared." The words are not wholly clear, but they apparently contain this profoundly ethical idea. "Return unto the Lord, for He will abundantly pardon" becomes a fundamental teaching of Judaism, and this very "return" may be helped by the God who longs to pardon. "Turn Thou us, O Lord, unto Thee, and we shall be turned." "Who is a God like unto Thee that pardons iniquity, and passes by the transgression of the remnant of His heritage? He retains not His anger for ever, because He delights in mercy. He will again have compassion upon us; He will subdue our iniquities; He will cast our

sins into the depths of the sea." Every word of this beautiful passage, with its odd mixture of old ideas and new, and its quaint metaphors and anthropomorphisms, sank deep into the Jewish consciousness, and became bone of its bone. "Thou, O Lord, art good and ready to forgive; plenteous in loving-kindness to all them that call upon Thee." "To the Lord our God belong mercies and forgiveness, because we have rebelled against Him." Equal to the stubborn sinfulness of man's heart, and prepared for it, are the vast pity and loving-kindness of God.

These, then, are the two chief relations of God to man: He punishes and rewards; He pardons and forgives. He does all this, first, because He is supremely just, and His wrath is kindled against wickedness; secondly, because He is supremely loving and compassionate, and in His pity and love He is keen to help, to deliver, and to redeem. God's goodness is delineated in many other ways, which are well known, and need not long detain us. He is the helper and the keeper: He is the healer and the comforter. "As one whom his mother comforts, so will I comfort you." What more tender image can be found? He is the stronghold and the rock, the fortress and the shield; under the shadow of His wings men take refuge. These images and others will come before us again when we consider the relation of man to God, and what man finds in God. But it is important to notice that already in the Old Testament the dynamic relation of God to man involves not merely material help, but also moral help. God helps man to do the right: He helps him to learn the divine will; He helps him to fulfil it. "Make me to know Thy ways, O God; teach me Thy paths." "Teach me to do Thy will."

The Psalmist only prays thus because he believes that God can and does act thus. "Create in me a clean heart, O God; renew a firm spirit within me." We may, I think, hold that the Psalmists imply, even though they do not distinctly state, that God helps man to conquer his sin. He teaches sinners the right way, because He is good.

Does it greatly matter whether, in the Old Testament, these various relationships of God to man are or are not summed up in one particular metaphor? Does it, I mean, greatly matter, whether or no, God is spoken of not merely as Creator, King, Judge, Comforter, Pardoner, Healer, Saviour, Stronghold, Refuge, Shepherd, and all the rest of the epithets, but also as Father?

I am not sure that it does, so long as you have the ideas which the word and metaphor of Father suggest and imply. And these, I think, you have. The idea of the divine fatherhood is, indeed, by no means wholly absent. "As a father has pity upon his children, so Yahweh has pity on those who fear Him." "Now, O Lord, Thou art our father; we are the clay, and Thou art our potter; we are all the work of Thy hand." "I am a father to Israel." "Israel is my son, even my firstborn." "God is a father of the fatherless." "Is not God thy father that formed thee? Has He not made and established thee?" Nevertheless, it is not usual in the Old Testament to address God as "father," and still less is He usually regarded as the father of all men, and the father of each. He is rather the father of Israel than of the Israelite, and rather the father of the Israelite than of the Gentile. The metaphor of regarding God and invoking God as "our Father"—the father of all men equally, the

father of each man individually—is undoubtedly of great value, and it would be foolish not to recognise the advance made by those who made the usage common. Only it would be no less foolish to exaggerate, and to suppose that because the best Old Testament teachers did not make use of the word, they did not know and express the main ideas which the word indicates and implies. More important, perhaps, is it to notice that most of the passion and the fervour, as well as much of the nobility and the truth, which we find and feel in the best Old Testament teaching about the relation of God to man was won through His supposed special relation to Israel. If He loves the individual Israelite, He loves him first as a member of the house of Israel, and only in the second place as a human being. And so, too, the Israelite loves God in the first place as the God of Israel, and only in the second place as the God of the spirits of all flesh. The development is from Israel to man, but we have often to do the universalisation ourselves, and in our thoughts to replace Israel by mankind. In the Wisdom literature there was reflection about man generally, and religious and moral truths were there achieved on these broader and less national lines. But specially where fervour and passion come in, it was through Israel that thought moved on, first to the Israelite, and then to man. We can notice in the Psalms how purely general and human and even universal the language about God's relation to man often is. But the conception of Israel is never really far off, and the idea of God's relation to man is mediated by, and generalised from, His relation to Israel and the Israelite. And the divine love for Israel remains. Towards Israel His love is keenest and

hottest; most passionate and tender. And it is this divine love for Israel which we to-day have to make use of by our modern methods and for our modern needs.

SECTION IV

THE RELATION OF GOD TO ISRAEL ACCORDING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT

In this section we touch what is in one sense the sore point, the Achilles heel, of Old Testament religion, and yet in another sense is of its essence and centre. Or shall we rather and more clearly say that what was the weakness of nascent Judaism has become the strength of Judaism in its maturity? A special relation of God to Israel, involving a special relation of Israel unto God, is still a keynote of Judaism to-day. Judaism can hardly get on without it. It can hardly be Judaism without it. But the trouble was how to change a particularistic relation with a taint of partiality into a relation which might, on the one hand, be regarded as particularistic, but which, on the other hand, was wholly devoid of the taint. A natural relation had to be changed into a spiritual relation, a relation of privilege into a relation of service.

It was extremely difficult. The process was lengthy. The change has, perhaps, only been fully effected in our own day. And, perhaps, the next stage for us will be to preserve and consolidate the gain, and then to repair and make good certain losses which have been incurred upon the road.

It is a curious fact (and not without its lesson) that the monotheistic development in the religion of Israel tended to make the relation of God to Israel

more partial and less moral. A "natural" relationship was fading away. A perfect spiritual relationship was not yet achieved. Monotheism upset the balance. To set things right and produce a relationship as close, but far more spiritual, was the work of time—of a long time.

If one had asked an ordinary, average Israelite of the days of Deborah or even Samuel how he would explain the connection of Yahweh with Israel, he would, I think, could he have understood the question, have been puzzled for a reply. There was Israel; there was Yahweh. So it had always been, and so it would always be. Yahweh was Israel's God, and Israel was Yahweh's people. To Moab its Chemosh; to Chemosh its Moab: to Israel its Yahweh; to Yahweh its Israel. What could be simpler and more obvious? What stood less in need of explanation? Chemosh fought Moab's battles; Yahweh fought Israel's. Chemosh would do his best for Moab; Yahweh would do His best for Israel. Yahweh was, indeed, a God who made conditions. He wanted exclusive worship, and He wanted justice. He was a just God, if also jealous. But Israel's honour was His, and Israel's enemies were Yahweh's. He might punish upon occasion; He had sometimes unaccountable moods; but He would not push things to extremes. If Israel needed His help, He needed Israel's worship: its sacrifices and offerings. And Israel's victories added to *His* reputation. This, what I have called natural, relationship was not immoral. It was rather non-moral. It was no more wrongly partial than a father's special care for his own child is wrongly partial. The trouble only began when Yahweh dethroned Chemosh, and in one sense took his place. Who

was to look after the Moabites when there was no Chemosh? Yet the process towards the new relationship would, perhaps, never have started had it not been that after all the connections between Yahweh and Israel (though the average Israelite tended to forget it) had never, from the very beginning, been quite the same as the relation between Chemosh and Moab. Yahweh had chosen Israel, or at any rate Israel had chosen Yahweh. We cannot pierce with any certainty through the thick mists which hang over the early history of Israel. But it is very generally now believed either that Yahweh only became Israel's God in the Mosaic age, and then by an act of deliberate choice, or that, even if Yahweh was known in Israel before Moses, He was, as it were, chosen and accepted afresh after the escape from Egypt. And this historic choosing of their God, this consecration of Yahweh to themselves, and of themselves to Yahweh, may have been the germ of all the rich development which followed. Rich, indeed, that development was. We need not trace it here. Yahweh did not cease to be the God of Israel, but He became the one and only God, the creator of the world and of man. And He became all this because He was not only greater than the other gods, who sank into insignificance, and then into unreality, before Him, but also more just, more righteous. Nevertheless, His ties with Israel are not sundered. Not even the noblest of His prophets (except, perhaps, Amos) contemplates a time when Yahweh will be and when man will be, but when there will be no Israel, or when Yahweh will nevermore be Israel's God, and when Israel will never again be Yahweh's people. Thus a singular situation presented itself. One God: the Lord of the

spirits of all flesh: the creator of heaven and earth; and yet one particular group of men is His special people, and He is *their* God. Who, then, is to be the God of all the other peoples? Can Yahweh be *their* God too? Can they be *His* peoples? Sons, though not first-born? Yahweh had become too big for the old arrangement, but it was very difficult to make any other. What prejudices, what passions, what loves and what hatreds, what devotion, on the one hand, what narrowness, on the other, stood in the way! And there was a double and even a triple process of development, and the third process sometimes hindered the movement of the other two. There was first the process by which Yahweh became One. Then there was the parallel process by which He became perfectly good and just and pitiful and omniscient and wise. And then there was the process by which His relationship to Israel became more intimate and more spiritual. As God became perfectly One and perfectly good, He did not (so it was thought) care for Israel less, but He cared with a deeper and profounder love, a love more tender and more passionate. As Israel clung more devotedly and more purely to Yahweh, so was Yahweh conceived to cling the more earnestly and entirely to Israel. How difficult, then, it was for this relationship of the One God to Israel to be conceived on lines which were free from partiality. How difficult it was for Israelites to imagine other nations with an equal share of the affections and solicitude of Yahweh: to think of Him as *their* God no less than Israel's God. And yet it added to Israel's prestige as well as Yahweh's that other people should acknowledge His power and His Godhead. Here was a certain way out, and it would not be the only

instance where good results have been achieved in questionable ways.

A first big step in the process in which we are interested was the prophetic teaching that Israel had been freely chosen by Yahweh, though not through its own merits. "When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called him out of Egypt to be My son." Israel and Yahweh were married in the wilderness. Israel was the wife: Yahweh the husband. Freely did the husband choose his spouse. In the "prophetic" introduction to Deuteronomy Yahweh insists that He did not choose Israel to be a peculiar people unto Himself above all other peoples because they were many in number; He did not give them the land of Canaan for their righteousness, for they are stiff-necked and rebellious; He chose them, and gave them the land, just because He loved them, and in order to fulfil the oath which He had sworn unto their fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob. It is true that the other nations (note the new desire for ethical justification) were more wicked than they, and for the peculiar wickedness of these nations Yahweh evicted them and drove them out from before Israel.

But is not partiality all the worse if it is free and freely avowed? If Israel did not even deserve Yahweh's partiality, was it not all the more immoral of Yahweh to give it? No. For ethical requirements were to be appended to Yahweh's favour as a condition of its continuance. If Yahweh could freely choose Israel, He could punish them for their sins. He could overthrow their national existence. And He did. To bask in the sunshine of Yahweh's favour, Israel must walk in His ways and obey His commands. His commands were not merely ex-

clusive worship of Himself, but the practice of justice and of compassion. The day of Yahweh was for the pre-exilic prophets no longer the day of Israel's triumph, but the day of its doom. And we have already had occasion to quote the poignant saying of Amos: "You only have I known of all the inhabitants of the earth; *therefore* will I visit upon you your iniquities."

The justice of Yahweh was, then, the second step towards freeing His relationship to Israel from the taint of partiality. Somehow or other *whatever* Yahweh did, or did not do, must be in accord with His justice, or if not with His justice, then with what is even greater than His justice—His pity and His love. And if His love for Israel tended to make Him partial, yet His single responsibility and His creative care drove Him, in the last resort, to take up some logical position towards the nations, a relation suited, in the first place, to His omnipotence, and in the second to the moral elements of His being. An inconsistent God became at last (even if the process has occupied centuries) an impossibility. Men could not away with Him.

Meanwhile the nations moved slowly within the orbit of Yahweh's influence. They have to come within that orbit less (as might have been thought) because Yahweh grows to be the One and Only God, than because of their relations with Israel. The first great change, the first great stage in the movement, is brought about by the Prophets and by Assyria. Instead of being overcome in their religious faith by the new world power, they absorb it and bend it to their own needs. Instead of Yahweh being conquered by Assyria, because Assyria threatened to conquer Israel, Assyria becomes

the instrument of Yahweh for Yahweh's own purposes. Israel has sinned and must be punished, and Yahweh's agent is Assyria. Assyria is the rod of Yahweh's anger, but the rod must not be allowed to smite further than its wielder may decree. The Kingdom of Samaria is to fall, but Jerusalem will be delivered. As with Assyria, so with Babylonia. It is Yahweh's agent, and its triumphs are His will. It is He, maker of "the earth, with the man and the beast upon it," giver of it unto whom it seems to Him good, that has now granted Babylonia its empire. Nebuchadnezzar is Yahweh's servant. Such is the daring conception of Jeremiah.

When, however, the blow has fallen, and Jerusalem lies in ashes, and her people are in exile, the attitude of the prophets changes. Cyrus, it is true, assumes the rôle of Nebuchadnezzar, though in a contrary sense. He, too, is Yahweh's servant, as the restorer instead of the destroyer. But, on the whole, there is a certain falling back. Israel's enemies, and Babylon chief among them, become the enemies of God. As it was of old, and as it had always been to the populace, so was it now even to the prophets. And yet, not quite. The attitude of denunciation, of enmity, and even of hatred (for it reached that pitch), had to be justified. The justification was either that the nations had been cruel and proud, or that they were idolaters. That they did not recognise Yahweh's sole divinity, that they worshipped the work of men's hands, that they oppressed Yahweh's people, that they exalted themselves in independent pride, were now offences: they were offences against Yahweh's majesty, and made those guilty of them the object of His wrath. But what was to be the final issue? Were the nations

to be utterly destroyed so that not only should Israel be triumphant, but alone? Some of the fiercer prophets and teachers seem, indeed, to have thought so, but it was not the prevailing conception, and the lot and function of the nations in the latter days and in the Messianic Age constituted another element in the process of universalisation, and in the gradual moralisation of Yahweh's relation to Israel and to the peoples of the world. The place of the surviving nations, or of the surviving portions of the nations, in the Messianic Age was differently imagined by different teachers and thinkers. There was a lower conception and a higher. According to the former, the nations seem to have little more to do than to heighten the twin triumph of Yahweh and of Israel. Their good is not reckoned with or thought of. They are only looked upon from the point of view of Israel and of Yahweh. Some, for instance, the Israelites may possess for "servants and handmaids"; "they shall take *them* captive, whose captives they were." Aliens shall build up the walls of Jerusalem, and the wealth of the nations shall be poured into Israel. Strangers shall feed Israel's flocks; aliens shall be Israel's ploughmen and vine-dressers. All shall recognise that it is Yahweh who had punished, and Yahweh who had redeemed: the sole divinity of Yahweh shall be universally acknowledged, and the Israelites shall be called Yahweh's priests and ministers. All this would doubtless greatly add to Israel's glory and to Yahweh's, but it can hardly be said to benefit the nations. Nor does it come about for their benefit. They are the conquered, who have only to admit the greatness of the conquerors. And the conquerors are Israel and Yahweh.

But the process did not stop there. It was, as it were, driven forward from three sides, or in three ways. It might, indeed, be that it was for Yahweh's reputation and glory, and not for their own benefit, that the nations are, at last, to believe in Him and to recognise His sole divinity; yet to acknowledge and to praise Yahweh is man's good. So when the Psalmist sings: "Let the peoples praise Thee, O God; let all the peoples praise Thee," he unites the two points of view. God's glory is man's salvation, man's health and well-being. So he continues: "Let the nations be glad and sing for joy, for Thou judgest the peoples righteously, and guidest the nations upon the earth."

For, secondly, it was in virtue of His great righteousness as well as of His great power that Yahweh had grown to be the only God. It was His goodness as well as His might which had brought about the full-blown monotheism of the later prophets and psalmists. When the thoughts of prophets, psalmists, and sages could be diverted from the wrongs and sorrows of Israel, when they could reflect upon Yahweh as the God of mankind, and not merely as the God of Israel, when they could think of foreigners just as human beings and not simply either as wicked idolaters or as Israel's oppressors and conquerors, it was almost inevitable that they should desire their "conversion" for more human and more religious reasons, and not solely for the glory of Israel or of Yahweh. Then, thirdly, the Israelites, or perhaps it would be as well to say the Judaeans or the Jews, were not surrounded with a high fence. Other people came into their land, and not merely as conquerors: they came to stay, or they came as travellers for a season. And during

and after the exile Israel was slowly changing from a people to a church. The notable thing about them was their religion; it was slowly becoming, perhaps even one might say, it was rapidly becoming, the *only* notable and valuable thing about them, as, indeed, it has remained the only notable and valuable thing about them to this day. To the resident alien, who sought "naturalisation" or a permanent dwelling-place in Israel, the Law was splendidly generous. With a grand overthrow of tit for tat, which has been too little regarded by "alien" critics, it urged that the Israelites were in no wise to treat the resident aliens among themselves as they had been treated by the Egyptians. "Ye know the heart of the resident alien, for ye were resident aliens in the land of Egypt." Not merely the Israelite neighbour, but the resident alien too (in other words, the only foreigner or stranger who claimed or needed his protection and care) is the Israelite to love as himself. "The resident alien that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were resident aliens in the land of Egypt: I am Yahweh, your God." This is the greatest commandment of the Law. Great as is Leviticus xix. 18, verse 34 beats it hollow. Not all the disparagements of grudging critics can remove an inch from its moral stature. Now the resident alien soon began to turn into the religious convert. The resident alien becomes the proselyte. Let it be granted that *Ger* in the Old Testament means resident alien only. But soon it comes to mean the proselyte. And even within Old Testament limits, proselytes were beginning. Strangers and foreigners were joining the people of Yahweh, because they

felt the attraction of Israel's God. They, too, sought to love His name, and to pay Him reverence. And because of them, or inspired by the thought of them, the Prophet is able to picture Yahweh's house as in the future justly called an "house of prayer for all peoples."

What part was Israel itself to play in this world drama? Had its election by Yahweh any connection with the drama and with its issue? The author of Solomon's prayer at the dedication of the Temple conceives of foreigners coming to Yahweh's house because they will hear of His great name and power, and praying unto Yahweh; and he begs of Yahweh to hear in heaven His dwelling-place, and "to do according to all that the foreigner prayeth to Thee for." And why? "So that all the peoples of the earth may know Thy name to fear Thee as do Thy people Israel." So too Hezekiah prays for the deliverance of Jerusalem, "that all the kingdoms of the earth may know that Thou art the Lord God, even Thou only." Was this universal recognition and worship of Yahweh the reason why Israel had been chosen by God? Was this the very purpose of its election? And if so, how was it to bear itself, or what was it specifically to do, in order that it might help towards the *realisation* of this purpose? Or had it to do nothing, and leave the issue wholly to God?

It is perhaps curious that the connection between Israel's election and the universal recognition of Yahweh's divinity and supremacy was not more largely and constantly recognised; that it did not become a generally accepted doctrine. Yet we may say that it only flashes out fully from one great teacher's mind, and that the flame sinks again and

is long dormant. It might be thought that the idea of this connection, and even more, was already present to the pre-prophetic author of the life of Abraham. But the translation of the Authorised Version is not accurate. It reflects later Jewish interpretation and the rendering of the Septuagint. Not "in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed," but "with thee" (or "by means of thee") "shall all families of the earth bless themselves" is the correct translation. The meaning is that everybody shall wish for themselves the happiness and the blessing which have been, or shall be, granted to Abraham and to his seed. One can wish for nothing better than that. Let us move forward to a later writer. "Now therefore," it is said in a notable passage in Exodus, "if ye will obey My voice and keep My covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto Me above all peoples, for all the earth is Mine: and ye shall be unto Me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation." But with what object? That is not stated, and probably the author would have answered: "for the welfare of Israel and the glory of Yahweh." One might have thought that priests serve for the benefit of laymen, and that Israel's priesthood must, therefore, be for the benefit of humanity. But this was not the meaning of the writer. The priestly service of Israel was for its own sake and for Yahweh's. So, too, when, in Deuteronomy, we are repeatedly told that Israel is to be "a holy people unto Yahweh; that God has chosen Israel to be a peculiar people unto Himself above all peoples that are upon the face of the earth," we are left completely in the dark as to the purport and object of this divine choice. We can only surmise that to the writer the object seemed obvious:

it never occurred to him to question or to define it. Yahweh loved Israel, and so chose Israel; in one sense Israel's well-being or glory was the object of God's election; in another sense, it was made just because Yahweh so willed it and for His own satisfaction. In neither case was there any idea that the election was intended to benefit any third party. The "nations" were outside the purview of the author when he conceived the thought and wrote down the words.

But it is of immense importance that the connection between the call of Israel and the "conversion" of the nations *was* made by an Old Testament writer, and by a prophet, whose word, incorporated in the "book of Isaiah," was destined to have so great an influence upon the development of Judaism. And it is curious that the earliest of the "literary" prophets should, in some respects, have been the most universal. Just as Amos can grasp the idea that Israel may have to perish so that divine justice may survive, just as he lays down the doctrine that Israel's election is the very cause of its punishment and its justification, so does he boldly bring the nations within the purview of Yahweh's will and Yahweh's care. Yahweh punishes Moab for an offence unconnected with Israel, but what is much more striking still is that any protest of the Israelites against the coming doom on the score of Yahweh's previous close relations with them is rebuked by the remarkable words, "Are ye not as the children of the Ethiopians unto me, saith Yahweh? As I brought up Israel out of the land of Egypt, so did I not bring up the Philistines from Caphtor and the Syrians from Kir?"¹ In some respects this is one

¹ The first part of the verse may, however, only mean: "Yahweh says,

of the most amazing and extraordinary sentences in the whole Old Testament. It is only equalled, though not surpassed, by Isaiah xix. 23. Yet the connection between Israel's election and the universal knowledge of Yahweh was not made by Amos. That prophet did not apparently dream of a Messianic age. To vindicate the justice and impartiality of God he would rather cut the special bond between Israel and Yahweh altogether. It is a disputed point whether Isaiah ii. 2-4 belongs to Isaiah or not. It may, perchance, be even later than Isaiah xl.-liv. Here, in any case, the connection of which we are in search is *almost* fully made. For here the nations come to Jerusalem in order to learn the ways and the paths of God. They desire teaching, and find it in Zion; they want enlightenment, and obtain it in Jerusalem. Was not this, therefore, the purpose of Israel's history? "Yahweh will teach us of His ways." But how? Hardly, directly. Rather by the mediation of Israel. Only through Israel's voluntary agency could the words be fulfilled: "Out of Zion shall go forth the teaching, and the word of Yahweh from Jerusalem." Somewhat similar to this prediction, and not moving beyond it, is the prediction of Zechariah: "There shall come peoples and the inhabitants of great cities; and the inhabitants of one city shall go to another, saying, Let us go speedily to intreat the favour of Yahweh and to seek Yahweh of hosts: I will go also. Yea, many peoples and strong nations shall come to seek Yahweh of hosts in Jerusalem, and to intreat the favour of Yahweh. In those days ten

Are ye not in your behaviour to me like Cushites? In other words, Your apostasy has become second nature. You can as little change your ways as the Ethiopian his skin" (Peake's *Bible Commentary*).

men shall take hold, out of all the languages of the nations, shall even take hold of the skirt of him that is a Jew, saying, We will go with you, for we have heard that God is with you."

Two passages in Jeremiah (iii. 17 and xvi. 19) of doubtful authenticity echo much the same thought. The nations "come" unto God from the ends of the earth, acknowledging and confessing that their fathers had worshipped "lies, vanity, and things wherein there is no profit." They will no longer "walk after the stubbornness of their evil heart." But what place Israel had, or shall have, in this transformation is not stated. The only Old Testament writer who, as it were, definitely puts two and two together, who distinctly makes the connection we have sought for, and draws the moral, is the author of Isaiah xl.-lv., or if the one be not identical with the other, the author of the "Servant Songs." The children of Israel were called to be the witnesses of Yahweh, the one and only God. "Ye are My witnesses and My servant whom I have chosen; ye are My witnesses that I am God." The nations are appealed to: "Look unto Me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth; for I am God, and there is none else." But the nations are to look to God through Israel. It is the witnessing of Israel which is to make them turn towards the light. Partly the influence of Israel is to be passive. The salvation which God will work for them; their outward and inward peace; the fulfilment of the prophecies; all these things influence the Gentiles. Israel will call, and the peoples will answer. "Behold, thou shalt call a nation that thou knowest not, and peoples that knew not thee shall run unto thee, because of Yahweh thy God, and for the Holy One of Israel,

for He has glorified thee." The servant is to be filled with the divine spirit ; he is to bring forth judgement (or possibly "the true religion") "to the nations." He is to be "a light to the nations, to open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison." And for this end he was called. God has appointed Israel His servant as a light to the nations that the divine salvation may extend to the ends of the earth. Thus is the great word spoken ; thus is the full connection made. Israel was called for the world's sake, and in the illumination of that purpose all partiality and lower favouritism fade away. The exact interpretation of Isaiah lii. 13-15 to liii. 12 is still uncertain ; yet a large number of modern critics accept the view which many mediaeval Jewish commentators upheld, that the suffering servant is the people of Israel who voluntarily underwent suffering, ignominy, and death for the sake of the world's peace, the world's enlightenment. The election of Israel was an election of service, not of privilege ; it was an election for the sake of others, as much as, or even more than, for the sake of themselves. And if it was an election for ultimate glory, for ultimate peace and salvation, outward as well as inward, the road to this glory was paved with stones and thorns. Sorrow and pain and suffering and degradation, these were to be the emblems of God's election, which Israel was to endure and to accept without quailing, without repining, faithfully, obediently, in humility, in love. Recognising and realising the end of his election—the world's salvation—Israel was freely and willingly to accept the means. How painfully true has the prediction been, at least as regards the pathway and the means ! The election of Israel has been sealed in blood. In

blood and tears, but yet in utter faithfulness, has the witnessing been performed.

How far the writer imagined that Israel was to attempt any sort of *direct* missionary activity it is very difficult to say. Some passages seem to imply it; others to tell against it. But in either case the missionary idea, whether actively or passively carried out, is clear and decisive. And we moderns who find in this conception of a mission an essential feature of our Judaism can and do return for constant encouragement and sustainment to the words of the great Old Testament teacher. We may apply his doctrine according to our modern needs; we may develop it; but the root of the matter goes back to him. Doctrine and conception are his. And his disciples are we.

It has already been noted that Isaiah xl.-lv. represents, as regards the relation of God to Israel, the high-water mark of Old Testament achievement. But though the standard of this great writer was not maintained, his influence continued. The universalism of many Psalms is due to him. "All the ends of the world shall remember and turn unto Yahweh; all the kindreds of the nations shall worship before him." This and many similar passages were partly prompted by his words. And that mysterious 87th Psalm, which speaks of Zion as the spiritual mother of the nations, could hardly have been written had his prophecy not been written first. We may also imagine that the protests against a policy of narrowness and reaction, of which in some Old Testament writings we seem to hear the echoes, were due to him. Was Jonah written to urge Israel not to be faithless to its great mission? The Yahweh of Jonah is the God of the whole

earth. He is the God of pity and of loving-kindness not only towards Israel, and it irritates Jonah that he knows that such is the divine character. Nineveh was the capital of Israel's old enemies, yet should God not "spare Nineveh, that great city, wherein are more than six score thousand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand, and also much cattle"? Truly, the "particularist" Old Testament has great and notable exceptions! And upon these exceptions we still feed with profit and delight to-day. And had not that unknown writer (Isaiah xix. 18-25) read Isaiah xl.-lv. when he wrote of the healing of Egypt, or when he, or yet another, foretold the day when Israel should be but "the third with Egypt and Assyria, even a blessing in the midst of the earth," and when Yahweh would bless them all, saying, "Blessed be Egypt My people, and Assyria the work of My hands, and Israel Mine inheritance"? We need not boggle at Israel being God's inheritance, if two such old enemies as Egypt and Assyria, and two such leading representatives of the Gentile world, are God's people and the work of His hands!

SECTION V

THE RELATION OF MAN TO GOD ACCORDING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT

More strictly this section should be entitled: "The relation of the Israelite to Yahweh." But we can generalise where the Old Testament particularises. If a valuable or beautiful relationship is set forth about Israel and Yahweh, or about the Israelite

and Yahweh, we can at once turn Israel into humanity, and Yahweh into God.

Some repetition is hardly avoidable. The relation of man to God depends upon the relation of God to man. As a given teacher or poet or sage conceives of the former, so does he, too, conceive of the latter. If God is for him a creator, he feels towards Him as a creature would to his maker. If God is pictured as the source of favour and of prosperity, but also as the dispenser of punishment and calamity, then man seeks to win His grace and avert His wrath and solicit His forgiveness. According to God's character and His dealings with man, so is He feared or revered or loved. Nevertheless, while following these general lines, the relationship of man to God works out in various ways. The same God, the God whose character is fundamentally the same for all, can yet be looked at from different angles. Different minds conceive their relationship to Him in different ways. He makes a different impression upon different people. Three men might all agree that God was just, merciful, loving, dispenser of punishment and of reward, and yet they could all approach God, or think of Him, or even worship Him, with considerable variety. For different aspects of God can make different appeal to this man and to that. And though the doctrine, which is professed and believed, may be in each instance the same, it is not realised or made vital in the same manner. Each person transfigures and transmutes it according to his special conception. It goes in one, but comes out various.

How the higher minds in Israel felt towards God, after the prophets had done their work, and

perhaps, we should also add, after the lawgivers had done theirs, is reflected for us in the Psalter. That is one of the reasons why the book of Psalms is of such enormous religious value. The writers are not primarily concerned to teach or even to edify. They are just expressing their own emotions; giving vent and free play to their own feelings, aspirations, joys, and sorrows. We must, indeed, make some deductions from this statement: like most statements of this kind it needs qualification. There is, in spite of their many differences, a certain family likeness in the Psalms; the writers keep within certain limits, and follow certain broad, common lines. And some of the Psalms, it must be allowed, are little more than conventional and imitative, though these very Psalms are, for us, extremely valuable, because they show what had become the accepted, or even, if you please, the popular view about God's character, about His relations to man and man's relations to Him. But when all deductions have been made, it remains fairly true to say that in the Psalter we have the unconstrained and free expression of the writers' feelings and opinions at the moment of composition. Most of them were written primarily, not to help others, or to teach them (a few are consciously didactic), but, as true poems are written, to relieve and to unburden the soul, to quiet the emotions in expressing them.

The Prophets had taught what is God's relation to Israel. They had also told what should be Israel's relation to God. So, too, the lawgivers. They set forth God's laws; the ways in which men should walk, the duties they are to observe towards one another and towards God. The Psalmists tell

us something of how (on the basis of all this teaching) Israelites did actually feel towards God ; what He was to them, what they found in Him, what they got out of Him.

What they tell us is uneven in value. Yet the essence of it has been permanent. We live on it still to-day. Judaism is not the Psalter, but much of the Psalter has gone to constitute Judaism, and much of Judaism is in the Psalter. The highest and deepest things in the Psalter should be written in letters of gold. Of them it could hardly be said : " The Psalter's words—and after." There has been no " after." In the sense of development or improvement there hardly needs to be an " after." At least, an " after," so far as they are concerned, seems hardly needed for *Judaism*. And many who are not Jews would, I fancy, be inclined to say, an " after " is hardly needed for mankind.

Yet the Psalter, even at its highest, draws sustenance from common roots. The summit does not hang in the air. It is not cut away from its base. In one sense we may say that the Psalter at its highest is yet organically connected with Old Testament doctrine as a whole. It shares in certain presuppositions. Some people might say, it shares in certain limitations. The God of the Psalter at its highest is still Yahweh, the God of Israel. And He is still a " personal," " self-conscious " divinity, omnipresent, but yet not identical with, or merely immanent in, the world which He has made. The relation of man to God as we find it in the Psalter at its highest is, it is true, very different from that relation, as we may reconstruct it, in the oldest period of Israel's history ; nevertheless it has been developed out of that relation ; the links which

connect it with its origin are not difficult to trace ; it is, in one sense, the old relation purified and spiritualised, but not contradicted or volatilised away. Yahweh has been purified indeed, but He has not been evaporated.

The Israelite, who was Isaiah's contemporary and Hosea's, thought of Yahweh as a very real and powerful divinity, who was the source of Israel's weal and woe. And if the source of Israel's weal and woe, then the source, too, of every Israelite's. Upon Him and His goodness, or even good humour, depended the rain for the crops. His wrath was destructive ; His favour gave prosperity. But neither favour nor wrath was purely arbitrary, even though there was no accounting for everything which Yahweh did or caused. Yahweh demanded obedience ; and many an Israelite, we may surmise, even before Hosea came or Amos, knew that He demanded exclusive allegiance. He liked offerings and sacrifices, but He liked justice too, and hospitality, and decent behaviour. Yahweh was the Lord ; Israel was His servant. Such was the plain and natural relationship between God and man.

This simple conception was further moralised and spiritualised, but it was never overthrown. God is always the ruler and the master and the king. He has a double right to Israel's obedience and worship. First, He is God and the Israelite is man ; He is divine ; the Israelite is human. And whoever heard of gods who did not rule, and of men who did not obey ? Secondly, He is Yahweh, who made a special covenant with Israel, choosing the Israelites for His special possession, and in return for His choice, His favour, and His

solicitude, exacting from them exclusive worship and frank obedience. Not only had Yahweh chosen Israel, but, in a sense, Israel had chosen Yahweh. It had agreed to serve Him. They were to be His people, and He was to be their God. They accepted the conditions, and it was their duty to fulfil them. Though the Psalmists do not, for the most part, emphasise the aspect of obedience, they imply it. To them, too, Yahweh is king. He is their Lord; they are His subjects and servants.

And this conception, though fused with others and given a more inward interpretation, is still part of Jewish Theism, still part of Liberal as well as of Orthodox Judaism. Our newer fruit is yet fruit of the old tree. To be obedient to God, to worship Him, to be humble towards Him, to walk in all His ways, to fulfil (so far as human frailty may permit) His laws—all this has meaning for us still, and not only meaning, but validity. It is true that the obedience we think of and seek to render is less outward than inward. God's laws are not so much imposed from without, sent down to us from heaven, as discovered (by His help) from within. We achieved, if God revealed. And in obedience we found our freedom. God's laws are the laws of our own true being; because they are most essentially and truly ours they are also His; for He and we are akin. But they are not *merely* ours; nor do these laws come to us or appeal to us with a merely human authority. We, too, bow down before them in humility and awe. They have "objective" value. They are "the unwritten and unfailing statutes of heaven, for their life is not of to-day or yesterday, but from all

time"; they are "of range sublime, and their parent was no race of mortal men, nor will oblivion ever lay them to sleep." For reason and righteousness and love are (as we believe) not merely human, but superhuman: they are older than man and diviner; they are the creation of God. They are what He is. Thus God is still for us our master and our king. He is master and king as well as father and saviour. And He alone. The fundamental attitude of the Old Testament towards God, the basis of the relation of man to Yahweh, as it is there conceived, are still ours.

How does the servant approach his master? There are three primary ways which we may fitly notice here, because they have all continued, even though their meanings and applications have been deepened or modified. Fear, gratitude, and supplication: these are, I think, the primary three.

There is only one word in Hebrew for fear. But the fear of Yahweh, as we find the word used in the Psalms and Proverbs, may more properly be translated by reverence. That fear which is the beginning of wisdom and, even more, that fear which is a fountain of life and the hatred of evil, that fear which suggests praise and confidence and trust, and which can be allied and associated with love, is not the same fear which men feel towards the adder or the tiger, or even the same fear which they feel towards a human despot. It is this kind of fear—awe, reverence, humility, adoration—which is implied in the fear of the Psalmists and the Sages. It rests indeed upon a basis of fear in the sense of terror. It has been evolved out of such a fear. But in its full development it is far removed from vulgar fright. It does, indeed,

depend upon the difference between God and man, between perfection and sinfulness, omnipotence and frailty, omniscience and ignorance, purity and uncleanness. It does perceive the awful distance that separates the Creator from the creature, even though, in a special sense, that distance can be transcended, even though the Creator, though distant, is also very near. It does appreciate the fact that God punishes man for his iniquities, and that the consequences of sin may be appalling. But not one of these implications—not even the last—makes this fear a slavish fear, inconsistent with love, inconsistent with a sense of kinship as well as of difference, inconsistent with a conviction that God is the loving father as well as the master, the lawgiver, and the king. Hence the fear of God is still upheld and taught in modern Judaism to-day. Its Old Testament implications are our own. Even the last (that God punishes) we too accept, albeit in a more inward and spiritual form than that in which it would have been interpreted by most, if not all, of the Psalmists, Sages, and Prophets of the Hebrew Bible.

It is needless to say many words about the way of gratitude. It is simple and obvious. For all the good and the joy of life, for all prosperity and well-being, both national and individual, the servant is thankful and grateful to the divine master and giver. "All things come of Thee." This conviction is rooted deep in the Jewish heart. Thus for present and for past mercies Yahweh is blessed and praised. So, too, for deliverance out of trouble and distress : the prevailing attitude of piety is to accept the woe as deserved, to give thanks for the salvation as a gift. And this prevailing attitude

continued throughout the ages. That for which God is thanked is both the outward and the inward. He is thanked for the corn and the oil, but He is also thanked for the teaching and the statutes : He is thanked for Himself, for His nearness to Israel and to the Israelite. Gratitude passes over into praise and joy. Evil is powerless to dislodge it from the heart of the worshipper. Is it not thus even to-day ?

The way of supplication is still trodden. Its application in the Old Testament is simple and ancient. Men ask Yahweh for His favour, or for victory, or for the removal of calamity, or for the forgiveness of sin. They ask to be taught His ways, to be allowed to dwell in His house, and to be granted a fuller vision of Him and a deeper knowledge. Even for such things do they ask to-day, though the inward has more often displaced the outward, and the spiritual the material. But the deeper petitions of the Psalmists are our petitions still, and their words are ours. We adopt them, and, in many cases, we do not even need to adapt them. "Create in me a clean heart, O God." "Teach me to do Thy will." What is there here to better or to change ?

It is very interesting and of great significance that the first larger code—the code of Deuteronomy, which was so deeply affected by the teaching of the Prophets—should have laid such stress, not only upon fear and on obedience, but also upon love. In some not over friendly quarters it seems almost painful that it has to be allowed that the love of God is emphasised in the Old Testament, and emphasised—*horribile dictu*—in the Law ! Yet so it is. "What does Yahweh thy God require of thee,

but to fear Yahweh thy God, to walk in all His ways, and to love Him, and to serve Yahweh thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul." It needed a much later and more reflective age to conceive that there could be any opposition between this demanded fear and this no less demanded love. The prophetic summary of true religion: "What does Yahweh require of thee but to do justly, and to love mercy (Chesed), and to walk humbly before thy God?" was not regarded in those early days as different from the interrogation in Deuteronomy. Are we to say that the love which is thus associated with obedience and fear must be a poorer love because of this association, or shall we rather say that the fear must be a nobler fear, and the obedience a freer obedience, because of their combination with love? I think that, on the whole, the latter is truer, though I would not wish to assert that the authors of Deuteronomy could have conceived a love as profound as that of Akiba. As his legalism was more intense than theirs, so, too, was his love! But yet their love was deep enough, and they meant what they said. The fear is exalted; the love is not depressed. And it was a wonderful, and I would almost suppose, a divinely guided, instinct that led later Jews (it must have been, I imagine, at the close of the Old Testament period) to fasten upon Deuteronomy vi. 4, 5 as the supreme doctrine and the supreme command of the Law and of Judaism. The doctrine, as we saw, was, indeed, deepened and even modified, beyond its original meaning. The unity of God, in our fuller senses of the word, is hardly taught in the declaration "Hear, O Israel, Yahweh our God is one Yahweh." But the *command* is distinct and plain and comprehensive. "Thou

shalt love Yahweh thy God with *all* thine heart, and with *all* thy soul and with *all* thy might." No words could be more definite and uncompromising. This combination of the cardinal doctrine with the cardinal command has been of immense importance in Jewish history. It has united theory and practice together. It has welded together dogma and life. Hence the Shema is still for us what it was for our ancestors two thousand years ago ; so far as God is concerned, it is the alpha and the omega of our faith.

Yet the Psalter teaches us, I think, not to be the slave of words. For if one thing is more clear than another it is surely this : that the Psalmists, or shall we perhaps more justly say, the more finely touched spirits among them, had appropriated and had obeyed the Deuteronomic injunction. They did love Yahweh. They loved Him with all their soul. Nevertheless the word "love"—that is the Hebrew verb *Ahob* and its corresponding noun—is rarely found in the Psalms as applied to a relation of man to God. The author of the 119th Psalm constantly speaks of loving God's law and His statutes. We hear, too, of the love of God's name, of His salvation, of His house. But the direct love of God Himself is rarely alluded to. "The Lord preserves all who love Him." "O love the Lord, all ye His saints." "Ye that love the Lord hate evil." "I love Yahweh because He has heard my supplication." For the Psalter these seem rather meagre applications of the Deuteronomic command and ideal. One would or might have thought that the reflection would have been far more brilliant. And yet is the lack of the word real proof of the lack of the thing? I hardly think so. The feeling of love is expressed in other words. Yahweh, who to the Psalmists was

stronghold and rock, in whose light they found light, who gave them peace and confidence and joy—that Yahweh was surely *loved*, and loved not so much (and here the Psalter is so precious to us) for what He gave as for what He was. Or if He is loved for what He gives, it is for the spiritual gifts He gives, for that very sense of nearness, of communion, of gladness, and of rest. The deepest value of the Psalms for us lies in their simple, yet profound mysticism. It is here that they reach the best which the Old Testament has to tell us of the relation between man and God. “Rest in God ; trust in God,” culminates in a rapturous closeness and joy. “How excellent is Thy loving-kindness, O God ; therefore the children of men take refuge under the shadow of Thy wings. They are abundantly satisfied with the fatness of Thy house, and Thou makest them to drink of the river of Thy pleasures. For with Thee is the fountain of life ; in Thy light do we see light.” No less wonderful are the words of another singer. “Because Thy loving-kindness is *better than life*, my lips shall praise Thee. . . . My soul follows hard after Thee, Thy right hand upholds me.” And again: “I am continually with Thee: Thou holdest me by my right hand. Whom have I in heaven but Thee? And there is none upon earth that I desire beside Thee. Though my flesh and my heart should fail, God is the strength of my heart and my portion for ever.” Love is not mentioned. But had these Psalmists not fulfilled the Law? Had they not obeyed the great injunction of Deuteronomy?

These passages are doubtless the three most rapturous utterances in the Psalter, but it can hardly be said that they are more than the culmination

of a prevailing tendency. In any other sense they are not exceptional. Especially noticeable is the frequent feeling of joy. "Thou hast put gladness in my heart more than in those whose corn and wine have increased." Spiritual joy surpasses material joy. "Rejoice in Yahweh, O ye righteous; be glad in Him and shout for joy." This joy in God's strength and presence and in the consciousness of His nearness was mediated in many cases by the Temple. The house of God stimulated the sense of God. Away from the Temple, the Psalmist pants and thirsts for God, even as the hart for the water brooks. He "longs and faints for the courts of Yahweh, his heart cries aloud unto the living God." But he does not really think that God is limited to Jerusalem or confined within the Temple. He is well aware that wherever he walks, even if it be through the darkest valley, the good shepherd is with him, and that the divine "rod and staff" are there to protect and sustain him. "In God's presence is fulness of joys; in His right hand are pleasures for evermore." This is stated in a Psalm where the Temple is not mentioned. In the long 119th Psalm the love of God passes over into a love of His law; the combination is characteristic of the latter, Rabbinic Judaism. We, too, can appropriate it. He who loves God must also love the Moral Law, and he who loves the Law (with a reverential and adoring love) must also love its guarantee and its source. To love goodness is to love God.

We have seen that many metaphors are employed in the Psalter to express the many-sided relation of man to God as of God to man. To the Psalmists God was shepherd and stronghold; He was sun and shield; He was master and king. How far,

we now may ask, did the Psalmists or any other Old Testament writers conceive the relation of themselves to God as of children to their father? The answer is that this particular metaphor is rarely used, but is by no means unknown. Israel, the nation, was certainly regarded as the child or son of God, but in the Old Testament pages the individual Israelite seldom addresses God as his Father. "Thou art our Father, for Abraham is ignorant of us, and Israel does not acknowledge us; Thou, O Yahweh, art our Father; our redeemer was Thy name of old." So we read in Isaiah lxiii. 16, and again in the next chapter: "Thou art our Father: we are the clay and Thou our potter; we are all the work of Thy hand." The David of Chronicles exclaims: "Blessed be Thou, Yahweh, God of Israel, our Father, for ever and ever." And already in the "Song" of Deuteronomy xxxii. God is called the Father of Israel. God promises David in the Second Book of Samuel that He will be a father to David's child, and "he shall be to Me a son." More important is the saying of the Psalmist: "As a father pities his children, so Yahweh pities those who fear Him." Or the famous adage of the Sage: "Whom the Lord loves He chastens: even as a father the son in whom he delights," which has its close parallel in Deuteronomy. But these and other instances, while they show that the metaphor was well known, do not prove that it was constantly employed. Jesus habitually, and the Rabbis very frequently, spoke of God as "our Father." This method of addressing God was not common, so far as we can gather, in the Old Testament period. Was much lost by the non-use of the word? Was much gained by its adoption? Or, rather, what

are the implications of the metaphor, and are these implications unknown to the Old Testament writers? We shall, I think, find that some of them are familiar enough, but that others are less so, and that in the manner in which Jesus uses the metaphor, and in the deductions which he makes from it, there may, perhaps, have been a certain measure of religious development and advance.

The first implication in the metaphor is complete trust and confidence. This is already found in the Psalter and in the Old Testament. Secondly, a child not only trusts his father, but he also loves him. Well, the love of God is already the ideal of Deuteronomy. Thirdly, the son is on friendly terms with his father. He can always enter into his presence. He may draw near unto him. There can be the best of understandings between father and son. Here, too, I doubt whether the best Old Testament writers and saints had much to learn. Now, in all these ways and respects, there is a certain difference between the attitude of a son to his father, and the attitude of a servant to his lord. It would be agreed that the one is a *freer* attitude than the other. And it is contended that herein lies the difference of the "Old Testament" attitude towards God from the attitude of Jesus and, following him, of the New Testament writers. The one attitude is that of servant to master; the other is that of child to father. The difference makes itself felt in two main relations. The servant works for reward. The son serves, not for reward, but for love. There is no idea of recompense or of measure in the son's service. Even as the father's love for the son is limitless, so too is the son's love for the father. In the next place, the servant has always before him as

his ideal a relationship of obedience: if we are dealing with orientals of the olden time, moreover, the word "servant" should be replaced by the word "slave." Then the contrast between the attitude of slave to master and the attitude of son to father is obviously heightened. The son obeys the father, but it is a free obedience: he has always before him as his ideal a relationship of liberty. It is among these ideas that the advance made by Jesus lay. Not that in the finest Old Testament passages there is any sense of constraint; to talk of the relation between the Psalmists and God as one of severity is absurd. But what is implicit in the Psalter is made prominent and explicit in the words of Jesus and elsewhere in the New Testament. And we want right teaching to be not only implicit, but also central and explicit. It should, however, be added that it was also, with slightly different touches and accents, made explicit by the Rabbis.

It has already been observed that one type of supplication familiar to us in the pages of the Old Testament is a prayer for forgiveness. The lower motive for such prayers is doubtless the desire either to escape punishment or to be freed from misfortune and calamity, which are regarded as punishment. For, as we shall see, the prevailing view, which led to so much difficulty and even anguish, was that one could argue back from suffering to sin. Yet, over and above the lower motive there was a higher. Sin separated the sinner from God: his "nearness" could no longer be apprehended; there was a wall between Deity and man. With the consciousness of sin in the mind, it was no longer possible to "rejoice before the Lord." True joy is the prerogative of the righteous. It is beyond the

reach of the high-handed sinner; it is even beyond the opportunity of him who, though not reckless or defiant as regards God, has yet not made his peace with Him, who has not repented and been forgiven. The few passages in the Psalter in which this point of view is made clearly manifest are of the highest value. We are nourished by them still to-day. In such Psalms as the 32nd and the 51st this spiritual teaching seems to be clearly set forth. We do not read into them any modern gloss. On the contrary. We owe *our* conceptions to *them*. "Happy is he whose transgression is forgiven." It is only the righteous or the forgiven who can rejoice in the Lord. To the wicked, as the prophet says, "there is no peace." "Your iniquities have separated you from your God." The "clean heart" for which the Psalmist prays will bring him near again to God. This joy of salvation is at least as much inward as outward. The sense of the divine presence, the coming of the Holy Spirit, are both its evidence and its result.

The relation of man to God is partly expressed in worship. For what purpose does man worship God? We can observe in the Old Testament two old and gradually superseded ideas. (1) God is specifically worshipped by gifts and sacrifices in order to secure His favour or His forgiveness; (2) these gifts and sacrifices are paid to Him because He likes them.

These ideas were modified or spiritualised in two directions. First, there came the great prophetic achievement that the worship and the offerings which God asks and likes, demands and cares for, are not sheep and goats and incense and oil, but justice, compassion, contrition, and the pure heart. The

achievement is familiar. It can be stated in very few words, and it is needless to dwell on it in detail. But it is of deathless importance, and we live upon it to this day. The old error crops up in new forms. And we constantly need to recur, with a sense of their ever fresh significance, to the simple and immortal words: "I desire love and not sacrifice, and the knowledge of God rather than burnt offerings." "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and a contrite heart Thou, O God, wilt not despise." So far, then, as God has pleasure in human action, He feels that pleasure when man obeys His voice. And such obedience is by Jeremiah sharply distinguished from sacrifices and burnt offerings. Obedience does, indeed, mean the exclusive worship of Yahweh; it does mean no idolatry; but, otherwise, it only means justice, compassion, love.

Secondly, while man needs God, God does not need man. At any rate, He needs him in a very different sense from that in which man needs God. It is good to worship God for one's own sake and for the sheer joy of it, but God is neither forgetful, on the one hand, nor in want, upon the other, that He should require human reminders or human gifts. "If I were hungry, I would not tell thee; for the world is Mine and the fulness thereof." "Can a man," says Eliphaz, "be profitable unto God? Nay, the wise man is profitable only unto himself. Does Almighty God care for thy righteousness? Has He gain from thy blameless ways?" In other words, "God does not need either man's work or His own gifts." So too Elihu declares: "What effect has thy sin upon God? What cares He for thy many transgressions? What gain comes to Him from thy righteousness? What receives He

from thy hand? It is to men like thyself thy sin matters, it is mortals thy righteousness touches." God is wholly self-sufficient. These utterances of Eliphaz and of Elihu have been very sharply criticised as revealing "a utilitarian or commercial conception of religion and a loveless conception of God." But, as I have elsewhere had occasion to observe, neither Eliphaz nor Elihu really merits, any more than Milton does, this severe condemnation. It is true that they go very much beyond the Psalmist, and that they go too far. Sacrifices and material gifts are one thing: righteousness is another. God does, we may believe, "care" for the second, however indifferent He may be to the first. Still, it was not without value in the development of the doctrine of God to point out that "God primarily desires human righteousness for man's sake, not for His own sake: that man's virtues affect man, and that man's sins injure man. If God rewards the one and punishes the other, He does not do so for any benefit or injury which *He* has sustained, but because man deserves what he receives, and is benefited by receiving it. It was necessary to establish the divine independence and self-sufficiency before one could safely go on to find a certain mystical or ontological sense in which it might be supposed that the fortunes, or the moral condition, of man affect God."¹ The relation of a man to God had first to be shown to be one where God gives and does not receive, and man receives and does not give, before any higher stage could be attempted in which man might be conceived as participating with God in the conquest of evil, or in the production of the divine kingdom, whether upon earth or beyond it. But that God

¹ *Judaism and Hellenism*, p. 295.

may be supposed to grieve over man's sin and to rejoice in his righteousness is doctrine in which we may still believe. The Old Testament speaks more of the "grieving" (or of the "anger") than of the rejoicing. But the one is only the complement of the other. If God may be supposed to suffer and to grieve, He must also be supposed to be capable of satisfaction and of joy. If human sin can cause the one, human righteousness must cause the other.

Meanwhile it emerges from the best Old Testament thought that the relation between man and God is not regarded as a bargain. "Do ut des" is a false description of it. The Old Testament rises above the level of such tit for tat. Man serves God to please God, and yet even the divine pleasure does not *fully* express the object of his service. He serves God in order to be prosperous and happy, but still less does this object exhaust, or fully indicate, the object of his service. He does not even serve God as a *mere* thankoffering. Two opposite purposes may be named as objects of his service. From one point of view he serves God exclusively for his own sake. From another, he serves God exclusively for God's sake. For to serve God in the true sense of being and doing "good" is man's wisdom and happiness. To disobey God is not merely rebellion and sin, but folly and misery. Those who reject God's service "wrong their own souls"; "all they that hate God love death." On the other hand, man serves God for the spread of the divine glory and for the sanctification of His name. This thought, too, is present, at least in germ, in the Old Testament. Israel, at any rate, exists and must labour, or must even die, for God's sake and for the wider diffusion of His glory. So,

too, Israel must imitate God: he must be holy even as God is holy. As man, or Israel, owes everything to God, so can he not render back what he owes. He cannot merit the divine mercies. The words of Jacob: "I am not worthy of the least of Thy mercies" represent in simple and child-like form the higher thought of the Hebrew Bible in this regard. Doubtless God renders to man according to man's work. Doubtless, too, we get in some of the Psalms rather loud protestations of innocency, which sometimes seem to amount to an assumption of self-righteousness. But the higher view emerges, on the whole, successfully. Before God there is no merit. If, on the one hand, God does not requite man's sins as the sins deserve, so, on the other hand, man cannot claim reward because of, and in proportion to, his virtues. Man's true relation to God is one of grace received, not of services rendered. This conception, too, is of Old Testament origin, though it was developed and made more clear and explicit elsewhere. And so far as the worship or service of God is carried out by specific ceremonial acts, and not (as essentially it must be) by deeds of righteousness and love, this worship and this service are also either purely self-regarding or purely altruistic! These ceremonial acts are done for the pure joy and satisfaction of doing them, and not for the sake of God, or, again, they are done to honour and praise God, and not for the sake of a reward.¹

¹ I admit that it is not easy to make definite quotations to illustrate or prove what has been said in the last few sentences. Yet I do not think they go beyond the general impression which is made upon the mind by the Psalter, the Wisdom Literature, and the Prophets as a whole: neglecting, that is, as we have for our purpose a right to do, all the lower elements in those books and concentrating one's attention upon what is highest and best. The spirit of the best is not other than what I have stated in the text.

SECTION VI

MAN: HIS RIGHTEOUSNESS AND HIS SIN

As our object is not to give any systematic account of what is contained in the Old Testament concerning the various subjects with which we have to deal, we can pass very lightly over much which in the text-books has to be discussed at length. We have to set forth neither Old Testament psychology nor Old Testament ethics, and thus we can escape from many a perplexing, or, at any rate, complicated problem. The precise and various meanings of the words *Nefesh*, *Ruach*, *Neshamah*, *Basar*, need not concern us. Nor need we consider how far the word *Zedakah* has moved away from its etymology, or how far it still suggests conformity to a standard or rule. For our purposes righteousness or justice can usually translate or represent *Zedakah*, and where it cannot do so, the passages in question are hardly of much value for our particular and limited object. When it is said in the Psalter, "Yahweh is just and loves justice," or "Yahweh is righteous and loves righteousness," we may, indeed, generalise the word "justice" or "righteousness" beyond the particular sense in which the Psalmist employed it: he was thinking mainly of the punishment of the wicked, while for us such punishment is only one, and perhaps not the most important, of the applications of justice or of righteousness, whether human or divine. Nevertheless, fundamentally, *Zedakah* meant for him what justice and righteousness mean for us, and we do not read different and modern significations into his utterance when we translate his Hebrew by our

English. Again, for the higher thought of the Old Testament, and for our special purpose in discussing or setting it forth, the various words for sin can be more or less lumped together, and it is needless to dwell at length upon the shades of difference between them. We, too, often use sin and transgression and iniquity as synonymous, and for our particular object in this book it will hardly be requisite to distinguish between the precise significations of Chet, Pesha, Avon, etc.

But there is another reason why we can lightly pass over many details which in books on Old Testament theology, ethics, or psychology have to be discussed in detail. We have passed beyond much which is found in the Hebrew Bible: its primitive standpoints are no longer ours. The early conceptions of the "soul" are interesting from an historical point of view, but are not of value for present-day religion. There is a certain simplicity about Old Testament ideas concerning sin which, on the one hand, does not hinder or repel us, but, on the other hand, does not carry us very far. We can generally use what we find, more especially in the later writings, but we are conscious of a certain inadequacy. Some problems are left untouched or unsettled altogether, or, perhaps, one should rather say, about some problems no set theory is advanced and maintained at all. There is a great lack of philosophic thought. Everything is very simple and even fluid. Nevertheless, we are the heirs of this simplicity, and we have been fed upon it. We have developed it; we have realised its inadequacies and its gaps; we have perceived its superficialities. But we have not turned our back upon it. This very simplicity is

an advantage. We can deepen the meaning of the words in which it is expressed or which it employs. And, so far as it goes, we still largely believe in it. It represents our own common sense. We are not in antagonism to it.

I suppose that this agreement of ours with the higher, or even with the prevailing, Old Testament thought on the subject of sin and righteousness and human nature depends also partly upon the very fact that there *is* no system, and that there are only just a number of tendencies, observations, and aspirations not always, by any means, consistent with one another. Nothing is pushed to a theoretic extreme. All is life-like and actual. It therefore appeals to our own experience and common sense, even though we are frequently aware that the writers are much above us in genius, in passion, in spirituality, in faith. But partly our agreement is also caused by the fact that the Old Testament view of life, in one or two important and fundamental respects, is the same as our own. When I say "the same as our own," I mean both the same as that of the average man in the street, whether Christian or Jew, and the same as that of our developed modern Judaism to-day. That looks as if I thought and meant that the views of the average man in the street and the views of developed modern Judaism were identical. I do not mean that. But yet, in one or two important respects, modern Judaism, in a deeper and more reasoned way, accepts and champions the views (the common sense) of the average man in the street (while recognising their inadequacy and incompleteness), and in these very same respects the Old Testament is in agreement with both.

The first of these points is, I take it, a certain

optimism; or rather a certain judgement that earthly life is, on the whole, good, and that it is made good by the will and effort of man and by the help and the grace of God. Even now that, unlike the heroes and saints of the Old Testament, the men of faith to-day look forward to an existence with God beyond the confines of death, they yet can say—so Judaism teaches—“Thank God for earthly life; earthly life is, or can be, not evil, but good.” Now this judgement or valuation can be held in a shallow sort of way, and doubtless often is. It can be held by shutting the eyes to phenomena which contradict it. And this, too, is often the case. It needs qualifications. It, perhaps, needs the acknowledgement of permanent and inexplicable rough edges. It, perhaps, needs a sort of transmutation or transfiguration, and even modern Judaism may be at some fault for often holding it too superficially, but if we are Jews at all, we must, and we do, accept it as fundamentally or predominantly true. And because we hold that earthly life is, or can be, made good, the Old Testament still appeals to us, and we are, in one essential point, in deep agreement with it. Then, too, connected with this “optimism,” there is the view that what we may call the outward, the material, the bodily, is in itself neither illusory nor evil. It may become evil for us by our attitude towards it, or by our own use of it. But, in itself, it is not evil. In itself it is neither good nor evil. But it may, in our use of it, become good. Body, as well as soul, is the gift of God, even though the combination of the two is the cause of our sin as well as the cause of our righteousness. Flesh of itself and by itself is not sinful. Now this doctrine too can be held, and is often held, in a shallow way. It can be made

to justify a feeble desire for comfort and outward well-being, an unstrenuous and very average goodness. It can be used to depress the tendency towards moral heroism and adventure. It is a dangerous doctrine, because it consorts with flabbiness and the desire for ease, because it can even be appealed to by selfishness. It needs qualifications; the approval, or rather the non-condemnation, of the outward and the material requires the spiritual and the inward to be exalted the more. But the more difficult doctrine may yet be the truer doctrine. At any rate, it is this acceptance of the outward as also the gift and creation of God which paves the way for the doctrine of its sanctification. And it is *this* view of the outward which unites us with the Old Testament writers, and makes us in *prima facie* agreement with them. Sometimes, indeed, their words are *too* near to the views of the man in the street: sometimes we need to be braced and stimulated by a view complementary, or even opposed, to theirs. But, in the long run, we can and do always return to the Old Testament with profit and satisfaction because of these fundamental agreements. For we too look upon life as good, or as capable of being made good; we too find in no part of creation an essential antagonism to goodness and to God.

There is, then, in the Old Testament view of man's nature nothing which fundamentally repels us. Body and soul, say we, and that is practically what the Old Testament says too. It does not make any more subtle divisions into body, soul, and spirit. Dust and spirit make up together the man we know. When this "dust" or earth is animated by spirit, it is spoken of as flesh. The word we commonly translate "soul" often stands

for the whole living personality, the “I,” but it often is little more than a synonym for “spirit”; it stands for the “inward self”; the seat of mind and heart; sometimes roughly equivalent to one of them and sometimes to the other. Man is a compound of dust and spirit, or of flesh and spirit; and by experience it is observed that he is frail and weak and transitory and sinful. The weakness and transitoriness of man’s nature partly excuses, and partly accounts for, his sinfulness. God forgives our iniquity when He remembers our “frame,” when He bethinks Him that we are but “dust” or “flesh,” “a wind which passes away and comes not again.” Yet though the flesh and the dust and the frame are thought of as a cause of general weakness (which issues in sin), they are not thought of as themselves the seat of sin. Man is not sinful *because* he is partly material, because he has a body, because he is “flesh.” The sin is regarded as an obvious consequence of the transitoriness, of the physical frailty, but though the two conceptions are connected, they are not, as Dr. Davidson well points out, confused or identified. He quotes the words of Eliphaz in Job: “Shall man be righteous before God? Can a man be pure before his maker? Behold He puts no trust in His servants, and He charges His angels with error. How much more man that dwells in houses of clay, whose foundation is in the dust.” “In all such passages,” says Dr. Davidson very rightly, “the universal sinfulness of man is strongly expressed, and his physical weakness and liability to decay serve to strengthen the impression or liability of his moral frailty. . . . It is considered natural that one physically so frail should also be

morally frail and sinful. Physical frailty is pleaded as a ground of compassion for moral frailty. But the two do not seem to be confounded ; neither is it taught that the cause of man's moral frailty is to be found in his physical nature, or that the flesh is in itself sinful or the seat of sin." ¹

Yet whatever the cause, the fact is acknowledged. In one well-known passage it is even clearly and definitely stated : "There is no man who does not sin." And, again, in Proverbs : "Who can say I have made my heart clean : I am pure from my sin ?" The Preacher is more pessimist in outlook than any other Old Testament writer, yet he would hardly have been contradicted when he wrote : "There is not a righteous man upon earth who does (only) good and never sins." I suppose we should all agree with the Biblical authors.

How do they account for the fact ? Not historically by Adam's sin and fall. For in the Old Testament this story is never made use of. Original sin, in the sense of a punishment inflicted by God upon the whole human race because of the first man's disobedience, is unknown. It is unknown, too, in the sense of a sort of transmitted poison, curse, or guilt, which passes with divinely appointed inevitability, from generation to generation. It is only original in the sense that it is native to the race, that the make and constitution of man render it inevitable. It is true that in one remarkable verse in the greatest, or one of the greatest, of the Psalms we find the utterance : "Behold I was brought forth in iniquity and in sin did my mother conceive me," but the passage is isolated, and its meaning is uncertain. Probably

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 192.

Duhm is right in saying that it does not refer to the fact of procreation : it does not mean, as Dr. Kohler supposes, that " every sexual act is the work of sensuality, the Yetzer ha'ra," but it is merely a poetical way of declaring that the writer, like every other man, is descended from sinful men and women, and that he has, therefore, been inclined, or had a tendency, towards sinfulness from his very childhood. From the unclean, as Job has it, the completely clean cannot come forth. The Psalmist does not mean much more than Isaiah when he says that he and the people among whom he dwells are all alike (morally) impure. Or as the old writer in Genesis puts it : " The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth."

As to the nature of sin the writers of the Old Testament again show their simplicity. We find no speculation or theory. But even the quotations already made are enough to show that sin, while expressing itself in sinful deeds, and more specifically in the violation of God's commands, is yet recognised to proceed from man's inmost constitution, from his self, from his heart. The sin may be the deed, but the sinfulness of the sin, so to speak, is the wicked self, the wicked heart, the evil desire. Only God can fully know the heart in its complexity and its sinfulness. " The heart of man," says Jeremiah, " is deceitful and woefully sick : who can know it ? Only God, therefore, who searches (and does know) the heart, can render unto every man according to his ways."

All this is simple, and while we should scarcely deny it, it is not very inspiring. We are neither attracted by it nor repelled.

What is it that makes this constitution of man

so liable to sin? Over and above man's clay or dust, breathed into his frame, is his spirit, and this spirit is the more special gift of God. It is, indeed, allied to the divine spirit itself. All life comes from God, and is, in a sense, divine. It is God's spirit, according to the Psalmist, which is in every living thing, in the beast as well as in man. Nevertheless, from another point of view, it is the spirit of man which distinguishes him from the beast, which, coming from God, is the source of wisdom and understanding and the knowledge of good and evil, and so of all righteousness and of the fear and the love of God. Why, so endowed, does man sin? This question is neither raised nor answered. Nor does it really enter the mind of any Old Testament writer to doubt the justice or the fact of human responsibility. Job, it is true, complains that as sin is such an inevitable constituent or consequence of human nature, God deals with it too seriously. But even Job does not go so far as to say that not man, but God, is really responsible for man's sin. Moreover, Job is exceptional in the boldness of his accusations. The general attitude of the Old Testament may be summed up by saying : (1) Every man is sure to sin, (2) yet man is responsible for his sins, (3) he ought not to sin, or he ought to get the better of his sin ; he need not sin unless he chooses. How far, then, it may be asked, is such an attitude or view of use for us to-day? Is it shallow, hopeless, inadequate, and contradictory? For if every man is bound to sin, how can it be true that no man need sin unless he chooses? Or if every man is bound to sin, is not God, his maker, rather than himself, responsible for so unsatisfactory a result? How can God blame a creature for doing

that which his very make and constitution render inevitable? Again, if every man is bound to sin, does not this lead logically either to indifference or to despair? Some might argue, "I must sin; therefore sin does not matter." Others may feel, "I ought not to sin; I hate it; and yet I know I shall and do sin. Therefore I despair and am filled with wretchedness." Moreover, if every man is bound to sin, the more prohibition, the more sin. For every prohibition, or every injunction, is so much the wider opportunity for man's sinful tendency to make use of. The more laws, the more sins; thus the more you seek to curtail sin, the more you increase it. And if sinfulness is the evil tendency in man's very heart, if it is somehow dependent upon, and inseparably connected and mixed up with, man's make and constitution, how can it be cured? Must not man on earth continue to sin for ever and ever, so that no one generation can be better than another? Any radical change is out of the question and impossible.

It cannot be truly affirmed that all these questions were fully present to the minds of any Old Testament thinkers. Most of the troubles which the questions raise did not harass them because the questions themselves had scarcely occurred to them. Nor can it be said that they were fully grasped and tackled by subsequent Jewish thinkers of the Rabbinic period. Some of them came acutely before the mind of Paul, but the reply which he gave to them raises fresh difficulties in its turn, greater even, according to our Jewish ideas or preconceptions, than those which he sought or thought to solve.

If the problems raised are, in their fulness and

entirety, insoluble, then the fact that they are not realised by the Old Testament writers may not be so very harmful. The simplicity of the Old Testament attitude may even turn out to be a merit; for solutions which are unacceptable or inaccurate are worse than no solutions at all. Better that the puzzles should not be recognised than that replies should be given which are false or which do not fit the facts. And this is what seems to be the case. Sin is a part of the problem of evil, and that problem is confessedly insoluble. It does not appear to be eradicable from the human race. Yet that does not prevent the propriety of the feeling of obligation to resist and diminish it. Man can never become sinless, partly because the better he becomes, the higher is the demand made upon him by his own conscience. With greater power the ideal rises. The various sides of the antinomy must be consciously accepted. In spite of our "frailty," we are to regard sin with horror. In spite of our frailty, we are ever to strive to conquer our sinfulness and get the better of our sins. In spite of our frailty, we are to hold ourselves responsible for our sins. This is the doctrine of Judaism, and, upon the whole, we may say that it is already the doctrine of the deepest Old Testament thinkers and saints. Nevertheless, it would be an inadequate doctrine, liable to lead to despair or perfunctoriness, if it were not supplemented by others. These are the doctrine of repentance and forgiveness, the doctrine of "grace," the doctrine of the Messianic Age, and the doctrine of a future life. About almost all of these other doctrines the Old Testament has at least something to say, and about some of them it has a good deal. The later

literature developed them all, and *we* have to develop them still further. For even in their Rabbinic form they are not wholly acceptable for us to-day. Meanwhile, the feeling of despair because of the inevitability of sin is lessened more especially by the conviction that moral progress is possible both in the individual and the race ; by the realisation that though all " sin," there are yet tremendous differences between man and man, between " sinner " and " saint," and by the faith that with God's help and grace even the sinful heart can be made comparatively pure. In spite of sin, there is a meaning in atonement. And this conviction, realisation, faith, are all *based* upon Old Testament doctrines or utterances, even though they may now go beyond them in explicitness and depth.

The very conception of sin is only possible to those who believe in God. Wrongdoing with that belief is not only wrongdoing. It is not only an offence against society, but it is an offence against God. It is a violation of His laws, either because we conceive the laws of right and wrong to be His laws (inasmuch as He is Himself the source and essence of " goodness "), or because we suppose that He is the author and giver of the definite laws which make up and constitute goodness in action, or, lastly, because we believe that God has entered into a certain covenant or relation with us, the conditions of which we are bound to observe. These three views shade off into each other ; the Old Testament writers, while strongly influenced by the third view, yet also hold the second, nor are they ignorant of, or unsusceptible to, the first. And all three views we can and do still hold to-day,

though not necessarily in the same form as our ancestors. For we, too, regard God as the source of goodness, and we, too, believe that the moral law is divine. Goodness is for us, too, an imitation and love of God ; sin is for us, too, an " insult " to His nature and a violation of His laws. Then, secondly, we, too, hold high and dear the ideals of justice, pity, and love, which are laid down for our observation and reverence in the Prophets and the Pentateuchal codes ; we, too, hold that these things did not come into existence without the will and the inspiration of God. And, lastly, we, too, hold (it is essential to Judaism) that we of the Jewish brotherhood stand in a special relation to God ; sin in us is specially heinous and detestable ; it is a violation of a special covenant relation, a soilure of our priesthood, an infraction of the terms of our service.

Sin, therefore, is presented in many aspects in the Old Testament literature. As connected with man's or Israel's relation to God it is disobedience, or alienation of heart, or pride, or guilty ignorance ; as expressing itself in man's relation with his fellows it is injustice, oppression, cruelty, lovelessness, and many other cognate vices. But the idea of a violation of God's commands, whether the written commands of the code or the unwritten oral commands of Yahweh's messengers, or the commands and divine will of which everybody knows by the promptings of his own heart, is at bottom never absent. There is always in the deeper natures, even after the full domination of the Law, a realisation that sin was something inward, though outwardly expressed, that the sinfulness was more than the sinful deed, and that " the root of the matter " was the evil heart, or, as the Rabbis came

to call it, the evil disposition, desire, imagination, or thought : the Yetzer ha'ra. It does not do full justice, I think, to average Old Testament teaching, when the late Professor Toy says that "sin was conceived as the infringement of particular laws," or that the author of the 51st Psalm stands "alone in the Old Testament in his conception of the sinfulness of human nature : no prophet and no other psalmist has expressed this spiritual view of the inward religious life."¹ While recognising the greatness and depth of the 51st Psalm, I am inclined to think that we must regard it as the climax and verbal efflorescence of a tendency and of a general consciousness rather than as a violent contrast and opposition.

But what is quite true is that the general or prevailing view of the Old Testament writers is that man "by his own inward power" can conquer sin and sinfulness ; while sin "is universal, it is not uncontrollable." Now this conception may be, and is, inadequate, but it is based upon an important truth. Effort and will are both needed and fruitful. Even if God helps us, this divine help mingles strangely with our wills, and is only through them made manifest. While sin may be universal, it is yet always conquerable or reducible. We may fail three times and win the fourth ; we may advance four steps and go back three ; but something is still gained and gainable. This Old Testament conviction is encouraging, helpful, and full of a generous confidence in the God-granted powers of man, in the capacity of that divine spirit or image within him to rise superior to temptation, to conquer the sinful desire, and to accomplish the virtuous

¹ *Judaism and Christianity*, pp. 192, 193.

deed. And if we are humbly conscious that our powers are God-given, that this very will of ours, which, while free to choose the bad, can also choose the good, is itself of origin divine, or contains within it an element that is akin to the divine nature, then there is no fear of pride when we prevail ; rather is there the shame of failure or the shame of not prevailing enough, the sense of the big difference between the best performance and the ideal. It is, as it seems to me, an excellence and not a defect of the Old Testament that it portrays "human nature as weak and inclined to evil, but not as morally impotent."¹ For this theory is in accordance with the facts and in consonance with the goodness of God.

On the other hand, the theory would be inadequate by itself. But, as I have already baldly stated, it does not stand alone. It hardly stands alone even in those writers who appear to know no more ; at any rate, it does not stand alone in the Old Testament taken as a whole. (And it is the various sides or strands of Old Testament teaching which went to make up the Judaism of the Rabbis and our own.) To supplement the theory comes the doctrine of divine help or grace, and the doctrine of repentance and forgiveness. Partly it may be that these doctrines, in their deeper aspects, were acquired by the very sense of sin itself, and by the awful and agitating conviction that the yoke of it was sometimes beyond human strength to break. Where human will seemed powerless, God Himself must step in and regenerate and redeem. Partly, too, they were acquired by the strange idea of *inherited* sin, as if the sin and guilt (for these two conceptions were merged together) of one generation

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 191.

were transmitted to, or visited upon, another. There is a sort of nexus or chain of sin from the meshes or the poison of which it is impossible to escape. The words of the second commandment related to punishment, but in the Old Testament, and even in Rabbinic days, a continuing calamity awoke the sense of guilt and accentuated it. Sin seemed to become a sort of external, as well as an internal, force, itself something of a divinely ordained punishment. In a foreign land to pine or rot away for their own and their fathers' iniquities is the punishment with which the exilic or post-exilic author of Leviticus xxvi. threatens the Israelites who disobey God's laws. The exiles themselves, Ezekiel tells us, complained that they were rotting away for their transgressions : the feeling of death—is, perhaps, moral death as well as physical death intended ?—was upon them. The 51st Psalmist, as we have seen, declares that sin was with him from the very first ; his transgressions are ever before his mind. Ezekiel takes a double line with those sorely crushed and disheartened men who seemed unable to lift themselves by effort and struggle from the slough of sinfulness and despond. He first bids them save *themselves*, and by his very bidding implies that they can. It is not God who wishes or wants them to sin : He has no pleasure in their " death." " Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways," He urges them ; " cast away from you your transgressions, repent and turn from your sins, *make you a new heart and a new spirit.*" You ought, therefore you can. But in addition to this command, He has also a gracious promise to give them for their encouragement. " A new heart will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you, and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and will

give you an heart of flesh, and I will put My spirit within you, and ye shall walk in My statutes." Jeremiah had already said much the same. He, too, had declared that God would cleanse the Israelites from all their iniquity, and would pardon their sins. He would put His "fear" in their hearts so that they should not depart from Him; He would "put His teaching in their inward parts and write it in their hearts." In the Psalms this divine help is asked for, not as a gift for the nation in the Messianic Age, but now, at once, for individuals. "Teach me to do Thy will." "Lead me in the way everlasting." "Make me to know Thy ways, O Lord; teach me Thy paths." "Teach me Thy way, O Lord." "Teach me, O Lord, the way of Thy statutes." "Let me not wander from Thy commandments." These utterances are none of them from the 51st Psalm, but they lead up to it. They all imply that God can and does help man to realise and to fulfil the divine law of goodness and of right. Yet I fully admit that the author of the 51st Psalm does more. To begin with, he clearly asks from God more than mere forgiveness of sin in the sense of remission or cessation of punishment. He asks for that new heart which Ezekiel had promised for every Israelite at the coming—the near coming as he supposed—of the Golden or Messianic Age. He does not *say*, "Of my own strength I cannot overcome my sinful heart," but he seems to imply it. He asks for a divine cleansing, a "supernatural" or "super-human" purification. God must start him on the way: God must open his mouth: God must renew a "firm" spirit within him—a tendency towards the good; God must uphold him; God must buoy

him up with the consciousness that the divine spirit of holiness is with him. Only then will he be clean and feel clean ; only then will his crushed and contrite heart (the only sacrifice and gift he now can render) be enabled once more to rejoice ; only then can he, having been taught by God what true wisdom is, teach others the divine pathway ; only then will he be quit of this drag and burden of sin which now is ever before his mind. We may, perhaps, say that the author of Psalm xxxii. has experienced the joy of that forgiveness, or rather of that inward regeneration, for which the other puts up his prayer. For it is hardly going too far to assume that he, too, is thinking of something more, and of something more inward and more spiritual, than outward punishment and its cessation. We must, however, note that even according to the doctrine of the 51st Psalm, if out of it we may construct anything so formal, man is not inactive, and may even be said to start the whole process. He prays, and he is contrite : then only, so we may conclude, were salvation and the new heart bestowed upon him ; then only did the fetters of sin fall off him : then only was he aware of this inward redemption and deliverance. And this, as we shall see, is the Rabbinic doctrine of repentance : man moves an inch, God advances to him an ell. To this view we still, I think, adhere : man is not the mere passive recipient of the divine grace. He longs for it ; he strives for it ; he believes in it—and it comes.

How far is the Biblical doctrine of forgiveness superficial ? So far as forgiveness means the mere remission of punishment, it is ethically and religiously uninteresting, and it may even be harmful. But

even if it be taken to mean an inward change of heart, and therefore a changed relation to God, there seem difficulties in the way. That sin separates from God is intelligible enough. I suppose that what we now can mean by the statement is not that God's love towards man is really changed by man's sin, still less that He is angry, but that the divine love cannot operate, it cannot be apprehended; the links which connect, the influences which unite, the currents that combine, God and man together are broken or dulled by man's iniquity. It is the pure in heart who can feel and commune with God. It is the pure in heart who alone, in the measure of their purity, righteousness, and love, are at one with Him. Hence, atonement must depend upon the removal of sundering and separating sin. This removal is effected by man's repentance and God's forgiveness. Both must act for the result to be achieved. The curtain is removed by contrition, and the sun shines through and heals. It heals and it renovates.

But once more we are met by the question: *can* it heal and *can* it renovate? Can man pass from sin to righteousness, or from an old heart to a new heart, at a bound? Can he start afresh?

Ezekiel's doctrine seems much too outward and easy, just as, from another point of view, it is not encouraging enough. Ezekiel was so anxious to disentangle his listeners from the past, so keen to assert their separateness and distinctness from their fathers, so resolute to maintain their freedom and independence, that he seems to exaggerate grossly in his turn. He forgets the force of habit; he ignores character as a slow creation, not easily changed whether for good or for evil; he looks upon

“righteousness” as a collection of actions, which man is quite “free” to perform, whether they are bad or good. He seems to suppose that man can pass and repass from sin to virtue, and from virtue to sin. It may, however, be questioned whether by such criticism we, too, do not exaggerate. Ezekiel is compelled to drive his point home with the utmost emphasis. Hence, he has to stress one aspect of the matter and to ignore the other. He wishes to do two things, to impress two truths, and both of these truths are still valid and valuable. He wants to caution and to encourage at one and the same moment. As Dr. Davidson truly says, the prophet seeks (in modern language) to assert that “however much a man’s past may influence his nature and even his personality, yet the personality can take up a new position towards God, and thus gradually overcome even the evil of its own nature.”¹ This, on the one hand, but, on the other hand, he desires to put in a caution. Man is always liable to sin. He is never so rooted in righteousness that he has become sinless or incapable of sin. In homely phrase: “It is never too late to mend.” But it is also never too late to sin. The new heart is never complete. No man is so regenerate that he is incapable of iniquity. To suppose that he is so may lead, and indeed has led, to strange aberrations and antinomianism.

Now this doctrine, though in need of deepening and amplification, still holds good. And this double outlook upon life—no despair and no carelessness—is characteristically Jewish. Habits are formed and characters. But they can be broken through. The bondage of sin (like the security of virtue) is never

¹ *Theology of the Old Testament*, p. 223.

absolute and complete. Yet from our religious point of view we may be more hopeful of the solidity of righteousness than we need be fearful of the servitude of sin. For against sin and the bad habit and the old evil heart two forces can and do operate : first, man's margin of effort, his contrition, his resolve ; then, God's love and the redemptive agency of His holy spirit. Whereas to upset the good habit and the new heart there is only one force : the remnants of the " old Adam " with the temptations of circumstance. In other words, God helps us to become good : neither He nor aught beyond ourselves drives us to do wickedness or become evil. The religious man feels that sin is all his own, but his virtue is less native than given.

We may, perhaps, fitly add here that the higher Old Testament teaching, including Ezekiel and the 51st Psalm, is always healthy and encouraging. It is easily understood, and is true so far as it goes. But while it would be very unfair to say that the Old Testament writers do not realise that sin springs from the heart, it is, perhaps, not inaccurate to say that they did not sufficiently realise how sin *affects* the heart ; or again how righteousness affects the heart, or how love—the love of God, the love of man—can affect the heart. The religious psychology of sin and of regeneration had not been pushed very far. There is much development, much new thought and experience, in these difficult regions, both in the New Testament and in the Rabbinical literature. The effect of the Law and of its central and dominating position in Judaism was very curious. On the one hand, combined with or illumined by a great experience, it produced in Paul a violent antagonism to itself, and a new theory of sin and its overthrow.

On the other hand, in the Rabbis it produced not so much a new, as a developed, theory of sin in which this very law plays the part of the good physician ; with Paul the strength of sin, with the Rabbis the Law is sin's medicine and overthrow. Paul and the Rabbis, though in violent antagonism to each other, may yet both have something of value to say to us to-day. For, looking back upon them from the vantage ground of nearly two thousand years, we, in all humility, can "place ourselves above them."

Meanwhile it is desirable to note that the idea of divine forgiveness was never allowed to weaken the need of repentance and reformation. The sacrifices which the Law ordained as sin-offerings and guilt-offerings were limited in their scope. Professor Toy says very rightly : "The Jewish Law made no attempt to provide an atonement for all sins ; its restriction in this respect is noteworthy. The offences for which it does provide are, first, sins of ignorance (Lev. iv.) ; and secondly, certain slighter ceremonial offences, failure to testify in a court of justice, and false dealings in money matters (Lev. v., vi.). To this must be added the expiation of the great day of atonement (Lev. xvi.), which, however, was of a purely national character and could have had no bearing on individual sins. Offences other than those above mentioned were regarded by the Jewish Law as committed against society, and were punished accordingly. So far as they were regarded also as committed against God, they were expiated only by the punishment inflicted by the state, the whole law, civil and religious, being the enactment of God." ¹ Of a truth the prophetic protest against grosser

¹ Toy, *op. cit.* p. 226.

conceptions had sunk into the heart even of the priestly legislators to whom sacrifices and offerings were so precious and so dear. The prophetic conditions for forgiveness are repentance and amendment: a severely practical test, which is never obsolete and can never safely be forgotten. Isaiah's grand words which, as Toy says, put forward the prophetic view with "admirable clearness and fulness," ring through the ages: they can never lose their force. "Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before God's eyes; cease to do evil; learn to do well; seek justice, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow." But here again we have the assumption that the cleansing and the reformation are in man's own will to neglect or to perform.

Soon after the time at which Ezekiel was making his protest against false ideas of solidarity, and the visitation of the sins of the fathers upon the children, an even greater prophet than he broached the conception of a higher solidarity and of a vicarious atonement. To men of antiquity the state or the nation was a unity and possessed a personality of its own. It did not seem unjust that all should suffer because some had sinned, though it was also held that the virtues of a few could compensate for the iniquities of many. Sacrifices for collective sins, expiation or atonement in spectacular form and with peculiar rites for national iniquity, seemed reasonable and right. Such ideas continued even after Old Testament times, and a measure of truth we are disposed to find in them even to-day. We, too, hold that a society, a religious brotherhood, a nation, constitute in some real sense a unity, and are more than the units of which they are composed.

There is such a thing as national wrongdoing and sinfulness, and there may justly be such a thing as national punishment and national expiation. But the prophet goes further. He advances to a higher and more voluntary solidarity. That the many may have to suffer because of the sins of a few may be a stern fact in the methods of God's rule: that many may benefit by the virtues of a few may be the gracious obverse of the same fact. The prophet, however, teaches that the few may voluntarily accept pain and suffering for the benefit and the moral redemption of many. Voluntary sacrifice: here was a new and wonderful conception, not merely in the development of righteousness, but also in the development of the idea of the conquest of sin. The sin offering is not the slaughter of ignorant animals, but the voluntary self-surrender of men. Thus, the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah opens up new vistas of thought.

But the doctrine is exceptional. Common, however, to the whole of Old Testament teaching, and not less precious, is the appeal to, and the trust in, the mercy of God. Man and God are brought directly together without intercessor or mediator, without sacrifice or piacular rites. It may be that the forgiveness sought is often only the remission of punishment. Nevertheless, with this remission there would also be effected the removal of the sin. It was inevitable that the very thought of this direct appeal to God should become spiritually deepened. "As a father pities his children, so God pities them that fear Him. As the heaven is high above the earth, so great is His loving-kindness towards them that fear Him." And what happens? Partly, it is true, that He does not punish us as we

deserve : but partly, that far as the east is from the west, so far does He *remove* our transgressions from us. “He *subdues*, or treads down, our iniquities : He casts them away from us into the depths of the sea.” This is surely more than the remission of punishment : it is akin to the cleansing of the heart ; to the gift of the new spirit ; to the indwelling of Himself—His own holy spirit, of which we have already heard.

How far do the Old Testament writers give an impression that they view sin with loathing and hatred ? How far do they regard it as an inward defilement, and therefore with anguish, or as an alienation from God, and therefore with horror ? We can, I think, find indications of such a view in various passages of the Prophets and the Psalter. And we have seen how the writer of the great eighth chapter of Proverbs regards folly, which for him is equivalent to sin, as the purveyor of the soul’s sickness and death, and wisdom as the giver of its health and life. But, perhaps, it is not without a certain distinctive value that the Old Testament writers are *not* overwhelmed by sin, just as they are not overwhelmed by sorrow. They hold that human happiness is as possible as human misery, and human righteousness as real as human sin. A sort of humble cheerfulness seems to be their characteristic ; not fretting overmuch because of human frailty, yet not careless or indifferent ; eager to do the utmost that human endeavour can, yet not forgetful of the need for divine assistance ; withal leaving the issue with trust and prayer in the hands of God. I am inclined to think that this attitude (which it is not unfair to ascribe to them) has still a value for us to-day. It has the dangers of any doctrine, or

application of the doctrine, of the Mean, but it has also its advantages and its truth.

Moving on from sin to righteousness, I need merely allude in passing to the nature of it according to Old Testament teaching, for speculation on this subject is wanting. God is as much the author of moral, as He is of ceremonial, enactments: such is the view both of oldest and latest writers. Yet to the prophets the ceremonial enactments fall away: what God requires (besides His *exclusive* worship) is righteousness, and righteousness only. It cannot be said that the question whether righteousness is what it is because God demands or ordains it, or whether God demands it because it is what it is, is ever faced or raised. Is goodness the law of God, or is the law of God goodness? But to the ordinary believer the question is of no practical consequence. The good God can only care for and require goodness. "What does Yahweh require of thee but to do justice, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" This famous prophetic utterance remains for ever great, emphatic, refreshing, life-giving, even in its very simplicity. It is one of the cases where simplicity can be both august and true.

Incidentally we have seen that the higher Old Testament thinkers realised well enough that righteousness was an internal condition of the soul, a state of the heart, issuing in deeds, but not identical with deeds. It is true that the domination of the Law tended on its evil side to the externalising of righteousness. Goodness tended to be looked at as a series of actions, and, moreover, as a series of specified actions: the good man was not he who possessed a good heart, whose *will* was good

and set on goodness, but rather he who avoided certain specified prohibitions (both ceremonial and moral) and performed certain specified injunctions. Such a view of goodness tends to lower it in various directions. (1) It confounds the moral and ceremonial together: both are ingredients of the Law; they tend to become equal in value. Indeed, the stress tends to be placed upon the ceremonial rather than upon the moral enactments, for they are easier, and more distinctive of the particular "church," "denomination," or "party." (2) It lowers the ideal, for it is comparatively easy to fulfil, in a more or less outward manner, any series of laws. (3) It tends to make goodness negative, for it is easier to abstain from violating prohibitions than it is to fulfil injunctions. (4) It tends to self-righteousness, for the cool, strict legalist will be proud of his easy outward conformity, especially in all ceremonial matters, and in all the prohibitions and negative precepts of the code. (5) It makes goodness and wickedness a mere matter of more or less. If the code contains 743 injunctions, including both ceremonial and moral, positive and negative enactments, the man who fulfils 372 is more good than bad, whereas the man who fulfils 371 is more bad than good. The very inaccurate and outward nature of such a conception is now obvious to us all. (It is another question: *How has it become so obvious* to us all?) A man, as God sees things, even as clumsy man sees things, who does *little* and often fails, may yet be morally worth much more than he who *does* much and fails seldom. And so on. The passion for righteousness is chilled and even extinguished. Ideal and performance are both degraded. It is ignored that the highest righteousness is not avoid-

ing a series of prohibitions and fulfilling a series of injunctions, but a complete conformity of the will to the ideal, a measureless giving and loving. Goodness is also unselfishness, absolute and self-regardless, whereas legalism can be well consistent with selfishness. For the law may be observed for the observer's sake, and if its fulfilment involves giving a tithe to the "poor," the gift may be rendered without love, to fulfil the code and reap the reward. Pride is stimulated, and with pride—self-righteousness, contempt of others, formalism, and all that is meant by the depreciatory term "Pharisaism."

All this was undoubtedly the danger of the Law. It is remarkable to what an extent and how often these dangers must have been avoided, and how well the knowledge was kept alive that the root of righteousness was the good heart.

Another danger in the Law was connected with the conception of God as the giver of punishments and rewards. Such a conception always contains within it a certain danger. Live so as to avoid the punishment and to obtain the reward. When to this conception of God and life a complicated code is added, which maps out the whole of duty in laws, ceremonial as well as moral, the danger of looking at all life as a field for the reaping of reward and the avoidance of punishment is vastly increased. The wise man is he who orders his life to the best profit. He fulfils more laws than he will transgress, and will reap, upon the balance, a sure reward. His whole view of life receives a false and selfish orientation. Legalism stimulates the passion and lust for reward, the fear of, and the worry about, punishment. From this point of view, too, it degrades goodness and cheapens it.

There is a third danger of legalism, and that is its intellectual element. There was a pre-legal strain in Judaism which tended to increase this danger. For, apart from the Law, there was a certain line of thought (of which we see the product in the book of Proverbs) which tended to confound wisdom and goodness. The Law strengthened this tendency. One had to know the Law in order to fulfil it. And on the whole, to know it well moved in the direction of keeping it well. There was a certain consistency between knowledge and performance, just as there was a certain merit in study and knowledge for their own sakes. The professional teachers of the Law (like the bootmaker who extols his leather) were naturally inclined to magnify this consistency. They tended to look down upon the ignorant, who, clearly, if they did not know, could not perform, and perhaps even cared neither to know nor to perform. Here, then, was another opening for pride, exclusiveness, formalism, and a false and narrow intellectualism.

How was Judaism, which undoubtedly went through a long and intense legal stage, from which it is only now emerging (while even we do not wholly evict law from religion), enabled to avoid, or, at any rate, if it did not wholly avoid, yet largely to triumph over, these dangers? Perhaps partly because of the very nature of the Law itself, and partly because the Sacred Scripture, while it contained the Law (which was regarded as the best and most inspired portion of the whole), yet also contained the Prophets and the Psalms. Or, in other words, because the prophetic teaching was never wholly forgotten, or because the Prophets (inconsistent with the Law as their teaching partly was) had yet partly

begotten and produced the Law. No priest, no law; but also, in this case, no prophet, no law.

Now the Law not only included a number of ceremonial enactments, both positive and negative, but as a *code* it did contain those moral and spiritual dangers which have already been pointed out. On the other hand, the Law included enactments which could only with difficulty be fulfilled in an outward, perfunctory, self-regarding, cheese-paring, and selfish way. It asked for the love of neighbour and of resident alien, it asked for the love of God. And these two laws were moved from early days (let it be noted, not merely by Jesus) to a position of superiority and of primacy. Again, the heart was not wholly quenched even in the Law! The neighbour was not to be hated *in the heart*; God was to be loved with all the heart. "Thou shalt not covet": the tenth word could hardly be obeyed except *from* the heart.

But these are, perhaps, casuistical elegances. The real and fundamental reason I conceive why the dangers were so often and so largely avoided was because the Prophets and the Law together succeeded somehow in making the service of God into a passion. God and His Law were loved, and they were loved not merely because men were asked to love them. God and His Law were so loved that the fulfilment of the Law was carried out for its own sake, and not merely for the reward. And pity and kindness are such prominent characteristics of the Law that they, too, sank deep into the Jewish heart, and were performed for more than reward, and more than outwardly, and more than perfunctorily. God was so loved that the imitation of Him was sought for its own sake. And to imitate God meant pity,

meant Chesed, meant a good and a holy life, meant a tender and a loving heart. Believe that God is good and love Him, and all the rest follows. Believe that He is pitiful and loving as well as just and holy, and whatever your system, be it legal or be it Pauline, so long as you *love* Him enough, true goodness and uncalculating unselfishness will ensue.

One aspect, however, of goodness, according to Old Testament conceptions, must be more specifically considered. We have already, indeed, alluded to it. It is the identification, or, at all events, the close coincidence, of goodness with wisdom. Judaism is still a debtor to the book of Proverbs, and especially to the introductory chapters. We still emphasise the idea that God is the guarantee of truth as well as of righteousness: the God of knowledge and wisdom as well as the God of goodness and love. One need not be learned in order to love God and goodness, or to do good and to be good. That is true. But wise love is better than foolish love, and wise goodness than foolish goodness. It may even be questioned if, within its own sphere, love is true love, or goodness is true goodness, if it be not wise. Moreover, true religion must be a religion which is suited and adapted to the sage as well as to the simpleton; it must be a religion which can be formulated in a theology, and which is congruent with truth in all departments of knowledge, historical, literary, scientific. In all these ways, then, Judaism, and Liberal Judaism not least, accept and cherish that praise of wisdom, that denouncement of folly, with which the introductory chapters of Proverbs reach so magnificent a climax. We, too, co-ordinate wisdom and righteousness and happiness and life: we, too, would say that they

that hate wisdom "love death." The intellectual element in religion, a marked feature in Judaism, has its dangers, but we cling to it, open-eyed, none the less.

It is needless to say much as to the actual content of righteousness as the Old Testament writers conceived it. The main virtues are justice and pity, charitableness and loving-kindness: justice in all the public and private dealings of man with man; and beyond justice, compassion and loving-kindness. These all lead up to, or flow together into, the cardinal command, "Thou shalt love neighbour and resident alien as thyself," which at the lowest meant, "Thou shalt love as thyself 999 out of every 1000 persons with whom thou hast to do." I am willing to give up the thousandth person to the tender mercies of those critics who love to harp upon the point that "neighbour" in Lev. xix. 18 means only "fellow-countryman," and "stranger" in Lev. xix. 34 means only "resident alien." Of whom else were a man's neighbours composed in those days but fellow-countrymen and resident aliens? It is true that the Law does not say, "Thou shalt love thy fellow-*man* as thyself." And it is true that the national enemies of Israel were not loved, but hated. But we are considering the ethics of every day, not the ethics of war. We may, however, admit a certain particularism. The love of man as man had still to be inculcated, but so far as we are concerned, and for our purposes to-day, we need not worry about this limitation, such as it is. The love of fellow-countrymen and resident aliens is almost as sufficing for us as it was for our ancestors, for almost all the people with whom we come into daily contact are one or the other. And the wider *justification*—the

love of man as man—we can add. We have learnt to do so from many sources—Rabbis, New Testament, Stoics, all three.

Besides justice and pity, charitableness and loving-kindness, there are other virtues as well. Self-control, truthfulness, contentment, humility, cheerfulness, gentleness, placability, and forgivingness—these are all specifically mentioned and praised in the book of Proverbs.¹ It is customary rather to look down upon Proverbs for its *bourgeois* and homely ethics. But, after all, a man who had all the virtues I have just mentioned, and had them rooted in the fear of God, would not by any means be a bad specimen of humanity. Even in sheer morality we can still learn a thing or two from Old Testament ideals. Only we must be allowed to have the *whole* Old Testament to pick and choose from, whether the Psalter with its good summary, “clean hands and a pure heart,” or the Law with its command to love our neighbour as ourselves. An Old Testament from which the 19th chapter of Leviticus is excluded would not serve our turn. As to the limitations of the Old Testament doctrine of forgiveness something may be said later on. But as it stands in Proverbs, it goes pretty far. And to Proverbs we

¹ If our purpose were to discuss Old Testament morality as a whole, it would be necessary to discuss the alleged self-righteousness of some Old Testament writers, notably some of the Psalmists. There is undoubtedly something in the charge, and it is a danger to which legalism, and the possession of a national religion and a national religious consciousness higher and purer than their neighbours, made the Jews peculiarly liable. The Psalmists who seem most self-righteous do not, however, claim to be sinless. They only claim and feel that they do, at all events, *wish* to fulfil God's law and that their heart is set Godwards. They are honestly seeking to walk in the ways of God (cp. Davidson, *Old Testament Theology*, p. 275). Moreover, the self-righteous Psalms have a national reference. As compared with the oppressors of Israel, Israel, and the writer's party or friends more especially, *are* righteous. But undoubtedly national self-righteousness might easily become individual self-righteousness (cp. Toy, *Judaism and Christianity*, pp. 187-190).

must add Exodus xxiii. 4, 5, and Leviticus xix. 17, 18. The resultant code is not a bad one. Let him who has never failed to obey it, and to act up to it in the spirit as in the letter, be the one to cast upon it the first stone. Shall I set it down baldly as it stands ?

“ Whoso rewards evil for good, evil shall not depart out of his house. The discretion of a man makes him long-suffering: it is his glory to pass over a transgression. Say not thou, I will recompense evil; wait on the Lord, and He shall save thee. Say not, I will do so to him as he has done to me: I will render to the man according to his work. Hatred stirs up strife: but love covers all sins. Rejoice not when thine enemy falls, and let not thine heart be glad when he stumbles, lest the Lord see it, and it displease Him, and He turn away His wrath from him (to thee). If thine enemy be hungry, give him bread to eat; if he be thirsty, give him water to drink; for thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head, and Yahweh will reward thee. If thou meet thine enemy's ox or his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again. If thou see the ass of him that hates thee lying under his burden, thou shalt forbear to leave it to him alone; thou shalt surely loosen it with him. Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart; thou shalt not avenge, or bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am Yahweh.”

SECTION VII

SUFFERING AND EVIL IN THE OLD TESTAMENT,
TOGETHER WITH THE CONCEPTION OF THE
GOLDEN AGE

We have already noticed how in the Old Testament there is a prevailing tendency to link together suffering and sin. If calamity befalls me, the outside observer may infer from it that I am receiving the just retribution for committed sins. And, again, if I have committed sins, I may expect punishment; and punishment means pain, suffering, calamity.

It is needless to indicate here the unsatisfactory inaccuracy and externalism of this tendency or doctrine. We are all familiar with its weaknesses. Moreover, this book seeks to find out what is still true and valuable in the Old Testament for us to-day: it has not to set forth inadequacies and errors. It will be more suitable for our purpose to observe how the Old Testament itself here and there criticises and modifies its own doctrine. But before this or anything else is done, it is desirable to point out how the equation of suffering and sin marks a distinct stage in an ethical and unitary conception and interpretation of the world. It does so, at least, in that application or treatment of the equation whereby all suffering is a *punishment* for sin inflicted upon the evil-doer by the moral will of Yahweh. Behind the doctrine in this developed form of it, there lies a long period in which different explanations of suffering jostled each other. Before Yahweh became the one God of Israel and the ultimate cause of all that happens to man, a given calamity might be thought to be due to some other divine or

semi-divine agency, and not necessarily to Him. Or, again, before the individual had, as it were, asserted or discovered his religious rights and independence, suffering might be supposed just to *happen*. It was not Yahweh's doing; it was not Yahweh's concern. And if it was not Yahweh's doing, neither was it the result of the individual's sin. Again, as the ordinary citizen was just a tiny limb of the corporate body, he had to suffer if the whole suffered. Nor did he complain. The suffering might, indeed, be the punishment of sin, but it was rather national sin than individual sin. The particular individual might, or might not, be guilty, but he had to suffer with the rest. Or the guilt might be the grandfather's or the father's, and not his own. For did not Yahweh visit the sins of the fathers upon the children? Or, lastly, even though the suffering was sent by Yahweh, and sent direct, and without relation or reference to state or ancestors, yet it need not necessarily *be* assumed that it was sent *because* of sin. For Yahweh (like every god) had unaccountable moods: He was not obliged to render an account of His actions. And His reasons for His deeds and His visitations were sometimes unfathomable.

It is clear that all these older views (of which some are older than others) might render suffering much less painful to endure. If, at all events, my private calamity comes because it comes, and without the will and intention of Yahweh, or if it is due to my nation's sin and not to my own, or if I can lay the blame upon my grandfather, or if some malignant spirit be the author, or if it is, indeed, due to Yahweh, but not to Yahweh the judge and retribution-dealer, but to Yahweh the moody, the unaccountable, the irresponsible, then I need not

bother my head about it any longer. I must just grin and bear it as best I can. I need not worry as to what known or unknown sins I may have committed, nor can my neighbour wag his head at me in condemnation and rebuke.

Thus difficulties are avoided. But they are avoided at a considerable cost. Or, rather, it was necessary to incur the difficulties, in order to obtain the higher conception of Yahweh, and the higher conception of the individual. If any event or phenomenon is due to Yahweh, it must be due to His righteousness and love. Nothing that He does can be outside the range of His character. Nor can any event or phenomenon be due to any other divine agency than Yahweh, for no such agency exists. And over and above the relation of the community to Yahweh, there is the relation to Him of the individual. No individual is too small for Him to care for: and if He is the judge or the father of a king, He is also the judge and the father of the humblest of the king's subjects. The difficulties and the troubles were, therefore, worth having, for the gain was greater than the loss. Religious troubles which spring from a higher conception of God are better than a cheerfulness or *insouciance* which depends upon a lower view of Him.

The bad part of the trouble is, I suppose, that the lower views did, nevertheless, include facts, which facts have somehow to be assimilated, or made consistent, with the higher views. For it *is* true that in national calamities the innocent suffer as well as the guilty. It *is* true that, as a result, if not as a punishment, of parental sin, children suffer. If, then, God is the ultimate cause of all which befalls man, and if nothing that He does is outside

the scope and range of His goodness, and if the individual's calamities are to have some reason over and above his nation and his parents, nothing except sin seemed left over. For the Hebrews knew nothing of any semi-evasions, such as that God acts through general laws, and that what befalls the individual is not the direct effluence of the divine will.

Hence the better and holier Yahweh became, and the more intimate His relation with each individual Israelite, the deeper did the religious mind tend to sink into the mire. The more inevitable did it appear that calamity betokened sin. The more did every Eliphaz seem justified in condemning his Job, or the more did every Job torture his soul with self-accusations or with doubts of the divine justice. The more could the prosperity of the wicked puzzle the observer, or the prosperity of the careless increase his self-righteousness and his pride. For what else could calamity betoken *but* sin, or what else could prosperity betoken but righteousness? For here is another marked feature of Old Testament doctrine, a feature which is both a weakness and a strength. The Old Testament thinkers never despised outward prosperity, or made light of sorrow and pain. The goods of sense were neither illusive nor indifferent. They were both real and precious. And the Old Testament thinkers never made any clear, clean-cut, and profound distinction between what we now commonly call physical evil and moral evil, between the evils of the body and the evils of the soul. They never approached the stern doctrine of the Stoics that nothing really matters except virtue and vice, or that the only good is virtue and the only evil is vice. It might have saved much agony of

soul had they done so, but, on the other hand, it is doubtful whether it would not have tended to make them captains without an army. The writers of the Psalter are less free, and more worried about outward sufferings, than Epictetus or Aurelius, but nevertheless the Psalter has been (and will be) the comfort, the encouragement, and the joy of millions, whereas Epictetus and Aurelius can probably never be more than the sober solace of the few. Can we imagine a Stoic Psalter at all? Yet we shall always need our Stoics as a supplement, and their austere and uncompromising message will never be out of date. As we shall see, neither the Rabbis nor Jesus can wholly supply their place. It is true, for instance, that Jesus said magnificently, "What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world, and forfeit his own soul?", but by this solemn question he meant less to emphasise that the only good worth having is righteousness than, in view of the new life, and of the fortunes of the soul, after death, to assert the extreme inadvisability and short-sightedness of vice.

So far, however, as the sufferings of earthly life are concerned, the whole conditions of the problem were utterly changed by the new doctrine of the future life of blessedness or misery. Once believe in that, and neither the wretchedness of the good nor the prosperity of the wicked need affect you. Either can be more than made good after death. Had the author of Job lived in the age of Hillel, or Jesus, or Akiba, he would never have composed his book. And it was not only the conception of future compensation which changed men's view of earthly felicity or earthly pain. When it was also held that the joys of heaven would not only be more durable

than the joys of earth, but different and higher in *kind*, it was inevitable that as the sorrows of earth became more bearable, so the joys of earth should also become less precious. There was a certain tendency to approach towards the Stoic depreciation of the outward, though along a very different road and for a very different reason. It is a curious fact that in Judaism, in spite of the intensely passionate conviction with which men clung to the doctrine of the future life, this depreciatory tendency towards earthly joys (or earthly sorrows) never went very far. Judaism always held the balance even, so to speak, between this life and the next. It always wanted to believe that this world as well as the other was the creation of God, and that there should be, there could be, there ought to be, a kingdom of God upon earth as well as in heaven. And this belief leads on to or involves that other belief of Judaism, to which I have already alluded, that there is some true, reasonable, and therefore divinely willed correspondence between virtue and prosperity, and between calamity and vice. The best earthly life towards which men should strive, and therefore the life which God wills for the Golden Age, is at least not a life in which the most righteous should be outwardly the most miserable, and the most wicked should be outwardly the most prosperous. That honesty is the most prosperous policy has a deep meaning.

This seems to me the first kernel of abiding value in the Old Testament doctrine that suffering betokens sin. It is only putting the same truth in different form if we say that there is a true sense in which, in the long run, virtue is rewarded by felicity, and wickedness punished by suffering. But

this form of the doctrine goes, in another sense, beyond the other. It is not said or implied what kind the felicity and the suffering may be. They can, in truth, be inward as well as outward, and may be the more intense because the more inward. It is only in this sense that Judaism still desires to maintain Old Testament teaching. There *is* in God's world and will such a thing as punishment, and there *is* such a thing as reward. That, I take it, is the second kernel of abiding value in the doctrine that suffering betokens sin. But as to the nature of that punishment, and as to the nature of that reward, we can move, and we have moved, far beyond Old Testament limits.

The prevailing Old Testament teaching, like many other teachings of antiquity, lays much stress upon the end. Long life is a divine blessing, but not less a peaceful and prosperous end is a divine blessing. Solon's general doctrine, if not his special and beautiful examples of that doctrine, is quite on Old Testament lines. The end of life, the manner of death, compensate for much. A happy and peaceful death is an adequate make-weight to much continued misfortune. So, too, much and long prosperity is discounted by a sudden and violent death. But even a sudden and violent death may be got over when you believe in an endless life beyond death. And if you can sink your own happiness in the well-being of your country, that is another way in which you can also get over it. It was in accordance with the prevailing optimistic temper of the Jews, and with the intensity of their faith in God, that they rarely despaired of the future. The Golden Age of the prophets was ahead and not behind. It lay in the future, not in the past. And

this prophetic conception was always maintained. Moreover, in spite of the acquisition and the retention of a full religious individualism, there was kept up a double kind of corporate feeling. Israel remained a personality, and if Israel's calamity pointed to Israel's sin, every member of Israel shouldered his share of the burden. "*Ahshomnu, bagodnu.*" The confession of sin in the first person plural was felt by every one who uttered it. A measure of responsibility for national delinquencies may justly be felt by us all. To that extent we still share in the old doctrine which Israel and the Jews never abandoned. But, secondly, if you feel yourself one with your nation, sharing with it in its troubles, you can be comforted by your faith in the certainty of its future glory. You will be ready to suffer *with* it, without murmuring or despair; just as, with a further turn of ethical development, you will be ready to suffer *for* it. I think that, at any rate, the first of these two readinesses may be found in the Old Testament scriptures. That is all the more significant because of the absence of any belief in a personal life of blessedness beyond the grave. It betokens all the greater faith in God, all the finer willingness to sink and waive your own claims for happiness in the happiness of your country. It is this good sort of individual unselfishness and of corporate solidarity which we can, I am inclined to think, still learn to appreciate, less from any particular passages or texts of the Old Testament than from its general tendency and spirit. The individual gives himself to the nation, and so long as the cause and the nation prosper and triumph, he asks nothing more and nothing better for himself. And he feels this contentment and faith, even though

he knows that this prosperity and triumph are to come *after* his death, and not before it.

The Golden Age of the prophets is always a combination of the outward and the inward. The picture drawn in the 60th chapter of Isaiah is a fair average view, though somewhat more particularistic, perhaps, than usual. Israel is prosperous and rich, but, in addition to the gold and the silver, its officers are peace, and its governors are righteousness. God is unto the Israelites an everlasting light, and "they shall be all righteous." Another writer predicts a wonderful longevity, but he does not expect sinlessness, "for the sinner who dies at a hundred years old shall be regarded as accursed." Much nobler are the conceptions of the Golden Age in earlier chapters of the book. The Messiah Prince of the 11th chapter is to rule over a regenerate people. The land shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea. Gentleness and peace shall spread even to the animal world. We have already heard how Jeremiah (if he be, indeed, the author) looked forward to a time when the divine teaching would be graven in the hearts of the people, when all, from the greatest to the least, would know the Lord. And to know Him meant to all the prophets the same thing. It meant justice, compassion, loving-kindness, humility, the whole gamut of the virtues. All the children of Israel "shall be disciples of Yahweh, and great shall be their peace." And through Israel the knowledge of God shall be diffused over the world's face. "Out of Zion shall go forth the teaching and the word of Yahweh from Jerusalem." Then God will cause all wars to cease. The peoples shall "beat their swords into ploughshares and their

spears into pruning-hooks : nation shall not lift up sword against nation ; neither shall they learn war any more." These beautiful pictures, dreams, predictions, call them what you will, can never lose their value or their charm. We still drink at the fountain of their inspiration, and we hear the echo of them in many a Psalm. " One shall say, I am Yahweh's ; and another shall proclaim the name of Jacob ; and another shall mark on his hand : ' unto Yahweh,' and give titles of honour to the name of Israel." For Israel, God's servant, has been called to be " a light unto the nations," his duty is " to open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison," so that through Israel " God's salvation may reach unto the ends of the earth." Yet will God " gather others unto Israel besides those of him that are gathered," so that God's " house shall be called a house of prayer for all peoples." The hope, which these verses so grandly and simply express, has never been extinguished in Israel and in Judaism. No persecution could wholly quench it : it might be dormant for a time ; it might be crusted over with particularism and a desire for revenge ; but it was always ready to reappear ; it has in it a principle of continued life ; its universalism is in accordance with the other fundamental doctrines of Judaism ; and now it has sprung up into the forefront of our consciousness and as the final key to all our hopes, our efforts, and our sacrifices. *Communal* calamities, at any rate, are explicable or endurable upon this missionary hypothesis. In *this* light they are transfigured. For *that* end Israel can fitly repeat the prophetic words, and find in them patience and encouragement. " The Lord God has opened mine ears and I was not rebellious, neither turned

away back. I gave my back to the smiters, and my cheeks to them that plucked off the hair : I hid not my face from shame and spitting." No grander, holier, or more satisfying explanation of Israel's sufferings can be suggested than that put forward in the famous 53rd chapter of Isaiah. If, indeed, the nations are the speaker (and it is delightful to think that, whether rightly or wrongly, this has been the predominating view of Jewish interpreters throughout the ages), then what can be more comforting and more spiritual, more ethical and more religious, than the immortal words : " Surely he has borne our sicknesses and carried our pains : whereas we regarded him as stricken, smitten of God and afflicted. But he was wounded for our transgressions ; he was bruised for our iniquities ; the chastisement which led unto our peace was upon him ; and by his stripes we have been healed." Because he poured out his soul unto death, therefore shall he cause many to become righteous ; " he bore their iniquities and made intercession for the transgressors." Whether the figure be Israel or no, the doctrine remains the same. Voluntary self-sacrifice for the sake of others : *their* spiritual healing through *his* voluntarily accepted pain. This is the finest palliative of suffering which human thought and human love have yet devised.

We do not find this palliative elsewhere in the Old Testament than in this one chapter of Isaiah. But in one Maccabean Psalm we get the conception of suffering for a cause. " For Thy sake," the words run, " for Thy sake are we killed all the day long." Here in germ is the idea of martyrdom. We shall see in another chapter how the conception was fruitfully developed by the Rabbis.

Another palliative of which the Rabbis made great use is also found in a simpler form in the Old Testament scriptures. It is the idea of discipline; as the Greeks saw too: *πάθημα μάθημα*. The verse in Proverbs: "Whom the Lord loves He chastens," won great vogue. It was itself only a development of the Deuteronomic reflection: "As a man chastens his son, so Yahweh thy God chastens thee." We find it again in Job: "Happy is the man whom God chastens; therefore despise not thou the chastening of the Almighty. For He makes sore and binds up; He wounds, and His hands make whole." "It is good for a man," reflects the writer of Lamentations iii. "that he bears the yoke in his youth." "It is good for me that I have been afflicted," says the Psalmist, "that I might learn Thy statutes," for "before I was afflicted, I went astray, but now I have kept Thy word." So, too, according to Elihu in Job: "He delivers the afflicted through his affliction; He opens his ear through suffering."

This comparative transfiguration of many kinds of suffering, which thus become not punishment, but the discipline of love, is partly paralleled by a transfiguration of reward. It is very curious that this transfiguration was itself partly achieved by the domination of the Law. By Christian critics it is usually thought (and under the immense and secular influence of Paul it is not easy for them to think otherwise) that legalism and the rule of the Law must have enormously increased not only the desire for reward, but the very assurance itself that, as suffering betokened sin, and was its punishment, so prosperity implied righteousness, and was its reward. Legalism, it is supposed, degrades virtue: men fulfil the commands in order to avoid punishment

and to obtain reward. There is no goodness for its own sake. Goodness becomes a mere number of isolated deeds, and these deeds (even if they be deeds of kindness or justice) are done for the sake of profit and reward. That may have happened in some cases. There is no religion which cannot be corrupted and caricatured. But the higher tendency of the Law acted in a precisely opposite direction. Happiness no longer meant mere length of days and outward prosperity. It meant the keeping of the Law and its study. The very *doing* of the commands was its own reward, quite apart from all anticipation of any other. "O how I love Thy law." "How sweet are Thy words unto my taste." "Thy law is my delight; Thy testimonies are the rejoicing of my heart." The Law is also a consolation and make-weight in affliction. "Unless Thy law had been my delight, I should have perished in my affliction." Communion with God is the highest "reward." "Thy loving-kindness is better than life." We have already heard the noble outburst: "Whom have I in heaven but Thee, there is nought upon earth that I desire beside Thee." Come what may, "God is the strength of my heart and my portion for ever." This is the greatest of the purely religious palliatives. No outward affliction can rob a man of God and of the joy of loving Him! We shall hear how this idea is nobly illustrated in the story of Akiba's martyrdom.

Another interesting feature as regards the Old Testament and the whole subject of this section is that in spite of the prevailing tendency to equate suffering with sin, and righteousness with prosperity, the difficulties of such a combination were strongly felt, and find eloquent expression. We have already

dealt with the protest about the idea of delayed punishment. "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge." We have seen how Ezekiel repudiates the doctrine. The Psalter is full of complaints against Providence for allowing the sufferings of the righteous and the prosperity of the wicked. That the wicked *should* be rapidly punished and the righteous rapidly rewarded is, however, never doubted. The inadequacy of the doctrine *in itself* is not recognised: all that we find is a protest that in actual life itself the doctrine is not applied. It ought to work, but it does not. In the Psalms the wicked who prosper (and oppress) are usually either the men of the party opposed to the party of the Psalmist, or they are the heathen as contrasted with Israel. For the purposes, and within the limits, of such a contrast, Israel is righteous, just as where the prosperous and wretched are both Israelites, the second are they who seek to obey God's law, while the first neglect and despise it. In the book of Job the problem is generalised and refined. Life's ironies are emphasised, as they are also by Ecclesiastes, the preacher. Either one lot to all, or different lots without any reference to desert. Happiness to one; wretchedness to the other; and the first may be righteous and the second sinful. "One dies in his full strength; he is wholly at ease and quiet; and another dies in bitterness of soul, and has never tasted happiness." Wicked men spend their days in wealth and prosperity; they reach old age and die in peace. Is it to be wondered at that they have no desire for the knowledge of God's ways; that they sarcastically exclaim: "Who is the Almighty that we should serve Him, or what profit should we have, if we pray unto Him?"

To this bitter question the dialogue in Job provides no answer. We find, indeed, the exclamation that, in spite of every difficulty, the "righteous hold on their way, and they that have clean hands grow stronger and stronger." And Job is certain that his just vindicator lives. Yet the framework of the dialogue, and the very purpose of the book, suggest something more. Suffering frequently does *not* betoken sin. That is one great point gained, and it wins the stamp of the divine approval. Secondly, there is, and there should be, such a thing as disinterested goodness. It is the Satan, the accuser, the doubter, who suggests that Job's piety is merely skin deep. He serves God for reward. But Satan is confounded. Job is overwhelmed with calamity, but he sins not: he "ascribes no unseemliness to God." On the contrary. He utters the two classic and deathless apophthegms of pure goodness and disinterested piety: "The Lord gave, and the Lord has taken away: blessed be the name of the Lord." And again: "Shall we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive evil?" Religious resignation can no further go. The Old Testament at least hardly goes further. Apart from the very ancient myth in the second and third chapters of Genesis, which, for the Old Testament itself, is of no influence or importance, it contains no reflections upon the origin of evil. It does not, happily, assign evil to the machinations of a devil, or think that anything is gained by so polytheistic a device. Satan, not yet the devil, plays but a small part in its pages, and only in one single passage is it suggested that he is at the bottom of a human sin. On the other hand, any better or more philosophic attempts to cope with the difficulty are wanting also.

That, for instance, a creature such as man needed freedom to sin in order to be righteous, liberty to hate in order to love, is not suggested. Nor is it definitely asserted that if goodness always brought happiness (over and above its own), and sin always brought sorrow, there might indeed be little sin, but, in any deeper sense, there would be still less virtue. The origin of the evil heart is not inquired into. Both goodness and wickedness have always existed upon the earth, and at least till the coming of the Messianic Age they will always exist. Then, perchance, the wicked heart may be removed, and all men may be righteous, disciples of wisdom and of Yahweh.

It is not for the lack of inquiries into the origin of evil, or of efforts to solve the insoluble, that we need blame the Old Testament scriptures. So far as we find the book unsatisfactory and inadequate, it is rather because of its too frequent combination of outward suffering with inward sin, its too frequent iteration that God deals, and should deal, with man upon the basis of measure for measure, and upon the lines of retribution and reward. We want, somehow, a more fervent and plainer insistence that sin is *worse* than suffering, and that suffering admits of hallowing and sanctification. We need to be taught that much (though not all) suffering can be made an education, an offering, a sacrifice. Yet while the outward may be too much valued by Old Testament writers, we have already seen that this excess is a defect of a quality. It implies the Jewish doctrines that the outward is not an illusion, that the visible and the invisible world are controlled by the same God and form a unity, that earthly happiness is not wrong, but right, and that there is

a certain proper correspondence between goodness and prosperity.

To expect and desire compensation (whether for righteousness or sin) in another world is in principle no better and no other than to expect or desire it on earth. Nevertheless, when, as with all later Judaism, the compensation is put off beyond the veil, certain advantages accrue. The prosperity of the wicked, the misery of the righteous, cease to agitate. All such temporary misfits can be adjusted for good in another world. And as they can more patiently bear their own sorrows and pains, so they cease to fear, or to be worried by, the expectation of death. Thus (what is more important and more ethical) men tend to care less for, and to put less value upon, the material and the outward; they tend to think more of, and to value more, the spiritual and the invisible. The adornments of the soul they can carry with them: the adornments of the body perish.

Earth and heaven; this life and the next: these are contrasts. But there is a sense in which it is possible to speak of eternal life here and now; in which eternity means something other than mere endless prolongation of time. Important germs of such conceptions may be found in those mystic passages in the Psalms which we have already had before us. "I am continually with thee. God is always before me. He holds my right hand." This God-consciousness and God-communion are here and now. Perhaps death itself can neither hinder nor change them. But however this may be, they are, in any case, the best palliatives of the problem of evil, the best corrections to a one-sided emphasis upon outward retribution and outward reward.

They almost seem to say : " I am happy in the midst of my sorrow."

SECTION VIII

FAITH, WORKS, AND THE LAW

Hitherto there has been plenty of material to be drawn from the Old Testament. Hitherto a large part of our modern Jewish religion as regards the subjects with which we dealt rests upon, and is drawn from, the thoughts and the words of the Old Testament scriptures. But there are other subjects which are only incidentally touched upon by Old Testament writers : whether, for instance, as in the case of the doctrine of the future life, the matter had not yet come within the range of their consciousness ; or, again, as in the case of such a question as " faith and works," or " legalism and the Law," the difficulties and problems which the words imply to *us*, had not been raised or been felt by *them*. It is the later literature only which deals with these subjects more fully, and for many of them one would have to go beyond either the New Testament or the Rabbinical writings. Some subjects, indeed, are wholly modern, or, at least, in the form in which we now wish to discuss them they are modern, and we should, I imagine, find little to help us even in post-Talmudic Jewish literature right up to our own times. Inspiration, revelation, and miracles would, no doubt, be all discussed in the mediaeval Jewish philosophers, or later on by Mendelssohn, but though, historically, what these men have to say on these subjects may be full of interest, our modern needs are not satisfied by them. We look at these matters from a fresh point of view, and with wider

knowledge. Certain subjects such as the relation of God to suffering and evil, the limitation or self-limitation of the divine power, the possibility of suffering in the divine nature, the relation of religion to democracy, the limits of toleration, are, I think, quite modern ; and we could only get hints or adumbrations or incidental flashes about them either from the Bible or from the later literature.

Then, again, there are certain subjects, both among those which I have already named and others, which are not of Jewish, but of Christian, origin. They are not exactly polemical, but yet some of them may depend upon Christian criticism of supposed Jewish weaknesses or inadequacies. We, to-day, want to know what are the rights and wrongs of these criticisms ; what, if anything, is there which we have to abandon ; what to add, what to develop ? Are there Jewish equivalents for certain Christian conceptions ? Do, or should, any of these conceptions form part of our modern Jewish religion, and, if so, how have we obtained them, or how should we mould them ? Have these Christian conceptions Jewish origins or parallels, and were these dropped out of the Jewish consciousness or the Jewish religion when the more deliberate opposition to Christianity began to grow up ? A certain Christian conception may be in the forefront of the Christian religion and of Christian theology : in its specific Christian form it may be inconsistent with Judaism, whether orthodox or liberal ; nevertheless, it may have distinct Jewish parallels in old Jewish thought or in old Jewish literature. But because the conception became predominantly Christian, and a characteristic feature of Christianity, it dropped out, or was deliberately extruded, from Jewish religion

and Jewish theology. What was the result? This must be considered and decided in each particular case. It may be that Judaism was rendered in some given point one-sided. The conception in question may have provided a certain balance. The lack of it may have tended to exaggeration, aridity, one-sidedness. Again, it may even be that a certain Christian conception may supply a corrective to a particular Jewish inadequacy, or a supplement to a particular Jewish doctrine. The conception, being cast in a Christian form, was repellent to Jewish thinkers, and the result may have been that Judaism was rendered still more one-sided. For if a certain religion X lacks a certain conception Y, the omission may not for X be of any very great consequence, or, again, it may be easily supplied. But if a rival religion, Z, adopts this conception, and gives it a place of prominence in its own system, what may happen? The religion X may now make a dead set against Y; it may declare Y to be false, dangerous, and antithetically opposed to itself. Instead of finding out the truth about Y, X may set itself to caricature and condemn Y, with the result that X becomes consciously one-sided, which is far more serious than being unconsciously one-sided. It may be of real importance to find out what, if any, are the old Jewish parallels to Christian conceptions which have been deliberately dropped by later Judaism, and not only dropped, but opposed and condemned. And, again, it may be of importance to find out what, if any, are the Christian conceptions which have no old Jewish parallels, but which, nevertheless, are not essentially opposed to Judaism, but which, on the contrary, in a modified form, could be adopted with profit and consistency. Such

additions might merely add volume and depth to Judaism, and correct any existing one-sidedness, exaggeration, or roughness of edge. There seems to me little doubt that Judaism has suffered from Christianity in a very different way from what has usually been supposed! It has suffered from it by keeping half an eye on it. In some respects, Judaism would have developed more freely and naturally, if it had never known that there was such a religion as Christianity existing in the world. It would all have mattered less if Christianity had been a tiny religion in an out-of-the-way portion of the globe. But Christianity became a universal religion: the religion of Europe and of Western civilisation; partly the creator of that civilisation. It partly absorbed, and was itself partly modified by, the best thought of Greece and Rome. Hence, the rejection by Judaism of all Christian conceptions may have meant that it rejected a great body of thought which was not merely and purely Christian. It may have rejected much which was, or could be made, supplementary and complementary to itself. By too wholesale rejection it may have rejected what was true as well as what was false, and it may have narrowed its own outlook and its own doctrines more than was needful or desirable. And it may have done all this in modern times more than in ancient times; it may even be doing this to-day. It may be that Talmudic Judaism is more full of living, varied, sometimes, I admit, inconsistent ideas than is the Judaism of our modern text-books or sermons. Instead of being more one-sided than they are, it may be in some ways less one-sided, more alive, more responsive to, more expressive of, various aspects of truth, various sides of experience.

Or we may represent what I am suggesting may conceivably be the case in the following way. The Old Testament and Talmudic Judaism were moving along certain religious lines, which we may call AB. Christianity came and criticised these lines, and itself moved along other lines which we will call XY. But both in the Old Testament and in Talmudic Judaism the lines XY may be not wholly unknown. Many indications of them may be present. Modern Judaism, however, may too often ignore these indications, and even sometimes misinterpret them. It may be so hostile to the lines XY that it insists on an exclusive attachment to AB. It refuses even to consider whether there may, perhaps, be anything of value in the new lines at all. XY are wholly false ; AB are wholly true. AB want no enlargement ; no supplement. XY have no good in them whatever. Whether XY may not contain certain valuable corrections to one-sidednesses in AB, or doctrines complementary, and in no way destructive to AB, must not even be considered. He who makes suggestions to this effect is already contaminated by Christianity: he is half a Christian himself ! Surely not in such temper, and with such an outlook, can a religion be profitably deepened and developed. Nor are orthodox theologians the only ones who seem to suffer from this anti-Christian bias. There are liberal theologians, too, who are similarly blinkered. Is it not wiser to push home our liberal doctrine that all light has not shone through Jewish windows, even if one of the other windows be a Christian one ? Or would it be an illustration of my own bias to quote the New Testament saying: " Test all things ; to what is good hold fast " ?

Among the subjects which would fall under one or other of the heads that I have indicated would be those with which the present section is intended to deal: "Faith, Works, and the Law." It would probably be admitted by everybody that they can hardly be fully discussed without reference to Christian theology and Christian criticism. The question, however, is: What sort of reference is there to be? Is the one sole object of the reference to be to show that *all* specific Christian developments in this religious field are false and wrong, that *all* Christian criticism is inaccurate and valueless? That what Judaism means by faith is something very different from what Christianity means by faith, and not only very different, but very superior? That whatever is specifically Christian in any modern conception of faith is *ipso facto* otiose, valueless, false? Such a way of looking at the matter would be a good illustration of that wrong manner of writing Jewish theology which I venture to complain of. And it would also tend, as I am inclined to believe, to do a certain injustice even to the Jewish material itself! For it would, *e.g.*, tend to seek to squeeze out of the Talmudic references to faith any drop of meaning which was in any way cognate to the Christian conception of faith. There must apparently be the sharpest possible contrast between Christianity and Judaism on all those matters about which what may be called specifically Christian doctrines or conceptions may be declared to exist. This tendency has even affected the modern Jewish interpretation of the Old Testament itself to the detriment of its value and of truth. The teaching of the 53rd chapter of Isaiah concerning voluntary and vicarious suffering is either somewhat neglected, or somewhat rubbed

down by Jewish writers, because it has become closely identified with Christianity. Surely this is an unfair weakening of Old Testament profundity.

Meanwhile it is clear from the very nature of the case that all those subjects and teachings which would fall under one or other of the categories hitherto mentioned can exist in the Old Testament, if they exist at all, only in germ, or incidentally, or undeveloped, or in what we may call a fluid, inchoate, or undefined state. That would certainly be the case as regards "Faith and Works, Legalism and the Law." The Old Testament material for these subjects (though this seems a whimsical paradox in the case of the Law) is only small.

Some of the greatest Old Testament teachers, the true founders of Judaism, the prophets, spoke their messages before the Law, as we now know it, had been compiled and recognised. On the other hand, neither they nor those who lived under the Law, such as many of the Psalmists and Sages, knew anything of any conflict between the conceptions of faith and of works. Neither the authors of the Law nor any other of the Old Testament writers are aware of those specific evils which are often reckoned to be inseparable from Legalism or Nomism.

What the prophets censure is not obedience to an outward rule, or heteronomy, or even self-righteousness produced by soulless conformity to a series of injunctions; it is neglect of morality; it is the false conception that God can be cajoled by offerings, or that religion consists in sacrifices; it is the combination of injustice and cruelty with a plethora of ceremonies and an exactitude in ritual. "I cannot away with iniquity and solemn

assemblies." When they pass on to comfort and consolation, they do not attempt to show a better way (the road of "faith") to those who despair of finding God by conformity to laws and ordinances, or who despair, however eager their desire, of fulfilling the Code book and the Law. If they comfort those who feel the pressure and weight of sin, it is not to bid them see the emptiness of "works."

It is true that when the great formative prophets spoke, there was as yet no Pentateuch, no Law invested with the unquestioned and divine authority which accrued to it after Ezra. But if the Law had only included ordinances about justice, pity, and kindness, or even if to these had been added injunctions about social and civic or criminal matters, such as are now contained in the Pentateuch, and if a Law of this kind, claiming Mosaic and divine authorship, had been in existence before, and well known to the prophets, it is more than doubtful whether they would have objected to it. On the contrary. They would have said, "Obey God's law," and they would have censured the people for their disobedience. Jeremiah is a prophet of "inwardness." He finds the root of sin in the wicked heart and in its stubbornness. He realises that by constant sinning you can lose the power of doing or being good. But yet he has no other exhortation to make than "obey God's voice," and he does not really and truly suppose that the average person is incapable of obeying it. But this very attempted obedience to God's voice is itself an act of faith. It involves a "belief" in God's sovereignty and uniqueness, a "belief" in the absolute duty of the Israelite to worship Yahweh only, as well as to do right deeds of justice, kindness, and compassion.

And, perhaps, it is this unconsciousness of difficulty or of contradiction which constitutes, in this particular subject, the value of the Old Testament. It is also the combination, in a fluid, unsystematised form, of "faith" and of "works"; it is the conception of true religion (by which a man may find outward and inward salvation) as consisting in the maintenance of this free and happy union. True religion involves faith in God, and in One God only; it involves obedience to His voice: doing deeds of justice, pity, and love. And this voice of God is, in one aspect of it, the moral law, objective, external, divine; but, in another aspect, it is man's own creation, his own growing conscience, his own recognition of the divine call, his own conformity to that call, "very nigh" unto him, in "his mouth and in his heart that he may do it."

This not merely comfortable fluidity or combination, but rather this fluidity or combination which is true to life, and concordant with the many-sidedness of truth, is partly illustrated by the very meaning of the Hebrew verb *Amon*, which signifies to believe in, to trust in, to have faith in, to rely on—all in one, while the noun *Emunah* signifies "faithfulness" rather than "faith." Biblical faith is never mere intellectual belief in a given proposition or doctrine. (And I might at once remark here that Paul's conception of "faith" remains largely in this respect true to type: it is a Jewish caricature of it when it is represented as merely an intellectual assent to a series of metaphysical or theological statements.) Abraham's belief in God which was accounted as righteousness was trust as well as belief; it was faithfulness towards God, reliance on God, as well as faith in God. So, too, when King

Jehoshaphat, in the Second Book of Chronicles, is made to say: "Believe in Yahweh your God, so shall ye be established; believe His prophets, so shall ye prosper" (where the author has Isaiah in his mind, and Isaiah's indignant pun, untranslatable in English, "If ye will not believe, surely ye shall not be established"), both prophet and historian mean to include trust, willing and obedient, as well as "belief"; full and implicit reliance as well as "faith." When the Ninevites believed in God and in the divine source of Jonah's message, this belief implied a change of heart. For because they "believed" they turned from their evil way, so that God saw their "works," the product of their "belief," and to Jonah's annoyance and displeasure God repented of the evil that He had said that He would do unto them, and He did it not. Here we have a truly charming and classic illustration of Old Testament (I might add of Jewish,—might I add, too, of Pauline?) combination, interconnection, and co-ordination of faith and works. From the faith spring the works. The second are dependent on, and, indeed, hardly separable from, the first. In the 78th Psalm, when the Israelites are censured for lack of faith in God and in His power, faith is paralleled by trust. "They believed not in God and trusted not in His salvation" (or "in His capacity to save"). And there are many similar passages.

The compilers of the Law had no idea that their injunctions were anti-prophetic in their very form; while the prophets had no idea that they themselves were in this sense anti-legal. Torah to both of them was teaching rather than "law," though the lawgiver cast his "teaching" in the form of enact-

ments and ordinances. To both of them goodness, as we saw, is obedience: following the instructions of God. There is a prophetic Torah as well as a priestly Torah, and our existing Pentateuchal codes are in some sort a combination of both. Both are apprehensive of the vagaries of the heart. Both would apparently insist upon "heteronomy," the imposition of an external law. Jeremiah denounces the "counsels and the stubbornness of the evil heart." The lawgiver bids the people "seek not after their own heart." Yet the ideal to the Prophet is that the Law shall be written in the heart, so that outward teaching may be needless, and the ideal to the lawgiver is that men shall love God with all their heart. The authors of Deuteronomy would have been highly surprised if they had been told that there was any essential antagonism or opposition between love and law. The one prophetic passage in which there is an opposition between the heart and law is in Isaiah xxix. 13, but the "law" which is there contrasted with the religion of the heart is declared to be the work of men. Nevertheless, the words are interesting. "This people draw near me with their mouth and honour me with their lips, but they have removed their heart from me, and their fear toward me is a commandment of men which has been taught." Here, indeed, faith is opposed to laws, but the laws are expressly denied to be from God. We may regard them less as law than as routine.

We may take it, then, that the opposition between faith and works, in any Pauline sense of the words, is unknown to the Old Testament. This was not, however, because *faith* in the higher meanings of the word was unknown to Old Testament

teachers; it was rather because no trouble had yet been experienced about *works*. "Ought" and "can" seemed to go together. Men believed that they both should and could fulfil the injunctions of God. We have heard the exceptions. We have heard of the sour grapes and the children's teeth, of the exiles who seemed to be mouldering away in their iniquities, of the denunciations of the prophet who declared that his people were so far gone in sin that they could not do good if they tried. But Jeremiah, psychologically significant, and perhaps novel, as his remark is, only meant it to apply to persons of exceptional sinfulness: it was a sarcastic remark, half consciously exaggerated. The next moment he would probably have urged those very people to "repentance and amendment." And the other sayings were rather deductions from continued misfortune than from the conviction that righteousness was too hard a thing for any man to gain. It is true that Ezekiel predicted the Messianic gift of a new spirit, and Jeremiah that the law of God would be graven upon the heart, but we saw how this same Ezekiel had urged his hearers to make them a new heart by their own energy and repentance, and Jeremiah was constantly bidding the men of Judah to return and to amend their ways. All is still fluid, and the difficulties are not yet felt. Nor can it be said that there are more signs as to a consciousness of the difficulty of goodness after the introduction of the Law than before it. If we take the Psalter and the Proverbs as, upon the whole, examples of post-exilic piety, we hear nothing in them of any note of despair. We have, indeed, in a few Psalms a deep consciousness of sin, but there is no idea of any barrier which prevents a man being

good, no indication that the putting up of a number of ordinances, bidding a man "do this and refrain from that," constituted such a barrier, and sharpened the very tendency to sin which it was universally acknowledged existed in every member of humanity. On the contrary. The "legal" Psalms seem, if anything, rather to indicate that one of the supreme merits of the Law was that it positively helped a man to become "good." We shall observe how this idea is enormously developed in the later Rabbinical literature.

On the other hand, without any theoretic statement, or even a very conscious conviction, that a man cannot of himself do good, or be good, or cleanse his own heart, we do find in the Old Testament a not unfrequent prayer for the divine help to this very end. "Teach me to do Thy will. Cleanse me from my sin. Make me to know Thy ways. Create in me a clean heart. Teach me Thy statutes." To these supplications we have already listened. In the Proverbs there is hardly a definite sentence to quote, but one has the general impression that the writers felt that God meets those who honestly desire wisdom (or righteousness) halfway. "Those who seek Me earnestly shall find Me." And this is the doctrine of all later Judaism. Man is *free* to sin, but he is not *driven* to sin by any supernatural power. He is, however, helped towards goodness by the divine spirit. Let men seek to fulfil the Law, and God will help them to fulfil it. Love God, and strength to resist temptation, and to do good, will be given you. It might even be said that already in Deuteronomy there are germs of such a view. For the bidding to love God precedes the order to keep His commandments.

The second is idle and even impossible without the first. Love God, and then of themselves the commands are seated in the heart ! The Deuteronomic love answers, in a measure, to the Pauline faith. It is a turning of the whole man, with passion and conviction, towards the Divine. It is the full acceptance of God with all the soul and with all the mind. Through this "love" we shall gain power to "do." Out of love will issue works. This is, I admit, a modernisation of Deuteronomy, and yet if one had read it out to the author of those introductory chapters, would he not have said : "Yes ; I meant no less" ?

There are two strands of the "faith and works" difficulty which, though combined together in the consciousness of Paul, we can, I think, for our purpose disentangle and distinguish. The one is connected with the question, how is a man to become good and do good ? How is he to fulfil the divine commands ? The second is : how is a man to be justified, or, slightly varying the point of view, how is a man to win salvation ? To the first, the Old Testament, as we have seen, answers : "By effort, which effort will be assisted by God." Or, again, very simply : "By the fear and the love of God." To the second question it replies : "By obediently fulfilling God's commands, by walking in His ways." Suppose, then, you come to believe in a future life of blessedness or woe, dependent upon how you have behaved in your earthly existence, does this mean that God will allot to you woe or blessedness according to your fulfilment or violation of His ordinances ? Is your salvation the result of your "works" ? A man may like to be good for the sake of goodness, but the average person will worry

vastly more about goodness if everlasting happiness or woe depends upon his goodness, and, therefore, upon his fulfilment of God's commands !

To the writers of the Old Testament "salvation" is limited to life on earth. And earthly life is full of vicissitudes ; prosperity and calamity are strangely intermixed. Does it then come to this, that a peaceful death is the only test or indication of salvation ? As individualism grew, and private prosperity and private adversity were regarded, not merely as, in the last resort, the gift of God, but as His direct dispensation according to retributive justice, all kinds of difficulties (as we have already seen) were bound to arise. It seems hardly possible that the doctrine could have sustained itself at all had it not been reinforced by the further doctrine of a life of weal and woe beyond the grave.

Yet even in the Old Testament the doctrine of retribution by works is crossed and modified by the doctrine of divine forgiveness and the higher equity. "If thou, O Lord, shouldst mark iniquities, who could stand ?" But God forgives. In God's sight "shall no man living be justified." Therefore God cannot deal with man according to his works in any strict sense, and if a man repents, He is ready to overlook any number of offences. This is the simple Jewish doctrine which was never really changed. It is of three parts, and does not form a consistent whole. But it is a living doctrine, suited alike to keep men from carelessness, on the one hand, or from despair upon the other. (1) God (as Paul too teaches, Romans ii. 6) renders to every man according to his works. (2) God does not deal with man according to his works, for if He did, no man could be "justified." None could win "salvation."

(3) If a man "repents," all his sins are freely forgiven him. Thus man's good deeds are rewarded more than they deserve, his bad deeds are punished less than they deserve; his righteousness receives more than it merits; his wickedness less. So far as we still look at this life, or think of the future life, in terms of "merit"; or so far as we look upon what befalls us here, or think of what may befall us hereafter, on the lines of reward and punishment at all, we have hardly advanced, or need hardly advance, beyond this simple Old Testament and Jewish teaching.

The doctrine of salvation by works received doubtless a powerful reinforcement by the introduction of the Law. It is needless to dwell here upon the moral and religious dangers to which the Law and the doctrine together exposed men's minds. As the Law was a mixture of "moral" and "ceremonial" injunctions, there was the old danger, now immensely strengthened, of setting ritual before morality. And no teacher could now say that God had not commanded, and did not care about, the fulfilment of these ceremonial laws. Secondly, there was the danger of supposing righteousness to consist in the mere doing of a number of isolated deeds, whether ceremonial or moral; as if a man's goodness could be counted up in deeds, as his wealth could be counted up in coins or sheep. Outward and soulless conformity to a code, instead of inward character, the soul and heart aflame with the love of God and man; the degradation of righteousness; the production of hypocrisy, mediocrity, narrowness, conventionalism, self-righteousness, pride: these evil possibilities of the Law in conjunction with the doctrine of salvation by works were doubtless often

converted into reality. Jesus did not beat the air for nothing at all. Doubtless, too, to these evils there would be added those of anxious and pedantic scrupulosity; a holding of the nose, a drawing of the skirts, towards those whose standard of strictness was lower, or whose conception of righteousness was less legal, and whose view of life was less formal and more ardent. But that these evils did not become widely prevalent seems to be no less true than that they were always a possible danger. Why they did not spread, what prevented their prevalency, I have already suggested, and may have occasion to suggest again. But the matter in its fulness and detail lies beyond the province of this book.

It is a common charge against the Law that it tends to make people think of nothing but reward and punishment. The motive for righteousness is merely to avoid the one and gain the other. The motive is both selfish and low. "Do this and avoid that, that your days may be long, and that it may be well with you." Justification or salvation by works strengthens this tendency of the Law, as, indeed, you can hardly have a "legal" religion, which does not also put justification or salvation by works in the very forefront of its doctrines. The two—law and works—hang together.

Nothing is more comic (I have often alluded to this) than to see how Jewish critics of Christianity and Christian critics of Judaism make precisely the same charges against each other. The Christian says: "Judaism thinks of nothing but reward. It is a low and selfish religion." The Jew says: "Christians think of nothing but saving their own souls. Christianity is a self-regarding and selfish

religion." Yet the one set of critics is as wrong as the other.

It is odd that the particular code which is most eudaemonistic, and insists most repeatedly upon the selfish motive, is also the code which enjoins most earnestly the love of God. It provided the cure for its own evil. The Law as a whole avoided eudaemonism and selfishness in a remarkable manner. The higher motives triumphed over the lower. Men sought to fulfil the Law for the sheer joy of fulfilling it, and for the love of God. And we may also say that a higher eudaemonism triumphed over a lower; a higher selfishness overcame the lower. To try to be good in order to have a good time, whether on earth or in heaven, is a poor motive. To try to be good in order to "save one's soul" and "enjoy life eternal" is not necessarily a poor motive. It depends upon what your conception of "soul," and of "saving" it, and of "life eternal," may be. If you regard your "soul" as the one supreme gift of God, which should be kept as pure as you can, and therefore as near to God as you can, and if such "purity" and "nearness" constitute the essence of "life eternal," then to try to be good for the sake of such purity and nearness is no longer a poor motive, but a high one. It is, in one sense, a self-regarding motive, but it is a self-regardingness which is not selfish. For the good of the whole depends upon the good of each, and while each man *can* only save his own soul, yet he saves it by caring for and loving his brother. Altruism and selfishness fade into each other.

Here we can break off the subject, so far as the Old Testament is concerned. It is true that here, as well as elsewhere, the edges are rough. If the

Law in the Old Testament period did not reveal all its possibilities of evil, it also was very far from revealing all its possibilities of good. We may, however, note one more result which the jumble of subjects that the codes of the Pentateuch embrace tended to bring about. It is, again, in one sense, a dual result: good and evil. The evil we already know: the equalisation of ritual and morality, outward and inward. But the good here alluded to has not yet been mentioned. It is the coincidence of religion with life. Religion, on the outward side, is not merely sacrifices and ceremonies. The civil code and the criminal code are religion; eating and drinking are religion; cleanliness is religion; justice is religion; men's duties to the State are religion. Whatever you do in whatever department of life can hardly be other than to the desecration or the glory of God. This was a very important consequence of legalism upon which we may have again to dwell.

SECTION IX

ETHICAL IDEALS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

The purpose of this short section is not to give an account of the ethical contents of the Hebrew Bible. Its scope is very much more restricted. We have not to tell the whole story, to show developments, to point out contradictions, to set forth the different points of view or ideals of priest and prophet, lawgiver and sage. For our purpose the part is greater than the whole. We have to ask (and the reply can but be brief): what is there in the contents and in the spirit of Old Testament ethics which is still of value to us to-day, which still

has potent influence in our religion, which still survives as an essential part of Judaism? That part of the contents and of the spirit of Old Testament ethics, which answers to this demand, and of which we are now in search, will clearly include all that is best in it and purest. But it will not necessarily be entirely confined to what is best and purest. It will also include some of that which was subsequently developed and ennobled. The developed product is, to some extent, read back into the original germ, and the germ becomes the symbol of the product and of the whole movement. The spirit becomes of value to us, even though we may have outgrown the content. Thus, for example, a feature of post-Biblical ethics became its insistence upon chastity. And here there is a continuous growth to be observed. For the content and expression of Talmudic chastity is not ours, any more than it is purely Biblical. But the spirit of both is of value to us; we read the end (so far as we have got) into the beginning.

To us, too, who, though we may (when adequately enlightened and free from prejudice) admit the ethical advance in the New Testament writings, are yet accustomed to make and find no violent difference between the Old Testament and the New—to us, for whom the Old is not the “preparation” and the “immature,” the New the fulfilment, the completion and the perfection (seeing that to us there is, and can be, no completion and no perfection in any human document),—the Old Testament ethics have a value and an inspiration which they cannot possibly have to those who make this sharp distinction and difference between the Old and the New. Nor do they (and this is important

to emphasise) possess this value and inspiration, because we ignore their limitations. We can see the inadequacies of Old Testament ethics quite as clearly as our Christian neighbours. But it is not of importance and urgency for us to dwell upon these inadequacies as it is of importance and urgency for them. We do not want to make contrasts. We want to show developments. It is, as we saw, of great importance and satisfaction to some Christian writers to emphasise the limitations in the command, "Thou shalt love the 'Ger' as thyself." If "Ger" meant foreigner, the result would be too terrible for words! It is of immense importance to some Christian critics to dwell with glowing satisfaction upon the fact (and it *is* a fact) that the command "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" only refers to fellow-countrymen (though most of them, in the fervour of their satisfaction, forget the resident alien of twenty verses later). But as for us, while we do not unscientifically forget or deny these limitations, we need not gloat over them or constantly dwell upon them. We stand above our documents, but we stand above them *all*, not merely above one or two. They are all stages in a process in which we ourselves form part. And the beginning of this process has a value for us which is peculiarly its own.

Thus—another example—the Ten Commandments are to us valuable for what they contain in the most literal sense. Nor are they any the less valuable because their contents may have been known to, and represented in, the ethical literature or injunctions of other races at an earlier date than they were known to, or written down by, Israelites. The six ethical commands of the Decalogue do, with much

tact, single out six of the great ethical pillars upon which society rests. We honour and value them for their literal meaning. And even if the tenth word only mean "defraud not"; if it be only "directed against a desire associated with an act," we still may value, and still may honour it. Desires that end in acts are worse than desires that do not so end. (" 'Tis one thing to be tempted, Escalus; another thing to fall." Shakespeare was not so wrong.) But beyond the literal meaning of the Ten Words, they stand in our minds and hearts for what they have been made to include, for what men have read into them or distilled out of them. Jesus and the Rabbis made murder include anger; Jesus and the Rabbis made adultery include lustful desire. And we, following in their footsteps, can make stealing include much at which our ancestors would, perhaps, stare. But it is the Ten Words which began the process, and what is much more, it is the continuous existence, recollection, and pressure of the Ten Words which have sustained and stimulated us in the development.

Again, the Ten Commandments mean for Jews that the most sacred portion of the Law emphatically associates together religion and morality. Except for the fourth word, which in Deuteronomy has an ethical foundation, there is no ritual law included in them. The fifth and seventh words sanctify the family. The sixth, eighth, and ninth imply for us the demand, elsewhere definitely expressed, for justice and truthfulness, while the tenth, however interpreted, forbids envy. When we combine together Exodus xx. and Leviticus xix., and read them in the spirit as well as in the letter, read them in the light of their developments (including in those develop-

ments both the New Testament and the Rabbinical literature), we are filled with gratitude, honour, admiration. Here, for our own present ethical ideals—the ethical ideals of modern Liberal Judaism—is the “rock” whence they have been “hewn,” and the “hole of the pit” whence they have been “digged.”

And yet, perhaps, the “rock” should rather be found in the prophets than in any portion of the Law. For the date of the Decalogue is disputed, and even if it be (as I am inclined to believe that it is) pre-prophetic, it was the prophets’ work which gave to it special place and dignity. The author of Deuteronomy v. was a product of prophecy. The ethical work of the prophets was to link ethics to religion: to make religion expressed by morality, and consequently to root morality in religion. It was the prophets who constructed the equation. To serve God means to be good; to be good means to serve God. We have to admit (what the writers of neither Old nor New Testament would have allowed) that a man may disbelieve in God, and yet be “good,” but it still remains as true to-day as when the prophets first started it, that a man cannot be evil and yet serve God.

Moreover, the Law, as we have seen, put this connection between religion and morality in another way still—a picturesque way of great potency and stimulus. Israel was not only to serve, it was also to imitate God. Now this imitation of God became a great motive towards noble living in the Rabbinic period, and we still make use of it. We substitute for the imitation of Christ the imitation of God. (Each kind of imitation, it may be observed, has its advantages and each its limitations.) Hence the

famous phrase in which the imitation of God is urged in the Pentateuch has for us, members of the Jewish community, a peculiar value. We read into it its developments. "Be ye holy, for I the Lord your God am holy." It does not matter to us whether the content of holiness to the mind of the author or of the compiler of Leviticus xix. 1 was one-third ceremonial and two-thirds ethical, or one quarter ethical and three-quarters ceremonial. Ultimately the ethical element was to drive out the other. Ethical holiness, as an imitation of God, is a wonderful weaving together of religion and morality. The good man is not necessarily holy; but (to Judaism) the holy man is necessarily good. Only his goodness has in it a distinction, an elevation, a delicacy, and a passion which are peculiarly his own. Nor is the ethical value of holiness confined to the individual. It is no less felt by the community; at some periods, perhaps, even more. Israel is the holy people. to differ from, and to excel, all other peoples in both ceremonial and ethical holiness. In justice, in purity, in loving-kindness, in truth, Israel is to be the pattern people to the world. (That the actual has fallen far short of the ideal does not alter the conception of the ideal.) The ways of Yahweh in which Israel is to walk, so as to become holy, are ways of righteousness. The Yahweh whom the Israelites are to love, and unto whom they are to be consecrated and holy, is the God "who regards not persons and takes no bribe, who secures justice for the fatherless and the widow, and who loves the stranger" (that is, "the resident alien") "in giving him food and raiment."

What, then, *is* the "goodness" which is the imitation of God? What is the goodness which

makes the ethical constituent of holiness? What is the goodness which the prophets regard as the service of God? We have already seen that it is very simple, almost primitive; the real value of the prophetic teaching being in the solid binding together of religion and morality, in the fierce denunciation of ritual piety as a substitute for righteousness, rather than in the details of the morality itself. Yet the simple demands of the prophets for social justice, compassion, truth, can stand as a symbol for all that we choose to put in them. All that we may elaborate for ourselves under the rubric of social morality—and to-day this rubric extends far—can be rightly included in the iterated and reiterated prophetic injunctions: do justice, love mercy, cherish truth. Throughout Biblical literature from Amos to the latest Psalms there is a constant pleading for the poor, the oppressed, the helpless. In some writers one can even detect a certain bias against the powerful and the rich. The sins complained of are land-grabbing, oppression, bribery, injustice, drunkenness, lying, slander, deceit, murder, adultery, false swearing, malice, and malicious devices. The virtues are just the opposite of all these: strict justice, pity, truth, loving-kindness, good faith. Individual differences in detail or emphasis need not be pointed out. Amos opens the ball with his insistence upon justice and justice only. "Let justice roll down as waters, and righteousness as a perennial stream." Hosea stresses loving-kindness. "I delight in loving-kindness (Chesed) and not in sacrifice." In Isaiah and Jeremiah the virtue of truthfulness and the sins of bribery, slander, and deceit are also mentioned. Ezekiel notes usury and adultery. The author of Isaiah lviii. enjoins pity

and charity. But fundamentally there is no change from beginning to end. Zechariah's teaching is quite on the old lines : " Speak ye every man the truth to his neighbour ; judge truthfully, let none of you devise evil in your hearts against his neighbour, love no false oath ; show loving-kindness and pity every man to his brother ; oppress not the widow, the orphan, the ' stranger ' or the poor." Such is prophetic morality.

Not very different are the ethical ideals of the Law. To begin with justice, though we must not expect that the application of the principle in detail will not often be on a much lower level than that which was subsequently reached. The " Talio," eye for eye and tooth for tooth, had to be abolished by the Rabbis. The whole conception of " measure for measure " has been ethically transcended, and no one saw its weaknesses better, and exposed them more acutely, than the great Teacher from Nazareth. We have not here to deal with the social institutions of the Law, such as slavery, or to discuss the severity and mercifulness of its penal legislation as compared with other ancient and modern codes. Moral lapses such as Exodus xxi. 21, or cruelties such as Deut. xxv. 21, or barbaric rules about war such as Deut. xx. 13, 14, need not concern or worry us. They are only a worry to those who have to maintain the hopeless position that the Pentateuchal codes are perfection. To us Liberal Jews they cause no anguish. Our withers are unwrung. We look only to the spirit of the codes at its best, and to their letter at its best. And here there is much on a line with, and in application of, the principles of the Prophets. Laws such as " That which is altogether just shalt thou follow," or " thou shalt not respect

the person of the poor nor honour the person of the mighty," or "ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgement, in meteyard, in weight or in measure," or "thou shalt not have in thy bag divers weights, a great and a small, or in thine house divers measures, a great and a small, for all that do such things, and all that do unrighteously, are an abomination to Yahweh thy God," still move us and exhort us, and may still be our watchwords and inspiration to-day. "Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil ; thou shalt take no bribe," are laws not yet wholly needless.

Next to justice, and a part of it, is truth. That Yahweh is the God of loving-kindness and truth is a remarkable juxtaposition and combination. Truth implies fidelity as well as truthfulness. Lying and treachery are equally its opposites. The man of "truth" is trustworthy both in deed and in word. "Ye shall not steal, neither deal falsely, neither lie to one another. Thou shalt not go up and down as a tale-bearer among thy fellows." These injunctions are still of power. We find their spirit reflected again and again in the maxims of the sages.

Judaism has ever held high the purity of the family. It was soon noted that the Law in one place puts the father before the mother ; in another the mother before the father. Therefore must equal reverence be shown to both. Akin to the reverence of parents is the honour to be shown to the old. Not needless nowadays is the order : "Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head, and honour the face of the old man and fear thy God : I am Yahweh." I have already intimated that our conception of chastity is not the same in detail as that of the Old Testament writers. Above all, we have moved forward to strict monogamy. And we have much

stricter rules for divorce than the Oriental Pentateuch; and what is much the most essential point of all, we reject that Eastern conception whereby the man can divorce his wife, but the wife cannot divorce her husband. But there is a certain spirit of purity in the Pentateuchal legislation which was destined to produce better fruit. Even in the repeated warnings against the strange woman in Proverbs, we may see a beginning of the movement that was to end in a hatred of every kind of unchastity: of fornication as well as of adultery. "Defile not yourselves in any of these things." Sexual purity became an integral part of moral and religious holiness. And in this connection it is important to point out the dead set made by the Law against unnatural offences. When one reflects upon the wide prevalence of these offences in the ancient world, one cannot be too grateful to the Law for its outspoken utterances. "These things are abomination." Here, too, we seem to recognise the finger of God, and we reverence the Code which, in spite of many weaknesses, yet contains such words and laws.

It is, perhaps, needless to recite the various laws of the Pentateuch which apply the general principle of benevolence and compassion. The note struck in Deuteronomy has remained a characteristic note of Judaism; how far the words show also a certain weakness as well as an obvious strength need not be discussed. "The poor shall never cease out of the land; therefore I command thee, saying, Thou shalt open thine hand wide unto thy brother, to thy poor, and to thy needy, in thy land." Institutional religion is to cause a common rest and a common rejoicing for rich and poor alike, and more

especially for the "stranger," the fatherless and the widow, the bondman and the bondmaid. To these claimants especially must justice and charity be shown. Touching is the repeated motive: "because thou wast a bondman in the land of Egypt."

"Thou shalt not defraud an hired servant that is poor and needy, whether he be of thy brethren or of thy resident aliens that are within thy gates: at his day thou shalt give him his hire; neither shall the sun go down upon it, for he is poor and sets his heart upon it. Thou shalt not pervert the judgement of the 'stranger' nor of the fatherless; nor take a widow's raiment to pledge. When thou cuttest down thy harvest in thy field, thou shalt not go again to fetch it; it shall be for the stranger, the fatherless and the widow. When thou beatest thine olive tree, thou shalt not go over the boughs again; it shall be for the stranger, the fatherless and the widow. When thou gatherest the grapes of thy vineyard, thou shalt not glean it afterward; it shall be for the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow. And thou shalt remember that thou wast a bondman in Egypt; therefore I command thee to do these things. When ye reap the harvest of your land, thou shalt not make clean riddance of the corners of thy field when thou reapest, neither shalt thou gather any gleaning of thy harvest. Thou shalt leave them unto the poor and the stranger: I am Yahweh, your God." The kindness demanded for the Israelite servant may, indeed, be contrasted with the rigour which is allowed towards foreign slaves. We, however, can neglect the weakness and the limitation, and use only the goodness and the strength. And we can enlarge the religious *motif* with which the moral injunction is introduced. "For unto me the children of Israel

are servants." We use the spirit of these words, and for us they mean : because all men are God's servants, created in His image (Job xxxi. 15), therefore must all men be respected by one another, and none must be oppressed or despised. In this way it is that the Pentateuchal legislation can be adapted by us to-day.

Very important is the fact that the ethical ideals of the Pentateuch include kindness to animals; an ethical feature which is wanting in the Gospels and even jeered at by Paul. "Does God care for oxen?" This question, so different from the last words of Jonah, and so repulsive in its callousness, shows another point in which that great genius is off the Jewish line. Here, again, the particular examples in which the principle is applied may need enlargement and purification. We should, *e.g.*, prefer a law which went a good deal further than Deut. xxii. 6, 7. (The motive of Deut. xxii. 4 is probably ceremonial and not humanitarian.) There are more precautions which might be fitly taken for the ox than the absence of a muzzle. But the spirit is there, and its application was capable of, and received, indefinite development. In the oldest code the motive of the Sabbath law itself is that "*thine ox and thine ass may rest*, and the son of thy handmaid and the resident alien may be refreshed." The injunction respecting the fallen ass "of him that hates thee" (not, be it observed, of him whom thou hatest), to help in loosening it from its burden, has both a humanitarian object as regards the ass, and a charitable motive as regards the enemy. It kills two birds with one stone, and, like the law respecting the straying ox and ass which precedes it, is highly noticeable and even inspiring. It is remarkable that the Deuteronomic

code is here unable to maintain the high ethical level of its predecessor. The "enemy" becomes a "brother."

One of the most interesting observations to be made about the Pentateuchal codes is that we find in them the beginnings of that curious ethical sensitiveness and delicacy which is characteristic of the Rabbis. Here Gospels and Talmud supplement each other. In the one we have the expression of an heroic ethics of self-sacrifice and adventure ; in the other we have the expression of a tender and delicate ethics for every day. We need them both. One fills up the gaps of the other. Instances of this budding delicacy are : "When thou dost lend thy brother anything, thou shalt not go into his house to fetch the pledge. Thou shalt stand outside, and the man to whom thou dost lend shall bring out the pledge unto thee." If the man gives his upper garment as a pledge, then it is to be restored to him when the sun goes down, "that he may sleep in it and bless thee." Again : "Thou shalt not curse the deaf nor put a stumbling block before the blind, but shalt fear thy God : I am Yahweh." Delicate, too, is the reason (and the inverted tit for tat does this oldest legislator high honour) why the resident alien is not to be oppressed. The Israelites were resident aliens and oppressed in Egypt. "Therefore ye know the heart of the resident alien : ye shall not oppress him." There are both preciseness and delicacy in the injunction : "the wages of him that is hired shall not abide with thee all night until the morning."

Finally, let us recur again to the command of love. Is it, however, combined with a command to hate ? There is no command to hate your enemy,

whether in the Pentateuch or anywhere else in the Old Testament. It is often remarked that the familiar statement in the Sermon on the Mount is a justified inference from such passages as Deut. xxiii. 3-6, in which it is said of the Ammonite and the Moabite that "thou shalt not seek their peace or their prosperity all thy days for ever." The truth is that a distinction must be made between private enemies and the enemies of Israel or of God. I do not know that it was regarded as an order and a duty to hate the latter class of "enemies," but it *was*, I think, considered as legitimate. We cannot ignore the fact that so deeply spiritual a man as the author of Psalm cxxxix. exclaims: "Do I not hate them, O Yahweh, that hate thee? I hate them with perfect hatred," he adds, quite as if, so far from such a hatred being a weakness, it was rather a feather in his cap. But when we come to the private enemies of the individual, that is altogether a different matter. And it is very doubtful whether Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount is not throughout addressing himself to the individual and to the individual's private life. But there is no indication that any hatred of a private and personal enemy was permitted. Rather are there indications that private enemies are to be forgiven and helped. We have heard the law about the enemy's ox. When we take that law into conjunction with the culminating injunctions in Leviticus xix., and in conjunction with the maxims in Proverbs about forgiveness, is it fair to say that the Old Testament orders, or even allows, the Israelite to hate his enemy, if that enemy is to be interpreted either as a brother Israelite or as a resident alien? Is it even fair to say that the Old Testament allows him to hate any man, whether

Israelite or no, who is *his* personal, private foe? I do not think so. All we may say is that the Old Testament allows him to hate *Israel's* enemies and *Yahweh's* enemies in the lump and as a class. I do not approve of this hatred. I refuse to believe that God has *any* enemies. But the two cases are, at least, very different. And an enormous number of Christians have not thought it inconsistent with the order to love their enemies to show and feel anything but love towards the enemies of their religion, towards the heretic, towards the infidel. Jesus himself found no inconsistency with his "new command" of love in showing anything but love towards the men who opposed his mission and disbelieved in his claims and his authority. Let us hear those verses of Leviticus again: I wish that a Buddhist or a Hindoo would write their commentary. "Thou shalt *not hate* thy brother in thy heart. . . . Thou shalt not avenge nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. The resident alien that dwells with you shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were resident aliens in the land of Egypt: I am Yahweh, your God." At any rate, no less happy is our lot, who, if anything, seek to put into these noble words even more than they at first contained, than the lot of those who are always wanting to recall and emphasise their possible limitations. It is, perhaps, even more blessed to praise than to depreciate.

The ethical ideals of Prophecy and Law are reflected in the Psalter. The 15th Psalm lays down the moral conditions incumbent on those who would "sojourn in God's tent." Such a one must

walk uprightly and do righteousness; he must speak the truth *in his heart*. He must not backbite with his tongue or do evil to his neighbour. He must not lend on usury or take a bribe. He must not swerve from his sworn word, whatever to himself may be the issue. The conditions, both outward and inward, are more briefly summed up in the 24th Psalm: "Clean hands and a pure heart." To which is added truthfulness. The emphasis upon the "tongue" became more and more marked in the post-exilic period, in the direction both of truth and of peace. "Keep thy tongue from evil, and thy lips from speaking guile; depart from evil and do good, seek peace and pursue it."

It remains to say a few words about any contribution to ethics made by the Biblical sages, the authors or compilers of the book of Proverbs. There are two general points of value that deserve notice. First, the identification of goodness with wisdom and of both with religion was significant and influential. It is not merely that goodness is the prudent, wickedness the foolish, thing to do. It is not merely that wickedness does not "pay" in the end, that honesty is the best policy. The sages do, indeed, urge this, and, perhaps, they urge it more definitely than the facts of life would admit. But there is something more. Goodness is wisdom in a higher sense. It is man's health, it is his higher well-being; it is, in a deep sense, his life; it is his soul's salvation. Wickedness is folly, not merely because, in the long run, it does not pay; it is folly because it leads to every sort of vital ruin. Life to the sages is not merely length of days; death is not merely physical death, or even sudden, premature, or violent death. The words hover around a deeper

signification. Life is good life ; it is wisdom ; it is righteousness ; it is the fear and the knowledge of God. Death is the opposite of all this and its negation. Life is thus drawing near to the New Testament conception of " eternal life," which again means more than the indefinite prolongation of consciousness beyond the grave. Next, while the sages are keen on retributive justice, keen that virtue will be rewarded and wickedness punished, they frequently imply, and almost definitely assert, that the reward and the punishment are not something purely external. They are internal. At all events, they are the necessary outcome of virtue and wickedness respectively ; not something added on to them without any inherent connection. The wicked are filled with their own devices or ways ; the good are filled with their own deeds. Thirdly, wisdom is goodness, but it is also knowledge. And there is an intellectual element in virtue : there is a unity in the soul as in God. Moreover, wisdom is happiness. So, too, is righteousness. This is very important in two directions. First, though wisdom and goodness may and do *bring* outward prosperity, they are better than outward prosperity. " Wisdom is better than rubies." " Her gain is better than gold." Next, wisdom is pleasant. Nor are you really wise till wisdom *is* pleasant to *you*. Goodness is happiness ; nor are you fully good till you *like* being so. Jewish morality would sympathise with the Aristotelian view that the truly righteous man likes being righteous, while the truly wicked man rejoices in his sin. " The reward of a command is a command," say the Rabbis, and only he truly fulfils the Law who experiences *joy* in fulfilling it, and fulfils it for its own sake.

For the rest, the specific ideals of Proverbs do not greatly add to what we have gathered in from the Prophets and the Law. We have already noted the deepening stress upon chastity, and also upon the virtues and the vices of the tongue. Great emphasis is laid upon truthfulness and straightforwardness ; also upon good temper, self-control, peacefulness, humility, diligence, and moderation. The ideal is quiet content ; a modest competency : neither poverty nor riches. Great sympathy is expressed for the poor, and righteousness tends to assume its Talmudic signification of almsgiving and benevolence. Before God there is equality. "The rich and the poor meet together. Yahweh is the maker of them all." "Who stops his ears at the cry of the poor, he shall cry himself, and not be heard." "The poor and the oppressor meet together : Yahweh lightens the eyes of both." (A remarkable adage, with which we may, I think, compare Matthew v. 45.) But though there is this marked sympathy with the poor, there is no delight in poverty as such. Nor is there any puritan gloom. Goodness is joy. And more generally, "A merry heart makes a cheerful countenance ; it brings good healing ; it is a continual feast." Hatred alike in their outward and inward results are envy, jealousy, and anger. Though the wicked and the righteous are strongly contrasted, it is not meant that any man can boast of his virtue. "Who can say, I have made my heart pure, I am free from sin ?" The book of Proverbs does not deal with the relation of Israel and the Israelites to the outer world and to the heathen. Its adages are broadly human. How far its authors would have limited, or suggested that others should limit, their charity to fellow-country-

man or resident alien, it is impossible to say. We cannot, therefore, definitely state that in this, or, indeed, in any other matter their moral ideals go beyond those of the Lawgivers. The love of neighbour is not mentioned; yet we have indications that it was not unknown. We are, at any rate, told that while "hatred stirs up strife, love covers all sins." And in the matter of forgiveness and of enemies, we may, perhaps, hold with justice that Proverbs advances beyond the Law. So far as God's forgiveness is concerned, its doctrine is on prophetic lines. It is parallel to that of Jonah, where God only cancels the imminent punishment when He sees that there is a positive turning from evil. "He who covers his sins shall not prosper: who confesses and forsakes them shall have mercy." For the forgiveness of man by man we have the adage: "Say not thou, I will recompense evil; but wait on Yahweh and He will save thee." Then again: "If thy enemy be hungry, give him bread to eat; and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink." Is not this a *practical* love of enemies which even Jesus would have approved of? It may be objected that its merit is partly cancelled by the continuation: "for thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head, and Yahweh will reward thee." The objection seems to me somewhat frivolous. It need not be contended that Proverbs xxv. 21 is a full equivalent of Matthew v. 44, 45, but it is surely a big step upon the way. And the concluding stimulus of reward is no worse than precisely the same stimulus in Matthew vi. 4, or Luke xiv. 14. Then, finally, we have the sayings: "Say not, I will do so to him as he has done to me; I will render to the man according to his work" (a brave slap to tit for tat). "Rejoice

not when thine enemy falls, and let not thine heart be glad when he stumbles." But here too it is held that the end destroys the beginning. "Lest Yahweh see it and it displease Him, and He turns away His wrath from him." It has to be admitted that one could wish the end away. But all the great commentators hold that we must, at least, understand the last clause to mean, "lest God deflect His anger which the enemy—assumed, because of his 'hate,' to be a wicked man—aroused in Him from that enemy *to thee*." By this interpretation much of the apparent offensiveness of the end is removed. And *we*, at any rate, can neglect it wholly. For us the maxims which we have brought together mean that the heart is to be pure, and the hands are to be helpful, when the enemy is in need. Is it requisite to go much further? And that this last adage represented a more or less well-known ideal we may surmise from the parallel in Job. What is the catalogue of sins from which the great sufferer insists that he has kept his soul free? There is first sensual lust; next, lack of pity and justice and benevolence towards dependents or the poor. Next comes pride in possessions; next, inhospitality, and lastly: "If I rejoiced at the destruction of him that hated me, if I lifted myself up when calamity found him." Though put in negative form, the catalogue yet represents no meagre list of virtues.

Ethical ideals may, as we shall see, find in New Testament and Rabbinical literature refinement, extension, deepening. But I can hardly think that it is mere bias and prejudice and narrowness when I contend that the root of the matter is already contained within the four corners of the Old Testament.

CHAPTER II

THE ADVANCE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

THIS chapter of my little book will necessarily be controversial. And, as has happened to me before, I shall probably be attacked by both Jews and Christians. To the second I shall not go nearly far enough; to the first a great deal too far. I can, however, only set down what seem to me the facts and the truth.

As regards the conception and nature of God, I see little advance in New Testament teaching, and least of all in the Synoptic Gospels. For the Synoptics, at any rate, I am able to justify my own view by a forcible quotation by two distinguished Christian scholars, Dr. Foakes Jackson and Professor Lake. They say: "Until controversy with polytheism began, there is no sign that Christianity ever claimed to be a new message as to the nature of God. The God of Jesus and of his disciples is identical with the God of the Jews: his message was not the announcement that God is a Father or King—that was assumed as part of the common belief of Israel—it was rather instruction as to the kind of conduct required from the children and subjects of God, and the future in store for the obedient and disobedient."¹

¹ *The Beginnings of Christianity*, part i. vol. i. p. 402.

Again they say : “ In what way did the teaching of Jesus differ from that of his contemporaries ? Not—and the nature of much modern writing makes it desirable to emphasise the negative—not by teaching anything about God essentially new to Jewish ears. The God of Jesus is the God of the Jews, about whom he says nothing which cannot be paralleled in Jewish literature.”¹ To these two utterances from the two English theologians I will add two from a great American scholar, perhaps one of the most learned and impartial historians of religion now living. “ Jesus was not in his own thought or in the apprehension of those who heard him, friend or foe, the founder of a new religion. However different the emphasis of his teaching from that of the school and the synagogue, he had no doctrine about God’s nature and character, or about what he requires of men, or on his relation to his people and his purpose for them, or concerning the hereafter of the individual and the world, that would have been unfamiliar to a well-instructed Jew of his time.” Again : “ It has been frequently asserted in recent times that the Jewish conception of God in the age of Jesus was of a being so exalted as to be remote and inaccessible, or, as it is sometimes expressed, a ‘ transcendent ’ Deity ; and that the immediateness and reality of religious communion were correspondingly impaired. The whole temper of Jewish piety is a refutation of this singular misjudgement. The loftiest terms of human speech are employed to magnify God—as they are in the Psalms and in Christian liturgies from the New Testament down—but the greatness of God does not signify his

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 288.

aloofness, his holiness no longer means his inaccessibility. 'What great nation is there that has gods as near to it as Yahweh our God is wherever we call upon him?' is spoken from the heart of the Jew in the age of the Mishnah as truly as in that of Deuteronomy. In later books of the Old Testament the title 'king' is frequently given to God, and, following this usage, he is frequently addressed in the prayers of the synagogue as 'our king.' In another sense he is the 'king of the universe'; and, as in the Old Testament, the sovereignty of God is the corner-stone of redemption. The characteristic note of Jewish piety in this age is the thought of God as father—not the father of the people only, as in the Old Testament, but of individuals. The name is much more frequent in the liturgy and in the utterances of Palestinian Rabbis than in the popular writings, whether Hebrew or Greek. The word expresses love, confidence, and intimacy, and the relation is reflected in the quality of obedience. The attitude of the Jew towards God is contrasted in this respect with that of the Gentile: the former is like a son who serves his father gladly, saying, 'If I commit a fault against my father he will not be angry with me, for he loves me'; the Gentile is like a foreign-born slave, who serves in fear, saying, 'If I commit a fault against my master he will be angry with me.' Sinners whose conscience makes them shrink from approaching God are encouraged: 'Is it not your father in heaven to whom you come?' In a time of deepest depression after the war with Hadrian, when all other help and hope failed, a Rabbi exclaims: 'Whom have we to lean upon? One only, our father who is in heaven.' The sovereignty

of God and his fatherhood are so far from conflicting that one of the most familiar of the synagogue prayers begins : ' Our father, our king.' ”¹

It is, as I have elsewhere stated, probable that, in some ways, the conception of God's nature which was held by Jesus was less mature and less "philosophical" than that held, for example, by the author of the 8th chapter of Proverbs, or by the author of the 139th Psalm. This would not, however, imply that God was less near and less intensely realised and experienced by Jesus than by those two writers. On the contrary. The truth would be just the reverse. God may be very near to a man, and very intensely realised and experienced, and yet that man may conceive God's nature in a very childlike manner. The limited and childlike conception does not interfere with the intensity (and the purity) of the experience. And though we have nothing theoretic to learn from Jesus as to the divine nature, we can still be moved and helped by the echo, as imperfectly retained in the Synoptics, of the intensity and the purity of that experience.

The divine fatherhood was clearly realised by Jesus with the utmost clearness and intimacy. He would have wished that all his disciples should have realised that fatherhood as closely and fully as he. And though the fatherhood is not particularly stressed by Mark, and is an especial characteristic of Matthew, we may, nevertheless, believe it to have been a genuine feature of the language and the teaching of Jesus. The scholars from whom

¹ G. F. Moore, *History of Religions*, vol. ii. pp. 114, 73. I have not thought it well to curtail the quotations. The Rabbinic passages in the second quotation may have to be cited again in a subsequent chapter.

I have just quoted say : " The fatherhood of God is a characteristically Jewish doctrine, found in equal abundance in the Old Testament and in Rabbinic literature." (There is a little exaggeration in this sentence, at least about the Old Testament.) " This fatherhood of God is not represented in Mark and in Q as characteristic of the teaching of Jesus and of the apostles, though no doubt it was part of their concept of God."¹ For our present purpose it does not matter whether the actual use of the word " father " in reference to God was made by Jesus himself, or whether it is due to the " reporters," and more especially to Matthew. We have to take the Gospels as we find them. And though it cannot be said that even the language of Matthew adds anything new to the conception of the nature of God, as it was known and taught in the age of Jesus, it does add something to the general impression which we win from the pages of the Old Testament. It does not add much to the general impression which we can gain from Rabbinical literature except in so far as it is highly concentrated. We may perhaps say that *both* Matthew and the Rabbinical literature represent a certain advance on the Old Testament. We certainly do not get in the Hebrew Bible any teacher speaking of God and to God as " Father," " my Father," " your Father," and " our Father," like the Jesus of Matthew. We do not get so habitual and concentrated a use from any Rabbi in the Talmud. And this habitual and concentrated use rightly produces upon us an impression. By it we are led to believe all the more in the truth of the doctrine on which it rests.

¹ *The Beginnings of Christianity*, vol. i. pp. 401, 402.

We are moved by it to wish that we, too, could feel that doctrine, even as Jesus teaches that we ought to feel it ; and that we, too, could order our lives in its light and by its strength.

When we pass from the Synoptic Gospels to the rest of the New Testament scriptures, the doctrine about God becomes so closely connected with the doctrine about Christ that for *our* own purposes its value is diminished. Whether it registers advance or no depends ultimately upon the truth of some of those specific teachings which separate Christianity from Judaism. Any discussion of that question lies entirely outside the scope of this book. I have already alluded to the statement in the Fourth Gospel about the spiritual nature of God. It appears to sum up, to sharpen, and to bring to a conclusion, teaching which was more or less clearly expressed and implied in the Old Testament. When Isaiah said that the Egyptians were men and not God, and that their horses were flesh and not spirit, he implied, I should imagine, that God was spirit and not flesh. The spirit of God, as described in Psalm cxxxix., is hardly to be distinguished from God Himself. In the Fourth Gospel, however, the teaching is definite and explicit. "God is spirit." But though it carries forward Isaiah's teaching to its logical conclusion, it was the result of Greek as well as of Hebrew thinking. It represents a mingling of two streams. Its point and emphasis lie in its application ; because God is a spirit, therefore He must be spiritually worshipped. The depreciation of animal sacrifices and of the Temple service joins hands with the highest teaching of prophet and psalmist. "Do I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats ?" "Is

God pleased with thousands of rams or with ten thousands of rivers of oil?" From different points of view is reached a similar conclusion. The true worship of the omnipresent God is not limited to any one place. Its essence does not lie in material symbols or sacrifices. The spiritual God must be spiritually worshipped. So, too, in Paul's address to the Athenians in Acts, the Old Testament teaching that God does not dwell in man-made temples and shrines is expressed with the utmost emphasis. He does not live in temples made with hands ; neither can men's hands serve Him. And the deduction from this spirituality and omnipresence of God is that God is near to all men without distinction of race, and then follows the famous saying, half Greek and half Hebrew, "For in Him we live, and move, and have our being." (The fine phrase "have our being" is a, perhaps, justified filling-out of the simple word "are" of the Greek original.) They who are not philosophers would be hard put to it to explain exactly what this saying means ; yet we feel it to express, in necessarily inadequate words, one side of a complex truth. God is present in all things, shall we say, but He is more present in life than in inert and lifeless matter, and most present of all in human souls. We men, capable, as we are, of knowledge, goodness, and love, have more of Him than beast and plant and stone. The doctrine of the divine immanence can only be imperfectly and inadequately understood and appreciated by most of us ; it has to be set forth in various ways, more or less halting, more or less inadequate, more or less incomplete. One of these ways is Paul's, and we shall, surely, be glad to use it, even though it

may not say all we feel, or even though it cannot be paraphrased by us with perfect clearness and intelligibility. The words are noble. They answer, no less than Psalm cxxxix. or 1 Kings viii. 27, to our deepest conviction ; they are, therefore, by no means merely sublime to us because we have been taught to regard them so, and still less because, being unintelligible, they are supposed to be magnificent. We feel that they do partly express a truth of religious experience even though we, who are not philosophers, cannot fully set forth that truth to our own minds or to others in ordered words and phrases.

Paul's doctrine of the divine spirit cannot give much help to Jewish readers to-day. That is not because the conception of the divine spirit is not part of our own religion. It is because Paul's doctrine concerning it has to be so pruned and curtailed before we can make use of it that what remains over does not really carry us beyond the Spirit or Wisdom doctrine in the Old Testament and the Apocrypha and in the Rabbinical literature.

Nor does either Paul or the author of the Fourth Gospel tell us anything entirely fresh as to the character of God. Nevertheless, the teaching of the First Epistle of John that "God is love" cannot be overlooked or ignored. Nothing can be more striking or more noble than the ethical use to which the doctrine is put, or the argument which leads up to it. It is an appeal to the disciples and believers, but it could be equally an appeal to all our fellow-men. "Let us love one another : for love is of God ; and every one that loves is begotten of God, and knows God. He that loves not knows not God ; for God is love." It is idle to attempt

to minimise or to pare away the greatness of these moving and wonderful words. And it would be foolish to argue that goodness or righteousness could be put equally well in the place of love. "Let us be good and righteous to one another : for goodness and righteousness are of God ; and every one that is good and righteous is begotten of God, and knows God. He that is not good and righteous knows not God, for God is goodness and righteousness." The words may be true enough, but who does not feel that the force and fire have gone out of them ? And more. For who does not feel that there is, not only more force and fire, but also more *truth*, in the original than in the substitute ? It is, in one sense, a question of words. A Christian can give an impassioned description of all that he means by love, and a Jew, if he pleases, can say : "Yes, that is *exactly* what I mean by righteousness." But two observations must be made if the Jew chooses to say this. His use of righteousness or of goodness is not the use made of these words by ordinary men ; the meaning commonly poured into the word "love," and associated with it, he has removed from "love," and somewhat arbitrarily added on to "righteousness." Again, the Hebrew word for righteousness does not mean and imply all that the Christian means by love, and it is doubtful how far the Hebrew word *Chesed* (though a great and noble word, as I have urged) means quite the same as the Christian means by love, or as the author of the Epistle meant by *Agape*. The Christian and the author of the Epistle mean something more forthgoing, more passionate, more venturous, more self-sacrificing, more eager, more giving, than can honestly be said

to be connoted by righteousness or goodness. It is the virtue which, as the author of the Gospel says, does in its height "cause a man to lay down his life for his friend." It is the virtue which drives a man forth to save, to redeem, and to forgive. *That* virtue is more than "goodness" and more than "righteousness." It is charged with emotion. It is filled with longing and yearning. It is, in short, "love," and love, being all that, is more than goodness and more than righteousness, and we dare not forgo the word, lest we do not practise or adore the thing. Moreover, the saying in the Epistle lays down the one great "proof" to the believer of the existence of God. Love calls out to love. Human love recognises divine love. We are unable to believe that man's love has not a superhuman source and a superhuman guarantee. And only through love can we, in spite of evil, believe in God's love or in God. From the visible to the invisible. The author is justified in arguing: "He that does not love his brother whom he has seen, cannot love God whom he has not seen." I admit that the Christian believer is justified in pleading that he who, as regards this great passage in 1 John iv. 7-21, does not accept verses 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, cannot feel the full force of the whole. But I do not think he can urge that unless the Christology be accepted, the whole argument falls altogether to the ground. Even in that mangled form of it which remains after the "Son" verses are removed, the passage has still, as it seems to me, cogency, nobility, and truth. Jews, as well as Christians, can be grateful for it; they, too, can believe that "God is love."

There is a certain advantage and even progress

gained by the New Testament combination of the two Hebrew words Chesed and Ahabah into the single word Agape. By that amalgamation we get the emergence of love (Agape), as both the highest attribute of God—His true essence—and as the highest quality of man. In the Old Testament, especially in Deuteronomy, man is urged to love God, and the word used is Ahob. Sometimes the love of God for Israel is also alluded to by the verb Ahob and the noun Ahabah. Again, a good deal is said of the divine Chesed, or loving-kindness, and sometimes this same quality of God is put forward as a human ideal as well. "I desire Chesed and not sacrifice," where the Chesed which God desires is a quality to be shown by man to man. But there is no clear combination of Ahabah and Chesed, no final emergence of love, as the one great supreme link between man and God, as at once the essence of the divine nature and the ideal of all human action.

From these somewhat meagre contributions to the doctrine of the nature and character of God, we may pass on to the relation of God to man. Here we are immediately reminded of the Pauline universalism. It is true that Paul usually presents the doctrine to us in a form which is not only unacceptable to Jews, but which itself paved the way for a new particularism of a theological, instead of a national, kind. He says emphatically: "There can be neither Jew nor Greek; there can be neither bond nor free; there can be no male and female," but it is because "ye all are one man in Christ Jesus." (Or in a modern rendering: "There is no longer any distinction between Jew and Greek, slave or free, male or female, but ye are all one in union with Christ Jesus.") And again, in the Colossians:

In the "new man," "there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcision and uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bondman, freeman." And why? Because "Christ is all, and in all." Nevertheless, we can adopt the universalism and reject the limitation. It is not for us that "*Christ* is all, and in all," but for us it is that "*God* is all, and in all." God, not Christ, is our Lord, and referring the noun to God and not to Christ, we can re-echo, and even render tribute to the words: "There is no distinction between Jew and Greek; for the same Lord is Lord of all, and is rich unto all that call upon Him." And without such mental substitution we can adopt the words: "Is God the God of the Jews only? Is He not the God of the Gentiles also? Yes, surely, of the Gentiles also, if so be that God is One." (Or, "if so be that there is one God only.") Here the deduction from the divine unity is clear and categoric. The one God is, as the Pentateuch had already declared, the "God of the spirits of all flesh," or, as the Psalmist said: "The Lord is nigh unto *all* that call upon Him." But what is implicit has now become explicit. Controversy has brought out the full and complete universalism which was either latent or incompletely expressed in the earlier teaching. Even before the Gentiles know Him, He is, nevertheless, their God. The end is contained in the beginning. "My house shall be called a house of prayer for all nations." All men have a common origin; their human father was one and the same man (Adam), and their divine father is one and the same God. As the Paul of Acts says to the Athenians: "God created all nations from a common stock," even "as certain even of your own poets have said, For we also are His offspring."

Thus, if all men are equally the creation of God, if in virtue of their reason or soul—call it what you will—they are all His children, then He cannot act kindly to one group and unkindly to another, because one is white and another black, or because one group call themselves Jews and another group call themselves Greeks. There can be no gross idea, such as that “this world is for the Gentiles, the next world for the Jews.” The divine impartiality (however hard to reconcile with the facts of life) must be absolute. There can only be an election to service ; there can only be a privilege in sacrifice. Paul and Deutero-Isaiah ” clasp hands.

It ought, perhaps, to be added, though this is scarcely the place to mention it, that the universalism which we acknowledge, and for which we are grateful, in Paul, is not clearly to be found in the teachings of Jesus. There are hints and adumbrations, just as there are hints and adumbrations in the Prophets and the Psalms, but no more. Desperate attempts have been made by Christian theologians to argue that Jesus taught distinctly and openly a full and complete universalism. But the attempts have failed. We need not press the anti-Gentile passages, or discuss their authenticity. We can leave them on one side. Even without using them, it is a fact that Jesus never fully and openly declares that all men, be their race or beliefs what they may, stand on a footing of equality before God. He never categorically asserts that all men alike are His children. Why may not Paul have his own glory ? Jesus has enough. *Suum cuique*. It is true that Jesus, on the occasion of his conversation with the heathen centurion at Capernaum, is reported to have said: “Many (*i.e.* many Gentiles) will come

from the east and the west, and will sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven." And not only so. There will also be a corresponding exclusion of Jews. "The children of the kingdom will depart into the outer darkness." Whether these words are authentic or not does not here concern us. For our purpose their value is the same, whoever be their author. And value they have. Yet on the positive or admitting side they hardly go beyond the prophet's, "Yet will I gather others unto him besides his own that are gathered." They are not on a line with the direct and categoric universalism of Paul.

Something of the same sort might be said of the exquisite parable of the Good Samaritan. I do not here press the point on which, though ignored by almost all the Christian commentators, I feel very confident, that "Samaritan" formed no part of the original parable as spoken by Jesus. Taking the noble parable as it stands, its teaching is that a neighbour must be understood to be the man who has helped you in your hour of need, or the man who, in *his* hour of need, requires your help. And that, whether for gratitude or charity, "neighbour" is to be interpreted without limitations of race, and is even to include the members of a despised and hated race, who are therefore to be despised and hated no more, is teaching no less wholesome than sublime. The contrast between Luke's parable and such a passage as Ecclesiasticus l. 25, 26, is great indeed. But that the parable lays down the equality of all men in the eyes of God, or the equal love of God to all, can, I think, be no more reasonably asserted than that a similar doctrine is found in the Sermon on the Mount, because Jesus says there :

“ Love your enemies,” and “ God makes His sun rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the just and the unjust.” Jesus has not here the distinction between Jew and Gentile in his mind, and it is uncritical to drive into, or draw out from, his words what cannot legitimately be found in them. His teaching is noble enough to stand, as it were, upon its own feet ; it need not be made to mean more than it does mean, for what it does mean is sufficiently significant and great.

What advance or fresh light do we get in the New Testament concerning the dealings, and the method of the dealings, of God with man ? That God rewards and punishes is no less the doctrine of the New Testament than of the Old Testament. That the reward is for virtue and the punishment for sin is unequivocally maintained by Paul as well as by Jesus. But the growth and acceptance of the doctrine of a future life and of a judgement beyond the grave made many differences in the teaching about divine retribution, whether in the New Testament or in the Rabbinic literature. It matters not whether the future life is connected with a resurrection of the body or with a more spiritual immortality of the soul ; whether the scene is a regenerate and transfigured earth or a heavenly Jerusalem. In any case, the old difficulties as to the prosperity of the wicked and the misfortunes of the good no longer worry the mind. Both the one and the other may be a sign, not of God’s apparent neglect or indifference, but of His wisdom and His grace. The greater the prosperity here, the more assured can be the punishment hereafter, and the more poignant the earthly calamity, the more exquisite and the more permanent will be the bliss of the future and

its felicity. Again, reward on earth tends to be material ; reward beyond the grave is spiritual. " Eye has not seen and ear has not heard." The reward is neither proportionate to the virtue, nor is it of the same kind as the earthly prosperity of wickedness.

The doctrines of the " world to come," of the resurrection, and of the future life, tend by their very nature to modify the crudities of the old teaching of retribution, and tit for tat. It is true that God rewards and punishes, but both the reward and the punishment are out of proportion to the deed. For my own part, I see in the punishment doctrine, both of the New Testament and of the Rabbis, an ethical injustice. Finite faults receive infinite punishments ; the New Testament especially seems to ignore the doctrine that punishment is disciplinal. If for any earthly sin, however heinous, the punishment is either to last for ever or to consist in complete annihilation (and both Jesus and Paul seem to have thought that the lot of the wicked would be either the one or the other), it is hopelessly unsuited to, and unworthy of, a Deity who has created the souls of men, and is described as love. It is idle to defend the odious doctrine by saying that man's liberty to sin is a necessary corollary of his capacity to be really good, and that when the will is fixedly hostile to the good, eternal exclusion from beatitude is inevitable. The God of Jesus and Paul did not work by formulae such as these. If He condemns certain people to eternal perdition, or to eternal absence from felicity, or to annihilation, He does so because He thinks it to be right and just. He *need* not do so. The responsibility for the perdition and the annihilation is as much His as it is the

sinner's, and even more. Hence, so far as the wicked are concerned, the New Testament helps us not at all. On the contrary. The material prosperity of the wicked on earth is a much less terrible puzzle than what is predicated of their fate by Jesus and by Paul. A loving God and a fiery hell from which there is, so far as we can gather, no return ; out of which, so far as we are told, there is no escape—that is a worse inconsistency than anything in the pages of the Old Testament. *There*, at all events, God's punishments are ended by death !

But from the other side of the picture there is much to learn, and it is for us to accept the good and fit it in, while neglecting and ignoring the evil. We are happily quite free.

The reward is not only greater than the goodness which it rewards, but, in one sense, and that the higher sense, it is no reward at all. It is no reward, because we have no claim upon God, and, do what we may, we have no right to be rewarded. Before God we have no merit. “ For merit lives from man to man, and not from man, O Lord, to Thee.” Why have we no right to be rewarded ? Why is the idea of merit inapplicable to the relation of man to God ? The answer which may be inferred from the teaching of Jesus in the Synoptics would appear to be two-fold. First, we are God's servants no less than His children, and whatever service we render (and our “ goodness ” is just “ service ”) is no more than our duty. That God created us with the capacity to serve Him is reward enough. There can be no reward in addition. Secondly, man always falls short of what he ought to do ; he always misses the ideal ; who is there that feels that he has done as much as he ought to do, or been as “ good ” as he

ought to be? How, then, can we dare to speak of reward, when what we have left undone is far greater than what has been done? The greater our capacity for goodness, the greater is the demand which is rightly made of us, the higher up is set the standard. There is, therefore, none who can justly boast; humility and a sense of imperfection are in place for all. The first reply we may perceive most clearly in the noble parable of the servants and the supper. "Does the master thank his slaves because they do what he has bidden them? Even so ye also, when ye shall have done all the things which are commanded you, say, We are slaves; we have only done that which it was our duty to do."¹ The second reply has to be gleaned or inferred from many different passages. God's rewards are out of proportion to man's deeds or deserts. Him who has been faithful in respect of little God sets over much. On the other hand, the greater the gifts, the greater the demand. He who has the capacity for sainthood will yet fall short of the divine standards. The moral commandments may be the same for all, but God deals with men according to different standards; their nature and opportunities are taken into account. The old mechanical doctrine of retribution is broken down. Higher principles become apparent. Again, in the famous parable of the Pharisee and the tax-collector, it seems evidently implied that nobody has the right to consider himself righteous; everybody has fallen short. He who exalts himself must be abased. The exact interpretation of all the "child" passages in the Gospels is

¹ The omission of the adjective "unprofitable" in accordance with the reading of the Sinaitic Syriac immensely adds to the significance of the passage. So Wellhausen. But see also Klostermann, *ad loc.* (1919).

not perfectly clear. But one strain of meaning is undoubtedly that the child is supposed by Jesus to be humble and not self-righteous. Hence it is said: "Whoever shall humble himself as a little child, he is greatest in the kingdom of heaven." Who, indeed, is, or ought to be, without the consciousness of sin? Hence Jesus could state as a fact, or urge as a religious demand, "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her." Most significant of all is the great parable of the labourers in the vineyard. For unequal work the labourers receive equal hire. Not only that from unequal opportunities God does not demand equal results, but to unequal work God may give equal "rewards." As I have said elsewhere: "The parable was intended to teach that 'eternal life' is the result of grace rather than of work; or, at any rate, that the laws which govern admission to it are quite different from those which govern business transactions upon earth. Even if, at the last hour, a man chooses the better part and does his best, his 'reward' after death may be the same as that given to another who had laboured for goodness much longer. God gives of His own, and He gives His grace in full measure. Tit for tat may do on earth; it is not good enough for heaven. Though the bad man may be excluded from 'eternal life,' it is only by God's grace that the good man gets it. Just as the first labourers had no reason to complain, for they got their 'due,' so have none reason to complain if the same 'life eternal' is given alike to those who 'deserve' it more and to those who (on tit for tat lines) 'deserve' it less. From one point of view, none 'deserve' it at all; from another, if those who most 'deserve' it obtain it, how can they complain if, by God's

overflowing goodness, those also obtain it who 'deserve' it less? Inequality of service and equal 'reward.' That is the higher justice of grace and love upon which God acts."¹

The needed corrections for the doctrine of retribution the Jew can thus find in the Synoptic Gospels; it is more doubtful how far he can use with profit the Pauline antithesis between faith and works, and the Pauline theory of "justification." They are too scholastic and subtle in form, and too closely connected with the whole Christological doctrine, to be of much religious value to those who reject the Christology. Nevertheless, Paul's attack on "boasting," on confidence in one's own works, on any reliance upon, or satisfaction in, "merit" can hardly fail to be impressive for those who can free themselves from prejudice, and rise above the documents into a serener air. We must translate the whole argument into a modern form; we must look away from its letter and seek to get at its spirit. And then we shall obtain something like this.

What is needed of us is faith. Faith in goodness and love, and faith in God as their source and guarantee. God, goodness, and love (to which we must add truth and beauty), are the things in the world, and out of it, which are most worth having and enjoying; they are, in a sense, the only real things, and for them it is worth while to suffer and to "die." So believing, with that as our faith, let us go right ahead in confidence and hope. In that faith let us live and labour. The stronger that faith is, the more intensely we realise it, the less we shall sin; if we had faith ever purely and constantly and powerfully with us, we should need no commands

¹ *Synoptic Gospels*, vol. ii. p. 700.

and laws. We should always do the right. If we had that faith in its fullness, and realised it always and at every moment of action, we should not, indeed we could not, sin at all. ("Virtue is knowledge"; yes, in one sense. "Virtue is faith"; yes, in one sense.) But this faith is not our achievement in the sense that it is our achievement if we pick up a stone from the ground; it is in a true sense the gift of God. It is the immanent divine spirit within us; it is God working within us. Therefore, so far as we have it, we cannot boast of it; we cannot regard it as a labour attained; it is not a merit, it is a grace. And therefore, too, the works which spring from it, and are caused by it, are not a merit, and are not, in the truest sense, the fit-subject of reward. For what God gives, He cannot, logically or religiously, tender reward. The result, whether on earth or beyond, is always grace, always gift, always love.

I do not say that all this is the whole truth, or that it does not need supplement and qualification, but it is, at least, one aspect of the truth. And it is, I also think, an inspiring, a liberating, a healthy aspect. It keeps us fresh and humble, loving and eager; it prevents us from worrying, on the one hand; it makes us hopeful, on the other. It frees us from meticulous scrupulosities, but it also drives us forward to deeds of service and of love. And we owe it to Paul.

We may also, perhaps, modernise the Pauline conceptions, and use them for our own advantage, in the following way. We may say that there is a certain lack in the Old Testament of an adequate conception of personality and of character. More especially to the authors of the Law, and to all who fell under its influence, a man is good who does good

deeds, and does not do bad deeds. A man is bad who does bad deeds, and does not do good deeds. But the self, the man, the personality, the character, are more or less than the deeds; the personality is not a sum of the deeds, nor is it the result of the subtraction of bad deeds from good, or of good deeds from bad. Paul teaches us to look beyond the mere deeds, and in any case to estimate a man in less arithmetical a manner. Paul's thoughts and conceptions tumble over one another; they are not always consistent; they are presented in an archaic and unacceptable form; but out of the form there emerges the idea of a personality set towards evil or towards good, the idea of a character which is a whole; which, though expressed more or less imperfectly in deeds, is yet more (or less) than the deeds. The character as a whole, and so far as it is a unity, is irradiated and made one and "all of a piece" by a single principle, life-giving and unifying, stimulating and sustaining, and its deeds are the deeds which circumstance and principle together compel it, and make it desire and rejoice, to do. So far as it sins, it is because the principle has not yet completely dominated it, or because, at any given moment of temptation, the principle is not perfectly realised, or brought with perfect vividness before the mind.

This doctrine of the personality and of the vivifying principle can, I think, be elicited from Paul. Nor is the doctrine limited to the form in which Paul presents it. The vivifying principle need not be his. We can apply the doctrine to our own principle, that is to say, to the principle in which we ourselves believe, and we can so make use of it. We can, for example, fit it on to the principle of man's

love of God. We can thus give a completely Jewish garb to Paul's teaching, for none can deny that the love of God is a Jewish ideal. The "good" man, then, is he whose personality is quickened and interpenetrated, ruled and transfigured, by the principle of the love of God, and all his deeds, so far as his personality *is* completely thus transfigured, are the expression of this principle. We are, however, only then true to Pauline teaching, if this very principle is not regarded as something to be acquired by mere will and effort, and still less as an outward command to be obeyed, but as a gift of God, as the working in the man of the divine spirit, as something for which he has not to be proud, but to be grateful; which in one sense is, indeed, his own, but, in another and deeper sense, is not himself at all, but God working within him, God purifying and illuminating him. His love of God is thus also God's love of him. They are two aspects or two different expressions for one and the same thing.

It is the doctrine of the personality and of the vivifying principle which may supply a certain corrective to another deficiency towards which some critics have seen a certain tendency in those Old Testament writings which are later than the priestly code. If virtue is doing so and so many good deeds, and refraining from so and so many evil ones, two results may ensue. A man may have the consciousness that he has done a number of "good" deeds—obeyed the Law—and that he has not done a number of evil ones—not disobeyed the Law. He may be proud and self-righteous. Or, again, he may feel that he has not done enough good deeds, and that he has committed many evil deeds. He may have a too oppressive consciousness of sin. It

would be possible to give certain examples of both consequences from the pages of the Old Testament.

And here, too, the Pauline doctrine can be translated into more modern and more Jewish terms, and may be of corrective and supplementary utility. The good man is he who does good deeds, not because he is ordered, and not in order to gain reward, but as the glad outflow of a yearning, a desire, a love. Hence he is not puffed up by what he does, and he seeks no reward for it; for what he does is, on the one hand, his joy and his life, but on the other hand, it is God's work rather than his; it is the result of the divine grace and gift; it is God working in him; it is not the outcome of his own unaided will or strength, acting independently of the divine will and the divine strength. Done for love and with joy and for its own sake, it is done most freely. When he does good, the man is most "himself," and yet when he does good, it is least of all "he who has done it." He can ascribe no merit to himself for what he does, but he can ascribe blame to himself (be this a noble inconsistency or not) for what he has failed to do. He "ought" to do yet more. The divine gift is never perfectly appropriated. Yet, on the other hand, though he will not be careless or casual, he will not despair. His duty or ideal is not to accomplish an endless series of definite deeds, but ever, in all circumstances, to express the principle, to go right ahead, doing his best, loving, serving, and trusting in God.

All this may be regarded as another way of expressing the doctrine that man is "saved" or "justified" by "faith" rather than by "works." In other words, man reaches or realises the highest not by fulfilling a number of enactments, but by

being filled with, and transfigured by, a single great and ruling principle. Or, again, in yet other words, being is higher than doing, for being is the source of doing, and determines its worth. We may allow that to meet the exaggeration of works we need faith, and to meet the exaggeration of faith we need works. The Old Testament must be corrected and supplemented by the New, and the New must be corrected and supplemented by the Old.

The doctrine of faith as taught by Jesus in the Synoptics is simpler, and runs on more familiar Jewish lines. Faith, to Jesus, is trust in God. It is complete surrender to His love. It is absolute confidence in His goodness and in His power. The faith which Jesus demanded was only faith in himself so far as to recognise that he was the prophet and messenger of God. We are only concerned with it here in so far as Jesus seems to conceive that God looks pre-eminently to this faith as the *fundamental* quality, or the *supreme* virtue, which he desires man to seek for and to possess. Him who has this faith it is right that God should help and heal. By and through this complete trust in God, God can operate on man. Through faith man puts himself into the right attitude for receiving that which God can give him. Such appears to be the teaching.

Faith was no new virtue. The Psalmists had already spoken of trust in God; they had urged it as a duty; they had praised it as a delightful experience. Jesus, however, puts it more into the forefront of the virtues than they. If implicit trust in God, such as Jesus asked for, filled our minds and hearts, what might we suppose would be its effects? First, great fortitude in endurance. Next, a great courage in daring and doing. Thirdly, inasmuch

as a living faith in God means a most vivid realisation of His presence, it should, I think, greatly increase our capacity to resist temptation, and prevent temptation passing over into sin. The assurance of the divine help produces help; a sinful thought is quickly driven out of consciousness by the resurgence of the idea of God, the faith in His presence, His power and His love. Carry the thought of God about with you, and the realisation of Him will, as it were, do battle for you with the sinful desire, and it will put it to flight. Trust in God; He can be your talisman.

As Jesus modifies the doctrine of retribution in the directions that have been indicated, one might suppose that he would also have touched upon and criticised the old view that suffering betokened sin. It is commonly believed that he did so in a well-known passage in Luke (xiii. 1-5). This is not, however, the case. Jesus does not deny that the Galilaeans, or the eighteen upon whom the tower of Siloam fell, had deserved their fate because of their sinfulness; he only denies that they were greater sinners than others. A fate similar to theirs shall befall others, unless they speedily repent. But in the Fourth Gospel the relation of suffering to sin does seem to be discussed, and the doctrine that suffering betokens sin may, perhaps, be condemned. Jesus sees a man who was blind from his birth. His disciples ask him whether the man's blindness was due to his own sin or to that of his parents. Jesus replies: "Neither did this man sin nor his parents." The reason of his blindness was "that the works of God should be made manifest in him." Jesus then proceeds, by a miracle, to heal him so that he sees. It is possible that all that

is meant is that the man's blindness was divinely arranged for the sake of the miracle, and, indeed, this is all which, taken strictly, the words mean. Nevertheless, while we cannot allow the pathetic eagerness of the Christian commentators to find a proof that Jesus condemned the "current Jewish" doctrine of retribution so far as Luke is concerned, to be well founded, we may, perhaps, concede that the Johannine Jesus had this condemnation also in his mind.

As regards the question of God's attitude to sinners, there is little advance in the New Testament on the Old Testament. The beautiful words, "There is more joy in heaven over one sinner that repents than over ninety-nine righteous who need no repentance" do not go further than Ezekiel's noble "I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth." In fact, the whole doctrine of repentance is more fully worked out, and more elaborately illustrated, in the Rabbinical literature than in the New Testament. And the much-praised words: "He makes his sun to rise on the evil and the good" (to which, by the way, there is a good Rabbinic parallel) are overborne, and made of no account, by the doctrine of Gehenna and of the wide and broad way that leads to destruction, *and the many who enter upon it.*

It is curious that one of the most remarkable and far-reaching utterances of Jesus about sinners depends upon a disputed interpretation of a single verse, and consequently of a famous story. It is the story in Luke of the harlot at the dinner table. She enters the room when Jesus and his host are eating, and, standing at Jesus' feet, washes them, weeping, with her tears, wipes them with her hair,

anoints them with ointment, and kisses them. Jesus announces that "her sins which were many are (or 'have been') forgiven her, because she loved much." The question, as a reference to my *Synoptic Gospels* will show, is: Does Jesus mean that, because the woman offers all these manifestations of love, therefore he, Jesus, is convinced that God has *already* forgiven her, and that she had *realised* this divine forgiveness, and was assured of it? Are we to assume that the teaching of Jesus had brought her to repentance and to an assurance of forgiveness, and so she now comes to show to him her gratitude and her love? There are features in the story which make this interpretation not improbable. But still defensible, and, as I believe, originally meant, is the other interpretation, according to which the woman, having heard of Jesus and his goodness and his teaching, makes appeal to him. This appeal is, indeed, already a mark of *repentance*; but she has not yet received, or felt, or realised, the divine *forgiveness*. Then Jesus says: Her devotion, her reverence, her love, deserve to secure for her, and *have secured* for her, forgiveness. Much love justifies much forgiveness. In that case the story can be taken to mean that love changes the heart, love redeems, love breaks the bondage of sin, and, therefore, by awakened, and by awakening, love, God is able to forgive. Get a sinner to love some pure and noble soul, and this will be the best way for him to rid himself of his sin and his sinfulness. Love changes the heart, and with the changed heart follows the divine forgiveness.

There is, however, little doubt that for Jewish readers the chief use to be made of the New Testament, and more especially of the Synoptic Gospels,

lies in the doctrine of the relation of man to God in the realm of conduct. And in this doctrine I would include the criticisms upon the legal aspect of religion which are to be found in the teachings of Jesus and Paul. Not that we can by any means adopt the Pauline conception of the Law. We judge it very differently. We make no violent antithesis between works and faith, and we certainly do not accept the strange idea of the Law's purpose being the strengthening and sharpening of sin. Yet for Liberal Jews Judaism has ceased to be a legal religion in anything like the same sense as it was to the Rabbis of old, or as it is to orthodox Jews to-day. Hence we can appreciate, to some extent, the doctrine of Paul as well as that of Jesus. We can perceive in it, as we have already seen, a relative justification, and while not agreeing with it as a whole, and still less with its arguments and assumptions, we can, nevertheless, by "putting ourselves above the documents" (which is far removed from considering ourselves *superior* to the documents or to their authors), find in them a certain suggestiveness, illumination, and help.

Jesus occupies the remarkable position of resuming the work and rôle of the prophets. He is in the genuine succession to Amos and Isaiah. It is most just that the title of prophet is, in Luke, repeatedly ascribed to him. Not that the differences between him and Jeremiah or Isaiah are not marked. Not that, whether it is to be regarded as advance or retrogression, Jesus does not lay much greater stress upon his own mission, authority, and person than was laid by the prophets upon theirs. But, nevertheless, marked as are the differences, no less marked are the likenesses. And as Liberal Judaism

derives so greatly from the prophets, it is not wonderful that it should rightly find much to admire and use in the prophet of Nazareth. The two great points and poles of the prophetic teaching were, first, the exclusive worship and recognition of the One God ; secondly, that the service and demands of this God consisted, not in ceremonial or in sacrifices, but in justice, righteousness, mercy, and loving-kindness. The first of these two points dropped out. It was accepted on all hands, by Pharisee and Sadducee, by priest and scribe, by teachers and populace. There remained the second. But an extraordinary difference had come over the scene since the days of Amos and Jeremiah. There was now a universally acknowledged Law, which was regarded on all hands as Mosaic, authoritative and divine. And this Law contained a mass of ceremonial commands which, in many places, are put, apparently, on the same level as the ethical commands. Jesus himself theoretically believed that this Law was authoritative and divine. Hence the trouble of his position, and the inevitability of tragic conflict with the regular teachers of his day.

For us, however, who no longer look at the Law as the men of old regarded it, the pure prophetic doctrine of Jesus easily disengages itself from its historic setting, and stands out in clear and serene connection with, and succession to, the doctrine of Amos and Isaiah. Jesus, as the prophet of inwardness, can never cease to appeal, and in spite of their legalism there are many parallels to his teaching in the sayings of the Rabbis. For the Rabbis, too, had often their prophetic flashes and visions. The teaching of Jesus about prayer and fasting, or about adultery and almsgiving, in the Sermon on the

Mount, links itself on to the true prophetic tradition. No less prophetic is the summing up of the Law in the love of God and the love of neighbour, or the appreciation of the widow's "mite." It is only true prophetic teaching developed when Jesus bids us love our enemies. None of these prophetic utterances, however, gave rise to conflict. They would not have been denied by the Rabbis, nor are they really antagonistic to the spirit of the Rabbinic teaching at its best. Where the prophet in Jesus was likely to come into antagonism with practice and life was in relation to the Sabbath, the dietary laws, and the laws of clean and unclean. And according to the records it was just here that issue was joined between the new teacher and the existing authorities. The great saying that the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath, was also uttered by a Rabbi, but only Jesus properly appreciated it, and ventured to make a proper application of it. He applied to the Sabbath law a sort of inspired common sense; he preserved the spirit in violating the letter. He saw, moreover, that a deed of love must take precedence over a ritual command, and it is significant that he actually uses and quotes the sublime words of Hosea, "I desire love and not sacrifice." We can still learn from him here. Still more important, however, was his pronouncement as to inward and outward purity. It does not matter for us whether he was theoretically consistent or not; whether, that is to say, in his depreciation of *outward* uncleanness, he was not in unconscious conflict with his own unabandoned belief in the full divinity and obligatory character of the Law. In a way it is all the more splendid that in crises, and in moments of struggle, he was

able to free himself from consistency. Most noble and emancipating is the saying : "There is nothing from without the man, that going into him can defile him ; but the things which proceed out of the man are those that defile the man. For from within, out of the heart of man, proceed evil thoughts and wickednesses ; all these evil things proceed from within, and defile the man." And whether Jesus was thinking of dietary laws or not, Mark is right in holding (if the translation of the Revised Version be the correct rendering) that the great principle applies to these no less than it applies to all the old, priestly conceptions and taboos of clean and unclean which are contained in the Law, and which were, alas, maintained and enormously extended in the Rabbinical legislation. Mark is right in adding : "This Jesus said, making all foods clean." Jesus, as I have elsewhere said, proclaims the great principle that *things* cannot be *religiously* either clean or unclean ; only persons. And persons cannot be *religiously* defiled by *things* ; they can only be defiled by themselves, by acting immorally and irreligiously. The same doctrine is taught in the Acts in the vision of Peter : "What God has cleansed, make not thou common." From the point of view of religious universalism the doctrine is nobly applied in the same chapter to persons. One race and one religious community must recognise no impurity in any other. "God has shown to me that I should not call any man common or unclean ; God is no respecter of persons ; but in every nation he that fears Him and works righteousness is acceptable to Him." Paul recognises the same truth, but urges that respect should be shown to tender or scrupulous consciences. "I know and am persuaded in the Lord Jesus that

nothing is unclean of itself; save that to him who accounts anything to be unclean it is unclean." In the Pastoral Epistles we find the same teaching: "Every creation of God is good, and nothing is to be rejected if it be received with thanksgiving, for it is sanctified through the word of God and prayer." The doctrine of inwardness is preached by Paul with regard to a much more delicate point also, about which orthodox Jews have shown the most extraordinary tenacity and the most curious enthusiasm; I mean the rite of circumcision. He declares: "Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing; but the keeping of the commandments of God (is all)." Or again: "Neither is circumcision anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature." Formally the statement is absurd, for if ever there was a commandment of God, ordered with all clearness and emphasis (assuming that the Law contains God's commandments), it is circumcision. But Paul is unconsciously expressing the view that it is in the moral, and not in the ceremonial, law that the voice of God can be detected. Abiding and memorable are his solemn words: "He is not a Jew, who is one outwardly, nor is that circumcision which is outward in the flesh; but he is a Jew who is one inwardly; and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, not in the letter; whose praise is not of men, but of God." How well such a passage connects with the prophetic injunctions: "Circumcise yourselves to the Lord, and take away the foreskins of your heart, ye men of Judah." "Rend your heart and not your garments." The speech of all three writers is akin. We to-day can see the contentious one-sidedness of the famous antithesis, but yet we can

draw the good from it, and realise, and profit from, its measure of truth: "The letter kills; the spirit gives life."

The mockery and stern rebuke which the prophets of old dealt out to those who thought that the service of God consisted of sacrifices and burnt-offerings rather than of justice and mercy towards their fellow-men, are repeated and re-echoed (*mutatis mutandis*) by Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels. How far this rebuke was deserved, whether by many or by few or by none, is a totally different question which does not concern us here. The attack upon those who "strain at the gnat and swallow the camel," who cleanse the outside, but leave the inside foul, who tithe mint and cummin, and leave the weightier matters of the Law undone—all this abides, and is, just like its prophetic parallels, a lesson and a warning for ever. No less so are the frequent attacks upon hypocrisy and formalism. For ourselves and for our own society we still need words and passages such as: "Cast first the beam out of thine own eye," or, "This man went down to his house justified rather than the other," or, "Their works they do to be seen of men," and many more too familiar to quote. They are all in line with the teaching of Amos and Isaiah; all in harmony with the famous summary: "What does the Lord require of thee?" It is needless to dwell on them further. I would but add that for Liberal Jews it would be foolish either to refuse to recognise this identity of spirit, or to argue that the Gospel passages are negligible because the prophets have anticipated them. As well argue that Isaiah can be left unread because he has been anticipated by Amos. The words of Jesus are, indeed, of the same lineage and

spirit as those of the prophets, but none the less, inasmuch as they are suited to other environments and to a later age, and inasmuch as they are instinct with genius, with beauty and fire, are they negligible except to our own loss, and at the risk of incurring the deserved charge of ignorance and of folly.

We have still before us the most essential, and, in some respects, the most contentious, portion of the teaching of Jesus. It is his ethical teaching, the service of God as fulfilled in the service of man, in which his originality is often said to be most apparent. Before entering upon the details of this teaching, a few words must be said as to terminology, and we may usefully make them include the terminology not merely of the Synoptics, but of the New Testament as a whole.

But really "terminology" is too large an expression. I have in mind one word only—a famous word which we have already alluded to, a word tender and beautiful, but yet also contentious and troublesome,—the word "love."

In the Old Testament, as we have seen, the direct Hebrew equivalent for "love" is of not very frequent occurrence. It is much more often used for the love of God than for the love of man. The love which we should render to God is the characteristic creation of Deuteronomy, and the love which He bears to Israel is also emphatically dwelt upon. So, too, in the Psalms. On the other hand, the love of man by man rarely occurs as an ideal or command. All the more notable is the great verse in Leviticus: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour," and "thou shalt love the stranger as thyself"; and also in Deuteronomy, "Love ye the stranger, for ye were strangers

in the land of Egypt." In the prophets the word "love," to express the desired relation of man to man, is never used. Amos speaks of loving the good, Micah of loving-kindness (*Chesed*), Zedekiah of loving truth. In Proverbs we have the adage that "love covers sins," and that a friend loves at all times, and we also hear of the love of wisdom. But it is a remarkable fact that the prophets, urgent as they are about justice, compassion, loving-kindness (*Chesed*), never mention love. Indeed, we may say that love as an ethical demand and as the ethical ideal only occurs in those two commands in Leviticus: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and thou shalt love the stranger (or resident alien) as thyself." Now it is no less curious that something of the same paucity and chariness in the use of the word "love" characterises the Jesus of the Synoptic Gospels. As regards the love of God, Jesus speaks of it when he quotes Deuteronomy, and also in his condemnation of the Pharisees (Luke xi. 42)—hardly elsewhere, I think. We have noted the use of the word in the story of the harlot. We should have expected love as an ethical ideal and demand to be frequent, but as a matter of fact it only occurs (apart from the citation of Leviticus xix. 18) in the Sermon on the Mount (and its equivalent in Luke). Here the quotation from Leviticus leads Jesus on to the famous paradox, "love your enemies," with which we have still to deal.

In the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel the word "love" has a much more prominent place, and this more frequent usage is reflected in the First Epistle, where the famous definition "God is love" has already come before us. And yet how much more

profoundly ethical, how much more deeply loving, with his limited use of the word love, is the Jesus of the Synoptics than the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel. For in the Fourth Gospel there is no parallel to the love of enemy, there is no parallel to the redeeming love which seeks out the sinner and the lost, which, whether with or without the use of the *word*, are so characteristic of the historic Jesus, the Jesus of the Synoptics. In John the world of men is already rigidly divided into the sheep and the goats, the saved and the lost, those who have accepted Jesus and those who have rejected him. And the love which Jesus gives and demands is severely limited to the children of light. The others belong to the devil, and for them there is no love and no pity, and no desire to save or to redeem. Yet recognising the limits, and refusing to allow that the command to love is new, we may, nevertheless, admire and profit by what we read in that extraordinary book. "A new commandment I give unto you that ye love one another ; even as I loved you, that ye also may love one another. By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples if ye have love one to another." And still more notable : "This is my commandment, that ye love one another, even as I have loved you. Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." These noble words are taken up by the author of the First Epistle : "He that loves not, abides in death. Hereby know we love, because he laid down his life for us ; and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." "If we love one another, God abides in us and His love is perfected in us. . . . God is love, and he that abides in love abides in God, and God abides in him. . . . There is no fear in love : but perfect

love casts out fear, because fear has punishment; and he that fears is not made perfect in love. We love because He first loved us. If a man say, I love God, and hates his brother, he is a liar: for he that loves not his brother whom he has seen, cannot love God whom he has not seen. And this commandment have we from him, that he who loves God loves his brother also." The solemn nobility and beauty of these words, who can gainsay? Are we not the poorer if we cannot accept them as part of the formative religious literature of the world and of our own religious consciousness? The same might be said about the other familiar passages about love and the "royal law" (as the author of the Epistle of James calls it), "thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," in the Pauline Epistles. "The whole Law is fulfilled in one word, even in this: thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Or again: "He that loves his neighbour has fulfilled the Law. For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not covet, and if there be any other commandment, it is summed up in this word, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Love works no ill to his neighbour: love, therefore, is the fulfilment of the Law." Above all, can we afford to neglect the high paeon of love in the First Epistle to the Corinthians? It is needless to quote it here. It will ever remain one of the great and glorious gems of religious literature, and however we may disagree with Paul in his Christology or in his doctrine of the Atonement, or in his criticism of the Law, we cannot but feel glad that the author of this hymn to love was born, and in some sort died, a Jew. "Now abides faith, hope, love, these three; and the greatest of these is love." And

so long as love abides, so long shall Paul's praise of love abide likewise.

Let us now pass on from this discussion of the term "love," which in one sense is a verbal question only, but in another sense is much more (if it indeed be true, as I think it is, that love means more than righteousness or pity or justice or loving-kindness, and that in the ideal and the demand of love a higher ideal and a bigger demand were placed before the world), to a brief consideration of the ethical teaching of the Gospels and the Epistles, it being always remembered that this ethical teaching, like the ethical teaching of the Old Testament, is also part (and an integral part) of the religious teaching, because writers of the New Testament, no less than those of the Old Testament, regard the right relation of man to man as part of the service and even the worship of God.

The details do not very greatly concern us. They do not considerably differ from those of the Old Testament or of the Rabbis. There are, perhaps, a few new virtues enumerated in the Epistles. The list is somewhat longer, and the shades of meaning of the Greek words are not quite the same as those of their Hebrew equivalents. But for the most part the virtues which are demanded or praised are the same virtues with which we are already familiar.

But what—especially as regards the ethical teaching of Jesus—we are more particularly called upon to notice, what strikes the impartial outsider as new and formative and original, are a certain spirit, a certain tone and temper, a certain fire and enthusiasm that breathe through the whole. Sometimes the high value of what is taught may be said

to lie not in the substance, but in the manner, the expression. A pedestrian parallel may be quoted in vain: it does not and cannot derogate from the value and the greatness of the Gospel utterance. It is with some of the sayings and the parables of Jesus as with poetry. The wording is seven-eighths of the battle. But the wording is not mere wording: in it is contained the *poetical* sense; the sense which the poet intended. No paraphrase can really give the sense. Those who have read the wonderful and illuminating lecture of my revered teacher, Mr. A. C. Bradley, "Poetry for Poetry's Sake," will understand what I am driving at. "'To be or not to be, that is the question,' does not really mean the same—mean what Shakespeare's Hamlet intended it to mean—as 'What is just now occupying my attention is the comparative disadvantage of continuing to live or putting an end to myself.'"¹ The words of a great teacher (and for my present purpose the authenticity of the sayings and parables scarcely affects the argument) cannot be exactly paraphrased. "Substance" and form make up a unity, which you may admire or criticise, but which, in one real sense, you *cannot* parallel.

But if we attempt to characterise this spirit or tone more precisely, I think it might fairly be said that there are four points about it which are noteworthy and novel. They fuse and fade into one another, but may be kept separate for purposes of analysis or description. These four points are partly conditioned by the circumstances of the time, by a certain belief common to Jesus and to his surroundings, and by his peculiar relations to the population around him, but they are not entirely so

¹ *Oxford Lectures on Poetry*, p. 20.

conditioned. They are at least as much the product of his own genius, his own native way of looking at things, his own faith. These four points then are : (1) The teaching is heroic. It is an ethic of extreme demands, of passionate idealism. (2) It is an ethic of activity; it is forthgoing. Man is not to wait on circumstances: he is to set out and to act. (3) The teaching is a remarkable blend of what might be called the higher selfishness and the highest unselfishness ; it is altruistic and self-regarding in one. (4) The teaching contains the germ of a double ethic ; a lower demand for some, a higher demand for others. In the first three points it may be argued that, in most matters concerning which they come into play, they emphasise and carry forward Old Testament teaching. As regards the fourth point, however, this is not so. A new principle appears to be here introduced, of which the ethical and religious *validity* is at least disputable, and the ethical and religious *results* are still more so.

Jesus, then, demands the utmost from those who would seek to be his disciples, or from those who, with full intensity of purpose, would desire to enter the kingdom of God. His ethical teaching at its highest, or, as a whole, is an ethical teaching for heroes. As a whole, or at its highest, or in its most characteristic aspects, it is directed to those who are ready to give up everything, to make a full sacrifice of possessions, or even of all hindering affections (though these in themselves may be laudable or innocent), for the sake of the highest, for the sake of the cause, for the sake of the kingdom of heaven, for the sake of Jesus, the captain and leader, for the sake of God. All these expressions would to Jesus mean one and the same thing.

(We see at once how my third point enters into, and is illustrated by, my first.) The right attitude, according to Jesus, towards the service of God, which is also the acquisition of the kingdom of heaven, towards the service of man, which is also the saving of your own self, is set forth in the two parables of the treasure and the pearl. If a man finds a treasure hidden in a field, he goes and sells all that he has and buys that field. If a pearl merchant finds a single pearl of supreme value, he also sells all that he has and buys it. So Jesus says : " If any man would come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily and follow me." The surrender demanded is whole and complete. To Jewish readers there is, at first sight, something repellent in the asked-for repudiation of all family ties. To this feeling the reply can be made that the call of God or duty may require the sacrifice of such ties. So, for example, in the case of the Great War ; here the words of Jesus were literally exemplified and illustrated. Thousands and millions of men had to put father and mother and wife on a lower level than country and righteousness. We hear how Jesus said to one man, " Follow me." But the man replied : " Lord, suffer me first to go and bury my father." Then Jesus answered : " Leave the dead to bury their own dead ; but go thou and proclaim abroad the kingdom of God." And when another suggested that he should first be allowed to bid farewell to those in his house, Jesus rejoined with the famous utterance : " No man having put his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." The teacher goes so far as to say : " No man who hates not his own father and

mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, and his own life also, can be my disciple." If, however, the word "hate" means here no more than "put in the second place," "be ready to abandon," Jesus imitates, and intentionally outdoes and outdemands, what is stated of Levi in the blessing of Moses: "He says of his father and mother, I have not seen them; his brother he does not acknowledge, and his own children he knows not." He is also made to outdo Elijah and Elisha, for the latter asked that he might be allowed to bid farewell to his father and mother, and Elijah neither permitted nor refused the request. Two further considerations must, however, also be borne in mind. The first is that Jesus believed that the world order, the old world, was rapidly approaching its end. The idea that he merely preached an ethic which was deliberately intended and suited for this short intervening period—an "interim" ethic—is exaggerated, but it is not without its element of truth. The second consideration is that there is undoubtedly in the teaching of Jesus a vein of asceticism. But is not a touch of asceticism necessary in the ethical ideal? Can there be an ethical ideal which does not include the idea of strain, hardship, sacrifice, renunciation. And are not these ideas the fundamental elements in true asceticism? When Jesus is made to say: "Whosoever he be of you that renounces not all that he has cannot be my disciple," it would, however, appear as if he meant to imply that his disciples, in the truest sense of the word, could only be (and after all this was but a fact) a small selection or élite among a much larger number. Matthew's version of the saying about the family may represent most exactly what

Jesus meant. "Whoever loves father or mother or son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me." And if we substitute "God," or the "cause of duty," or "Judaism" for "me," we can but admit that the saying, though hard, is yet true. In most cases, and in most ordinary lives, the cause of God or truth or religion is identified with the love of father or son or mother or daughter. But there may arise cases or times when the highest will need the sacrifice of one or all of them. Still more is it obvious that the highest may need the sacrifice of what is less than they. A man's wealth is less than they; his leisure is less than they; his very happiness is less than they. The words of Jesus may then be taken to include the argument from the greater to the less: if the disciple of God and the highest must on occasion sacrifice father or wife or child, how much more must he sacrifice whatever is less than these!

The heroic and passionate nature of the ethical teaching of Jesus is illustrated not merely by the general demand of unlimited sacrifice, but also by certain definite and particular demands, all framed on the same lines, and all exemplifying that quotation of Browning to which I have often alluded: "A man's reach must exceed his grasp." The ethical ideal must be one to which a saint here and there seems to attain, but to which we ourselves never attain. So far from its being a reproach against an ethical teaching or ideal that it is suited for saints and angels, and not for average working-men and women, it is, on the contrary, a right and necessary quality. Every ideal must be beyond fulfilment: every lofty ethical teaching must be beyond the powers or the will of the average person. What

good would an ideal be, what beckoning, astringent, demanding power would it have, if ordinary people could fulfil it? Just because we can never do enough, just because we *cannot* fulfil it, *therefore* we are enabled to do a little *more* than otherwise we should be able or inclined to do. A low ideal is no ideal. Who loves God with his whole heart and with all his soul? What value would the demand possess, what force or driving power, if it said, "You must love God a good deal; not much, if at all, less than you love your brother or your mother or your wife?" It is the *unqualified* love which stimulates. The Old Testament contains its unfulfillable demands no less than the New.

Now let us look at some of the details. First, unlimited forgiveness. "If thy brother sin against thee seven times in the day and seven times turn to thee, saying, I repent; thou shalt forgive him." Or again, "I say not unto thee, Until seven times, but until seventy times seven." Are we *less* likely to forgive, or *more*, because the number is high? Surely more, even according to the spirit of the Golden Rule, or of that great saying: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." All sin is, in one sense, ignorance. Then again, unlimited giving, which must not be interpreted according to the letter that kills, even though the Teacher meant the letter as well as the spirit. It may, indeed, be that Jesus had a bias against riches and the rich, like the Prophets and Psalmists before him. There is, however, truth in the saying that it is hard for wealth to enter the kingdom of heaven. It may be that the highest perfection is not for one who has and keeps his great possessions. The question is by no means easy. It cannot be

argued that there is not much to be said in favour of the view taken by Jesus, or that it has not a good deal of world-wide experience and teaching upon its side. The voice of India, for example, must not be entirely neglected.

The best-known and the most far-reaching of the ethical paradoxes of Jesus is, however, concerned with the love of enemies, and it is precisely here that Jewish criticism has been most audible and most acute. Moreover, the love of enemies is connected with that other hotly criticised doctrine of non-resistance. We read in Luke: "I say unto you, Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, bless them that curse you, pray for them that despitefully use you. To him that smites thee on the one cheek, offer also the other; and from him that takes away thy cloak withhold not thy coat also. Give to every one that asks thee; and of him that takes thy goods ask them not again. And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise. If ye love them that love you, what thank have ye? For even sinners love those that love them. If ye do good to them that do good to you, what thank have ye, for even sinners do the same. And if ye lend to them of whom ye hope to receive, what thank have ye? Even sinners lend to sinners, to receive again as much. But love your enemies and do them good, never despairing: and your reward shall be great, and ye shall be sons of the Most High: for He is kind towards the unthankful and evil. Be ye merciful, even as your Father is merciful. And judge not, and ye shall not be judged; and condemn not, and ye shall not be condemned: release, and ye shall be released: give, and it shall be given you;

good measure, pressed down, shaken together, running over, shall they give into your bosom. For with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again."

In this passage, which I have purposely quoted in full, though it deals with other matters than love of enemies and non-resistance, it will be noticed how undoctrinaire Jesus is. He does not worry himself about consistency. He uses the theory of retribution; even while he attacks tit for tat, and demands a higher standard, he yet freely uses the doctrine of measure for measure. He is not afraid of eudaemonism: God does as a matter of fact reward right doing, if not in this world then in another; it would be to Jesus an entirely inconceivable, godless, and absurd world in which righteousness and love were permanently followed by suffering and misery. And yet, as Matthew, doubtless in the full spirit of Jesus, phrases it, we are to show the utmost love, not for any external reward, but so that we may be children of our heavenly Father. We are to seek perfection just because He is perfect. And while God will practise a sort of divine and overflowing measure for measure towards us, we are not to limit our love by the expectation of tit for tat in our dealings with men. As God's reward is more than our desert, so our love is to exceed the deserts of our fellows. This is the justification and basis of the love of enemies and of not resisting evil or the evil-doer. The maxims are not intended to be laws supplanting the civil and the criminal code: allowance must be made for oriental exaggeration, for the picturesque and vivid illustration, in order to make the principle more clear. It seems to me that, so far as the sinner and the

evil-doer and the enemy are concerned, Paul has grasped the principle clearly. "Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good." In the last resort it is love which alone can destroy hate, and good alone which can destroy evil. But Jesus, perhaps one-sidedly, is really thinking much more of the doer than of the recipient ; that is to say, *in this particular passage*, he is not thinking so much of the redemption of the evil-doer as he is thinking of the ideal conduct for those who have to do with the evil-doer, or, generally, of the ideal for man. Still less is he thinking of society as a whole, and of the effect of not resisting evil upon the State. Nor must love be taken to mean : "feel for the enemy and evil-doer the exact emotion which you feel for your best friend or for your son or your wife." "Love" must be taken in close connection with "do good to," "pray for." It means eagerly and actively help and save. With that signification, can the injunction be said to do more than carry forward, complete, and crown, doctrine found in the Old Testament itself ? Surely not. It remains an ideal, which may not be within our grasp, but to which we should, nevertheless, reach forward. It is the true consummation and fulfilment of "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." When it has once been revealed, we may kick against it and growl, but we shall, I think, always be brought up against it, and, at the last, we shall always be forced to acknowledge that, at bottom, Jesus is right.

It may be said that there are three grades in this matter of how to deal with one's enemies. The first grade is that of tit for tat : do good to those who are good, or, again, do good to your

friends. Do evil to those who are evil, or, again, do evil to your enemies. It must be allowed that there is a good deal of this sort of morality to be found in the Old Testament, whether as the rule for man or as the rule for God. Especially as regards God it is hardly shaken off even by the best of the Old Testament writers, just as it is hardly shaken off by the Rabbis. God is supposed, and is even asked, to do evil to His own enemies and to the enemies of Israel. The two are one. (How often one feels with Romola in her passionate outburst against Savonarola.¹) The wicked are punished : the good rewarded. God "hates" the wicked. Then there is a second grade, at all events for man's dealings with man. Do not do evil to him who has done evil to you. Take no revenge. Do not hate your enemy. Here the second grade stops short. It does not say : "Do good to your enemy and love him." It does not urge that this is the ideal whether for God or for man. Of this second grade there are some examples in Old Testament teaching, at all events as regards the dealings of man with man. Then there is the third grade, which bids man not only to do no harm to the enemy, but actually to do him good ; not only not to hate him, but actually to love him ; not only not to curse him, but actually to pray for his redemption and well-being. Of this final stage, too, there are, as we have seen, a few examples in Old Testament morality. It is this third stage which Jesus, in the Sermon on the Mount, pushes to the farthest point and develops to the fullest degree.

It may, however, be noted that the Old Testament never indicates that this third grade is the

¹ *Romola*, the end of chapter lix.

on the same plane as "a soft answer turns away wrath," and "love covers a multitude of sins." But again it must be said that Jesus in this passage is thinking of the doer. He is to imitate God by the exuberance of his love. He is to imitate God by exercising his goodness upon objects apparently "unworthy" of it. "A blow for a blow" will benefit neither the doer nor the receiver. So far as *it is evil* to give a blow, it does the doer evil to give it. That the same Jesus who said "Resist not evil, or the evil-doer," was ready enough that blows should be given where they are in place may be gathered from many of the parables. Indeed, so far as the future punishment of the wicked is concerned, he seems to go far beyond what we now should, and do, regard as both merciful and just. The redemption of the wicked he limits to earth : he does not realise that God will as much pursue it after death as man should pursue it before death. When he is not thinking of the effect upon the doer and upon the search for perfection, other points of view can legitimately come before his mind. There is no indication, for instance, that, in accordance with the customs of his time, he has anything but approval for the servants who are beaten with few stripes and with many. And for the servant who beat his fellow-servants, instead of pardon the punishment is drastic indeed. "He shall be cut in two." But from the point of view of character and perfection, as well as from the point of view of redemption, the ideal is the same. "Overcome evil with good." Nor do we even in our punishments think otherwise. We punish in order to save and redeem. Apart from the question of the effect of our action upon others, we should

either prosecute or forgive the starving stealer of our purse, according as we thought that the one or the other action would be the better for the thief. In either case we raise ourselves above the evil ; we overcome it and are not its slaves. In neither case do we act according to the law of tit for tat.

More simple, less paradoxical, more directly and immediately capable of being put into practice in ancient, mediaeval, and modern life, was, and is, the second main feature of the ethical teaching of Jesus. It was not only an heroic ethic, but it was an active ethic, an ethic which drove men forth to do and risk and dare. The teachers of the Old Testament constantly call the sinner to repentance, and if he repents, if he turns from his evil way, they assure him of the divine forgiveness. But *till* he repents, there is little to be said or done for him. He *can* repent ; he *should* repent. Till he begins to do so, he is threatened with punishment and woe. Jesus goes farther. Most sinners are conceived by him, not as outcasts from the divine favour, not as objects of the divine judgement, but as sheep who have strayed from the fold, or as sick who need the spiritual physician. For his mission is, not to destroy, but to save. Here, too, he builds upon and carries forward Old Testament ideas. We have seen how Ezekiel had urged that God does not delight in the " death " of the wicked. He desires their repentance. If they cannot make them a new heart, he will give them a new heart. If they cannot wash their stains of sin from them, he will himself sprinkle clean water upon them that they may be clean. Gracious are His words of promise (for Ezekiel is not merely the stern

“legalist,” but he is also the “evangelical” prophet) : “ I will seek that which is lost, and will bind up that which is broken, and will strengthen that which is sick.” Upon these divine principles and promises Jesus—it was a new and great departure—fashioned his methods and shaped his path. He conceived his mission as directed not to the whole, but to the sick, and not even merely to call them to repentance, as at first he said, but to *seek* for them, to win them back to goodness and to God. He calls them to repentance, not merely by preaching, and still less by threats, but by going among them, by eating and drinking with them, by showing them compassion, by winning their hearts, by showing them love. We do not hear of any such methods having been practised by any Israelite before him. (And it may be said that the *actual methods* of Jesus need a Jesus to accomplish them successfully. But their *spirit* is eternal.) No wonder that the Scribes and the Pharisees, when they saw him sitting at table with tax-collectors and sinners, marvelled. Then Jesus replied with the famous words : “ They that are whole have no need of a physician, but they that are sick : I came not to call the righteous, but sinners.” So in another place he declares : “ The Son of Man came to seek and to save that which was lost,” and in his spirit it was said of him, “ The Son of Man came not to destroy men’s lives, but to save them.” Moreover, this mission of his is not for himself alone. The principles according to which he acts must be followed by his disciples. The lost sheep must be searched for ; we must not merely wait till of itself it finds its own way home. “ What man of you, having a hundred sheep, and

having lost one of them, does not leave the ninety and nine, and go after that which is lost until he find it." Precisely as Amos and the prophets found the service of God in the service of man, so, too, does Jesus. "Whoever would be great among you, shall be your minister, and whoever would be first among you, shall be servant of all. For the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister." The remarkable picture of the judgement in the 25th chapter of Matthew has doubtless to be taken as a whole in weighing the value of the gospel teaching as a whole. But *we* can distinguish ; *we* can reject what we like ; *we* can use what we like ; *we* are free. And, for our present purposes, we can pick and choose. We choose the good ; we reject the evil. We choose what fits in with our present conception of God and truth ; we reject what is in conflict with it. We choose what carries forward the best doctrines of Judaism ; we reject what is in conflict with them. And therefore we reject and neglect the goats and the devil, the fire and the eternal, or even "aeonian," punishment ; we accept the implications of the sheep, and the kingdom, and the feeding of the hungry. We cannot allow or approve that another than God should assume the prerogatives of God ; so where Jesus speaks of the Son of Man we think only of God. Thus only can we, and do we, accept and use those wonderful words : "Inasmuch as you did it even to the least of these my brothers, you did it unto me." And "the least of these my brothers" we shall interpret in the very spirit of Jesus to include the outcast and the fallen and the sinner. That is the purest Judaism.

No less Jewish is the doctrine of the parable of

the prodigal son. Here the father does not, it may be admitted, go forth to search for the son. But at least when he sees him "afar off," he runs to meet him and receives him with loving joy. The elder son protests : is this justice, measure for measure and tit for tat ? No, it is not, it is something better and more divine. Or, again, yes, it *is* justice ; the higher justice, the equity of Aristotle ; the Agape of Paul. "It was meet to make merry and be glad : for this thy brother was dead, but he has come back to life ; he was lost, but he has been found."

But while Jesus asks from his disciples, and from all who would be his disciples, the utmost service and devotion for the sake of others, he also asks the same sacrifice for themselves. This is my third point. We find in his teaching a remarkable fusion of the higher selfishness and the highest unselfishness. To save others is also to save yourself. Self-surrender is self-development. Or, in his own words, to love your life is to win it. Jesus was not concerned to remove from his teaching the least suspicion of "eudaemonism." These conflicts and antitheses had not yet appeared above the horizon. He was entirely innocent of any knowledge of them. From one point of view, the highest and most important thing a man can do is to save his own soul, to be acquitted in the great judgement which was so imminent and so sure ; to win and be granted a place in the kingdom of God which, in one sense, was present, but in another sense, yet future ; in one sense, within a man, but in another sense, without ; in one sense, the result of his deeds, in another sense, the unearned gift of God. From another point of view,

the "one duty" of man is to serve his fellow. Jesus does not elaborately argue that the two are the same. He implies it. "If any man would come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me. For whosoever would save his life shall lose it, but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake, the same shall save it. For what is a man profited, if he gain the whole world, and lose or forfeit his own self." "What shall a man give in exchange for his life?" "He that finds his life shall lose it; and he that loses his life for my sake shall find it." Observe how subtly altruistic and self-regarding motives are interwoven together; "how subtly," or shall we rather say, how carelessly? The doctrine was, however, both new and true. You may call it either self-development or the higher life. In either view one must die to the lower to gain the higher. Man's nature is such that without a certain measure of sacrifice, the fullest life cannot be attained. There must be some death in order to gain yet more life. This is the doctrine which is further accentuated and developed by the Johannine Jesus where he says: "Except a grain of wheat fall into the earth and die, it abides by itself alone; but if it die, it bears much fruit. He that loves his life loses it; but he that hates his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal." From another point of view it is the same doctrine as is preached in the Sermon on the Mount: Go right ahead, and aim at the best, and look neither to the right hand nor to the left; or in the words of Jesus: "Seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness; and all these other things shall be added unto you."

The higher selfishness, then, is also unselfishness. If every man could save his own soul, the millennium would arrive. And it is a man's duty to save his soul; one can put it that way just as well as the other way, "It is a man's duty to do the right." The two mean the same thing. If, again, there *is* a life after death, if the nature of the life after death depends upon the manner in which you have lived on earth, and if that life after death is a thousand times more important in length, in happiness, in glory, than the life on earth, it is surely logical that the supremely important thing is to prepare for that future life. And each man must, in one sense, make his own preparation. Hence in *that* sense each must think of himself. Let him, then, die to live: let him die to the ape and the tiger, in order to live for righteousness and the soul and the future life and God. This is not selfishness; it is the highest wisdom. Nor can I see if, in any sense, one believes in a future life, that it is not good Jewish doctrine and sound doctrine. It is true that Jesus thought everything had to be decided before death. We have, as we think, a much higher belief. For we believe that there is progression after death and development; discipline and trial and purification; not mere beatitude on the one hand, and perdition on the other. The gulf which separates us from such doctrine as is taught in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus is large indeed. Nevertheless, so long as we believe in a future life in any shape or form, then, human nature being what it is, it is necessary for each of us, if we would be all that we can be, to die to a lower, in order to reach out to, and acquire, a higher. Nor can it be, I venture to think, denied that circumstances may arise in the lives of many of

us, in which it may be desirable and right to follow the advice of Jesus about stumbling-blocks. A man may have a hidden temptation or secret sin which he can only overcome, not gradually, but suddenly. And he may only be able to overcome it suddenly by drastic methods. Then he will realise the force of the saying: "If thy hand cause thee to stumble, cut it off, and if thine eye cause thee to stumble, cast it out." It is in the spirit of Jesus to suggest heroic remedies as well as to make heroic demands. And Jowett urged: "No man ever took his besetting sin, it may be lust or pride, or love of rank or position, and, as it were, cut it out by voluntarily placing himself where to gratify it was impossible, without sensibly receiving a new strength of character. In one day, almost in an hour, he may become an altered man; he may stand, as it were, in a different stage of moral and religious life; he may feel himself in new relations to an altered world."¹ And it may also be noted that these tremendous demands for service, and these tremendous demands for giving all in order to gain the highest, are offered, as it were, in substitution for the anxious and worried observance of a large number of ceremonial commands. Not that the theory of the Rabbinic Law demanded an anxious and worried observance; not that the observance of the Law by the best Rabbis or by the best of the faithful was anxious or worried. But if you set ideal against ideal, you must also set each ideal against each failure. Jesus says, "Give your whole life; seek first the kingdom of God, and everything

¹ Jowett, *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians, Romans*, 2nd ed. (1859), vol. ii. p. 241, in the beautiful essay on "Conversion and Changes of Character."

else will fall into its due place." The observance of a large number of ceremonial laws, assuming that these are believed to be ordered by a perfectly wise, perfectly good, and perfectly loving God, may be entirely suited to many characters. The very attempt to observe them fully may be a joy, a satisfaction, and a stimulus. To some persons the vagueness of the ideal of Jesus, its lack of precision and detail, may be inadequate and unsatisfying. One ideal may suit some; another ideal may suit others. To some it is probable that the ideal of the observance of a large number of ceremonial laws would or does cause anxiety and worry and a sense of failure. To such persons the ideal of Jesus will greatly appeal. In the modern words of the great teacher from whom I have just quoted: "Many a person will tease himself by counting minutes and providing small rules for his life, who would have found the task an easier and a nobler one, had he viewed it in its whole extent, and gone to God 'in a large and liberal spirit,' to offer up his life to Him. To have no *arrière-pensée* in the service of God and virtue is the great source of peace and happiness. Make clean that which is within, and you have no need to purify that which is without. Take care of the little things of life, and the great things will take care of themselves, is the maxim of the trader, which is sometimes, and with a certain degree of truth, applied to the service of God. But much more true is it in religion that we should take care of the great things, and the trifles of life will take care of themselves. If thine eye be single, thy whole body will be full of light."¹

The teaching of Jesus is altruistic in the very

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 236.

highest degree. To minister and to serve is the ideal. But it is also in the highest degree self-regarding. It bids a man act in his own highest interests. It bids him take big views and long views. It bids him reject the lower for the sake of the higher; the temporary for the eternal; earth for heaven. It is true that the last antithesis, "earth for heaven," can lead, and has led, to undesirable consequences. It is true that there may be a false otherworldliness, a neglect of earth which is altogether to be deprecated. But when all is said, the antithesis (for those who believe in "heaven") stands. It may well be that to reach heaven the best way may be through an improved earth. But in the last resort it remains true: the less for the greater. That is sound policy and right doctrine, where the abandonment of the less is the condition of securing the greater. *Through* the less *to* the greater may be *also* true. But it is not always the *only* truth. Therefore the antithesis, "earth for heaven," still can stand, and must still be retained.

The fourth point of special interest and novelty in the ethical teaching of Jesus is one the value of which seems to me less indubitable and clear. There seems a good deal to be said both for it and against it. This fourth point is the beginning in the teaching of Jesus of a double morality: one standard for the average man, and another, and much higher standard for those who want to dedicate their entire lives to the service of God. This division of morality into two was, I believe, a new thing in the history of Judaism. It may, perhaps, be argued, that the Essenes and the Therapeutae had already put the theory into practice. They demanded an ethical standard from the members of their orders which

was not demanded from those outside. That may be true. But, in the literature which has come down to us, we have in the Gospels for the first time a prominent Jewish teacher who, apart from any question of an "order," speaking freely to all and sundry, yet implies the validity, and indeed the propriety, of two kinds of moral lives, with two standards, one for the average man and one for the elect. The Law and the Sages, the Scribes and the Rabbis, do not appear to know or to countenance such a distinction. The commands, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with *all* thy heart," "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," "Ye shall be holy, for I, the Lord your God, am holy," were for all. Nor had there been any indication that they could be *applied* according to two standards. There were, it is true, certain Rabbis who in ritual matters affected a special scrupulosity. They continually observed the laws of purity as if they were priests on duty at the altar. But this was a question of ritual, not of morality. In morality the idea of a higher standard, or of works of supererogation, does not appear to have been advanced. Yet though there is nothing systematic or worked out on the subject in the teaching of Jesus, we do get hints and indications.

It is implied that, in the fullest sense, not all men could be "disciples." Not every man could be expected to renounce all that he had, or to "hate" (in the sense previously defined) father and mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, "yea, and his own life." There must be an inner and an outer ring. We see the same idea in the story of the young man who had great possessions, especially in Matthew's version. When the young man asks

what he shall do that he may obtain eternal life, Jesus tells him to keep the commandments, and mentions the chief of them as examples. The young man says : " All these things have I observed : what lack I yet ? " Jesus replies : "*If thou wilt be perfect*, go, sell thy goods and give them to the poor ; and come, follow me." Matthew, if not Jesus, distinguishes between a morality which is adequate for salvation, and a higher " perfection " which can only be reached through, or on the basis of, absolute self-devotion, abnegation, and poverty. We find, too, in Matthew a distinct beginning of an attempt to set celibacy above marriage, or, at any rate, to assume that the most unconditional self-surrender to the service of God is incompatible with family ties. " There are eunuchs who make themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven." Yet " all men cannot receive this saying : he that is able to receive it, let him receive it."

For our purpose it is unimportant and beside the mark whether the historic Jesus did actually distinguish in ethical stringency between an inner and an outer ring, between an ethical demand which was incumbent upon all men, and a further and higher demand which was only needful for those who, aiming at perfection, wanted to be disciples in the fullest and closest and most definite sense of the word. We have to take the New Testament as it is. Assuming, then, that the theory of a double morality is present in the Gospels, what are we to say to it ? I have dealt with the subject more fully in my edition of the *Synoptic Gospels* (especially on pages 691, 692, 695, 981, 982). Doubtless, as J. Weiss says, the drawing of the

distinction (as he thinks by Matthew in the words, "If thou wouldst be perfect") between "adequate goodness and counsels of perfection" introduced a fateful principle into Christian ethics, from which much evil ensued. Doubtless, too, the praise of asceticism and of celibacy (to say nothing of a compulsorily celibate priesthood) has had many mournful and evil consequences. But surely these tremendous demands for complete renunciation of all that makes life for ordinary people worth living have also had their value, and have it still. It is not merely, as I have said before, that the ideal must be always beyond the possibility of realisation. There is something more. These tremendous demands have, as a matter of fact, found in every generation men and women who have more or less literally carried them out. And he would take a narrow and prejudiced view who would venture to argue that the world has not been better because of their labours. In my remarks upon the subject in the *Synoptic Gospels* I have shown a certain amount of vacillation. That in itself celibacy is higher than married life is both un-Jewish and (as I think) false. That there is anything impure in marriage or in marital relations is an odious and outworn conception. (Note the superb saying of Theano quoted in my *Synoptic Gospels*, p. 171 *ad fin.*) But I do not gather that Jesus meant this even in his saying (whether authentic or no) about the eunuchs. All he means is that to carry out the completest self-surrender *may* demand the renunciation of marriage. It may also be freely admitted that there are many most noble and most veritable disciples of God (that is how *we* must translate "disciples of Jesus") who have lived *in* the world, and have not renounced all

that they had. Taken literally, the saying, if it meant that a most noble lover of God and of man cannot exist unless he has renounced all that he has, would be false. But we must not forget what the demand has accomplished, nor must we shut our eyes to a certain lack in our own religion and religious brotherhood which the absence of such a demand has probably occasioned. For we cannot deny that to a few in every generation the demand has drawn out all the goodness and greatness that were in them, and has even put in them still more. Mr. Westermarck is not wrong in urging that we "must not confound the moral law with the moral ideal. Duty is the minimum of morality, the supreme moral ideal of the best man is the maximum of it. Those who sum up the whole of morality in the word 'ought' identify the minimum and the maximum, but I fail to see that morality is better for this. Rather it is worse. The recognition of a 'super-obligatory' does not lower the moral ideal; on the contrary it raises it."¹ Have not Jews suffered to some extent by the absence of a "super-obligatory," by the lack of a demand for the surrender of all? They have, perhaps, suffered even less than they would, had they been always emancipated, prosperous, and free. As it is, persecution has often compelled them to surrender all in faithfulness to the Highest. But in prosperity do they not lack the inspiring leaven and example of men who "renounce all that they have" in the service of God? There is doubtless much to be learnt from the ideal of consecrating one's possessions and enjoyments to good uses and noble ends, from the ideal of stewardship, from the ideal of the sanctifica-

¹ *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, vol. i. p. 153.

tion of ordinary life, ordinary occupations, ordinary welfare, to the glory of God and the service of man. But is there not also something to be learnt from the ideal of turning one's back upon possessions and enjoyments, and from a *voluntary* life of hardship and renunciation? Is not a community the better from having within its ranks men and women who put both ideals into practice, and who exhibit the "heroism of every day" and the heroism of adventure and renouncement? If there be anything of truth and value in such reflections, we cannot pass by the hard sayings of Jesus with a superior shrug. They require attention, they summon our thought. They cannot be of value for all the world, but not of value for us. They may need supplementing, they may need correction; but they will remain for us no less than for others a requisite portion of our ethical literature and of our moral ideal.

Of the four points or features upon which I have dwelt, the fourth and last, it may be contended, is somewhat off the line of Jewish development, and bears within it the seeds of evil as well as of good. But the first three seem finely to carry forward pure, prophetic teaching, and to constitute true complements and supplements to the best Old Testament ideals. Or, again, if Rabbinic ethics carry forward and supplement Old Testament doctrine in one way, the ethics of Jesus do so in another. Happily it is unnecessary for us to neglect either. We may value both. The fire and passion of Jesus may be as warmly appreciated as the delicacy and detail of the Rabbis.

I have not attempted to relate the religious and ethical teaching of Jesus to the conditions of our modern life. There is, however, one specific detail

about which a word might be said, and that is the teaching of Jesus about divorce. It may be that we shall consider the truth or the right to lie for us between the one-sided doctrine of divorce which, founded on the Old Testament, was developed by the Rabbis, and the principles which may have been laid down by Jesus. Two features seem clear as regards those principles. First, that Jesus would at the least have condemned any divorce of which the cause was not adultery. Secondly, that he would have objected to any rules or system which put the woman in an inferior position to the man. For both these features we may be profoundly grateful to him, even if in such cases as hopeless insanity, or habitual drunkenness, or venereal disease, which did not come within his mind or his purview, we may regard divorce as justified or even desirable. That his ideal of marriage, permanent and monogamic, is also ours goes without saying. Divorce is a hateful and lamentable requirement because of sin or disease: nothing more. "I hate divorce, saith the Lord." The last of the prophets of the Old Testament holds out his hand to the great prophet of the New.

I have already alluded to the question how far the conviction on the part of Jesus that the ordinary life of earth was coming to an end coloured and determined the nature of his ethical teaching. Was the touch of asceticism in his doctrine, his bias against wealth (with which we may compare the familiar words of the Epistle to Timothy, "the love of money is a root of all kinds of evil"), the sharp distinction between the service of God and the service of mammon, due to this belief in the approaching end? However we may answer this question, it is obvious that an intense faith in a

judgement, and in a future life of felicity or sorrow as dependent upon that judgement, which in its turn is dependent upon the way in which the earthly life is spent, was bound to exercise a tremendous effect upon a great man's estimate of all earthly things. Old Testament teachers had declared that wisdom was better than rubies ; a Psalmist had exclaimed that to be near God was the only entirely desirable thing in heaven or on earth, but when one has no belief in any felicity beyond the grave, the ordinary setting of a happy life must assume a very different appearance from what it does when a man is vividly and passionately convinced that true and lasting beatitude can only be known after the gates of death have closed behind him. For a teacher the perspective is changed, and the leverage by which he works is different. " Lay not up for yourselves," said Jesus, " treasure upon the earth, where moth and rust consume, and where thieves break through and steal : but lay up for yourselves treasure in heaven." A wise command ; reasonable advice, common both to Jesus and the Rabbis. But suppose you knew nothing about " treasure in heaven." Then if you used the " reward " motive at all, the reward must be in terms of earth. But not only this. Till the doctrine of another world arose, you had nothing with which to contrast, and by which to depreciate, the goods and treasures of *this* world. Ephemeral and poor as earth's goods might be, they were infinitely better than anything you could look forward to in Sheol. It is thus obvious that, for a very important reason, the ethics of the Gospel *as of the Rabbis* are bound to differ from the ethics of the Old Testament. Isaiah, it is true, does distinguish between flesh and

spirit. But a depreciation of the flesh, an exaltation of the spirit, a contrast between the things of the flesh and the things of the spirit : that was hardly likely to occur so long as the outlook was limited to earth and limited by death.

Doubtless, however, the contrast between the fleeting joys of earth and the abiding joys of heaven (or of the New Jerusalem or of the life of the resurrection) is likely to be all the more stressed and all the stronger when it is believed that, quite apart from the certain death of every individual, the whole earthly order is approaching its end. This was the belief of Jesus, while this, on the whole, was *not* the belief of the Talmudic Rabbis. It is also not the belief of ourselves. Is, then, the contrast made by Jesus between this life and another life too violent for us ? Is his "otherworldliness" too extreme for us, so that we cannot find in it teaching which we can regard as of value for us to-day ?

I do not think so. I hold that we need both : the enthusiastic and ardent temper of Jesus and of many New Testament writers and teachers, and the perhaps somewhat more "practical" temper of the Rabbis. Moreover, it would be easy to exaggerate the difference between the two. The Rabbinical literature is so vast that every sort of temper is to be found in it. There is a good deal which is enthusiastic and ardent, as well as practical. There are many shrewd, practical sayings and suggestions in the New Testament. For it is possible to be both enthusiastic and also practical. Meanwhile, if the teaching of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels, or the teaching of Paul in the Epistles, be carefully investigated and looked at as a whole (though not necessarily a consistent

whole), it will be seen that it is not really pessimistic even as regards the world of sight and sense which is nearing its close. In the case of Paul, his earlier expectation of a rapid end had considerably cooled off in his middle and later period. Neither Jesus nor Paul was an ascetic. Jesus mixed freely with all and sundry. In matters of food and drink he was so indifferent that his enemies said of him, "Behold a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber." Paul in his own fine words was ready, and knew how, "to be abased and how to abound: in everything and in all things have I learned the secret both to be filled and to be hungry, both to abound and to be in want. I have learned in whatsoever state I am to be content." That is the higher New Testament spirit; it is to be raised, as it were, above the world, earthly things being transfigured in the light of the heavenly things which are to come. Abundance is less precious than it was before; want is less painful. The kingdom of God and His righteousness: these are all in all. At any rate, these must be *sought* first, according to the teacher's word, and only in *their* light, and as they suggest, must all other things, all earthly things, be judged and valued. In this view there lie, as it seems to me, both strength and truth. It may need supplementing. There is a right attachment to earthly life, and a right detachment from it. The "kingdom of God upon earth" is a right ideal to work for; the spiritualisation and sanctification of the sensuous and the earthly are right and noble conceptions. Yet there is a sense in which a man should rightly sit loose to earth and its ties, nor can any one who fervently believes in the life beyond logically complain of Paul when he declares, "Our

citizenship is in heaven." Is earth a preparation, or is it not? If it be, only such things as have value for the fulfilment have primary value here. And such things are the "spiritual" things—love, righteousness, the knowledge of God, and, let us add, truth, wisdom, beauty. Is not this, too, the deepest doctrine of the Rabbis? Do they not also distinguish between the treasures that fade and the treasures which abide? Do they not also compare this world to the vestibule and the other world to the banqueting hall? Do they not also bid us prepare ourselves in the vestibule so that we may enter into the hall? It would really be absurd if a convinced belief in the future did not exercise a great influence upon our estimate of the present. Coming events must cast not their shadow, but their light before.

And let us note that while we do not, I think, get directly from the New Testament any helpful inspiration towards that very proper conception of life and duty according to which we must strive to leave "our tiny corner of earth a little better than we found it," we do not by any means find in the New Testament any justification for gloom or sadness. There is little or nothing of the "vale of tears" theory, which Jews (without having studied the book) too often think is largely taught therein. The keynote of Paul's temper and advice is not sorrow, but joy. His constant order is "rejoice." Faith in the life beyond transfigures earth. It does not merely make earthly things cheap and contemptible: it can give *some* earthly experiences, at any rate, distinction and glory. It supplies armour against the shafts of earthly sorrows. It alleviates, it dignifies; it ennobles and consoles. Usually in the Old Testament, death, the all-

consumer, does not destroy gladness. Life and its goods, both spiritual and material, are appreciated and not despised. But there is an undercurrent of sadness. Even in David's mouth, at the height of his glory, and in a moment of legitimate pride and of religious devotion, it is thought fitting to place the pathetic words: "We are strangers before Thee and sojourners, as all our fathers were: our days on the earth are as a shadow and there is no abiding." And Bacon has to admit that "in David's harp" (the Psalter) "you shall hear as many hearse-like airs as carols; and the pencil of the Holy Ghost hath laboured more in describing the afflictions of Job than the felicities of Solomon." Against the onslaughts of sorrow and suffering and untimely death most Old Testament teachers can hardly find any adequate solace and refuge. Only the highest and keenest act of faith can rest consoled and unperturbed in the arms of God. The pressure of life becomes too great. But Paul uses the life to come as a means whereby to glorify the present, even when the present is sorrowful and hard. He rejoices and will rejoice, and as he rejoices, so he bids the brethren and disciples rejoice likewise. It is, I think, only in the dualism of the Fourth Gospel and the Johannine epistles that we find, not a gilding of earth by the sun of heaven, but an absolute dislike and rejection of earth in its contrast with "heaven," a casting-off of the present in favour of the future. There may be some few adumbrations or partial anticipations of such a view in Jesus and Paul, but, taken as a whole, the following passage goes very considerably beyond them: "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the

world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the vainglory of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world. And the world passes away and the lust thereof ; but he that does the will of God abides for ever." Nevertheless, even in this extreme and exaggerated statement, there seems to me to lurk a truth, and that, I hope, not because I am carried away by the sheer beauty and glamour and solemnity of the words. "The lust or vainglory of the world"—partly because the vainglory is temporary, partly because so much of it is unconnected with the things of the spirit, unconnected with truth, righteousness, beauty, partly because it is the theatre and vehicle of sin, we feel that the word attacking it has some truth. He who lives for *this* lust or vainglory, does not live for God. And the less he lives for it, and the less he lives in it, the more he lives for God, and the more he lives in God, and the more God lives in him. And for each one of us it is also the fact that the world passes away and the lust thereof : for each one of us it is, we believe, true that he that does the will of God abides with more *abundant* life for ever. Thus even in this most extreme of New Testament utterances there is a truth to be found and cherished.

Over and above what has already been incidentally noted, the ethical teaching of Paul need not detain us long. For our purpose there is much more to be gathered and utilised in the ethical teaching of Jesus than of Paul. But for those who can put old prejudices aside, or, again, for those who are able to appreciate a great genius even though they reject the cardinal doctrines of his

faith, the Pauline epistles will always exercise an attraction. There is something elevating and sublime in so many of Paul's expressions : his phrases stick in the memory. Even when we may not wholly agree with them, they stimulate thought. And with such striking phrases his epistles are studded, and even the epistles which are certainly not genuine show sometimes touches of his spirit. To quote a few of these phrases at random : " To them that love God all things work together for good " ; " We are God's fellow-workers " ; " Knowledge puffs up : love edifies " ; " In malice be ye babes : in mind be men " ; " The letter kills : the spirit gives life " ; " Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty " ; " The things which are seen are temporal : the things which are unseen are eternal " ; " Be not weary in well-doing " ; " Bear ye one another's burdens " ; " Know ye not that your body is a sanctuary of the Holy Spirit which is in you, which ye have from God ? " ; " Be ye therefore imitators of God " ; " The peace of God which passes all understanding " ; " No soldier on service entangles himself in the affairs of this life, that he may please him who enrolled him as a soldier " ; " To the pure all things are pure."

Apart from such sayings we are, I think, often stirred suggestively in Paul by the opposition (unused by Jesus) of flesh and spirit. The words may represent a psychology which is not exactly ours ; they may also imply doctrines which we reject, yet to us, too, they have a meaning, a truth. For though the lusts and desires of an animal are neither good nor bad, and though our " fleshly " lusts and desires are only " bad " because or when they are adopted by our reason, and though both

good actions and bad actions have sensuous elements, yet it remains true that with the flesh and with material things so many of our grosser sins are connected that for us, too, the flesh and things material are that in us and that around us which we associate, not only with what is temporary and fleeting, but also with what drags us down, and makes us gross or sinful or below the beast. The invisible things are love and righteousness and wisdom ; they are emphatically the creations of the spirit ; just as spirit is emphatically associated with God who is the source and guarantee of spiritual creations, so that by our belief in Him we believe in *their* validity. And to us who deny and reject the existence of any spirit who is not "good," the association of spirit with goodness is all the more congenial. To walk after the flesh and to walk after the spirit are terms in which we can find a meaning. Paul says : "Walk by the spirit, and ye will not fulfil the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh : for these are contrary the one to the other. The works of the flesh are fornication, lasciviousness, strife, and such like. But the fruit of the spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance." We do not understand by flesh and spirit *quite* what Paul understood by them : they are part of his system, and his theological system, from the scholar's point of view, must be looked at as a whole. But the *spirit* of these words *about* the spirit is for us very much what it was to Paul ; in a deep, and not unreal or artificial, sense our acceptance of them is *akin* to his, and therefore we can legitimately be edified by them. They can

help us with propriety. Less easily, perhaps, because it is more technical, but still with a little effort which is well worth while, can we win for ourselves truth and value in such a passage as this : " They that are of the flesh do mind the things of the flesh ; but they that are of the spirit the things of the spirit. For the mind of the flesh is death : but the mind of the spirit is life and peace. For the mind of the flesh is enmity against God ; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can it be ; and they that are in the flesh cannot please God. But ye are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if so be that the spirit of God dwells in you. . . . If ye live after the flesh, ye must die ; but if by the spirit ye make to die the deeds of the body, ye shall live." Any man who has fought and conquered, or who has been conquered by, a sensuous temptation will admit that Paul's words, however technically and theologically expressed, yet contain profound and stimulating truth.

Two further points may be noted about Paul's doctrine of spirit. Spirit—God's spirit—is, in one sense, opposed to the Law, though, in another sense, the Law is spiritual. Paul can say : " If ye are led by the spirit, ye are not under the Law." Or, again, " The letter " (which is equivalent to the Law) " kills ; the spirit gives life." Or, again, the Law spells bondage ; but " where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." But the Rabbis said, there is no freedom except through the Law. And we, the heirs of the ages, we who are possessed of a fuller liberty even than Paul's, we who are raised above the conflict between him and the Rabbis, *we* can see the relative truth both of his teaching and of theirs ; we can appropriate both. The

value of the Rabbinic utterance will come before us again. Here we can justly note and stress the value of that Pauline saying : " Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." The perfect law, as the author of the Epistle of James declared, is the law of liberty, and in this law of liberty works the spirit of God. Secondly, while Paul opposes spirit and flesh, this does not mean that he despises the body. Still less does it mean that in his exaltation of the spirit, the body may do what it pleases. There is nothing of the antinomian in any moral sense about Paul. He, too, preaches the sanctification of the flesh. " I beseech you, brethren," he says, " to present your bodies as a living, holy, and acceptable sacrifice to God—let this be your spiritual worship." And again, " Know ye not that ye are a temple of God, and that the spirit of God dwells within you ? " " Flee fornication : he that commits fornication sins against his own body. Or know ye not that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit which is in you, which ye have from God ? " No words could, so far as words can, be more inspiring to help a man against that " waste of shame," that " bliss in proof, but proved a very woe," of which Shakespeare must have known alike the fleeting " heaven " and the lasting " hell."

When he chose, Paul could give excellent advice on very concrete matters. For us Liberal Jews his maxim that " all things are lawful, but all things are not expedient ; all things are lawful, but all things edify not," is of peculiar importance. (For the word " all " we can substitute " many," which, indeed, is what Paul actually meant. He is alluding only to the world of ceremonial customs

and enactments.) Good taste ; regard for our brother's scruples or conscience ; gentleness in judgement ; all these and other wise principles are expressed by him in those admirable chapters in the Romans and the Corinthians in which he deals with those food and other ritual questions that caused perplexity in the new Christian communities. I have elsewhere dealt with them in their application to our own life in some detail. We must, above all else, be careful that whatever rule we observe, or whatever we abandon, we do all, as Paul says, to the glory of God. The Jewish dietary laws may be obeyed or may be disregarded, but whichever course is adopted, it must be chosen deliberately on *religious* grounds, and for the sake of Judaism and the cause of God. The only other justified point of view is ethical : not to give needless offence ; not to hurt the conscience of our brother. " Let each man be fully assured in his own mind : he that eats, eats unto the Lord, for he gives God thanks. He that eats not, unto the Lord he eats not, and gives God thanks. For none of us lives to himself, and none dies to himself. . . . Why dost thou judge thy brother ? We shall all stand before the judgement-seat of God. I know and am persuaded in the Lord Jesus that nothing is unclean of itself ; only to him who thinks anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean. If because of meat thy brother is grieved, thou walkest no longer in love. The kingdom of God is not eating and drinking, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit. All things indeed are clean ; howbeit it is evil for that man who eats with offence. It is good not to eat flesh, or to drink wine, or to do anything whereby thy brother

stumbles. The faith which thou hast, have thou to thyself before God." What admirable sense and delicate charity ! There is a time for open speech and action ; there is also a time for gentle regard and restraint.

No less worthy of notice are those brief ethical summaries with which Paul so often closes his epistles. They hardly contain a single virtue or moral duty with which the readers of the Old Testament are not familiar. Yet they are impressive by the way in which the most necessary points are wisely collected together : " Let love be without hypocrisy. Abhor that which is evil ; cleave to that which is good. In love of the brethren be tenderly affectioned to one another ; in honour preferring one another ; in diligence not slothful ; fervent in spirit, serving the Lord ; rejoicing in hope ; patient in tribulation ; continuing steadfastly in prayer ; given to hospitality. Bless them that persecute you ; bless and curse not. Rejoice with them that rejoice ; weep with them that weep. Be ye of the same mind one toward another. Be not wise in your own conceits. Render to no man evil for evil. Take thought for things honourable in the sight of all men. If it be possible, as much as in you lies, be at peace with all men. Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good." Or again, more briefly : " Put on, therefore, as God's elect, a heart of compassion, kindness, humility, meekness, long-suffering ; forbearing one another, and forgiving each other, if any man have a complaint against any ; even as the Lord forgave you, so also do ye ; and, above all these things, put on love, which is the bond of perfectness." Or once more in an earlier epistle : " Admonish the disorderly,

encourage the faint-hearted, support the weak, be long-suffering toward all. Rejoice always ; pray without ceasing ; in everything give thanks. Quench not the spirit ; prove all things ; hold fast that which is good ; abstain from every form of evil." Or more briefly still : " Finally, brethren, rejoice ; be perfected ; be comforted ; be of the same mind ; live in peace ; and the God of love and peace shall be with you."

Perhaps one may fitly set side by side with these brief exhortations that fine Rabbinic definition of religion by the author of the Epistle of James : " Pure religion and undefiled before our God and Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep oneself unspotted from the world."

We may also fitly notice in Paul his application in his own person of the saying of Jesus : " Happy are ye when men reproach you and persecute you, and say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake. Rejoice then, and be exceeding glad." Jesus adds, it is true, " for great is your reward in heaven," and Paul believed intensely in this addition. Yet it would be true to say that the new touch of passion and enthusiasm in the words of Jesus did not spring from any calculation of profit and loss. And so with Paul. When he rejoices in his sufferings, he doubtless is convinced that his future joy will be sublime and supreme ; and if he had not believed that, he would not have undergone the sufferings. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to say that he underwent them, and underwent them in joy, because of the future in store for him. He underwent them and felt joy in them for the sake of the cause, through his love of God and

Christ, because of the men and women whom he was thus winning over to the faith in which he so enthusiastically believed. That was a new religious emotion, and the record of it is, therefore, of value, and supplements our Old Testament ingathering. Paul, as he says, laboured: "sorrowful, yet always rejoicing; having nothing, yet possessing all." He "took pleasure in weaknesses, in injuries, in necessities, in persecutions, in distresses." When he was "weak," then he was "strong." "I rejoice in my sufferings for your sake." "Yea, and if I am to be poured out as a libation upon the sacrificial offering of your faith, I joy and rejoice with you all." We can compare such words with the story of Akiba's martyrdom. They find a parallel in the teaching of the First Epistle of Peter. "For what glory is it, if, when ye sin, and are buffeted for it, ye shall take it patiently? But if, when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye shall take it patiently, this is acceptable with God." "Insomuch as ye are partakers of Christ's sufferings, rejoice." So we are told that when the apostles on one occasion were beaten, they departed "rejoicing that they were counted worthy to suffer dishonour for the name." We may substitute God for Christ, and find profit in the exhortation and the story.

Such seem the contributions—the complements, the supplements, the developments—of the New Testament for our Liberal Judaism of to-day. I have not touched upon the mysticism of the Johannine writings, partly because it is so intimately mixed up with its Christology that it is hard to profit by the one while rejecting the other, partly because I am not capable of dealing with any "mystical" literature. Yet many who are neither Christians

nor mystics can dimly feel the truth as well as the power of such utterances as, "He that keeps God's commandments, abides in God and God abides in him."

Many years ago I ventured to write an article in the old *Jewish Quarterly Review* entitled "Mystic Passages in the Psalms." There still seems to me full justification for such a paper. Passages such as: "With Thee is the fountain of light; in Thy light we see light." "Thy loving-kindness is better than life. My soul follows hard after Thee; Thy right hand upholds me. I am continually with Thee; Thou hast holden me by my right hand. Whom have I in heaven but Thee; there is none upon earth that I desire beside Thee," may, I suppose, in the larger sense of the word, be legitimately spoken of as mystic. Nevertheless, there are two or three observations to be made about these passages. First, they are not very numerous. Secondly, they do, perhaps, stop short of the fuller, deeper, more philosophic mysticism which we find in the Fourth Gospel and in the First Epistle of John. That a man can feel himself *in* God, and that he can feel God in him, is indisputable; and many religious persons will be convinced that the conviction is not only the result of actual experience, but that the experience is true. It is not merely that man thinks, and believes, that he feels that God is in him and that he is in God; but this feeling is true. In such exalted and rapturous moods the words express an actual truth: he *is* then in a peculiar, deep, and true sense in God, and God in a peculiar, deep, and true sense is in him. Now *this* degree of mysticism goes beyond and develops the mysticism of the Psalter. Hence, if it be true, we have here a veritable New Testament

supplement to Old Testament teaching. But there is also something more. This "more" is rather an impression than a defined and limited fact. It is gained not so much from individual passages of the New Testament, as from a view of, a feeling about, the whole of it. What one feels in this matter about the New Testament in its contrast with the Old Testament (and very much more still in its contrast with the Rabbinical literature) is this. The Psalter represents individual Jewish piety and individual Jewish intimacy with God at their highest. Nevertheless, even in the Psalter we have the feeling that *much* of this intimacy is, as it were, communal, or even national, intimacy, and not just the intimacy of man as man, and of God as God. One remembers the old controversy of the "I" of the Psalter. Now the theory that the "I" is always a personification, and that it is always consciously meant to be the pious community of Israel, is an exaggeration. In the form in which the theory was developed by Smend and even held by Wellhausen it is now probably almost extinct. But the opposite theory that the "I" is always an individual is exaggerated in its turn. Neither Duhm nor Balla can prove as much as this. The truth lies in between. And though the most mystic Psalms are also the most "individualist" Psalms, one feels, nevertheless, that the community is never very far off. The facts that the writer is an Israelite, that he is a member of the community, the people of God, that his God is the God of Israel, are never far below the horizon of his consciousness. In one sense these very facts constitute the strength of the Psalter: in one sense they give it value. But to some extent they detract from its purely *human* value, and more

especially from its power and interest as a purely human document. Much more is this the case (as we shall see) with the "mysticism" of the Rabbis. Though very deep and keen, it is intensely national. It is throughout conditioned by the peculiar relation of God to Israel and of Israel to God. It is true that we, too, are Israelites. But in our relations to God we desire to distinguish. Sometimes we wish to feel ourselves as Israelites, charged with a peculiar mission. But sometimes we desire to feel ourselves simply and purely as men, and more especially to feel God, not as the God of Israel (in however pure and legitimate a sense), but just simply as God. In such moods we may legitimately feel a certain lack in the highest Old Testament piety, just because so much of it is conditioned and mediated by national and communal conceptions. We want a mysticism or an intimacy which can appeal to us purely as men, which could make us feel that, as that man felt, so does he urge us to feel. He urges us to feel as he felt just in virtue of our common humanity, our common relationship to a universal God. Regarded from this point of view the mysticism and intimacy of the New Testament do seem to carry us some steps beyond those of the Old. It is true that the Johannine mysticism has also its limitations. It, too, is conditioned and mediated. Its mysticism is the product of its Christology. And this Christology must for us be deducted and stripped off. Nevertheless, the condition and limitation are not national or communal: therefore we perceive why it is that this Johannine mysticism could have so wide and enormous an influence. And we also perceive one reason why in some of our own moods, and even in spite of its Christology, it makes appeal

to ourselves. Yet we pass from it not unreadily to the teaching of the Synoptics. The historic Jesus of the first three Gospels can hardly be said to put forward mysticism. But if there is not much mysticism, there is a great deal of intimacy. And one charm, one attraction, one power, of this intimacy is that it is so human. Except in a very few, and historically very doubtful, passages, Jesus never implies that his own intimacy and intimate relation with God is not possible for others. On the contrary. We, too, are to pray to our Father even as he, each one of us in our own inner chamber, alone with God, each one of us, not specially as Israelite, but just as a simple human being, a being who, doubtless insignificant enough, in one sense, is yet, in another sense, incomparably privileged and endowed as the child of God. It is this general feeling of possible and justified intimacy between man and God—man as man and God as God—which we gather from the Gospels, and which seems to supplement the more national and communal piety of the Old Testament.

By far the greater part of the New Testament contributions seem to me legitimate expansions and developments of best and purest Old Testament doctrine. A few things are complementary in the sense that they suggest a new point of view, and thus counteract the possibility of one-sidedness or exaggeration. Is there anything to which Amos and Isaiah would have taken exception? Is there not rather much which, on being presented to them, they would have confessed to be in accordance with their own most cherished truths? Be this idea too bizarre, it may, nevertheless, be safely asserted that he whose religion is founded upon what has

here been presented from Old Testament and New Testament together, will possess a religion which, whatever else may be said of it, is in its fundamental constituents both consistent and Jewish. But that is not to say that it would not need, or be the better for, supplementing and development. The Rabbinic contribution towards such development we have now to consider.

Yet before leaving the New Testament and passing on to the Rabbinic literature, we might perhaps look at the subject of this chapter from one more point of view. Does the Old Testament, at its very *highest*, leave *any* religious gaps and deficiencies? Are there, in other words, any rough edges in the Old Testament to the smoothing of which the Old Testament makes of itself no contribution whatever? I think the answer must be that there are remarkably few. It may be that the higher doctrine and the complementary conception is only *very* occasionally taught; it may be that we can only cite as examples one or two brief passages, incidental and disconnected. Nevertheless, an indication, a suggestion, often, indeed, a definite, if isolated statement, are there. That is why, I suppose, Jews are usually so emphatic that, possessing the Old Testament, they have nothing to learn from the New. It is not *merely* prejudice. It is not merely a wilful shutting of the eyes. It is also something more and better. It is that they are so familiar with these incidental and occasional utterances of the Old Testament that they regard them as its dominant and prevailing view. They turn the exception into the rule. They get everything they can out of the few sentences which teach the doctrine they desire and cherish; they squeeze

out of them all that can possibly be extracted from them, and perhaps a little more ! They ignore the many, or the prevailing, passages which could be quoted on the other side. As an estimate of the Old Testament as a whole this Jewish attitude towards it is unscientific and inaccurate. Nevertheless these occasional and exceptional passages *are* in the book ; they *do* form part of it. If attention is concentrated upon them, if what is in conflict with them is neglected (or explained away), then it is not unreasonable, and it is certainly not surprising, that men should repudiate the view that for the source, or for an exposition, of the doctrines which these passages contain, it is necessary to go beyond the pages of the Old Testament. And it is true that there is much more filling out to be found in the New Testament than actual and entire novelty. The rough edges of the Old Testament are smoothed, its gaps and deficiencies are, for the most part, filled up, by the Old Testament itself. It is its own correction and supplement. What the New Testament does is to correct and supplement afresh, sometimes more fully, sometimes more brilliantly, sometimes with fresh illumination and from a novel point of view. Or again, as we have seen, it develops a doctrine and pushes it towards its logical end. But it does not, for the most part, contain what we, from our Liberal Jewish point of view, can regard as *completely new* doctrine which is *also true* doctrine. And of those few Old Testament edges which are rough, and which the Old Testament itself makes no incidental and occasional attempt at smoothing, the New Testament smooths by no means all. Some it leaves untouched, no less rough than it found them.

We have seen how, in the conception of God's nature, little of value is taught in the New Testament which had not already been taught in the Old. We hear, it is true, simply and definitely stated, that God is spirit ; that in Him we live and move and are ; that of Him and through Him and unto Him are all things. But even these sayings, noble as they are, do not take us very much further than the 139th Psalm. Nor is there advance as regards God's character, when we contrast with the New Testament not the lowest Old Testament statements, not even the average Old Testament teaching, but its highest and its best. (And in the New Testament, too, we have to eliminate as well as in the Old.) God is loving, says the 145th Psalm ; God is love, says the Fourth Gospel. Is the difference so great ? And can the Jew forget that, if to the author of the Fourth Gospel, God is love, His love is very unloving to the majority ? The partiality of the God of Israel is undeniably a prevailing and predominating weakness of Old Testament doctrine : here one might think is a rough edge which none before Paul had smoothed. Nevertheless, recalling all the familiar universalist passages, Jonah and Isaiah lvi., and several Psalms, one has to acknowledge that Paul has only smoothed more completely, more definitely, what these others had begun to smooth before him. In God's dealings with man the doctrine of retribution and of punishment and of reward constitutes another rough edge. It is partially smoothed by the fine attack made by Jesus upon tit for tat, but the *disciplinal* theory which, carried to its logical conclusion, is fatal to any doctrine of annihilation or of eternal punishment, is not developed by New Testament writers. On the

contrary. The iniquity of temporary guilt being visited by indefinitely prolonged punishment escapes their vision, and Jesus never uses the future life as a means for working out and overcoming the imperfections of this life. Here is a rough edge which is left wholly untouched. The same teacher who declares that God gives rain to the unjust as well as to the just, and makes His sun to rise upon the evil and the good, speaks with complete assurance about the many who enter the gate that leads to destruction, nor does he so much as hint or pray that those who enter that gate may ever again pass out of it. This rough edge of the Old Testament is only made rougher in the New.

It is, perhaps, in the relation of man to God, as well as in the relation of man to man, that there is most New Testament "smoothing," and also most developments and fillings out. Here, too, we find some definite corrections and denials of certain Old Testament roughnesses which, on the purely Jewish line of development, have been found hard to get rid of, and have even been augmented, hardened, and turned into theory. Man cannot acquire merit before and unto God. "Reward" is rather gift than payment. Do our utmost, and much remains to do. A man's worth is not the difference between his good deeds and his bad. In such statements, which to most of us would seem obvious truths, we may trace the development of New Testament teaching beyond the teaching of the Old, and the smoothing of edges of which, in the Old Testament itself, the signs of smoothing are small. As regards suffering and evil, the doctrine of the resurrection and of the new life in the world to come threw a wholly fresh light upon the problems of earth, and suggested

fresh and comforting solutions. Suffering can now not merely be endured in faith ; it can be endured in joy. Accepted as service for God and for His cause, it is the prelude of an abiding bliss. It is not the mark of sin ; it is, on the contrary, the symbol of election and of grace. It is the note of joy in suffering which is new ; the rest is a smoothing which, depending, as it does, upon the doctrine of the life to come, had been reached in the interval between the close of the Old Testament period and the opening of the New.

We saw that the increasing rule of the Law was to have its moral and spiritual danger. Traces of these dangers are already visible in the Old Testament. Yet it is not easy to constitute out of these dangers an actual defect. For if some passages of the Old Testament show signs of these dangers, and are thus to be regarded as defects, other passages are quite free from them. We cannot say that the conception of faith is wanting in the Old Testament ; here is no rough edge ; all we can say is that both from the teaching of Jesus about faith, and even from the teaching of Paul about faith, there is something to learn, something complementary. We cannot say that the Old Testament does not know humility and the sense of sin on the one hand, a joyful confidence in God upon the other. Above all, we cannot say that there is not to be found in the Old Testament a depreciation of the ceremonial, in comparison with the moral, elements of religion, or that the moral demands of God are not concentrated in a few simple principles, rather than beaten thin into a number of separate and isolated enactments. Nevertheless, if there is here no rough edge to be smoothed, there is yet to be found in

the New Testament a view of goodness and of character, a view of the whole relation of man to God, which comes as a helpful supplement and a deepening development to those portions of the Old Testament which are already on the same line and breathe a similar spirit. If in the ethical teaching of the Old Testament, when we seek to make up its highest portions into a connected whole, there is any rough edge at all, we should, I imagine, discover it in a certain inadequacy in the attitude towards the sinner, in a certain lack of *élan* and passion, of eager and redeeming philanthropy. We have seen how the moral teaching of the Law turns in the Proverbs into a series of excellent adages and recommendations, covering a considerable number of the virtues, but somewhat wanting in enthusiasm and adventure, in the spirit of sacrifice and denial. It is this deficiency—this comparative lack of high idealism—which is most grandly filled up by the teaching of Jesus and Paul. Go forth and save, give service even to the sacrifice of life : so they teach and so they lived. Active, redeeming love, not stopping short of the sinner and the enemy : this is the new ideal. And though it may be too high for most of us to reach, it may, nevertheless, bring us a little further forward than we should have advanced without it. Shall we refuse to allow either that there are rough edges and deficiencies in the Old Testament, or that any of these were smoothed down and filled up by the doctrines of the New ? Are we the better Jews for such a refusal ; are we the worse Jews for the admission ? I cannot believe it. The Old Testament remains great enough even if the deficiencies and the rough edges are freely allowed. Nor have we moved away

from Judaism because, with frank and open eyes, we perceive in the New Testament excellences which supplement and carry forward the excellences of the Old. What is there in these new excellences that is not Jewish too? If for almost all of them parallels are eagerly sought in the Rabbinical literature, this does not look as if the searchers thought them as not in harmony with the purest Judaism. And so in truth they are. They are separable from those doctrines and theories in the New Testament which we reject as inconsistent with our faith. Let us not then persist in keeping to a poorer Judaism than we need. Why should we not make our religion as rich as we can? Jesus and Paul can help us as well as Hillel and Akiba. Let them do so. What is good in them came also from God.

CHAPTER III

THE ADVANCE IN RABBINIC LITERATURE¹

IT is a pity that this essay has to be written by an amateur like myself. It ought to have been written by a scholar and an authority. But no such person seems likely to write it, and so, the right man being wanting or silent, I am compelled to do it myself. For the essay I want must be written from a particular point of view and in a particular way. The point of view must be that of Liberal Judaism; the way must be that of freedom: freedom towards the Old Testament, freedom towards the Rabbinic literature. But only the Liberal Jew is completely free. The adherent to orthodoxy is always more or less hampered, fettered, or tied down. And freedom must include impartiality. There must be no attempt to improve any Rabbinic passage by reading into it what it does not contain; on the other hand, there must be no attempt to make it mean less than it does mean, so that the greatness or originality of any other writing—the New Testament, for instance—may shine forth more brightly.

¹ A large portion of this chapter consists of quotations, some quite literal, some a little condensed, from the Rabbinical literature. But in order to make the look of the page less ugly, quotation marks have been, in most cases, omitted. It is hoped that the context will show sufficiently what is quotation and what is comment. Quotation marks have been retained in almost all the quotations from the Bible.

“Advance” may be sought in more than one direction. It would not be fair to limit it to sheer development, to sheer novelty, though doubtless these would constitute the highest and most salient form of “advance.” We ought, however, I think, in fairness to find advance where an idea or a teaching, enunciated rarely in the Old Testament, is enunciated frequently by the Rabbis, or where it is put in various ways, or where it is emphasised and much dwelt upon. I call it an advance if certain difficulties and crudities in Biblical narrations and teachings are perceived, and some attempts (however naïve) are made to get over, or remove, them. It is also an advance when there is some effort at theorising; for this very theorising is also an attempt to move forward as well as to smooth over difficulties and inadequacies.

Perhaps I had better here intercalate some few words of rejoinder to an objection which may be taken to my entire method. I have spoken of the Rabbinic literature and of the Rabbis as if they formed some sort of unity. But have I any right to do so? The literature extends over a large number of years. It contains the records of men who lived from the first century to the sixth or seventh. Some of the sources I have used were compiled even later. Here, then, is a great “corpus” containing the views and utterances of Rabbis who lived as early as, say, A.D. 20, and of Rabbis who lived as late as A.D. 620. Six hundred years or more separate the earliest of these Rabbis (with their views and utterances) from the latest. Six hundred years! Wycliffe¹ on the one hand, and Dean Inge on the other! Surely an essay which attempted to deal

¹ Wycliffe was born about 1324 and died 1384.

with the religious views and utterances of English Christians from 1323 to 1923, all jumbled up together as if they formed a unity, would be absurd.

But for the Rabbis the attempt is not so absurd as it sounds. It is true that there was some change and development in the thoughts and opinions of the Rabbis from A.D. 20 to A.D. 620. It is true that there was variety in the views of individual Rabbis who lived at one and the same time. It is true that there is some reflection, mostly by way of polemical opposition, in the views and utterances of the Rabbis, of the non-Jewish thought of their environment and age. But it is, I think, no less true that, in spite of this enormous interval of time, in spite of the variety of influence and environment, and in spite of all individual differences, there is yet an immense underlying agreement. The Rabbinic religion changed much less from A.D. 20 to A.D. 620 than English Christianity changed from A.D. 1323 to A.D. 1923. Speaking very generally, it would, I think, be true to say that the beliefs and the spirit of A.D. 20 were fundamentally the same as those of 620. There was, it is true, a hardening and a fixing, there was also a broadening and a development, in those 600 years. But all took place, generally speaking, along the same lines. The great doctrines and beliefs of 20 were the great doctrines and beliefs of 620; and still more would it be true to say (and this is of grave importance, for the immense mass of the literature and of the "views and utterances" are affected) that the great doctrines and beliefs of A.D. 90 were the great doctrines and beliefs of A.D. 690. Hence while a scientific history or exposition of the Rabbinic religion must attempt to give some historic sequence of development, and

must seek to show how certain doctrines and beliefs grew up and spread, and how others were altered, checked, or expanded, an essay such as I now attempt can usefully, and with some propriety and measure of truth, speak of, and deal with, the Rabbinic religion as a whole. It can deal with the Rabbinic "advance" as a whole. I can take the literature, as it exists and as I find it, and collect from it whatever seems to me good and useful for my particular purpose, more especially, therefore, what seems to me to go beyond the Old Testament in religious and moral excellence, and what seems to me to be of value, stimulus, and suggestiveness even for us Liberal Jews to-day. When I quote a particular utterance or view, I ought, strictly speaking, to say, "This is the view or utterance of such and such a Rabbi who lived in the second, or fifth century," as the case may be; I ought not to say, "the Rabbis" held such and such a view. Yet often I *shall* certainly say so, and, I believe, with adequate justification. It is true that one can sometimes feel or know that such and such a view, however valuable, such and such an utterance, however delightful, is an exceptional view or utterance, rather off the usual Rabbinic line. Then, while one may use and emphasise this view or utterance for present-day purposes, one must mention that it is exceptional or off the line. But otherwise one need not do so. A given utterance may be a noble and beautiful utterance, much too good for an average Rabbi to have said at all, or for an exceptional Rabbi to have said often. And yet one may be quite justified in remarking about it, "the Rabbis say." For the utterance may be in full accordance with the prevailing Rabbinic spirit, with the general trend of Rabbinic religion, and even with the general

trend of Rabbinic development, so far as this combination of adjective and noun is a possible and correct combination. It needs some knowledge and tact to distinguish the cases where one may state, "the Rabbis say," from the cases where one must not. Whether the present writer possesses such knowledge and tact is, perhaps, doubtful. But that there *are* cases, and very many cases, where one can legitimately say, "the Rabbis hold," or "the Rabbis teach," is to my mind certain.¹ Perhaps the largest percentage of such cases might come from the enormous quantity of views and utterances which are not recorded of any Rabbi in particular, but are either put into the mouth of the Rabbis in general or of none (the anonymous Haggadot as they are called). Not that the distinction of anonymous and named authorities is of much importance for my present purpose. There have been scholars who, in dealing with, and writing about, Rabbinic religion, neglected chronology too greatly: there are others who appear to press chronology too much. There is something, or there was something, which can be properly called the Rabbinic religion, and which can, somewhat roughly, be set down or described in words. This Rabbinic religion did not exist in its entirety in any one age or in any one Rabbi. The account one may give of it would not apply with complete accuracy to any one generation or to any single individual Rabbi. And yet it is roughly true of them all.

¹ Dr. Abrahams says: "Nachmanides, in the Barcelona disputation of 1263, maintained that the Hagadah often represents individual standpoints, that it has not the same generally binding force upon the orthodox as the Halachah (*Jewish Encyclopaedia*, ix. p. 90). This distinction has much weight. Yet he was not referring to those very elements of the Hagadah on which you chiefly build, nor would he have disapproved of works like Aboab's *Candelabra of the Light*, written one generation later. Aboab collected into a systematic whole the moral and religious sayings of the Talmud and Midrash without any regard to the date and individuality of the authors of the sayings."

And still more is it true to say that it existed as a sort of spirit above them all. The words, "the Rabbinic religion," are not *mere* words. They correspond to some fact, to something real, or to something which once was real. They are much more true than the words, "the Old Testament religion." They are even more true than the words, "the New Testament religion." And for my particular purpose and object as so often laid down, they become still more true. Hence I proceed to my task undeterred by the spectre of chronology, though always, I hope, unforgetful of the difficulties, and always unforgetful when a given utterance or opinion has to be recorded as exceptional, or when it may cheerfully be set forth as "general" and "prevailing," in the sense that, even though unique in expression, depth, or power, it is yet not outside the general Rabbinic line.

The utterances collected together in the vast corpus which constitutes Rabbinic literature seem all to come from one predominating type. They are the teachings and opinions of Rabbis, of one class, who all look at Judaism and religion from one and the same point of view. They all magnify their office and their class. Moreover, almost all are men with limited outlook and limited knowledge. They have no training except the training of their own Rabbinic schools and colleges. It is a great loss that few gentiles, learned in the rhetoric and poetry and philosophy of Greece and Rome, became converts and Rabbis. Aquila turned to translation, not to exposition. No real development in theology was possible without philosophy, and no philosophy could come except from Greece. It may be said that the religion of Akiba was better than the religion

of Philo. To this objection the answers could be numerous, though there is no opportunity to give them here. Anyway, most people would allow that the philosophers of the Maimonidean and the subsequent era did a service for Judaism which can hardly be overestimated, and also that if Judaism had never emerged with Mendelssohn into the light of western thought—which practically means, if it had not become again subjected to the influence of Greece—it must have lost the opportunity which it has since enjoyed of claiming its rightful place among the systematised forces of modern civilisation.

It was a misfortune that the great intellectual ability of the Rabbis was given no standards and no training outside the narrow walk and outlook of their own houses of study. This want must be one reason why they sometimes seem lacking in capacity to distinguish between the great and the little, between the solemn and the trivial, or why so much of their teaching seems so childish and so absurd. For they had nobody and nothing to keep them from such confusions and degenerations. Moreover, so far as order and system and reason had any sway with them, it was in the sphere of ritual, of law, and of practice. Religious and ethical conceptions and ideas were under no control, were formed into no system, were allowed to run riot. The imagination had free play. This freedom had its good side. There was no stiffening of doctrine into dogma. In some ways the scholasticism which produced the Rabbinic codes and the discussions about them was better than the scholasticism which produced puerilities such as those which disfigure mediaeval Christianity. Endless discussions about Levitical impurities or Sabbatical regulations are in a way less

harmful for thought and freedom than the metaphysical subtleties and dogmatic minutiae into which the later schoolmen became entangled. It is better, moreover, to tie up action than to tie up thought. In spite of Spinoza, it may safely be said that the legal labours of the Rabbis, however ill-directed, however childish, could not have produced so many heresies and heretics as the dogmatic labours of the Christian theologians. Whether you may wear a handkerchief on Saturday is a childish subject for discussion; yet it is little likely to produce heretics who are burnt alive at the stake.

But the real trouble with the Rabbis, the real check upon religious advance, was the burden of the Old Testament, the burden of the Book. For in spite of some efforts (some of which will be mentioned) to explain away, to reconcile the lower with the higher at the expense of the lower, it remains broadly true that to the Rabbis the whole Old Testament, and especially the whole Pentateuch, was true and good and divine: the crudest statements about God were somehow not less true than the noblest; the taboo survivals—the red cow, the waters of impurity, the dietary regulations—were hardly less good, and were certainly no less divine, than “Thou shalt bear no grudge, and shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.” That is why the great move onwards has been deferred till modern times. It is only Liberal Judaism, with its freedom to distinguish between higher and lower, good and bad, temporary and permanent, that has been able to carry Judaism forward by strides which have made of it a religion that can be purer, freer, less fettered, than almost any other sect in the whole western world. Moreover, the burden of the Book

acted in another evil direction as well. It stimulated the passions and hatreds and prejudices of the natural man. There was only too much reason why the Rabbis should be intolerant, particularist, and narrow, where the gentile and the "nations" were concerned. Now the Old Testament, instead of checking these tendencies, did, upon the whole, stimulate and intensify them. It gave them the sanction of religion. It threw over them the veneer of holiness. It gave them divine authority. Thus God is not usually made less partial in Rabbinic literature than He is in the Old Testament. He is usually more partial. He hates the enemies of Israel with an even deeper hatred. And, sometimes, painfully ingenious reasons are given for this partiality which make it all the worse. The crude anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament are often imitated by the Rabbis. It is true that they do not seem to believe in these anthropomorphisms; but they were dangerous to use, and in Rabbinical literature they are often used in an unseemly and childish manner, which could not have had effects for good. It is even difficult to say how far all the Rabbis were perfectly aware that the anthropomorphisms *were* anthropomorphisms. They became entangled by them, and the burden of the Book often impaired the purity of their conceptions both of the divine nature and of the divine character. You cannot use crude and childish metaphors too long and too frequently without danger.¹

Thus the advance of the Rabbis on the Old

¹ Dr. Abrahams writes: "It must, of course, be conceded that Judaism did not have to wait for the Liberal movement for its reaction against this danger. The protest of Nachmanides strengthened the powerful influence of Maimonides, one of whose great services to Judaism was his thoroughgoing removal from it of every trace of anthropomorphism."

Testament in their doctrine of God is a very complicated and difficult question. It is the more intricate because the advance is often inextricably mixed up with the defect. There are warmth and passion and inwardness and intimacy in the Rabbinic conception and doctrine of God : and this warmth and passion and inwardness and intimacy do in many respects go beyond, or develop, the conception and doctrine in the Old Testament ; but they are difficult for us to use because they are almost inextricably mixed up with the Rabbinic particularism. It is not man whom God loves : it is not man who loves Him. It is Israel whom God adores ; it is the Israelite, as Israelite, who adores God. Thus here, in a most fundamental point, are advance and defect, excellence and weakness, strangely and strongly interwoven. Interwoven, moreover, are also the childishness of the Rabbis and their deeper thought, and it needs both tact and impartiality to know when the crudity and childishness and anthropomorphism mean little more than they say, or when they are startling and pictorial ways of expressing something deeper and grander. One has sometimes to read beneath the lines. But when ? And how much ? How much is mere wayward, unpruned fancy ? How much is meant seriously ? How much is the play of the moment ? How far may we translate these wild fancies and vagrant imaginings into modern ideas without reading into these fancies and imaginings thoughts of which their authors were innocent ? It is a task of much delicacy neither to include nor to exclude too much.

Taking first the Rabbinic conception of God, we find in it an immense and sincere exaltation of

the Divine Being. He is other and greater than the world which He has made. His transcendence and personality are everywhere emphasised or taken for granted. But this transcendence does not interfere with or prevent what we should now call His immanence, though no attempt is made to do what even moderns find hard to the verge of impossibility, namely, to harmonise the one aspect of God with the other, or to establish a conception of Him which harmoniously includes both. An intense conviction fills the minds of the Rabbis that God sustains the world, and that His spirit and His glory are ubiquitous. No place is without God, or, as they often prefer to say, is without the Shechinah, which is the divine manifestation, or which is God as immanent in the world. Crossing this convinced idea of the divine omnipresence is the idea that God is brought near the world by human virtue, and driven far from the world by human sin. For the ethical aspect of God is never far removed from the more metaphysical aspect of Him : God is never the mere Creator, or the mere sustainer of the non-moral universe, or the mere transcendent Deity beyond and greater than the world which, by His spirit and glory, He fills and pervades. He is always also the Holy God, the righteous and merciful God, the God who rewards and punishes, the God whom human goodness attracts and whom human sin repels. That God is regarded as a cold, distant, transcendent, unapproachable Deity is a monstrous misunderstanding of the Rabbis, and a misunderstanding which can only be retained by the ignorant or the prejudiced. No nearer God than the Rabbinic God could there possibly be, or perhaps rather, I should say, no set or society of men

could have felt God nearer than the Rabbis : to no set or society of men could God have seemed nearer than He seemed to them. But their general doctrine of God and of His relation to man, so far as one can speak of such a doctrine as existing at all, and so far as one can set it forth, was always intermingled with, and coloured by, their doctrine about God in His relation to Israel. Their doctrine about God, their feelings about God, their sense of God, are made both better and worse by their doctrine, feelings, and sense as to His relations with Israel. It is these relations, or rather it is their beliefs as to these relations, which dominate and colour their conception of God, giving it intensity, intimacy, enthusiasm, and passion, upon the one hand, and particularism and narrowness, upon the other. Even in such a matter as the divine omnipresence and nearness we find this twofold influence. Always, too, the burden of the Old Testament comes in. The Tent of Meeting and the Sanctuary partly intensify and partly (to our thinking and feeling perhaps more than in reality) restrict the sense of this omnipresence and nearness : they partly exalt the passion, and partly bedim the purity of the conviction, with which the omnipresence and nearness are felt and expressed. God is nearer to Israel than He is to any other people in the world. The nearer He is felt to be to Israel, the farther is He (alas !) believed to be from Israel's foes, the nations of the world. Or if Israel's sin makes Him "far" from Israel—an idea which is never really held for long at a time—it makes Him also far from the world, while Israel's repentance brings Him near again. It is a curious Rabbinic idea that God needs the world not so very

much less than the world needs Him. But this idea rarely becomes vocal. It is crossed or overshadowed by the other idea, very frequent and very keenly felt, that if Israel cannot get on without God, God cannot get on without Israel. Nothing could well be more particularistic, but yet no idea made the sense of God's presence and of His love more intimate, more constant, and more overwhelming. In considering the question of the advance of the Rabbinic conception of God over that of the Old Testament one has to consider the further question how far the fine fervour and passion of the Rabbinic conception can be stripped of their particularism, and so made available for our service and edification to-day. They owe that fervour and that passion to a particularism which Liberal Jews can no longer share, to a particularism which conflicts with their profoundest convictions of the divine nature and impartiality. Can the fervour and the passion remain—are the ideas still serviceable—if the particularism be removed? Can man be substituted for Israel? Or do the particularism and the passion constitute an inseparable unity, so that if you take away the one, the other inevitably fades away and evaporates, and becomes useless and unserviceable? That is the very important question which is yet very difficult to solve.¹

The Old Testament teaches the divine ubiquity very plainly. What can be more definite than the famous verses in Solomon's prayer, in Jeremiah, and in the 139th Psalm? But it is no less clear that such stories as that of the Burning Bush, or such con-

¹ Dr. Abrahams writes: "As the whole world is acceptable into Israel's communion, and in the end is expected to be so received, it ought not to be impossible to read 'mankind' for 'Israel' in many a Rabbinic text."

ceptions as that of the (visible or invisible) presence of God in the Mosaic sanctuary or in the Temple at Jerusalem, did originally imply a belief in a localised God, in a God, that is to say, who, like man, occupied a particular portion of space, and who, being in one place, was not also at the same time in every other place. Now the Rabbis had to reconcile one set of passages with the other. Being all in the Book they were all true. Nevertheless, the fundamental, dominating belief of the Rabbis was in the omnipresence. Therefore the Bush and Sanctuary stories (with others of their type) had to be fitted in with the omnipresence, rather than the omnipresence to be accommodated to the Bush and the Sanctuary.

Over and over again it is stated that God spoke to Moses from the lonely thornbush, so that men might realise that there is no spot on earth which is empty of the Shechinah. And as to the sanctuary, it is often repeated that it resembled a cave near the shore of the sea. When the tide pours in, it fills the cave, which becomes full of water, but the sea outside remains no less full. So the sanctuary was filled with the radiance and the glory of the Shechinah, but there was none the less of the Shechinah in the world. So it is said that as the sunlight floods the chambers of a palace, but is also no less in the world beyond, so is the Shechinah with every group of Israelites when they pray; but it is yet one and the same Shechinah which is with them all and is in the whole world, as it is also one and the same sun. God fills the world, but the world does not contain God. He, as we should put it, is not only immanent, but transcendent. In their vivid realisation of this truth the Rabbis go beyond the Old

Testament. They are more theoretic. God, says R. Jose ben Chalaphta, is the place of the world, but the world is not His place. God, says R. Isaac, is the dwelling of the world, but the world is not His dwelling. R. Abba bar Judan said the matter is like a warrior who rides upon a horse. The horse is secondary to the warrior, but the warrior is not secondary to the horse. The difference between man (a being of "flesh and blood") and God is strongly emphasised. If a king is in his bedroom, he is not in his dining-room; if he is in his dining-room, he is not in his bedroom; but God is in heaven and earth, and fills them at one and the same time. How can this omnipresent God be said to dwell in a human sanctuary? The more thoughtful Rabbis felt the difficulty more acutely (as was only natural) than the author, or rather the editor or interpolator, of Solomon's prayer. There is no theoretic solution. It is part of the marvellous omnipotence and gracious condescension of God. I will confine my Shechinah, says God to Moses, within the limits of a square yard. When God said, "Make me a sanctuary that I may dwell among you," Moses asked how a dwelling-place for God could possibly be made, and in the usual manner he quotes the stock Biblical passages. God replies, I do not ask it according to My capacity, but according to your capacity, for even if I were to demand the whole world, it could not contain My glory. This idea of God accommodating His demands and His revelation to the receptive power of man and of every individual man is quite Rabbinic. God does not, it is said, come upon, or act upon, His creatures with burdensome violence, or according to the full greatness of

His power. He acts upon them according to each one's strength. A heathen, who brings forward the omnipresence and temple difficulty to R. Meir, is met by being asked to look at his face in two mirrors, one of which magnifies, while the other diminishes. If *you* can seem now large and now small, says R. Meir, how much more can God, who fills heaven and earth, yet also, if He pleases, speak with Moses from the midst of the sanctuary. Just because God is everywhere, none can tell His place. Even as within the body none knows the place of the soul, so none knows the place of God ; and it is rather significant that it is added more than once that the very creatures which bear the throne of God's glory know not His place, and when their turn comes to praise Him in song, they say, Where is God whose praise we are to sing ? We know not if He is here or there, for He is everywhere. Therefore they exclaim, "Blessed be the glory of the Lord from His place" (Ezekiel iii. 12). Thus here the restricted and anthropomorphic expression of the prophet is made to indicate the very opposite of its actual meaning. God and the soul are often likened together. As the soul "carries" the body, so God "carries" the world. As the soul within the body is pure and exalted above the body, so is God pure and exalted above the world. Here the exaltation as regards the soul seems only capable of being understood in a non-spatial sense, so that the exaltation of God above the world must be also understood in a more or less spiritual sense as well.

But if in these quaint ways the divine omnipresence is insisted on, the conception is crossed by the idea that human sin removes God from the

world, so that there is a sense in which he is less in a given place at one given time than at another. Moreover, the idea of God's ubiquity and of His "nearness" to man is partly injured and partly helped by the Rabbinic particularism, by the fervently held belief that God was (and is) "nearer" to Israel than to any other people in the world. And, though it is needless to labour the point here,—for we are out to show the excellences of Rabbinic religion and not its defects—there is little doubt that very often the Biblical anthropomorphisms had an evil result: they were often more before the minds of the Rabbis than the comparatively few passages in which the omnipresence doctrine is clearly taught. It is true that they frequently use language showing a full realisation that anthropomorphisms are not applicable to God in a sense in which they are applicable to man, yet the Rabbis seem often to believe that God's dwelling in the Temple or His departure from the Temple had a more definite and literal meaning than any firm spiritual belief in His ubiquity could justly allow. We are also told that though God yearned to dwell with His creatures, He did not do so till the Mosaic sanctuary was set up in the wilderness, so that the first day of the sanctuary can be regarded as the first day of the Shechinah. Here we have the idea that, in a sense, the erection of the sanctuary was of immense benefit to the world. And the same conception in another somewhat modified form meets us frequently elsewhere. The Shechinah did at first, we are told, dwell or rest upon the earth, but the sin of Adam and the subsequent increasing sins of the human race drove it away, so that it retreated ultimately up to the

seventh heaven. The virtues and merits of the patriarchs gradually brought it back again, but it was not till the Mosaic sanctuary that it came right down again upon the earth. More generally we have the idea that sin diminishes the presence of God upon the earth, whereas goodness increases it. Thus of arrogance (an especially offensive vice to the Rabbis as to Jesus), it is said that God and the proud man cannot live together in the same world, and of him who commits a sin in secret we are told that he presses against, or drives away, the feet of the Shechinah.

These various conceptions can, I think, be applied and found serviceable even to-day. Perhaps, too, the same may be said of the idea that the Shechinah has ever accompanied Israel in all his wanderings and exiles ; or that even when Israel sins, the Shechinah does not abandon him. So, too, of the righteous being ever accompanied by the Shechinah, so that even to one single individual, if he occupies himself with Torah, the divine presence is vouchsafed. Can we not both *use* the idea about Israel, and also *universalise* it ? May we not hope and believe that God is with man in the long tragedy of his ascent, and that there is a sense in which He is ever near to the righteous, and that there is a sense in which He is never far from the wicked ?

The wonderful graciousness of God (as the Rabbis believe) to the repentant will be mentioned later on. The general "nearness" of God ("He is near with every kind of nearness") is constantly reiterated. Once the matter is dealt with half theoretically, when God and an idol are contrasted. The idol is physically near, but spiritually far, for it can neither hear nor help : God, on the contrary,

may be far—for who knows His dwelling-place?—but He is spiritually near. From earth to heaven is a journey of five hundred years; therefore God is far; but if a man stands and prays and meditates in his heart, God is near to hear his prayer.

Before speaking further of the relations of God to man, I want to refer to the conception of God's need for man; as if by Himself, and apart from His creation (and man, to the limited purview of the Rabbis, is the goal of creation, that is, of the "world below"), God were not completely God, or not entirely self-sufficient. Thus it is said that while it is to the honour of children to be with their father, it is also to the honour of a father to be with his children. If we need the glory of God, God needs our glory. God yearns for Israel's prayers. Israel's bondage is His, so that when He redeemed the Israelites from Egypt, He, in a sense, may be said to have redeemed Himself. To some extent, indeed, it may be said that it is a question of reputation. God's honour and glory are involved in the rectitude and wickedness of His people. If the Israelites do His will, His name is exalted; if they disobey, His name is desecrated. But this is not all. God's very divinity, so to speak, is injured by Israel's sin; His power is lessened; His very goodness is lessened. If the Israelites do God's will, they make His left hand His right; if they disobey, they make His right hand His left. Or, again, by sin they make the will of the Merciful One to be cruel. Or again, they make Him sleepy, paralysing, as it were, His sleepless watchfulness and love. When they do His will, they increase God's power; when they disobey, they weaken it. Still more daring is another saying in another source:

When you Israelites are My witnesses (that is, when you fulfil your calling), then I am God ; when you are not My witnesses, then I am not God. How far can we translate such sayings into modern equivalents which would have value for our religious thought to-day ? Undoubtedly they bear upon problems, and suggest ideas, which go far beyond the limits of the Old Testament.

There is not much of fresh or great value for us as regards the divine fatherhood or unity in the Rabbinical literature. The metaphor of fatherhood is used quite naturally and frequently ; the Rabbis could not have imagined that the time would come when anybody would charge them with a lack of conviction that God was their Father, and that the phrase, "our Father who art in heaven," was not familiar to them. All the reward, we are told in one passage, which God wants from the Israelites is for them to honour Him as His children and to call Him their Father. The relationship is natural and obvious. So, too, as regards the unity of God, it is rather taken for granted than dwelt upon at length or with elaboration. There are many allusions to the folly and wickedness of believing in a "second power in heaven" or in any "division" in the Deity, but these, while historically or theologically interesting, are of no present-day value for us in our own religious life, especially for those of us who have no desire or inclination to question the Jewish conception of the divine unity, or to exchange Judaism for Christianity. Early in the Rabbinic period the slogan of Judaism had been established in Deut. vi. 4. We know this from the New Testament. The original meaning of the verse had been greatly changed.

As I have already indicated, it is probable that the Hebrew words originally meant that there were not many Yahwehs, but one Yahweh ; even as there was only one sanctuary at which Yahweh might be offered sacrifices, so there was only one Yahweh, and not many Yahwehs, or many manifestations of Yahweh, to receive such sacrifices. There was not a Yahweh of Hebron, and another Yahweh of Jericho, and another Yahweh of Jerusalem: the local Baals were many, but there was only one Yahweh. But gradually the meaning of the verse changed and deepened. It was taken to signify: (1) there is one God only, and that one God is Yahweh. (2) Yahweh is Himself a unity. (3) Yahweh is ever the same: the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever ; the same, even though His manifestations seem many. The reading of the " Shema," the confession of the divine unity, is thrown back to pre-Mosaic times. Thus we find the story: When Jacob was about to die, he called his sons and said (Gen. xlix. 3), with a play upon words, Harken to the God of Israel, who is your Father in heaven. Is there in your heart any doubt (or division) about God ? Then they answered: Hear, Israel, our father, as your heart is undivided for the Holy One, so is our heart undivided, for " the Lord our God, the Lord is One." . . . Since then the Israelites are wont to say every morning and evening : Hear, Israel our father, the word which you enjoined upon us still stands for us to-day: " the Lord our God, the Lord is One." God has many names, but He is none the less one. An architect may be called also builder or master-workman, but he is one and the same man. The same God in the past, the same God in the future, the same God in this world, the same God

in the world to come. Quaint is the saying: God appeared to the Israelites at the Red Sea as a man of war; at Sinai as a teacher, to Daniel as an old man; but He said, Because you see Me in so many manifestations, there are not many gods: it is I who have appeared to you now in this way, now in that, for I am Yahweh thy God. And it is said, When God revealed Himself at Sinai, each Israelite thought that the word of God addressed itself to *him*. For the word spoke with each according to the power of each. But God said: Because you heard many voices you are not to think there are many gods, but know that it is even I, for I am Yahweh thy God. In these passages the unity of God seems merely to oppose one God to many gods, but there can be no doubt that with the rise of Christianity some of the allusions to the unity have a more definitely anti-Christian reference, and are thus used in a deeper and more metaphysical sense. It is interesting that words were coined or used to mean the unity of God and to confess or profess that unity. In the Targums the word Yechudah is used to signify the divine unity. The passage in Lam. iii. 28, "Let him sit alone and keep silence, for God has laid it upon him," is enlarged thus: "Let him sit alone, and keep silence, and bear the chastisements that come upon him for the sake of the unity of the name of God" (cp. Canticles viii. 9). Even when (it is said in the Midrash) we are weakened by sufferings, we hope for the salvation of God and daily proclaim the unity of His name. The martyrs of Judaism are alluded to as the sons of the living God who gave up their lives for the unity of the name. In such passages we have an obvious advance upon the Old Testament. What

was implicit becomes explicit, and the special function of Judaism—the jealous maintenance of the divine unity—is already realised and expressed.

As regards the conception of the divine character some advance can be observed. If we take the Old Testament at its very best—for instance, the simple confession of the divine goodness such as we find in Psalm cxlv.—it is not easy to see how it can be improved upon or developed. There was, indeed, room for a reply to objections or to doubts, but the statements themselves stand unexcelled and probably unexcellable. You can systematise a little, and theorise: you can vary the phraseology, and make it here and there more pointed and sharp. But does the famous saying “God is love,” mean more than, “The Lord is gracious and compassionate, slow to anger and of great loving-kindness. The Lord is good to all, and His mercies are over all His works. The Lord is righteous in all His ways, and loving in all His works”? There was little here, as it seems to me, for the Rabbis or any one else to go beyond. On the other hand, the lower conceptions of God in the Old Testament, and the grosser anthropomorphisms, were, as we have seen, a terrible burden for the Rabbis. They could not always escape from them by explaining them away (even though ancient exegesis, whether Rabbinic or Christian, is in this line capable of much), partly because the statements are too clear, emphatic, and abundant, partly, alas! because they tallied too closely with, and were too pleasing and comforting to, their own lower passions and impulses, their longing for revenge, their national hatreds and prejudices. It is only occasionally that we find an effort to rise to a nobler view, to overcome the

letter of Scripture by ingenious theory and interpretation. Thus, as regards the divine wrath, the Rabbis could not rise to the Platonic conception that anger is an impossible quality to associate with perfection. But yet they can say: Thou subduest wrath, but wrath cannot subdue Thee. A man is overcome by his wrath, but God overcomes wrath. A man is ruled by his passion, but God rules passion. I, God, rule over passion, but passion does not rule over Me. In other words, I suppose, the attribution to God of the quality of anger is a mere metaphor. *His* wrath, at any rate, is different from human wrath. An angry man is overcome by a passion; he acts irrationally. God's anger is merely a metaphor for His justice, or for that just hatred of, or indignation with, sin (not necessarily the sinner), which is consonant with justice, with holiness, or even with love.

The Rabbis reduced the moral attributes of God to the two fundamental qualities of justice and mercy. Mercy or compassion was made to include—I think this may fairly be said—the conception of loving-kindness or love. They devised the theory of the two divine Middot or attributes, namely justice and mercy, but the attribute of mercy was said to include in itself thirteen subdivisions (by an ingenious reckoning up of words in Exodus xxxiv. 6, 7). More anthropomorphically, God was said to have two thrones, one of justice and one of mercy: He passed from one to the other according as He judged (and punished) or as He pardoned and forgave. I do not know that the Middahs and the thrones carry us much beyond the Old Testament. The simple, childlike theology of the Rabbis, founded upon, and continuing, the simple, childlike theology

of the Old Testament, gave them some advantages over Christian anxieties and speculations. There was no question of some extraordinary device being needed to overcome the awful consequences of man's sinfulness and sins, or of God's justice, or of the devil's demands. God had simply to forgive, and it was His nature and desire to do so. He realised that with strict justice man could not endure. Therefore He created the world, and He rules it, by a mixture of justice and mercy, and in the mixture mercy predominates. If I create the world, said God, with the Middah of mercy alone, sins will be multiplied, if with the Middah of justice alone, how will the world endure? I will create it with both. O may it endure! In another passage Abraham argues with God that He cannot have it both ways: if He wants strict justice, there can be no world (of men); if He wants a world of men, He cannot have strict justice. More profoundly it is declared that the Middah of mercy is greater than the Middah of justice; in other words, mercy (or love) is a more essential feature of God's nature than justice. The same idea is, I suppose, indicated in the quaint prayer which the Divine Being is said to pray: May it be My will that My mercy may subdue My anger; may My mercy prevail over My Middah (of wrath), so that I may deal with My children with the Middah of mercy, and enter on their behalf within the line of strict justice. (The last words will be noticed later on.) It is also to be observed that the Rabbis adopt the theory that of the two divine names, Elohim (God) and Yahweh, the former marks or signifies the attribute of justice, the latter the attribute of mercy. Now with the name Yahweh were doubtless associated some relics and remnants of old fears and

superstitions ; somehow or other Yahweh was really God's name, even in a sense far deeper than Jones may be your name or Smith may be mine. For if God *has* a name (and the Bible says that He has), then the name must embody in itself something very awful and tremendous. We know how all antiquity believed in the mysterious connection between a man and his name: hence it was only natural to believe that there was a dread and mysterious connection between God's name and God. Now the point of value for us in these hoary ideas, long since past and overcome, is that Yahweh was more intimately connected with the essence of God's nature than Elohim. And Yahweh expressed His mercy ; Elohim His justice. *Therefore* mercy was a much more essential, predominant, and powerful attribute of God than justice. All sorts of anthropomorphic and antiquated ideas about the divine justice and mercy in connection with the New Year and the Day of Atonement (*e.g.* the sound of the Shophar makes God get up from the throne of justice and sit upon the throne of mercy) need not concern us. It suffices that to the Rabbis the essential feature in the divine nature is goodness, mercy, or love, which perhaps, too, they realised to be not inconsistent with justice, though superior to it.

While, however, the Rabbis, when they were not thinking of Israel's enemies, laid the predominant stress upon the divine mercy, they were sensitive to the danger of confusing mercy (or, as we should say, love) with good-nature. God is not merely easy-going. He is long-suffering, but He will by no means acquit the guilty. Their many discussions—sometimes rather casuistical, sometimes rather childish, sometimes inconsistent, and often

particularistic—about the long-sufferingness of God seem to imply that we must not allow the idea of love to degenerate into laxity. Better, in spite of difficulties of consistency, to assume that while there are no limits to the divine goodness, justice and punishment are not excluded from the divine rule because of mercy and love. Or, again, as we shall see later on, it is better to acknowledge ignorance of the innermost causes of the divine action than to lower one's conception of the divine nature.

It is rare in the Rabbinic literature, just as it is rare in the Old Testament, to find much pity with the unrepentant wicked, more especially if there is any connection between the wicked and the enemies of Israel. Precisely the same lack of pity is to be found in the New Testament, where the unrepentant wicked are consigned without compunction to the "aeonian" fire. And on the largest and most colossal scale this lack of pity, which, I suppose, in antiquity the members of one religion almost invariably showed to the adherents of another, is exhibited in the Fourth Gospel, which has yet a just claim to be called the Gospel of love. So awful are the inconsistencies of the human mind. Yet in the Talmud, from whose vast sea every doctrine and every idea can be fished up, you can find, by way of bright and rare exception, instances of divine pity even for the enemies of Israel. Thus, there is the famous passage, several times referred to, where the angels begin a paean of praise and triumph at the destruction of the Egyptians, and God rebukes them, and says, My creatures are perishing in the waters, and you would lift up your voices in song. Curious discussions occur in the Talmud as to whether God rejoices at the destruction of sinners.

Somehow or other there *must* be occasions when He does, because it says that He does in the Old Testament ! Nevertheless, the *dominant* view is that God does not rejoice when the wicked fall. And there is a very remarkable passage in the Mishnah which runs thus : R. Meir said, In the hour when a man suffers (*i.e.* when a malefactor is put to death), what says the Shechinah ? How heavy is My head ! How heavy are My arms ! If God grieves thus over the blood of the wicked, how much more over the blood of the righteous ! Here I might add that the Rabbis have also ventilated the question whether *grief* is consonant with the divine perfection. The intimacy between Israel and God is, however, too great for any pain which comes to the one not being also felt intensely by the other. "In all their afflictions He was afflicted." What large use do the Rabbis not make of this corrupt verse from Isaiah ! More generally it is said that God weeps three times a day : Because of him who could occupy himself with the Torah and does not, over him who cannot and yet does, and over an officer of the community who is proud.

One is struck in the Rabbinic literature by this double tendency : on the one hand, the unhesitating extension of the Biblical anthropomorphisms, sometimes reaching the greatest degree of pictorial detail and fullness ; on the other hand, a certain struggling against all anthropomorphisms, a certain desire to indicate that they are all metaphors and not to be taken literally. Perhaps the most venturesome passage in this second direction is found in the Mechilta, which is one of the oldest of the Rabbinical compilations, and is a sort of commentary upon Exodus. The comments upon Exodus xix. 20

run thus : And Yahweh came down upon Mount Sinai to the top of the mount. One might suppose, upon all the mount. Therefore it says, on the top of the mount. One might suppose that the divine Glory really, or in itself, came down, and spread itself out upon the mount. Therefore it says, I have talked with you from heaven. These words mean that God bent, or bowed down, the lower heavens and the upper heavens upon the top of the mount, and the Glory came down and spread them upon the mount, as a man who spreads a coverlet on the top of the bed, and as a man speaks from the coverlet. . . . R. Jose said, It is written, The heavens are the heavens of the Lord, but the earth has He given to the children of men. Moses and Elijah did not go up (to God), and the Glory did not go down below, but we are to understand that God said to Moses, Behold, I call to thee from the top of the mount, and thou goest up (*i.e.* apparently there was a created voice which sounded from the summit of the mountain; God Himself, or even the divine Glory, was not on the mountain or on the top of the mountain).

In the relations of God with man the Rabbinic conceptions of the divine nature and attributes are still further exemplified. A number of passages exist which, while not going beyond the best Old Testament teaching, yet emphasise and illustrate that teaching in many quaint and telling ways. Passages describing how God can hear all men at once, how all, sick and poor, slaves, women and men, are equal before Him, how large is His pity, how constant His compassion, are frequent enough, and are often beautiful as well as quaint. But for our present purpose it is perhaps needless to quote

them. More important, because carrying us a little further forward, is the question of the divine aid. The Rabbis, as usual, have no theory of grace; yet indications are not wanting that they were conscious that man, when acting righteously, did not act by his own unaided power. They do not say in so many words: It is not I, but God in me; it is not I, but the holy spirit within me, but they do say that God helps man. And they feel—though they clearly find it difficult to express it—that God does not help a man to wickedness. A man cannot excuse himself for his wickedness by saying, It was God who urged me to do it: but (they do not say this, yet we may add it to what they *do* say) a man cannot, and must not, boast of his good deeds, for they are rather God's than his. Thus they say, He who would pollute himself is given opportunity; he who would purify himself is aided. And again, It is like a man who sells balsam and pitch. If one wants to buy pitch, it is said to him, Measure it for thyself. If one wants to buy balsam, it is said, Wait, I will help thee to measure it, and I and thou will both smell well. The last words are extremely curious and significant. We may, I think, find in them the idea which we have already observed: by man's virtue God is glorified and His divinity increased, or perhaps, rather, that God imparts of His nature to man without thereby losing anything of His own perfection. It is somehow almost always noticeable in the Rabbinical literature that a fine idea often gets spoilt by some petty application or particularisation: it gets split up in some casuistic manner, and seems to lose itself in the sand of detail. Is there any polemical reference, or what are we to make of a passage like this: R. Isaac said, If

any one says, I have laboured and not found, or, I have not laboured and yet found (*i.e.* succeeded), believe him not; but if he says, I have laboured and found, believe him. All this, however, only applies to the study of the Law; in matters of business, help from heaven comes in, and in the study of the Law what was just said only applies to intelligent apprehension, but to remember what one has learnt needs help from heaven. Such a saying makes one almost hesitate to believe that the speaker had any deeper conception of the religious problem at issue. It may, however, be that what the Rabbi wishes to emphasise is that man possesses free will, and is responsible for his deeds. If he honestly toils in study, he will succeed, and no success can come without toil. There is neither magic nor chance, nor does God supply the place of effort. But in business there is an element of what the man in the street calls chance, and this element is due to the goodness or will of God. So, too, men differ in power of memory, and the difference in endowment is due to God. But all this would leave the deeper question of the divine element in human righteousness and in the conquest of sin untouched and unsounded.

Justice and mercy, the two fundamental qualities of God, operate, according to the Rabbis, by way of reward and punishment, discipline and forgiveness. There is no doubt that, both upon the human and the divine side, both as regards the dealings of God with man and the relations of man with God, there is far too much in Rabbinic teaching about reward and punishment, far too much of measure for measure as a principle, and far too much of its application. There seems to be here one of the weakest, as well

as one of the least attractive, portions of Rabbinic theology and Rabbinic religion. The doctrine of reward and punishment bulks large in the Old Testament: it was accentuated by the Rabbis. Moreover, it was just such a doctrine which can be terribly coarsened by detailed application and elaboration. The externalism of it, when externally conceived, becomes gross and often ludicrous. The principle that God renders to each man according to his works is assuredly only true, if it be true at all, in a spiritual sense. Outwardly it is only true if we substitute humanity for man, and it is then only true as a principle or article of faith which needs explanation and qualification. Even so far as a life beyond the grave may be concerned, we should still only desire nowadays to accept it with the reservation that the nature of the divine punishments and rewards is completely unknown to us. When outward punishment or outward reward is assumed to be the sequel of virtue and sin, and—far worse—the nature of these rewards and punishments is presumptuously and foolishly supposed to be ascertainable, the results are lamentable indeed. The Rabbis were by no means able to shake themselves free from the follies of the friends of Job, and they even carried these follies into detail and astounding lengths. Instances of such painful folly even found their way into the Prayer Book, where they are allowed to disfigure and deface it to the present day.¹ In this essay we are, however, only concerned with the advances of the Rabbis, not with their failures and retrogressions. And it is a remarkable fact that even here where they failed most, where they must have found it most difficult to move forward, where,

¹ *The Authorised Jewish Prayer Book*, ed. Singer, p. 121.

perhaps, the disadvantages of a legal religion were most serious and pressing, they were often better than their most cherished doctrines, and often showed a happy inconsistency in respect of them. In these inconsistencies we have something to use and find valuable even to-day.

To begin with, the doctrine of individual retribution is considerably modified by the view that, though the divine gifts (whether of forgiveness or of prosperity) depend upon human virtue, there may be a transference of the virtue of one man for the benefit of another. The doctrine of Zechuth, or merit, has much in it which is fantastical, exaggerated, and unattractive, but it has this good point about it that it is a sort of indication or acknowledgement of human solidarity and interconnectedness. Thus the merits of the Patriarchs help their descendants. Zechuth may even inhere in what is not a human being. The Law has much Zechuth, and because of it God grants favours and privileges to Israel. A whole wicked nation may be preserved by the Zechuth of one righteous man who is found in it year by year. It is said that all the world is sustained by the Zechuth of Israel. Connected with this doctrine of Zechuth, which cannot be further dwelt upon here, is the doctrine that the righteous, and especially the death of the righteous, act as an atoning power for the sins of the wicked. Thus, it is said that there are many Israelites who possess neither good works nor knowledge of the Law. Does God destroy them? No. He unites the good and the wise with the bad and the ignorant in a single bundle, so that the one atones for the other. The atoning efficacy of the death of the righteous is constantly alluded

to and emphasised. And though it never seems to be said that this atoning efficacy should be a *voluntary* sacrifice whether in life or death, yet, in Akiba's case, and occasionally elsewhere, martyrdom is not merely a voluntary act, but is even *desired*, not indeed as a sacrifice for man, but as an act of love to God.

But, in addition to Zechuth, there is grace. Where there are no works, God gives and forgives through His goodness. The two agencies are sometimes queerly combined, as when it is said that, till the granting of the Law, God saved the world by His goodness, and afterwards He saved the Israelites by the Zechuth of the Law. Yet things were not wholly satisfactory till the erection of the sanctuary. For before the sanctuary was erected, the world was like a stool which has only two legs. As the stool does not stand firm till it gets a third leg, so the world needed the sanctuary for its firm establishment, for then it stood firm upon the divine goodness, the Law, and the sanctuary. But when the sanctuary was destroyed, God made the righteous in Israel supply its place, and thus He forgives the sins of His people. Quite, or almost, as frequent as the references to Zechuth, are the references to God's free grace, by which God acts without any need of Zechuth or of works. God redeems Israel for His own name's sake. He forgives through His own goodness. He can supply the wanting righteousness of man by His own superabundant righteousness. Thus the congregation of Israel say : We have no merit or good works. Deal with us in loving-kindness. David is made to say : Many trust in their own good works, many trust in the works of their

fathers, but I trust only in Thee. Though I have no good works, yet, seeing that I call upon Thee, hear me. The old Rabbinic commentary (if one can call it so) on Exodus thus briefly comments on xv. 13 ("In Thy loving-kindness Thou ledest the people"): Thou hast wrought loving-kindness for us, for there were no works in our hands. From the beginning the world is only built upon loving-kindness. (The proof is a designed mis-translation of Psalm lxxxix. 2.) On the whole, the Rabbinic idea seems to be that man is saved, or rather lives, whether in this world or in the next, through the grace, the *givingness*, the Zedakah of God. So far as human righteousness avails at all, it avails for others rather than for the righteous themselves. Thus we are told that two Rabbis (their names are variously given) disputed as to the meaning of Isaiah xlv. 12. Each one gave an explanation which has no relation to the original text, but the substance was this. The one said, The whole world is sustained by divine grace (Zedakah), but the very righteous are sustained by their own merit or works. The other said, The whole world is sustained by the merit of the very righteous, but the very righteous are not sustained even by their own merit. Another form of the same dispute runs: One said, All men are sustained by God's grace, but the very righteous are sustained by their own merit. The other said, All the good and all the consolations which come to the world are due to the merit of the very righteous, but they (*i.e.* the very righteous) gain no benefit from their righteousness (*i.e.* they are sustained by God's grace). We may gather this, it is added, from what befell Mar Zutra, for when

he prayed for others he was answered, but when he prayed for himself he was not answered. Thus we always come back to the conception of the fundamental goodness of God. He *wants* to save. He *wants* to forgive. Divine love desires to redeem, but the desire is not inconsistent with justice. If God created the world, He must have created it for life and not for death, for salvation and not for ruin. Thus the Rabbis always try to find loopholes for God's mercy, so long as these loopholes do not weaken the sense of human responsibility, and turn love into mere good-nature. If, for instance, a man means to sin, but is prevented, his evil intention is ignored ; if he means to do a good deed, but is prevented, his good intention is regarded as an accomplished act. And there are other sayings to the same effect, always illustrating the doctrine that the Middah of love is greater than the Middah of justice, and that the desire of God is to save and to redeem. "I will cause all my goodness to pass before thee"—that is the Middah of mercy as well as the Middah of justice (both are good). In that hour God showed Moses all the treasures of reward which are appointed for the righteous. Moses asked, For whom is this treasure? For him who fulfils the commands. For whom is that treasure? For him who brings up the orphan, and so on. Then Moses saw a big treasure, and he said, For whom is this one? To him, said God, who has good works I give the reward that is due to him ; to him who has none I give gratis of this big treasure, as it is written, "I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious." We have to translate such sayings and stories as these into their modern equivalents, and I think we can.

They are childlike methods of expressing the redemptive love of God, in which we would fain believe and find our comfort. Whatever the method, and however long and strange it be, the divine purpose—for man *we* say where the Rabbis too often said for Israel—is not to destroy or to requite, not just to punish or just to reward, but to train, to educate, to bring near, to enlighten, and to save.

Too often, indeed, the Rabbis seem almost possessed by a consuming passion for reward. And too often they show the mere ordinary human desire for divine retribution to befall the wicked and the enemy. Too often also they attribute to God coarse, mechanical methods of retribution and reward, as if there were no such thing as character with its subtlety and delicacy, but as if God were constantly weighing man's good deeds against his evil ones, and judging and rewarding and punishing a man according to the balance. All passages, and they are innumerable, in which these ideas are reflected, are of no value for us to-day. The passion for reward is expressed with the utmost *naïveté* and simplicity. Thus it is said that the real reason why Moses was so anxious to enter Palestine was because he knew that certain commands could only be fulfilled in the promised land. God, however, said to him, What you *really* want is the reward of these commands. Therefore I will reckon it as if you had fulfilled them ! Sometimes the attitude towards God is what *we* should call wheedling. If a king hires good workmen, who labour well, what praise befits the king if he gives them their reward ? Such renown is only his, if he gives their full hire to lazy workmen. The forefathers were good workmen ; we are but lazy

workmen. Give us good reward : *that* is great goodness !¹ There is, indeed, no end to the reward of fulfilling the Law, but most of these rewards were regarded as reserved for the life beyond death, whether in "heaven" or upon the renovated earth of the resurrection aeon. One Rabbi went so far as to say that in *this* life there was no reward. The Israelite is not to consider and ponder on the various rewards of the various commands. In fact, the amount and quality of the reward attached to each command are hidden, precisely so that some may not be neglected and others fulfilled. Hence the sages said : Be as careful over a light command as over a heavy one, for thou knowest not the reward of either ! But the rewards of the hereafter are infinitely great. Eye has not seen, and ear has not heard, what has been prepared for those who fulfil the Law.

The mercy of God is, however, as I have already indicated, never allowed to degenerate into an unethical good-nature. Though He is ever ready to forgive, He does so only upon conditions : there must be some sense of guilt, some evidence (such as God can see) of repentance. The Rabbinic doctrine of repentance, which I have described in detail elsewhere, is one of the finest things in their whole system. No one who repents, whatever the greatness of his sin, is rejected by God. Moreover, if man makes the smallest beginning, God meets him more than half-way. Open for me, God says, a gateway as small as a needle's eye, and I will

¹ Dr. Abrahams writes : " This is hardly fair. God's generosity is compared with man's deserts. And your sentence beginning, ' There is, indeed,' is not adequate. The immense change produced by the fact that the rewards were supposed to be ' other-worldly ' and spiritual, because after death, should have been more emphasised. The Jews got very little earthly reward at any time ; it was scarcely illegitimate to hope for the rewards of the Hereafter."

open for you a gate wide enough for carriages and chariots. God's gates, which repentance opens, are not strait and narrow. There is no reason why any should not be able to pass through them. And these gates are never closed. The contrite heart finds immediate acceptance. To use broken vessels is for man disgraceful, but God loves the broken vessels, as it is said, God is near to the contrite. What shall be the punishment of the sinner? Wisdom said, Evil shall pursue sinners. Prophecy said, The soul that sins shall die. The Law said, Let the sinner bring an offering, and he shall find atonement. But *God* said, Let the sinner repent, and he shall be forgiven. It is a Father who bids His children return unto Him and be forgiven. The matter is like a king's son who had become wicked. Then the king sent the son's tutor to the son, and bade him "come to himself." But the son said, With what face can I do so ; I am ashamed before thee. Then the father sent to him to say, My son, can a son be ashamed to return to his father? If thou returnest, is it not to thy father that thou returnest? Similar passages abound, and are too numerous to quote. For the Rabbis the type of the worst sinner is Manasseh, for he was both an idolater and a murderer. Yet the book of Chronicles asserts that he repented, and that his repentance was accepted. The Rabbis enlarge upon this story, which was itself a legend. The angels of the service shut all the windows of heaven that the king's prayer should not reach unto God, and they said to God, May a man who set up an idol in the Temple repent? But God replied, If I do not accept his repentance, I should shut the door upon the penitent. What did God do?

He bored a hole under the throne of His glory, and hearkened to Manasseh's supplication. Another version of the story is to the effect that God bored the hole on account of the Middah of justice. God had, as it were, to plot a secret escape from His own attribute of retribution ! Love, whether human or divine, will " find a way " for its own desired end. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the Rabbis did not observe any ethical limitations. A good deal of superstition tended to collect round the Day of Atonement. It is needless to deal with that here. But, on the whole, the Rabbis, burdened, as they were, by such a sentence as Leviticus xvi. 30, which, because it was in the Pentateuch, was necessarily true, yet kept themselves and their teaching commendably pure and high. Ritualistic as they loved to be, and much as the words of Scripture played into their hands if they were inclined to the temptations of externalism, these very men chose Isaiah lviii. for the first prophetic lesson on the Day of Atonement and the book of Jonah for the second. They pointed out that God forgave the Ninevites, not because of their fasting and their sackcloth, but because they turned from their evil ways. And they said in the Mishnah itself, in the very code book itself, " For him who says I will sin and then repent, repentance will be of no avail. For him who says, I will sin, and the Day of Atonement will bring absolution, the Day of Atonement will bring no absolution. The sins of a man against God the Day of Atonement can absolve, but the sins of a man against his neighbour the Day of Atonement cannot absolve, till he has become reconciled with his neighbour." They also distinguished between a repentance which was

sincere and out of "love" from a repentance through fear of punishment, or as the mere consequence of suffering. It was only the true repentance which was assured of the divine acceptance. We, doubtless, are far less solicitous about punishment than the Rabbis. There can be no divine punishment after death which would not be for our redemption. To pray that we may be let off a discipline and a purification is absurd, yet forgiveness, in the sense of drawing near again to God, in the sense of the bar which sin had fashioned between us and Him being broken, has still a spiritual and religious meaning. And, in that case, the warnings of the Rabbis have still a sound and valuable import for us all.

Can a man repent when he likes? And is repentance always efficacious, not in the sense of bringing divine forgiveness, but in the sense that it causes amendment and the conquest of sin? To these high questions it cannot be said, I think, that the Rabbinic literature gives us any clear and definite replies. It would appear as if Liberal Judaism must largely find the answers itself, or develop them out of earlier hints and adumbrations. It is taught by the Rabbis, though, perhaps, the teaching is not meant to be taken too literally, that for some sins no repentance is possible. He who causes others to sin is not permitted to repent. And again: He who says, I will sin and repent, is not permitted to repent. (This is in the Mishnah.) The hardening of Pharaoh's heart is explained and justified on the theory that after giving several chances of repentance to a man, God finally "takes away his heart," so that even if he would repent, he cannot, and he is punished for his sins. R. Pinchas

said, He who is wholly given over to his sins has not the capacity to repent. It would seem fairly clear from these sayings that "repentance" to the Rabbis meant *operative* repentance, that is, repentance which is genuine, and which is bound to issue in amendment. True contrition is implied, not a mere wish. Repentance involves the power not to sin when the occasion arises. Who is the true penitent? asks the Talmud. He who has the opportunity to do the same sin once or twice again, in the same environment, and who does it not. It would be, I think, in accordance with their prevailing doctrine to say that the Rabbis held that, generally speaking, a man *had* the power to repent effectually. It is very rarely too late to mend. It is very rarely beyond man's power. How far, however, are this very act of repentance, this very turning of the heart to the light, this very contrition of the soul, and this very amendment of deed, themselves the work of God? How far are they due to divine grace? How far does God help man to repent? The Rabbis do not envisage, or reply to, these questions very clearly. One of the oldest prayers in the liturgy includes a petition for repentance. "Cause us to return with a perfect repentance before Thee." Here there seems little doubt that man asks God to help him to conquer sin. In the endless panegyrics on repentance, however, the usual note struck is that if man will but advance an inch, God will move forward to meet him an ell. Let but man begin his part ever so little, God will do His part ever so much. He holds the door wide open: His hand is stretched out. These sayings and metaphors would appear to mean that God is not only anxious to forgive (which is their

main meaning), but that He stimulates or encourages the penitent upon the first glimmer of repentance. Further than this I do not think we can safely go. There is a very odd passage at the end of the Midrash on Lamentations in connection with the famous verse, "Turn us back unto Thee, O Lord, and we shall be turned: renew our days as of old." Israel says to God: It is Thy business to bring us back. Nay, God replies, It is your business to make the beginning. And Israel rejoins (each party quoting Scriptural verses), Not so, it is *Thy* business! So there the matter ends, and nothing is decided. But He who, in Rabbinic phrase, "gives a hand to transgressors" must in all probability have been generally regarded as the God who helps to repentance as to all other kinds of good.

There are things which we miss in the Rabbinic teachings about God; there are questions which do not seem to receive adequate treatment; there are others which are hardly dealt with at all; yet taken all in all, the teachings are pure and sane, virile and tender. On the whole, too, they are free from superstition, for though the pictorialism and the anthropomorphisms are carried to an extreme, yet, somehow, the speakers seem always half conscious that it is all metaphor or symbol: a human way of talking, and we can talk of God in no other way. Moreover, the Rabbis keep nothing back; one sees them in undress, just as they were, with all their virtues and with all their faults, with all their strength and with all their weakness. If their prejudices and passions are their own, so is their love for God and for His service. The one is as unaffectedly genuine as the other. And if God, in His nearness and reality, was sometimes too over-personalised for our

modern taste, too crudely conceived as a distinct and separate "individual," yet we have also to remember how the defect was part of the quality. The crudeness and excess of personality are the obverse of the nearness and the reality. Again, all the work of God is done by God Himself. And all His influence comes direct from Him. The Rabbis (at a certain price) did successfully achieve the great problem of finding God near without the need of mediation (except the mediation, if it can be called such, of the Law) and without impairing the Unity. God, they say, is unlike a human being who acts through ministers and deputies : He has none of these ; no other accomplishes His work ; He does it alone ; no other shares with Him the burden ; He carries it alone. It was said to the priests, Thus shall ye bless the children of Israel, but it is really not the priests who bless, but God. The Israelites say, Why didst Thou order the priests to bless us ? We want Thy blessings only. And God replies, It is I who stand by the priests and bless you. There is no magic about it, and, we might almost say, no sacrament. So, too, with all the other rites of the Law, as, for instance, with the water of purification. It is not the water which purifies : it is God who purifies and assoils. Happy are ye, O Israelites, exclaims a Rabbi. Remember before whom you seek purification and who gives it to you. It is your father who is in heaven.

The Rabbis believed in one God for all the world: nevertheless, this one God was not, it must be confessed, an impartial God. He was still the God of Israel in a special sense, a God who loved Israel more than He loved every other race and nation. So too: as there is one humanity, so there

is one God, but though humanity is one, Israel occupies in humanity a special and peculiar place. And when the Rabbis speak of the divine love for man, they often mean only His love for the Israelite, and when they speak of the value of each individual soul, they often mean the value of every individual Israelite. Yet not always. When the contrast between Israel and his foes, or between Israel and the other nations in the world, was not brought to, and did not consciously arise in, their minds, they could sometimes say fine things, and mean them, about man as man, and sometimes they could say, and intend, fine things about the whole human race, over and above the people of Israel. Beloved is man, said R. Akiba, because he was created in the image of God. Here man in general is distinguished from Israel in particular, for Israel is dealt with in the next adage. He who saves the life of one human being, it is reckoned as if he had preserved the whole world, for one human life weighs equally with the whole creation. Love men, says Hillel, and bring them nigh to the Law. The Rabbis had a genuine sense of the unity of the human race. When Akiba said that the greatest principle or utterance in the Law was the injunction, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," he was certainly not consciously limiting the meaning of "neighbour" to Israelite, whatever may have been the signification of the word to the original author of the commandment. In fact it is pretty clear that he consciously meant to include all men, for otherwise the reply of Ben Azai would have less point. That Rabbi declared that the words, "These are the generations of Adam," constituted the greatest principle or utterance in the Law, not,

as we may assume, because he did *not* believe that love of neighbour was the summing up of all the Law's injunctions, but because he *did*, and because he found in the passage from Genesis a proof of the unity of the human race, or, as we should say, the brotherhood of man, and found in that very unity the basis for universal love. One must love men and not hate them. Because the men of the generation of the division of tongues loved one another, God would not destroy them; He only dispersed them. But the men of Sodom hated one another; therefore God destroyed them. Occasionally the Rabbinic sense of the unity of mankind comes very oddly to light. Thus one Rabbi says that rain is equal to, or greater than, the resurrection of the dead, for the latter only applies to men, the former also to beasts; the latter only to Israel, the former to all the nations of the world! Here the most awful particularism is associated in strangest fashion with a different and gentler feeling. A heathen asked a Rabbi, We both have festivals, but when you rejoice, we do not, and when we rejoice, you do not. When do we all rejoice together? When it rains, was the answer, quoting the last verse of Psalm lxxv. and the first of lxxvi., for it does not say, Rejoice before God, O Israel, but: "Rejoice before Him all the earth." When rain falls all are equal, and all the nations worship God (Psalm lxxxvi. 9). Rain is greater than the giving of the Law, for the Law was only a joy to the Israelites, but rain is a joy for all the world, and for the animals as well as for men. To these old Rabbis the universe was very small, and the number of animated and spiritual beings was known and limited. Besides God there were angels and demons, and besides these there was

only man. And man occupied a peculiar and special position. The righteous man is conceived to stand almost above the angels. It is stated: If man is worthy, they say to him, Thou didst precede the angels of the service in the order of creation; if he is not, they say to him, The fly, the gnat, and the worm were created before thee. A dispute arises in heaven when God announces to the angels that He is about to create a man in His own image. The angels asked, What is his nature? God answered, Righteous men will issue from him. But He did not reveal to them that sinners would also issue from him, for had He done so, the Middah of justice would not have permitted man's creation. The angels were divided. Some were for, others against, the creation of man. Love said, Let him be created, for he will do loving deeds. Truth said, Let him not be created, for he will be deceitful. Beneficence said, Let him be created, for he will do charitable acts. Peace said, Let him not be created, for he will cause strife. What did God do? He took Truth, and threw her on to the earth (Dan. viii. 12). The angels said, How dost thou despise honoured Truth! Let truth arise from the earth (Psalm lxxxv. 12). (In passages such as these one can never be quite clear whether the thought suggested the story, and the story sought and found its Biblical proofs, or whether the Biblical passages suggested the whole thing, story, idea, and all. In the latter case the thought would be less deep and less fixed.) While the angels were thus disputing, God created man, and He said, Why do you wrangle, man has already been created!

The constitution of man seems to have been something of a puzzle to the Rabbis; they hardly

reach any systematic view of it, nor are their various sayings of any great utility to us to-day. They are convinced, even as we might be, that man stands half-way between the divine and the animal. In their language he is partly made from the upper creatures and partly from the lower. Or, again, he is a combination of body and soul. Why does he sin? One gets no clear reply. Apparently it was in Adam's power to have refrained from sin, but it was yet according to his constitution that he did sin. The "fall" is far less important to the Rabbis than it was for Paul. Doubtless with Adam's "fall," a tendency to sin became a regular part of human nature, but it is not implied that this tendency is a sort of inherited curse.¹ The tales about Adam and his sin and his fall and its effect are just *tales*, which have no dogmatic value, and were hardly thought about very often. Man's constitution was man's constitution; it was taken for granted; so it was, and so it would be, at least till the Messiah or till the resurrection. The origin of it was little worried about, and when it was discussed, the tales that were told had little significance. The evil "Yetzer," or inclination, was a painful and evident fact. How far it came through Adam, and how far it was the effect of his sin, were problems that do not seem to have greatly worried the minds of the Rabbis. One finds casual utterances, which clearly reflect current legends, spoken as if they were of no great importance, and were just casually said without any great stress being laid upon them. Thus two or three

¹ Dr. Abrahams writes: "So far as the Rabbis did at all express themselves in this sense, it was with regard to the Golden Calf, the sin which was supposed to have left a permanent evil trace. See *J.Q.R.* xvi. 585."

times we read : When the serpent had intercourse with Eve, he put into her a pollution (literally a dirt) [which continued in her descendants]. When the Israelites stood before Mount Sinai (and received the Law), this pollution left them. But the nations, who did not stand before Sinai, it did not leave (*i.e.* they have it still). How about the Proselytes, said one Rabbi to another. Though they were not at Sinai, was the reply, their genius (or guiding star) was there. Some of us might, perhaps, say that in the lack of interest which the Rabbis appear to take in the problem of "original sin," or in the relation of human sinfulness to the disobedience of Adam and Eve, they show their common sense and, to some extent, their modernity. They are very emphatic that the soul which the body receives is pure. A very old prayer, which is recited daily by orthodox Jews, begins : "The soul which Thou hast given me is pure." It is also said : As the soul was given thee, so restore it. It was given thee pure : give it back pure. The relation between soul and body is constantly compared to the relation between God and the world. It "fills" the body, as God "fills" the world. It "carries" the body, as God "carries" the world. It survives the body ; God survives the world ; it sees and is invisible ; God sees and is invisible ; it is pure within the body, and God is pure in the world ; it never sleeps within the body, and God neither sleeps nor slumbers. If the soul is thus pure, why does it sin ? Is it contaminated by the body ? Is sin the sheer fault of the body ? The Rabbis do not assert this, although they use the contrast between the divine King, and a king of flesh and blood, as if the failings

of the latter were due to these. But the famous and often-quoted parable of the blind man and the lame seems to show that they felt that sin was somehow due to the combination of body and soul. Body accuses soul, and soul accuses body ; neither could have sinned alone, any more than either the lame man or the blind could alone have stolen the fruit. And God (at the resurrection) judges soul and body together. He fetches the soul and puts it once more within the body, and judges the two together.

The word Yetzer, which literally means *form*, occurs already in the Old Testament. In Isaiah it is used in its primary sense. " Shall the thing framed say of him that framed it, He has no understanding ? " The " thing framed " in the Hebrew is Yetzer. In Habakkuk it refers to an idol (" the maker of his work trusts in it " : the " work " in Hebrew is Yetzer). In Psalm ciii. 14 Yetzer is used to signify the form or frame of man as made of dust. But it is also several times used metaphorically to mean " what is framed in the mind," imagination, device, purpose. So in the famous (and old) passages, Genesis vi. 5, viii. 21. So, too, in Deut. xxxi. 21, and then again in 1 Chron. xxviii. 9, xxix. 19. It is this metaphorical use which was developed by the Rabbis. They spoke of a good *inclination* and *tendency* of the heart (which to them was also the seat of the mind) and, more frequently, of an evil inclination and tendency, and their doctrine of the Yetzer is undoubtedly one of their most original bits of development beyond the Old Testament. It has also some value, as well as a good deal of interest, even for us to-day. The evil Yetzer is more especially connected with sins of

sensuality, and many are the stories which are told of its power and its artifice. Though at first it is as thin as a spider's web, it ends—if yielded to—by becoming as thick as a cart-rope. Let none think of it too lightly. Starve it, and it is satisfied (*i.e.* its solicitations cease to plague); satisfy it, and it is hungry (*i.e.* the more you yield, the greater the desire). To-day the Yetzer says to a man, Go and do this (*i.e.* a small sin), and to-morrow it says, Go and do that (a little bigger sin); till at last it says to him, Go and worship idols. The proud and conceited man is the Yetzer's natural prey. He who yields to the Yetzer in his youth will grieve over its power in his older manhood. If a man is long enough addicted to a sin, that sin will seem at last almost allowable to him. At first the solicitations and temptations of the Yetzer come occasionally, like a traveller or passing guest; but if a man yields to its bidding, the Yetzer becomes a permanent resident in the house and the master of it. The Yetzer is sometimes spoken of as if it were an outside power, and sometimes as if it were Satan. But these personifications are more than half playful. It is not probable that the Rabbis really or habitually believed that there was any outside, living, self-conscious power in the world which was the constant author of human sin. Though they spoke now and then of Satan, he had clearly no great place in their religion or their theology; sin was something not external, but internal: and, indeed, that is the fine part of their teaching that they believe in an external power of helping goodness, but do *not* believe (in anything like the same way) in an external power of seducing sin. Man's freedom to sin is not aided and

strengthened by a devil : his freedom to goodness is aided and strengthened by God. That is good doctrine and sound even for us to-day

How is man to conquer the evil in his heart ; how is he to subdue the evil inclination ? The answer is by prayer and by the Law. God has created the evil Yetzer, but He created and gave the Law as its remedy. It is like a father who smote his son, and then put a plaster on the wound, and said, As long as the plaster is on your wound, you may eat and drink what you please ; you may wash in warm water or in cold, and need have no fear. So God says to the Israelites, If you occupy yourselves with the Law, you will not be delivered into the power of the Yetzer, but if you neglect the Law, you will fall into its hand. When you are tempted by the Yetzer, enter the house of study, and open the Law. For us to-day we must translate the advice : when tempted by sin, oppose to evil desires good. Remind yourself of your highest ideals and noblest interests, and occupy your mind with these ; do something in accordance with them. Bad coin, say the economists, drives out good, but good thoughts, the Rabbis held, drive out bad. It is no unsound psychology. It is quite characteristic of the Rabbis that while, on the one hand, they emphasise human responsibility, free will, and power ("if you will, you can rule over the Yetzer," an often-repeated saying, based on Gen. iv. 7), on the other hand they assert that its power is so great that man can only overcome the Yetzer by the help of God. The evil Yetzer seeks constantly to get the upper hand over man and to kill him, and if God did not help him he could not resist it. Prayers for divine help against

the Yetzer find a prominent and early place in the daily liturgy. "Let not the evil Yetzer rule in me. Subdue my Yetzer to submit itself unto Thee." Let me cling to the good Yetzer. That God created the evil Yetzer is often stated, and that it is very evil is no less strongly asserted. Bad, indeed, is the dough which even its creator calls bad (alluding to Psalm ciii. 14). A Rabbi was wont to pray, It is known before Thee, O God, that it is our will to do Thy will ; but what hinders ? The leaven that is in the dough, and the servitude of the kingdoms. Sometimes God is represented as repenting that He had created the Yetzer. On the other hand, there are passages which indicate that the evil Yetzer is, as it were, connected with instincts and passions that are vital to man's existence. The Yetzer as lust is yet only a perversion of the instinct which makes for and conditions man's continuance upon the earth. Hence one must not destroy the Yetzer, but tame it and sanctify it, and make it the servant of good. This is a profound idea, capable of much modern application. The evil Yetzer is like iron, from which, if it be cast into the fire, all sorts of useful implements can be made. The evil Yetzer can be made useful and friendly by the words of the Law. A man has two cows, one good for ploughing, one not. If he wants the second to plough also, he puts the yoke on both ; join the evil Yetzer to the good, and so turn it whither you will. So David prayed, "Unite [the double Yetzer of] my heart to fear Thy name" (Psalm lxxxvi. 11). And by subtle exegesis, the evil Yetzer is even declared to be "very good," for without it no man would build a house, marry, beget children, or engage in business.

Then, too, we have the saying (with its thoroughly oriental collocation) : Yetzer, child and woman are to be rejected with the left hand and drawn near with the right. And the Mishnah itself lays it down that to love God with all thy heart means to love Him with both the Yetzers, the evil one as well as the good one. In other words, the entire constitution of man is to be used in the service, and in the love, of the Highest. This seems to me a finer doctrine than the cutting off of hand or cutting out of eye. It is interesting, too, to note that, with true insight into human nature, it is recognised that the bigger the man, the bigger may be his temptation. The evil Yetzer cast its eyes upon the first temple and destroyed it, and killed all the Rabbis within it ; it cast its eyes upon the second temple and destroyed it, and killed all the Rabbis within it ; it leaves the nations of the world and incites the Israelites, but it incites the Rabbis most of all. A very queer story is then told of R. Abaje. He once heard a man say to a woman, We will go early upon the way. Then he said to himself, I will go and prevent them from sinning. So he went and followed them on the pasture three parasangs. When they parted from one another, he heard them say, The road is long, company would be pleasant. (Apparently they went together without any evil intention, and parted without sin.) Then Abaje said to himself, If it had been my enemy (*i.e.* if this temptation, the solicitation of the Yetzer, had occurred to me), I should not have been able to subdue him. Then he went and clung to the bolt of the door and grieved, till an old man came and taught him, He who is greater than his neighbour, his Yetzer is also

greater. "The greater the man, the harder his moral struggles."¹

The Rabbis have no theory about grace and sin. "They did not grapple in a fundamental, philosophical way with the difficulty involved in the goodness (and omnipotence) of God and the evil disposition of man as God made him."² On the whole, I would not only not blame them for not solving a problem which no one has solved, but I would even venture to urge that their inconsistent suggestions and fancies as to man's responsibility and God's goodness, as to man's power over temptation and the help rendered by God to man in the conquest of sin, are of more present-day value and use to us than any hard-and-fast dogmatic system. Up to a certain point we are able to control our desires and our acts: yet this very control is partly the grace and gift of God; beyond this point there is again the grace of God. It is not the recognition of the moral law which creates and increases the desire to sin. On the contrary. It is the recognition of the ideal, its attractive power, and its adorableness, which help us to resist sin, and drive out the evil temptation from our minds and hearts. The thought of the Law (*i.e.* the Good) expels the thought of evil. On the other hand, one finds occasionally the conception that the evil desire is due to, or is at least aroused by, the existence of the prohibition. ("The Law is the strength of sin.") The Yetzer ha-Ra only desires what is forbidden. Thus R. Mena went once on the Day of Atonement to visit R. Haggai, who was

¹ Porter, "The Yetzer Hara," in *Yale Biblical and Semitic Studies* (1901), pp. 117-123.

² Porter, *op. cit.* p. 117.

ill. R. Haggai said to him, I thirst. You may drink, said R. Mena. He left him and returned again after a while. How about your thirst, said he. Directly you allowed me to drink, the desire left me, was the reply.

On the whole, the Rabbinic conception of God's relation to man, when the idolater and the enemies of Israel and the heretics are not concerned, is thoroughly ethical, and, upon the whole, it keeps to, and to some extent co-ordinates, the highest ideas of the Old Testament. It needed some courage in the Rabbis, one would think, to explain away, as some were bold enough to do, the "visiting" theory of the Second Commandment, and make it consistent with the doctrine of Ezekiel in his famous 18th chapter. Yet the words of the Second Commandment were interpreted to mean that God only "visits" the sins of the fathers upon the children when the children imitate their father's sins—an interpretation which obviously flies in the face of the plain meaning of the passage. Ethical too, upon the whole, is the Rabbinic view of the relation of man to God. And not merely ethical, but spiritual. Here, too, it may be said that the Rabbis made some advance upon the Old Testament. They reflected upon what they found, and sometimes even ventured to say that one relation was higher than the other. I have already indicated that the "subject" relation—man the servant, God the king—was not regarded as inconsistent with, or even necessarily as lower than, the "child" relation—man the son, God the father. But the feeling of love was very definitely regarded as higher than the feeling of fear, and the service of love as higher than the service of fear. Yet fear or reverence was not ruled out altogether.

Through fear one was to reach love; there was a right fear which did not prevent love, and could continue with it. Love and fear God. Tremble and rejoice in the fulfilment of the commandments, said R. Jehudah b. Tema. Execute, so it was said, the divine injunctions in love and in fear. If ever thou shouldest be inclined to hate any law, know that thou art a lover, and no lover hates; if thou shouldest be inclined to despise any law, know that thou fearest, and no fearer can despise. Abraham, who served God from love, was esteemed higher than Job who served Him from fear, though it was also pointed out that Abraham not only loved God, but also feared Him, and that Job not only feared God, but also loved Him. It is definitely stated that the highest of the seven classes of Pharisees was formed by those who served God from love. That the service of God, whether in fear or in love, was for the Rabbis a service of joy is indubitable.

Naïvely keen as was the Rabbinic desire for reward, it was yet realised that man has no real claim upon God. In the final resort all that man receives from God is an act of grace. The creature has nothing over against his Creator, for Moses, the greatest of the prophets, could only come to God with supplications. God said to Moses, Upon him who puts something in My hand I will have mercy with the attribute of mercy; to him who puts nothing in My hand I will be gracious with a free gift. Not even Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob could go unpunished, if God dealt with them as in a court of law. All need the loving-kindness of God, even Abraham. And repentance, as has been already observed, may entirely upset the literal application of measure for measure. The sinner of a lifetime

may be pardoned because of the intense repentance of an hour, more especially if this repentance is followed by death. Hence the saying sometimes uttered in a half-playful, and sometimes in a half-perplexed and complaining tone: There are those who (hardly) acquire the world to come in years upon years; there are some who acquire it in an hour.

A main expression of man's relation to God is prayer, and while there is much in the Rabbinic utterances about prayer which no longer appeals to us, much remains which has a permanent value. In spite of a mass of ordinances and casuistical discussions about the hours of daily prayer, about the public services in the synagogues, and so on, it is remarkable how well the Rabbis realised, and how often they emphasised, the need for prayer being spontaneous and sincere. It must be not a burden, but a true "service of the heart." It must include both praise and supplication. It must not be selfish, it must be public in the best sense of the word—prayer, that is, for the community—as well as private. It can be either short or long, according to circumstance or need; in synagogue or at home, on a journey or in bed, there are few occasions when prayer is out of place. What is the service which is done with the heart? That is prayer. It is this service which God demands and cares for. If your heart is given to your prayer, you may be sure that God hears it. But let a man purify his heart before he prays. God says to Israel, Pray in your synagogues, or if you cannot, then in your field, and if you cannot there, then in your house, and if you cannot there, then in your bed, and if you cannot there, then meditate in your heart. Yet it is recognised that some excuses are invalid. A man

will work at his business all day long without being weary, but if his friend says to him, Come and pray, he replies, I am too tired. Famous is the sentence in the Mishnah: R. Eliezer said, If a man makes his prayer a fixed task, his prayer is not a supplication (*i.e.* not a true prayer). Four explanations are given in the Gemarah of the word translated "a fixed task." Two of them are rather feeble and valueless, but two are good and suggestive. A prayer which is a burden to the supplicant. A prayer to which the supplicant is not able to add something new. A man must not say his prayers as if he were reading a legal document. The Rabbis invented a word, which played a considerable part in the later literature, for the proper attitude of mind during prayer. It is *Kawanah*—the right direction of the heart or the mind. He who prays must direct his heart to heaven. In spite of the fact that, with the inveterate tendency of the Rabbis to play the legal casuist about everything, *Kawanah* itself becomes drawn into the sphere of casuistry as regards the particular portions of the statutory prayers to which it legally applies, it may, nevertheless, be maintained that the doctrine of *Kawanah* was, upon the whole, kept sweet and clean, while that we can use it now for our own profit, removing it wholly from the field of casuistry, is obvious. The Mishnah tells us that the pious men of old used to wait an hour, and only then say the statutory prayer in order to direct their heart to their Father in heaven. In the Jerusalem Talmud it is said that they "collected themselves" for an hour, then prayed for an hour, and then were again "collected." But how, then, it is asked, did they find time for study and for their avocations? The blessing of

God was upon them is the reply !¹ While R. Chaninah b. Dosa was praying, a serpent bit him, but he did not interrupt his prayer. When his disciples asked him whether he had not felt the bite, he replied, My heart was so concentrated on my prayer that I felt nothing. One must not, it is said, stand up and say the "Tefillah" from the midst of sorrow, idleness, jocularity, levity, or idle chatter, but only from the midst of "the joy of the commandments." The emphasis on joy is remarkable. In their stress on Kawanah the Rabbis go so far as to say about all "performance": It matters not whether one does much or little, if only the heart is directed to heaven. Prayer is sometimes exalted over charity, and it is sometimes declared to be greater than sacrifices. It is not true that the Rabbis measured the excellence of prayers by their length. Some of the prayers quoted as being often on the lips of particular Rabbis are models of conciseness. Some of them, moreover, are of much beauty. "Do Thy will, O God, in heaven above. Grant tranquillity of spirit to those who fear Thee below, and do that which is good in Thy sight. Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who hearkenest to prayer." (This might be said in a place of danger.) "May it be Thy will, O Lord our God, to place us in a corner of light and not in a corner of darkness; and may our heart grow not faint nor our eyes dim." Again: "May it be Thy will, O Lord our God, to grant us long life, a life of peace, a life of good, a life of blessing, a life of sustenance, a life of bodily vigour, a life marked by the fear of sin, a life free from shame and reproach, a life of prosperity and honour, a life in which the love

¹ The word translated "hour," as used in the original tradition, may have only meant a short space of time. See Büchler, *Some Types*, p. 107, n. 2.

of Torah and the fear of heaven shall cleave to us, a life wherein Thou fulfillest all the desires of our heart for good" (very characteristic). Or this : "May it be Thy will, O Lord our God and the God of our fathers, that our hearts cherish no hatred or envy against any, and that none may feel hatred or envy against us, and may Thy Law be our labour all the days of our lives, and may our words be as supplications before Thee." To this another Rabbi added: "And unite our hearts to fear Thy name, and keep us far from all which Thou hatest, and draw us nigh to all which Thou lovest, and deal with us charitably for Thy name's sake." Another prayed: "May it please Thee, O Lord our God, to put it in our heart to accomplish a perfect repentance before Thee that we stand not ashamed before our ancestors in the world to come." And another thus: "May it be Thy will, O Lord our God, to break the yoke of the evil Yetzer within our hearts. For Thou hast formed us to do Thy will, and we are bound to do Thy will. Thou desirest it, and we desire it. What prevents us? The dough in the leaven. Thou knowest that we have not the strength to resist it. May it therefore be Thy will to make it to cease from us and to quell it. Then shall we do Thy will as our will with a perfect heart." Such prayers as these were usually spoken at the end of the statutory prayer which, in the Rabbinic period, was of no very great length. It is true that one Rabbi said, Who prolongs his prayer, his prayer will not return empty. But it was agreed that in such cases the prayer must be spontaneous, for whoever lengthens his prayer with calculation will be disappointed. Rab said, A man's words should always be few before God. Elsewhere it is said, The prayer of

the righteous is short. In circumstances of danger a very short prayer could be substituted for the statutory "eighteen or nineteen benedictions." One form of it ran thus: "The needs of Thy people, Israel, are many; their knowledge is small. May it please Thee, O Lord our God, to give what is needful to all, and to give to each what he is in want of. Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who hearest the voice of my supplication and hearkenest to prayer." Though it was agreed that the praise of God should precede all prayer for personal needs, the Rabbis did not scruple to laugh at those who attempted to praise God immoderately. A certain man prayed aloud in synagogue in the presence of R. Hanina, and used some ten adjectives in God's praise. The Rabbi waited until he had done, and then said, Have you exhausted all the praises of God? If a man, it is said, praise God immoderately, he will be driven from the world. God needs no flattery. He may be compared to a pearl; the more you praise it, the more you cheapen it. More generally it is said, A man's words should be few before the Holy One. Yet there is a time for long prayers, as there is a time for short. It happened that a disciple who came before the ark in the presence of R. Eliezer unduly prolonged the prayers. His disciples said to Eliezer, Master, what a prolonger the man is. He replied, Did he prolong more than Moses? (referring to the forty days and nights of prayer). Another disciple unduly shortened the prayers. When the disciples said, How he shortens, Eliezer retorted, Did he shorten more than Moses, who prayed for Miriam, "Heal her now, O God, I beseech Thee."

With their intense belief in the actuality of the

divine rule and presence, it is no wonder that the Rabbis had a high sense of the dignity of prayer. Serve God with all your heart. This service of the heart is prayer. He who prays must think as if the Shechinah stood over against him. And if man must remember before whom, and in whose presence he prays, God, as the Rabbis believed, meets man more than half-way. For the prayer of the righteous (as of the repentant) is a delight to Him. He yearns to receive it. Prayer from righteous lips turns the attribute of justice into the attribute of mercy. When the Israelites study the Law and praise God in their synagogues, they sit, and the Shechinah stands. God leaps from synagogue to synagogue to receive their praise. The angel who is set over prayer takes the prayers which have been prayed in the various synagogues, and makes wreaths of them, and places them upon the head of God. Prayer replaces the sacrifices; it is the substitution for the sin-offering, but the substitute is greater than the original. Prayer unites the individual with the community. Hence a man should always offer the public prayer, as well as praise, to God before he prays for his own needs.

So far as the distinction between material and spiritual needs is concerned, we must not expect such refinements from the Rabbis. They were no more troubled by considerations about laws of nature than Jesus or the Prophets. Whatever the child needed, he might fitly ask from his father. Whether the request was high or low, material or spiritual, it was not criticised from the metaphysical point of view. Yet ethically, a prayer for wealth was as much lower than a prayer for wisdom to the Rabbis as to the authors of Proverbs. There was

no circumstance, there was no situation in life, whether exceptional or recurrent, which did not seem to the Rabbis to be suitable for prayer, and some of the prayers which are given as specimens, or as rules, in the Talmudic tractate *Berachoth*, seem very strange to our modern taste. To pray in bed before going to sleep seems legitimate and proper enough, and the suggested prayer is both suitable and beautiful. "Blessed art Thou, O Lord my God, king of the universe, who makest the bands of sleep to fall upon my eyes, and slumber upon mine eyelids, and givest light to the apple of the eye. May it be Thy will, O Lord my God, to suffer me to lie down in peace, and place my portion in Thy Law ; and do Thou accustom me to the performance of the commandments and not to transgression ; and bring me not into the power of sin, iniquity, temptation or contempt ; and let the good inclination have dominion of me, and not the evil inclination ; and do Thou deliver me from evil occurrences and sore diseases ; and let not evil dreams and lustful thoughts trouble me ; and let my bed be perfect before Thee, and give light to mine eyes lest I sleep the sleep of death. Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who givest light to the whole world in Thy glory." But a prayer to be said before entering and leaving the place where daily natural functions are discharged seems much more strange. The entering prayer is all the odder, because (very exceptionally) it is addressed not to God, but to angels. "Be honoured, ye honoured and holy beings, who minister to the Most High. Give glory to the God of Israel ; leave me while I enter, and do my will, then shall I come unto you." Or again : "Guard me, help me, support me, wait for me until I enter and come out, for such is the

way of human beings." The prayer on leaving is finer: "Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who hast formed man in wisdom, and created in him many orifices and vessels. It is revealed and known before the throne of Thy glory, that if one of these be opened, or one of those be closed, it would be impossible to exist and to stand before Thee. Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who healest all flesh and doest wondrously."¹ There is an appropriate blessing for every act, from leaving one's bed in the morning to getting back to it again at night. Not least important is it to pray before food. Whoever eats and drinks, and afterwards offers his prayers, has put *himself* before God. He first exalts himself, and only then receives upon himself the kingdom of heaven. And if, in *all* circumstances, God is to be thought of and prayed to, the "all" is to include events of sadness and calamity as well as events of joy, for whatever measures God metes out to you, do you return Him thanks (there is a play upon words in the Hebrew). If for good tidings one is to say, Blessed art Thou, O Lord, king of the universe, who art good and dispensest good, for evil tidings one is no less to bless God in the brief words, Blessed be the true judge. In the same way the old Rabbinic term for submission under sorrow is to accept the rightness of the judgement.

¹ Dr. Abrahams writes: "It is worth mentioning that this 'finer' prayer, unlike the former one, has maintained its place as a regular rite. This is an illustration of the wider use of the general as opposed to the individual Rabbinic utterances. For one orthodox Jew who has ever heard of the 'entering' prayer, a thousand know and habitually use the prayer on departing." It is recorded that Hillel regarded going to the lavatory as a religious duty (a Mitzvah), as it was done to prevent the body from being spoiled. It was the body, according to Dr. Büchler, and not the soul which he referred to when he said that he was created in the image of God, and that it was therefore a religious duty to keep it clean, so that to take a bath was also a Mitzvah (Büchler, *Some Types of Jewish-Palestinian Piety from 70 B.C. to A.D. 70*, p. 19).

It is, however, very difficult in the Rabbinic religion to separate general reflections and ideas about the relation of man to God from the special conceptions about Israel and the Law. In one point about which we hear a good deal in Christian books this difficulty makes itself particularly felt. Did the Rabbis recognise, as we are so often told in Christian books that Jesus recognised, the immense and "absolute" worth of every individual soul? Certain it is that within the community of Israel the old collective idea had been entirely overcome. Israel was still, the Rabbis held, a religious unit in the eyes of God. But the individual Israelite was a unit none the less. One righteous man or one Israelite is worth the whole creation, say the Rabbis, in their picturesque language. By such a statement do they mean something much less than the "absolute" worth of every human soul? They seem to pass without much trouble from the Israelite to the man. A passage in the Abot of R. Nathan is significant. Everybody who fulfils one command or keeps one Sabbath, and every one who has kept alive one soul in Israel, the Scripture reckons it to him as if he had kept alive the whole world, and he who commits one sin, or profanes one Sabbath, or destroys one soul in Israel, the Scripture regards it of him as if he had destroyed the whole world. Then follows the usual Biblical proof taken from the story of Cain and Abel. And then it is said, Hence thou mayest learn that one man (quite generally, not one Israelite) is worth as much as (literally, weighs as much as) the entire universe. R. Nehemiah said, How do I know that one man is worth the whole universe? A further Biblical "proof" is then alleged. An odd passage in the

Mishnah declares that every one is to consider, and to say, For my sake was the whole world created. In other passages the emphasis is laid on the righteous. R. Eleazar said, For the sake of one righteous man the whole world was created. One righteous man, said another Rabbi, "weighs" as much as the whole world. It can hardly be said, in the face of these citations, that the Rabbis did not know the value of the individual human soul, or that they reckoned its worth too low. Yet it was not unnatural that primarily "man" meant to them what the term means to us, their own selves, their own fellows, their own society, environment, people. And they were Israelites, whose relation to God was dominated by that fact, and by the Law which controlled and coloured the whole of their lives. They did not distinguish what they felt as men from what they felt as Israelites or Jews. The relationship was a single and a complete whole; they did not think about God, first as men, and then as Israelites, but simply as Israelites, who were men. How far we can use the emotions and thoughts which were appropriate and natural to them is another matter. Israel, to the modern as to the older Jew, is still in a peculiar sense a witness to God, and thus we may fitly use some of the ancient terms. Yet in other cases we may recognise these thoughts as beautiful and gracious, we may appreciate the intimacy of the relation which they indicate between the Rabbis and God, but we may not be able to adopt them for ourselves, just because the particularistic beliefs upon which they rest are for us impossible. It is always a question of translation: how far can "man" be substituted for "Israel"? This substitution may be sometimes practicable and sometimes not, and

the matter is further complicated by the Law. For here, too, we have conceptions which we can no longer share, and though sometimes the Law may be idealised into the moral law or into duty, such an idealisation is often unworkable. Sometimes, therefore, one has regretfully to acknowledge that the very strength and beauty of the Rabbinic religion, resting as they do upon ideas which can be neither accepted nor reinterpreted, have to be just admired, but cannot be imitated. We have to seek a new strength and beauty of our own. It is not easy for our particular purpose to know how to proceed in this subject. Passages that are beautiful in themselves may yet be hardly available. For though they show, in some respects, an advance, they yet show, in other respects, a retrogression. They reveal a passion and an intimacy in their conception of God which seem to betoken an advance, but they depend on an intense particularism which can only be regarded as a retrogression. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the passion and the intimacy are impure, except when they lead on to, or become connected with, a comparison between Israel's relation to God and God's relation to the nations of the world. When, as constantly seems to happen, the vision is restricted to Israel and God, the close and intense love of God for Israel and of Israel for God seems to bring no moral injury either to God or Israel. It appears to make God more near, but not less pure, and to make Israel more passionate in love, but not in vindictiveness. There might, I suppose, be a parallel in the relation of Roman Catholics to Christ and to God. When that relation is not contrasted with the attitude of God to Protestants and heretics, or with the relation of

Protestants and heretics to God, its intensity and closeness are not impaired by its particularism. The purity of the relation is only then degraded, when any idea is consciously present to the mind that as the Roman Catholic loves Christ and God, so does no other Christian love them, or as they love the Roman Catholic, so do they love no other group which calls itself by the Christian name. For the most part, however, this comparison or contrast would not be consciously present to the mind.

God calls Israel—so great is His love—sister, daughter, wife. Israel is His twin, as though God said, Israel is not greater than I, and I am not greater than Israel. As twins are God and Israel; when one feels pain, the other feels it too. The love between Israel and God is the love which waters cannot quench or floods overwhelm. It seems clear that in this love the individual Israelite of the finer type felt a share. He, too, loved God intensely by the very fact of his being a part of Israel, and through that fact he conceived that God loved him. Hence his fidelity and strength in days of trial and persecution. The assurance of God's love enabled him to endure for many generations unexampled atrocities and woes. And it enabled him, from the very midst of these persecutions and sorrows, to remain firm in his faith and in his love. Whatever God sends, the love remains. Israel exclaims: Though my lover sends me pain, yet shall he lie between my breasts (an adaptation of Canticles i. 13). The sufferings which Israel endures are due to his love and fidelity for God, and increase God's love for Israel. Thus the relationship is partly dependent upon ethical conditions, and partly independent of them. God is said to love Israel even when Israel

sins, and the Israelites are said to be His children, even when they are disobedient. But we also hear opposite strains, as when we are told that the Israelites are God's children when they do His will, His slaves when they reject it. In spite of the way in which the Rabbis let themselves go when they speak of the love of God for Israel, they yet realise that this love has a religious basis and even a religious purpose. There is a notable passage in the Midrash, which, though I have not found many parallels to it, yet seems to me to represent the real Rabbinic point of view. The value of Israel lies in Israel being the recipients and observers of the Law. If (God says) you had not accepted My Law, I should not know you, or look upon you more than upon the other nations of the Law. It is the Law which beautifies Israel, and which distinguishes him in the eyes of God. Nevertheless, though the value of Israel in God's eyes is his possession and observance of the Law, the idea of a mission for the benefit of the world is painfully infrequent. The doctrine of Isaiah liii. is neglected. The nations of the world are Israel's enemies, and therefore the enemies of God. What Israel longs for is their punishment and extermination; very rarely indeed their forgiveness or conversion. But it is right to notice that in the synagogue liturgy the underlying thought of these rare passages has predominance, not only in the daily prayers, but also in those for the Day of Atonement. The essential elements of these more universalist prayers are not later than the third century. Outside the Prayer Book, it is true that the importance and influence of Israel are stated in exaggerated and often ludicrous terms. But for

Israel there would have been no sun and moon ; but for Israel the world would return to chaos. But for Israel there would be no rain. In fact, all creation exists for Israel's sake. As God sanctifies Israel, so does Israel sanctify God. We have, indeed, already seen that though it has to be assumed that, in the infinite time before creation, God was able to exist without Israel, yet now it would appear that neither He nor His world could get on without His chosen people. Yet though the existence of Israel is cosmically so important, it is very seldom that the idea of a religious mission is alluded to. Israel has, indeed, a religious duty to perform. It is his duty to observe and study the Law. But it is not said that the very cause of his existence is to make known God's unity or His righteousness or His laws to the world at large. I have very rarely come across a sentence like this : If ye do not proclaim My Godhead to the nations of the world, I will punish you.¹ And though there are some fine and excellent things said about proselytes, which will be mentioned in due course, the *making* of proselytes is very rarely stated to be the business or purpose of Israel—its *raison d'être*. God, said R. Eleazer, has scattered Israel among the nations only in order that proselytes might attach themselves to Him. But I do not find many parallels to this saying. Nor do we get the idea, which has become such a favourite one in certain quarters to-day, that the mere existence of Israel is gradually to draw the nations to a knowledge of the One God. Israel is, as it were, to sit tight and do nothing, and truth, by its own native force, is at long last to

¹ Yet the quality of the martyr is said to be that he confesses God before the world, going through fire and water for the proclamation of the divine unity.

prevail. It is, indeed, sometimes stated that the nations in the Messianic Age will all recognise the God of Israel, but it must be admitted that such occasional statements are not placed in any organic relation with the purpose of Israel's election, existence, and continuance in the world. It would be more true to say that Israel was primarily chosen for God's sake and the Law's sake and its own sake, and only secondarily for the sake of the other human beings upon the earth. The relation between Israel and God is primarily, it might even be said, a relation for themselves, just as the relation between a lover and his beloved, between husband and wife, is a relation between themselves and for themselves. The relation is a puzzle to the nations. What has your lover, they ask, above all other lovers that you are ever ready to be killed and slain for him, and that you love him even unto death? The readiness for martyrdom, the unquenchable love of God, which no adversity and no suffering can drown or destroy, are quite as prominent, and quite as genuine, factors in the Rabbinic religion as the desire for reward. In the Rabbinic literature you have them both in undress. The one is just as simple and real as the other. What does "I am sick of love" mean? What is the sickness? It is not a bodily sickness, but the love of God, which is a sickness even unto death. Much appreciated and quoted were the words of the Psalter: "For Thy sake are we killed all the day long." How far does the son love the Father? So far that he gives his life for the Father's honour, even as the righteous did, the sons of the living God, who gave their lives for His unity; even as Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego were willing to do, for they said, Even

though God should not rescue us, thy god we will not serve. So they were ready to give their lives, not on the condition of being saved, but on the risk of being burnt, for love is stronger than death. The heroes and martyrs of the Hadrianic persecution, as twin sisters with God, gave their lives for the sanctification of the name. As the dove does not shrink when she is killed, so the Israelites did not shrink when they were slaughtered for the sanctification of the name. Israel is called a stiff-necked nation. Three are insolent. Among animals it is the dog ; among birds it is the cock ; among the nations it is Israel. Yet this is not said in blame, but in praise ! Either Judaism or crucifixion ! It is utterly impossible to question the passion or the purity of the Rabbinic love for God. It was not dependent on the prospect of reward in heaven, even though such reward was both expected and desired. It shines before us as a resplendent example. "Thou shalt love God with all thy heart." With both thy inclinations, says the Midrash, both with the good Yetzer and the evil one : a brief and profound remark. Thy heart must not be divided towards God. The whole man is to love him ; feelings, instincts, desires, all are to be used for, and directed towards, his love. "And with all thy soul" : even if he takes away thy soul (*i.e.* thy life) ; even if he demands that thou give up thy soul (in martyrdom). "With all thy might" is added because some men love their possessions more than their life, and some men love their life more than their possessions. With every measure that God metes out to you, must you love Him, be it the measure of good or the measure of affliction.

Can this Rabbinic love be imitated ? Can we

get this love from a basis of universalism? The Rabbis got it from a perfectly frank and unblushing particularism. Do what the nations would, God would never love them as He loves Israel. But deep as is God's love for Israel, no less deep was the Rabbis' love for God. Can we imitate them, even while we believe that God's love is universal and impartial? Even as our God is a grander and purer God than their God, so should our love, one might have argued, be grander and purer than theirs. But the human heart is strange. The very defect of the Rabbinic conception of God partly produced the quality of their love. Can we imitate, and even better, the quality, though we have not the defect?

As we have seen, it was the Law which, in the eyes of the Rabbis, gave Israel his worth in the eyes of God. Their love of God is inseparable from their love of His perfect Law. How far is there anything in their conception of the Law, and in their attitude towards the Law, which, with our profoundly different ideas, is yet of value for us to-day? Here we have to distinguish. There may be much in the Rabbinic doctrine about the Law which is an advance upon the Old Testament, and yet, though it be an advance, we are unable to make use of it. For instance, the Rabbinic view that such ritual commands of the Law as the ordinance of the red cow, or of the waters of purification, are just arbitrary commands of God which must be obeyed, because He, for some unknown reason, in His perfect wisdom and goodness, ordained them, completely removes from such injunctions any kind of superstition. Not the water purifies, but God. That is an advance upon

the Old Testament. But for us it is of no use, because we no longer accept the premiss. We no longer regard these laws as derived directly from the will and the mouth of God. The Rabbinic love of the Law, the joy in its observance ; the delight in its study ; all this must be freely acknowledged. That the Law was to the Rabbis, and to thousands and millions whom they influenced, not a burden, but a delight, that it led *to* God and righteousness, and not away from them, is assured. But all this advance, for advance it was, is no longer available for us. Nevertheless, there are still *some* things which we can translate into our own language and make use of.

In spite of the ever-increasing tendency to magnify the greatness of the Law, so that it was regarded as pre-existent in heaven, a delight to God Himself, who spends part of His time in its study, and thus itself almost divine—in spite of all this glorification and beatification (part of which may be an answer to Christian and pagan criticisms and attacks)—there was yet a very definite feeling that the main purpose of the Law was Israel's sanctification. It is true that it is wrong and idle to ask for the reasons of every enactment. There were few laws which produced more ridicule and criticism than that of the red cow (Numbers xix.). Nor was this unnatural. We, with our modern knowledge, can easily see that this law embodies ritualistic superstitions of a very primitive type, no less primitive, perhaps, than the superstition of the bitter waters and the ordeal (Numbers v.). The Rabbis were bound to insist that such laws were arbitrary ordinances or ukases of the King of kings, whose desires must not be questioned, but

obeyed. "The dead body does not really defile," they say, "and the water does not really purify." But it is just a decree of God, who said, I have given an ordinance, I have pronounced a statute : none shall transgress it. The reason of it no human being can understand. Nevertheless, it is often stated that the laws were given and ordained for the benefit of those who had to fulfil them. Thus God gave a law about lamps in the sanctuary. Does God need lamps ? Assuredly not : He is Himself all light. He gave the law to purify you. The Israelites are to shine before God, as He has been a light before them. Or, it is said, God multiplied the laws that by their observance Israel might obtain reward and inherit the life of the world to come. Israel is beautified by the observances. One Rabbi said that the laws were only given for man's purification. What does it matter to God if an animal is killed in one way or in another ? God needs no offerings or sacrifices. I did not order you, God is made to say, to bring Me sacrifices, for you to argue : I will do what pleases Him, and He will do what pleases me. It is for your sake, not for Mine, that I bade you bring Me sacrifices. The principle of Liberal Judaism to-day is fundamentally the same. One great test for laws the observance of which we keep or recommend is : how far can they be of spiritual or ethical service for human beings to-day.

It was doubtless as a rejoinder to the teachings of Paul (which the Rabbis would have found it exceedingly difficult to understand, and which reached their ears in a very distorted and confused form) that they emphasised the necessity of obeying the Law as a Must. The injunctions might be,

and were, a delight, they might be the outflow of divine love, given in order that Israel might be sanctified and abundantly rewarded, but *primarily* they were ordained by God the lawgiver, by God the ruler, whose will must be obeyed. Thou *shalt* hearken : you may delight in obeying, but primarily it is not a matter of your pleasure or choice, it is a matter of duty. You must. (From another point of view, indeed, it is said that while a man is not free to dispense himself from any laws, they must yet not be a mere duty, a mere "must," for they have to be fulfilled from love.) Greater is he,—so it is declared—who does something, because he is ordered to do it, than he who does it though he is not ordered to do it. There is a very interesting passage in the Mishnah of Berachoth. Whoever says : To a bird's nest do thy mercies extend . . . him do we silence. The Gemarah asks the reason. One Rabbi says the reason is Because he causes jealousy between God's creatures ; another suggests (on the same lines) that he appears to *limit* God's mercy which extends beyond the birds even to insects. But a third argues : the reason is because he makes the ordinances of the Holy One to be mere acts of mercy, whereas they are injunctions. Here, again, we find an anti-gnostic emphasis upon the Laws as ordinances : as a Must from God which man can and ought to obey. There was no doubt in the minds of the Rabbis about the "can"—at least, up to a point. Let, then, man obey up to this point. The good, if just, God would remember the limitations of man's frailty. While differing widely from the Rabbis about the Law and its value, we, too, I think, can still appreciate the

argument. The moral law is not *only* within man, and it must not be *only* appreciated and obeyed as the law of man ; it *is* the law of man, and it *is* his creation, but it is *also* older than man and outside man ; it is *also* the law of God. Before we obey the Law in love, we must obey it in compulsion : it is an Ought, a Must, which, through obedience, we have to make increasingly our own. It may, perhaps, have been anti-Pauline tendencies which led the Rabbis to hold that while it was desirable to fulfil the Law in love and in joy, it was also desirable to fulfil it with the full consciousness that it was the will and the desire of God. A man might, without knowing anything about a divine law, be charitable. That was good. And indeed charity may be the method whereby a heathen can avoid Gehenna. Nevertheless, a far finer thing is the charity of the Israelite who is charitable because he consciously obeys the divine command. This insistence upon immediate and conscious obedience to the Law is pushed in one passage so far as to declare that it is not (as one might suppose) the right thing to obey the Law because one does not like to do the actions which the Law forbids, but that, on the contrary, the right thing is to desire to do the actions, and yet to refrain from doing them. One must not say, I have no wish to put on a garment of linen and woollen, I have no wish to eat pig, I have no wish to be unchaste, but one must say, I wish to do these things, but what am I to do ? My heavenly father has forbidden me to do them, for God has distinguished you from the nations, consequently you are to be separated from transgression, and to receive upon yourselves the Kingdom (or rather, the dominion) of heaven.

These paradoxical words must not, I think, be taken too strictly, especially as regards the wish to be unchaste. Yet there is in the paradox a certain truth and grandeur. The moral law must be realised as God's law, and obeyed as such. However great our joy in fulfilling it, however *free* our fulfilment, however *autonomous* our service, we are yet always to remember that what we are fulfilling is not merely our law, but God's law, and that it was God's law before it was our law, and is only our law because His law. Within this limit and with this proviso, the Rabbis would, I think, entirely agree that voluntary compulsion must become willing compulsion, and willing compulsion must become joyous freedom.

There was a double tendency operative among the Rabbis. They had by no means lost the power of distinguishing between moral and ritual laws, and of perceiving that the second were less important than the first. On the other hand, they disliked the making of distinctions ; all the laws were God's laws, and it was improper to regard one as more important than the other. Moreover, there was a very special reason why the ritual laws became for them of enormous value. They were the laws which their enemies attacked and laughed at : therefore they were clung to with all the greater tenacity ; they were the laws which were for Israel's observance alone ; therefore they were all the more precious and adorable. They were precious *because* distinctive ; they were adorable because they were specially given by God to Israel for Israel's honour and delight ! Thus we find a distinction made between laws which if they had not been written would have had to be written (*e.g.*

prohibition of idolatry, incest, murder, robbery, blasphemy) and laws to which Satan and the nations make objections (*e.g.* prohibition of pig flesh, wearing garments of linen and wool, the law of Chalitzah (Deut. xxv. 5-10), the purification of leprosy, and the scapegoat). The list is interesting, showing, as it does, the sort of laws which excited the notice and the ridicule of the critics, whether Christian or pagan. The warning is added : And lest thou, perchance, shouldest think, These things are empty, it is said, I am the Lord, that is, I the Lord have made a decree ; thou art not free to think about its reason.

Nevertheless, distinctions and summings up were made all the same ! We have already heard how Ben Azai spoke of Gen. v. 1, and Akiba of Lev. xix. 18, as the great Kelal, the great principle, or summing-up rule in the Law, and by "great" each, I think, meant greatest. And the saying of R. Simlai became famous and was often quoted. David reduced the 613 commands to 11, Isaiah to 6, Micah to 3, Isaiah again to 2, Amos and Habakkuk to one. David's eleven, Isaiah's six, etc., are all moral laws, and R. Simlai's reductions remain good and valid unto the present day.

The Rabbinic study of the Law seems to us to-day both strange and undesirable. Much of it was casuistic ; much of it narrowing ; much of it trifling ; much of it an appalling waste of time and brain. Some of the Rabbinic laudations of various ritualistic prescriptions of the Law are to us positively distasteful, and when these laudations are even ascribed to God, they make an unpleasant impression. Such, for instance, are the many passages about circumcision. It is said, Some

sections of the Law may seem ugly for public recitation, such as those about menstruation, or nightly pollution or issues, but God says, They are pleasant to Me.¹ Stress is laid upon the great importance of the sections about the sacrifices. It seems that the unfortunate children were made to begin their reading of the Pentateuch with the book of Leviticus! Why, it is asked, is this? Why do they not begin with Genesis? God has said, As the sacrifices are pure, so are the children pure. Let the pure occupy themselves with the pure! But, nevertheless, the study of the Law had its good side. It kept the intellect alive; it was a form of idealism; it associated knowledge with religion. To bless God as the gracious giver of knowledge is a fine char-

¹ Dr. Abrahams writes: "All this is very questionable. These laws had a great power in keeping the Jews physically sound. Even if the motive is not clearly formulated, yet the consequence is certain. Why do they make 'an unpleasant impression'? If religion covers all life, it must cover the body as well as the soul. Is there no modern value in all this? Is it not still true that the body is the counterpart of the soul? As Hillel said, keeping the body clean is a religious duty, or if not in modern times a religious, yet certainly a moral, duty." I see the force of Dr. Abrahams' remarks, but I am not entirely convinced. The immense amount of space, and therefore of time, given in the Talmud to all physico-sexual questions and discussions seems to me to be at any rate partly due either to the continuance of old primordial superstitious ideas—to the religious or taboo conception of "cleanness" as opposed to the modern hygienic conception of it—or to the emergence of ingrained sex instinct. The Rabbis were very "moral," and had, moreover, no pleasant relations with women of a pure, friendly character as we have them in modern society. Their sex instinct, perhaps, took it out in these interminable discussions, and found great delight and attraction in them. I do not think that this view of mine is inconsistent with the intense desire of the Rabbis to avoid all sensual feelings and thoughts, as well as with their undoubted success in achievement. "Keep thee far from sensual thoughts by day," they urge, "that there may come upon thee no pollution at night." And there are stories about the Rabbis and their relations with their own wives, and stories even about their attitude towards their own bodies, which almost remind one of some mediaeval Christian ascetics (see Büchler, *Some Types of Jewish-Palestinian Piety*, pp. 42-53). Nevertheless, all this severity, however fine and even successful in one way, had, it seems to me, a certain evil effect upon the other. The best holiness in some ways is that which thinks least about these things altogether, one way or the other. If you worry too much one way, the consciously repressed and consciously condemned instinct crops up in another. *Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.*

acteristic of Judaism. I am astonished, said one teacher, that the prayer for understanding is not used on Saturdays, for without understanding how can one pray? We have to translate this association of study and knowledge with religion into modern terms and apply it to modern needs. And this Rabbinic study of the Law, however wrong-headed, however casuistic, however trivial, had one other great and noble distinction. It was disinterested and democratic. Jewish aristocracy became an aristocracy of learning, and this learning was free to all. Birth and wealth were nothing as compared with knowledge. Let a proselyte become learned in the Law, and he was the acknowledged superior to the most blue-blooded, native-born Jew. Before the Law rich and poor were wholly equal. None must use the "crown" of the Law for his own advantage. R. Tarphon ate some figs in an orchard. The owner came along, threw him into a sack, and was about to cast him into the river. The Rabbi cried out and mentioned his name, and the man let him go. But Tarphon all his life lamented that he had used the Law for his own advantage. The Law must not be studied for the sake of getting reputation and honour. It must be studied from love. The honour will come of itself. Make not the Law a crown wherewith to exalt thyself or a spud wherewith to weed (*i.e.* to gain a livelihood). The doctrine of Lishmah—for its own sake—applied to the study of the Law and to all good works is one of the finest creations of the Rabbis. The reward of the study lies in the study, though also in the world to come. Similar was the *ideal*, at any rate, as regards the practice of the Law. "Happy is the man who

delights in God's commandments," says the Psalmist. Yes, remarks R. Eleazar, in the commandments, not in the reward of the commandments. And it is important to note that, with all their insistence and glorification of the study of the Law, the Rabbis realised and proclaimed that the final object of study was practice. If study is said to be greater than practice, that is only because study leads to practice. To possess knowledge of the Law without the fear of God (= practical religion) is like a man who has been given the key to the inner chamber of a treasure, but not to the outer chamber. How can he get in? Woe to him who has no house and yet builds the doors! He who knows the Law, but does not act according to its behests, it were better he had never been born. The study of the Law, it was recognised, has its dangers. Studied with pure intent, the Law is a medicine of life, but if not, it may become a poison.

If a man is worthy (if he makes a worthy use of it), the Law is for him a medicine of life, but if not, then it is a medicine of death. Commenting upon Psalm xix. 9, one Rabbi holds that the Law makes glad the worthy and purifies the unworthy, but another Rabbi explains the passage to mean that for the worthy it is a purification to life, to the unworthy a purification unto death. To the Rabbis the Law and its study brought a man nearer to God, and made him strong, happy, and free. We, too, may cling to the root idea that the service of the moral law brings strength, happiness, and freedom. Only in its service is perfect liberty. Only he is free, says the Rabbis, who labours in the Torah. Only through the Law comes freedom. We agree. "Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben." He who

would enter the kingdom of God must obey its laws. So the Rabbis make God say to the Israelites: As you have taken upon you My rule (or kingdom), so also receive My commands. Only the willing subject of God may fitly become, or be regarded as, His son. Only service makes freedom, makes sonship.

The total Rabbinic attitude towards God and His Law is a curious combination of apparent inconsistencies. These inconsistencies are partly to be explained by the inconsistencies of the Old Testament, all of which are adopted by the Rabbis, partly by the higher and lower feelings and ideas that existed among the Rabbis themselves, all of which are impartially recorded by the literature, and partly (as we may surmise) by deliberate opposition to the external environment. Looked at in a hostile spirit, the Rabbinic attitude towards God and the Law could be declared to be one long and sheer desire for reward. The attitude could be regarded as one of anxious and constant service for the sake of enormous future felicity, a felicity which would come for the far greater part in the life after death. God would thus become the Law-giver and King who, to be sure, gives gigantic rewards, but gives them only in exchange for services rendered. These services He severely and strenuously exacts. And these services, it might be supposed, are anxiously and toilfully rendered, only because they are the unavoidable condition of the subsequent reward. There would, indeed, be little for us to use and appropriate from such an attitude. But he who so described the Rabbinic attitude would be guilty of great injustice. And he would be guilty of injustice, however many passages he could quote which appear to justify his description, or which even,

up to a point, do actually justify it. For he would omit a number of other passages which point the other way, and which are just as characteristic of the Rabbis as the first. And, for *our* purpose, we are perfectly justified in concentrating our attention upon these and neglecting those. We can use what we please, and neglect what we please. For we are not out to give an impartial account of the Rabbinic religion; we are out to observe in what respects that religion went beyond the Old Testament for good and not for evil. Though the advancing and developing passages must not be regarded as the complete picture, this does not matter for us. So long as the "good" passages are genuinely there, and we do not read into them what they do not contain, that is sufficient. There would be no *great* harm if we *did* read into them even more than they contain; it is one of the qualities of excellence that more can be found in it than it meant to the sayer. But without doing this, the Rabbinic attitude to God and His Law might be declared to be one of gladness and purity, an attitude in which God is "served" because He is loved, and for the sheer joy and sake of the service itself. Such a view would, however, be going too far. The truth lies somewhere between; it lies in a subtle combination of the joy with the desire for reward. Both are real. For our purpose we need bother little about the second, and can expatiate upon the first.¹ And certainly

¹ Dr. Abrahams writes: "As to the 'second,' we need not deny that reward, truly conceived, has its meaning for us. It is not a good discipline to plough the sands. Man may justly expect fruit from his toil. Morality would lose its attraction to many, if it were perfectly certain that immorality paid. The Rabbis, perhaps, over-emphasised this, and yet not without emphasising also the sense of exhilaration derived from sheer exertion, whatever the profit or lack of profit. The joy experienced in obedience counts as well as the expectation of the fruits of obedience."

joy in God, joy in the commandments—the *simchah shel mitzvot*, so characteristic a Rabbinic phrase—meets us in the Rabbinic literature again and again. Moreover, with this joy goes purity. The one is inseparably mixed up with the other. To fulfil God's commands for their own sake means to fulfil them in joy, and to fulfil them in joy is only possible if they are fulfilled for their own sake, *lishmah*. It is desirable to dwell upon this point a little further, even though I have partly to repeat what I have already said. According to the Midrash, the Israelites were not allowed or fit to receive the Law till they had sufficiently recovered from the gloom and bondage of Egypt. For the Law must be received with joyful countenance, even as the holy spirit rests only where there is joy. David said that the ordinances of God were to him not a burden, but a song (Psalm cxix. 54). Only a fulfilment of the Law in *joy*—to rejoice and make others to rejoice—is to do as God has commanded. The commands of the Law may at first be a purification, but the ideal is that they should be a joy. He who serves in joy serves in love, and he who serves in love serves *lishmah*, for the sake of the Law itself, or for the sake of God. Single-minded must be God's service, for it is rendered to Him who is "single." Every command must be fulfilled to please God, and this, again, means that it must be fulfilled just because it is a command and with no ulterior motive. As for him who does not fulfil the Law for its own sake, it were better he had never been born. Over and over again we find the same idea, so that if there is a strong naïve desire for reward, as a sign of God's grace and of the victory of righteousness and of Israel and Israel's cause, there is no less strong an

assertion that all "good" actions are only good if done for God's sake or for their own sake. These assertions are undoubtedly a great advance upon anything we find in the Old Testament. It is quite characteristic of the odd mixture of the Rabbinic religion that if, on the one hand, an Old Testament weakness is emphasised by the Rabbis, it is also overcome. The rough edge is made rougher, but it is also made smooth. Let all thy deeds be for the sake of God. Do all from love. The two injunctions meant one and the same. A strange Rabbinic paradox runs : Better a sin *lishmah* than a command which is not *lishmah*. Better to sin for God's sake than to fulfil a command from an impure motive. (On the other hand, the Rabbis were alive to the danger of "the means justifying the end," and coined a phrase for its reprobation.) Two men ate the Paschal sacrifice ; one ate it for the sake of the food, the other for the sake of the command. Only the second fulfilled the command aright. The Rabbis pray that they themselves, and that all men, may come to fulfil the Law for its own sake and in love. As for them who devote themselves to the Torah not for its own sake, may it be Thy will that they end by devoting themselves to it for its own sake. Again : Perhaps thou mayest be inclined to say, I will study the Law that I may become rich (here it seems to be proved that by "studying the Law" is meant no more and no less than *serving God*, for no payment was ever received for being learned in, and teaching, the Law), or that I may be called Rabbi, or that I may be called wise, or that I may have a seat in the house of study, or that I may prolong my days in the world to come, or that I may receive a reward. Therefore the Scripture says,

Thou shalt love the Lord thy God : all that ye do, ye shall do from love. It was, indeed, often said that a lower motive for study and righteousness must be accepted by way of transition. For he who begins by the lower may end with the higher, and he who begins by serving God in fear may end by serving Him in love.

Not less profound and far-reaching than the religious motive of *lishmah*—"for its own sake," and for God's sake—was that of the sanctification of the Name, *i.e.* the sanctification of God. Just as the profanation of the name was the worst sin, so the sanctification of the name was, for the Rabbis, the noblest virtue and the most inspiring motive. I have already spoken of the highest exemplification of this virtue in martyrdom. Every martyr was conscious that he gave his life for the honour and sanctification of God. And though it is permissible to violate all laws, except the prohibition of murder, idolatry, and unchastity, in order to save one's life, it is not permissible to violate any law if it be done as an open sign of apostasy. Sooner than cause such profanation of the name, every Jew must be ready to render up his life. Quite apart from martyrdom the conception of the sanctification and profanation of the name exercised a large and peculiar influence upon Jewish life. God's honour was, as it were, put into Israelite keeping. Here we find an odd moral result for good of Jewish particularism. Though God is the one and only God, yet He is in a special sense the God of Israel, and so any sin of any Israelite which becomes known to a non-Israelite constitutes a profanation of the name. It reflects upon God's honour. The special servants and sons of God must not sin, for their sin, if known,

reflects upon the credit of their God, who bade them be holy even as He is holy, and through *their* holiness to show forth His. To steal from a Gentile is worse than to steal from a Jew, because it is a greater profanation of the name. In times of persecution it is permitted, in order to save one's life, to transgress all laws except the laws against unchastity, idolatry, and murder; but if one is asked to violate the lightest law as a sign of apostasy, one must unhesitatingly refuse and die. If of two possible modes of action one involves an ordinary sin and one a profanation of the name, one must undoubtedly choose the former. It is better, it was said, that a letter should be torn out of the Law than that God's name should be openly profaned. It was even asserted that it was better to commit a sin in secret than to profane the name of God openly, while, on the other hand, it was also declared that this secret sin was itself a profanation of the name. Thus the sanctification of the name became an important string in the Jew's moral bow, and especially in his dealings with the non-Jew. This point comes out very naïvely in Talmudic discussions. The "natural man" in the Jew was inclined to take advantage of the non-Jew, to defraud him, in other words, when opportunity offered. For the non-Jew was the oppressor of the Jew. But the Jew was restrained from doing so by the law of the sanctification. Thus the rule stands codified: to steal from the non-Jew is a "heavier" sin than to steal from the Jew, because of the profanation of the name. Famous is the old story of R. Simeon ben Shetach (first century), who restored the jewel which was found upon the donkey that he had bought from certain Arabs. Characteristic is the remark made

on his action : Simeon preferred to know that those Arabs said (when the jewel was restored), Blessed be the God of the Jews, than all the reward of the world. The cry of the Arabs was a great sanctification of the name. In the Jerusalem Talmud, where the story is told, other tales follow of the same kind. Dr. Kohler is doubtless right when he says that to this day the warning against profanation of the name "tends to keep the commonest Jew from committing any act that might disgrace the Jewish community." There seems to be no reason why the ideal of the sanctification and the sin of the profanation should not still exercise this sway—the one towards virtue, the other in the avoidance of wrongdoing. For we, too, can and do regard ourselves as entrusted with a religious mission, and the conception of the "holy nation and the kingdom of priests" can and does have a meaning for us as well as for the orthodox. For to believe in this conception is not to be possessed of a false particularism. Every man who believes in God may rightly regard himself as bound to sanctify His name. But a group of men who, for many generations, have felt this duty incumbent upon them *as a group*, as part and parcel of their religion, can gain added strength and stimulus from this very fact. They have the duty of the group, and they can possess the motive of this duty, and the enthusiasm for it, over and above anything that they may feel about it as individuals. There is no reason why the consciousness of being a society of men banded together for the service of God should not be more persistently cultivated among Jews—whether Liberal or Orthodox—than it is to-day. Such a service is not a service for themselves or

for their own glory ; it is a service for humanity and for the glory of God. There might, indeed, even be some special justification for separative ritual laws—such as abstaining from rabbits and hares, or from wearing mixed garments of linen and woollen—if such abstentions could help to the more frequent and vivid consciousness of such a service, and of being born into the obligation, or of having accepted it at manhood. In any case, it is clear that this conception of the sanctification of the name is a considerable religious development for purity and good beyond anything which we find in the Old Testament. The germs are doubtless there, but the full and explicit development belongs to the Rabbis.

One of the common objections to a “legal” religion, such as Rabbinic Judaism undoubtedly was, is that too much stress is laid upon outward deeds, and too little upon motive. The actual doing of certain definite actions, whether ceremonial or moral, becomes all important : character is passed over, and it is not understood how there is a true sense in which “being” is of higher moral and spiritual value than “doing.” It is very remarkable how the Rabbis half unconsciously became aware of this danger. Doubtless some of them, or some of their disciples, fell a victim to it. In other words, their literature shows the defects of their religion as well as its qualities.¹ But in the very proportion

¹ Cp. what G. F. Moore says in his *History of Religions*, vol. ii. p. 110. “The Pharisees, who were a kind of Jewish Puritans, saw with great concern the lax observance of the Sabbath” (in the days of Jesus), “the indifference of the common people to the rules of religious cleanness, and their negligence in the payment of taxes for the support of the clergy. Their efforts to reform these abuses gave them an exaggerated importance in their eyes ; punctiliousness in such matters became for them the criterion of piety—an error which precisians seldom escape. The study of the twofold Law in the schools had for many

in which the legalism of the Rabbis far outdoes the legalism of the Old Testament, so also may it be said that the inwardness taught by the Rabbis goes far beyond the inwardness of the Old Testament. And from their inwardness we moderns can yet gain profit. We have seen examples of that inwardness as regards motive. It is not the mere execution of the Law which counts. Is it fulfilled from fear or from love? For its own sake, or for some ulterior purpose? From joy, or from the mere desire of reward? Again we have seen how, in spite of all the legalism as to times and seasons of prayer, and as to a host of details, the Rabbis yet realised what prayer was: the service of the heart—of that heart which God “wants.” They created the idea of Kewanah as the soul of prayer, as inward a conception as anybody could desire. They said that “much” or “little” was the same, so long as the heart was right with God. They argued that God reckons the good intention which accident has prevented from becoming a deed as equivalent to the deed, though in His mercy the bad intention frustrated He ignores. Yet they themselves did not ignore such a frustrated intention, but mourned over the sinful thought no less than over the sinful deed. So in that strange story of the elderly R. Chija whose wife disguised herself as a harlot, and he was tempted and fell. When his wife told him that she and the harlot were one, he said, “My intention was to sin.” And he fasted all the

a similar result; the minutiae of the Law and the casuistry of the doctors acquired the factitious value which microscopic points of learning always possess for the academic mind.” I have before quoted Mr. Moore on one side; it is well to quote him also on the other. He is a model of severe impartiality. He stands above the facts. Jews must not quote him only for their own special purposes!

remaining days of his life till he died. It was a Rabbi who said that the lustful thought is even worse than the lustful deed. Even repentance and confession may be mere outwardness. He who sins and confesses his sin and does not *abandon* it is like a man who holds an unclean animal in his hand. Let him bathe in all the waters of the world, he cannot become clean (cp. Sirach xxxiv. 25, 26).

The Rabbinic religion knows nothing of any opposition between faith and works. The difficulties and problems which are raised by Paul in the Epistle to the Galatians and to the Romans were unfelt by them, and would hardly have been understood. As we have seen, the Law, so far from being a burden, was a joy. So far from being an incitement or stimulus to sin,—by awaking a desire the satisfaction of which it forbade—the Law was regarded as the medicine which prevented such desires from becoming masterful and overpowering. It was never doubted that man could, as he ought to, fulfil—up to a point—the laws of God, laws which would not have been given to him, if the power had not also been given him to fulfil them. To order men to fulfil laws which they cannot fulfil would have been cruel. But God was not cruel, but merciful. He gave the Law, not to show its futility, but its usefulness, its beauty, and its joy. It is true that man often fails to fulfil it—he often sins ; but such sins are inseparable from the very constitution of a being who is set between the animal and the angel: half earthly and half divine. There would be no discipline and no joy (to say nothing of no merit !) in fulfilment if to fulfil were inevitable. There would be no *educative* obedience if there were not the possibility of disobedience. In spite of occasional

complaints about the power of the evil Yetzer, there was no feeling of despair. The cry, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" is, on the whole, an un-Rabbinic cry. The Rabbis won their way to God along their own lines. And with their strong, but rarely unethetical, belief in God's mercy and forgiveness, they were not daunted by failure and lapses. The Law remained medicine and joy, and was never burden or poison. Indeed (but this, perhaps, was a direct polemic against Paul, and therefore less interesting), they *wanted* the desire to be felt in order that the Law should be the more purely and powerfully fulfilled. To abstain from eating pig or from unchastity, if you have no desire to eat pig or to be unchaste, what virtue or glory in that? But to abstain because the commandment bids you abstain, this is the right fulfilment of the Law and the true service of God. The paradox is obvious—but no less obvious its spirit. And just as there was little trouble as regards the Law because of human frailty, so there was little trouble because of any conflict of works with faith. There are few and rare indications in Rabbinic literature of any theoretic unbelief, whether in the existence or in the power of God. It was needless to say "believe," because all the Rabbis *did* believe, and no suffering made them sceptical. Belief or trust in God was as natural to the Rabbis as belief in the regularity of night following the day. And faith in the sense of making the Law in any of its parts superfluous would have seemed absurd or unintelligible. This seems to be the reason why the references to faith occur with such comparative infrequency in the Rabbinic literature. We meet them only when a comment has to be made upon

a Biblical passage in which the Hebrew term for trust or faith occurs. Thus on Psalm xxxi. 23, the Midrash observes : These are the Israelites who say, Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who quickenest the dead, and in faith respond, "Amen," for they believe with all their might that God will quicken the dead, though the resurrection has not yet come. In a curious passage in the Midrash, too long to quote in its entirety, Jacob is blamed for lack of faith on the occasion of his vision of the ladder. He was afraid lest he, too, like the kingdoms who would oppress his descendants, should only rise to fall. God said to him : If you had believed (or had faith), you would have risen and not fallen, but as you did not believe, you did not rise, and your children will be oppressed by the four kingdoms. Even Moses was once charged with lack of faith. For when God sent him to Pharaoh and said, I am Yahweh, Moses hesitated, for he said to God, It is with the attribute of mercy (in your capacity as a merciful God) that you say to me, I will redeem Israel. But, perhaps, before I return hither, the attribute of mercy will have changed into the attribute of justice. Then God replied, I am Yahweh. I stand in (*i.e.* My innermost self consists of) the attribute of mercy. Moreover, I only revealed Myself to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as the Almighty, and yet they had no lack of faith in (literally, did not think or worry about) My attributes. It was not the snake or Moses' hands which brought victory or health to Israel, but when the Israelites looked towards God, and subjected their hearts to Him, then they conquered and were healed. The same idea is elsewhere expressed in the saying: Was it the *hands* of Moses which made the Israelites strong?

No. But when they looked at his uplifted hands, they believed in God. It was Israel's faith which was worthy that God, because of it, should divide the waters of the Red Sea, for they did not say to Moses, How can we go forth into the wilderness, for we have no victuals for the journey? but they believed, and followed him. Great is faith, for that the holy spirit rested upon the Israelites (enabling them to sing the "Song of Moses") was the reward of their faith. It was only through the merit of faith that Abraham inherited this world and the future world, as it is said, He believed in the Lord, and the Lord accounted his faith as righteousness. In the same Midrashic passage it is said of him who accepts one command in faith that he is worthy to receive the holy spirit. Through God's gate all men of faith pass (a deduction from Psalm cxviii. 20 and Isaiah xxvi. 2). What caused the joy spoken of in Psalm xcii. 3? It was the reward of the faith which our fathers showed while they were in this world that is all night. (The Midrash plays on the phrase "to show forth Thy faithfulness in the night," which is interpreted to mean, "their faith in Thee.") And the final redemption will only come through Israel's faith, as Hosea said, I will betroth thee unto me because of (thy) faith. He who has enough to eat for to-day, and says, What shall I eat to-morrow, is wanting in faith, for He who has created the day has created the sustenance for it. It did not escape the sharpness of the Rabbis that in the sentence Exodus xiv. 31 there seems to lurk an absurdity. The Israelites had passed safely through the divided waters: they *saw* the drowning of their enemies. How should they, then, *not* have believed? (*i.e.* what was the merit?) How should a man not

believe when he *sees*? The faith, therefore, which was so praiseworthy and is here alluded to, refers back to the faith which they had shown in Egypt (Exodus iv. 31, "And the people believed"). These simple utterances about faith go far to show that the Rabbis were quite alive to its virtues, but that they largely took it for granted: they did not theorise it, or dogmatise about it, and it would have greatly surprised them if they had been made to understand that the faith of Abraham, which they praised no less than their great antagonist, could actually be placed in opposition to the works of the Law. Like Philo, the Rabbis actually assumed that Abraham kept the Law before the Law! We, however, may perhaps still gain some profit from these simple and undogmatic utterances.

The relation of man to God in the Old Testament, man's estimate of life, and even, one may also add, the relation of God to man, were conditioned and coloured by the fact that life was supposed to be limited to earth and brought to a close by death. There was, indeed, a life after death—the life of Sheol—but it was a life not worth living, though it had to be lived. It was a life which was neither reward nor punishment, where was neither happiness nor pain, where the rule of Yahweh was hardly recognised, or where, at any rate, He was neither worshipped nor praised. The life of the shades in Sheol was a life which seemed as empty and valueless to the Israelite as the life of Hades seemed to Achilles. "The dead praise not Yahweh, nor any that go down to silence. In death there is no remembrance of Thee: in the grave who shall give Thee thanks? Shall Thy loving-kindness be declared in Sheol, or Thy faithfulness in Abaddon? The

dead Thou rememberest no more ; they are cut off from Thy hand. Sheol cannot praise Thee ; death cannot celebrate Thee : they that are gone down to the pit cannot hope for Thy truth. There is no work, nor device, nor knowledge in Sheol. Man dies and lies low ; he gives up the ghost, and where is he ? He lies down, and does not rise ; till the heavens be no more, he will not wake, or be raised out of his sleep." It was thus very rarely that this feeble, flaccid, monotonous, shadowy existence could ever seem desirable. The famous passage in Job is practically unique. For even though in Sheol the wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest ; though there the prisoners are at ease, and they hear not the voice of the driver ; though there small and great are equal, and the slave is free from his master, yet few, indeed, were the Israelites—and unrecorded their cry—who asked, Wherefore was light given to the miserable, or life unto the bitter in soul ? And yet fewer were those " who longed for death but it came not, and dug for it more than for hid treasures, who were glad even to exultation, and rejoiced, when they could find the grave." Even in sorrow and suffering there would not seem to have been many who felt thus.¹ The usual desire was to regain happiness on earth, and to achieve a happy old age.

Moreover, as earth was the only possible scene of valued life, it was almost inevitable that earthly, and even material, prosperity should be assessed at a high rate. It was the index of virtue and its reward, though even within the Old Testament period we find the conception that suffering may be a discipline, and that wisdom is better than rubies,

¹ Ecclesiastes vii. 1 is exceptional. Cp. Sirach xli. 2.

and once even that God's loving-kindness is better than life. But though suffering may be disciplinal, it could only be disciplinal for future happiness on earth. A discipline of suffering which did not end before death would have been meaningless. Though wisdom may be better than riches, wisdom is yet regarded as the source of riches : a wise and good life ever accompanied by suffering and sorrow was a perpetual challenge to the righteousness and power of God. The explanation offered by Isaiah liii. was exceptional, and in any case unsuited for suffering as a whole. Universal self-sacrifice could no more be an explanation of universal suffering than taking in one another's washing could be a universal method of keeping the wolf from the door. And whether the author of that wonderful chapter meant his theory to explain Israel's suffering as a whole or only the suffering of a few remains uncertain.

The growth of a belief in retribution, and in a life of glory or of pain, beyond the grave, changed everything. Between the Old Testament and the Rabbinic literature it put a huge gulf. The words of Gunkel, which I have quoted so often, are literally true. The doctrine of the resurrection made so gigantic a change that one can justly divide the history of Judaism into two sharply separated sections : before the belief and after it.

And yet—it is a remarkable thing—the change wrought was not *quite* as great as might have been anticipated, or at all events not quite as great as it *could* have been, not quite as great as was produced by the doctrine upon certain phases of Christianity. For remember what the doctrine implied. In the form in which it was accepted and remained dominant, it implied that while earthly life was

supremely important as a test, inasmuch as beyond the grave there was no further chance for repentance, its importance in itself was minute ; its span was limited ; its seventy or eighty years were a mere flash in the pan compared with what was to follow. And neither the joy nor the suffering of earth was comparable with the joy or the suffering of the hereafter. It was not, therefore, wonderful that to those for whom the joys and pains of the future life seemed very certain and very near, the life of earth should appear of no importance except as a preparation and a discipline. Better to forgo all happiness on earth and to secure the eternal happiness of "heaven." Earthly sorrow and suffering might, indeed, be justly welcomed if they were to lead to an immortal beatitude. Earthly prosperity might be justly held in suspicion if it was associated with careless living or with wickedness. And if the joy of heaven was "spiritual" and the joy of earth material, the second might reasonably be despised in order to exalt the first more highly. Moreover, to these very obvious considerations could be added others of a more theological order. Would not God be much nearer to the happy world to come than He was to earth ? Was not earth the theatre of schemes and machinations against His rule ? What caused human sin ? Was it not, first of all, the very flesh which in the world to come would be no more ? Was it not, in the second place, the plottings and deceptions of the Evil One ? A world which was the arena of such plottings was less God's world than the devil's. It was a scene of temptation and tribulation, fitted for tears and for asceticism rather than for happiness and well-being. Adversity was safer than prosperity,

for the one was far more likely to lead to "heaven," the other to hell. Not unjustly might prosperity be regarded as the blessing of a book the eyes of whose writers were fixed upon earth, and adversity the blessing of a book the eyes of whose writers were fixed upon heaven.

These theological considerations did not, however, affect the Rabbis, for they did not touch the centre of their faith. They were either not believed at all, or they were ideas which crossed their minds here and there, but did not really possess and dominate them. Even the other sort of considerations affected them somewhat less than might have been expected. In spite of the sufferings which they underwent, and the persecutions which they witnessed and endured, they never despaired of earth or lost their attachment to it. They rarely despised earthly or material prosperity. Earth remained God's earth and the theatre of His rule. It was God's creation originally, and He had never relinquished His control. It was never, and had never become, the devil's world. And the very purpose of it was that men might live in it happy lives and not miserable lives, that men might be righteous, not that they might be sinful. God had faith in the world and (therefore) He created it, and men were not made to be wicked, but to be righteous. A small sentence like this seems significant of much. Material things were God's gift, to be enjoyed, temperately it is true, but yet not to be neglected. Asceticism is not unknown, but it is not often commended. A desire to die seems rare. Long life remains a blessing still. There is a certain balance and temperateness in the Rabbinic estimate of earthly life which is very

noteworthy and even modern. At their best, this balance and temperateness issue in a noble sanctification of pure earthly pleasures and enjoyments which we can rightly make much use of, and lay much stress upon, even to-day. Sanctify thyself, it is said, in what is permitted to thee.

Nevertheless, even with these noticeable and important limitations, the effect of the resurrection doctrine was gigantic. Indeed, inevitably gigantic. The whole question of suffering assumed a very different aspect, and its pressure became ever so much less. The prosperity of the wicked and the woes of the good were no longer a necessary problem or puzzle. For the prosperity of the wicked could be looked upon as a snare to drag him the deeper into the mire, or, on a strictly retributinal theory, if "wicked" means the man who, on balance, is far more bad than good, then his prosperity can be regarded as the brief "reward" of his meagre virtues. So, also, as to the woes of the righteous. Either they are merely disciplinary, or they are the "punishments" of his meagre sins. In the next world the balance is fully redressed. The wicked will get everlasting punishment for his misdeeds, the righteous everlasting beatitude for his virtue. Earthly life becomes both less important and more. It is less important because of what is to follow, and also more. For upon it depends the quality of what is to follow. The results might be very diverse. One could be gloomier about earthly life, or one could live earthly life more gloomily, because of the fear of the future. So much depended upon it ! It was so desperately important : so terribly anxious ! Or, again, one could face all earthly trials and sorrows so much

more bravely and cheerfully. They became either so pettily insignificant, or so much to be welcomed as a wise and reasonable preparation for heaven. Death itself could be less feared or more, less welcomed or more. For it might, indeed, be the gateway to something which was infinitely superior to earth, and, if the absurdity be permitted, still more infinitely superior to Sheol ; but then, again, it might be the gateway to something which was infinitely worse than the worst earthly misfortunes, and even infinitely worse than the flabby emptiness of Sheol ! Here, again, we have to note what were the *actual* effects and results of the resurrection dogma in the Rabbinic religion, and what use we may make of them to-day.

We find occasional depreciatory remarks about earthly life, but on the whole, when we compare the immense mass of the Rabbinic literature with these occasional remarks, their significance seems small. There is a well-known passage in which we are told that the school of Hillel disputed for two and a half years with the school of Shammai as to whether it would, or would not, have been better for man had he never been created. They finally concluded that it would have been better had he not been created, but that as he has been, the best thing for him is to test and examine his actions. But this idea that it would have been better for man had he never been created is quite isolated and purely academic. The Midrash on Ecclesiastes seldom reflects the pessimism of the author. R. Pinchas said : Since the days of man are but vanity and like unto a shadow, what pleasure can be found in life ? Let him, therefore, occupy himself with the study of the Law, which alone is (true) life.

Elsewhere, commenting on the verse that the day of death is better than the day of birth, it is said that when a man is born, he is reckoned with the dead, and when he dies, with the living. When he is born, all rejoice ; when he dies, all weep. But it should be just the reverse. For when he is born, none knows if he will be good or bad, if he will conquer temptations or succumb to them ; when he dies, we may fitly rejoice that he has passed away in peace, and left a good name behind him. Two ships were sailing on the sea, one leaving the harbour, and another returning to it. There was rejoicing over the first, and not over the second. But a wise man said that one should not rejoice over the outgoing ship, for none knows what dangers it has to encounter ; one should rather rejoice over the ship which has safely come to port. Such reflections are not at all common. If the righteous do not rejoice in this world while the wicked do, that is exceptional, and not as it should be. This world is God's world as well as the next. It is true that the unblushing materialism of Ecclesiastes, or, at least, of one of its dominant moods, was too much for the Rabbis, who say that wherever the terms eating and drinking are used in the book, they mean good works and proficiency in the Law. On the whole, however, there is no frequent or regular depreciation either of the material world as such, or of material possessions. Leisegang goes too far when he says that for Rabbinic Judaism poverty is rather a hindrance to righteousness or to spiritual bliss than a furtherance.¹ It is untrue to say that he who would live the ideal Pharisaic or

¹ Hans Leisegang, *Pneuma Hagion. Der Ursprung der Geistbegriffs der synoptischen Evangelien aus der griechischen Mystik* (1922), p. 136, n. 1.

Rabbinic life must possess property or riches. It is a travesty of the truth to say that all who suffer are regarded by Rabbinic Jews as having been punished by God. There are, as we have seen, chastisements of love, just as there are sufferings which none can explain. Poverty, too, is said to suit Israel as its red trappings suit a white horse. And in the Mishnah we are told that a morsel of bread with salt thou must eat, and water by measure must thou drink, thou must sleep upon the ground, and live a life of trouble, the while thou toilest in the Torah. There were very poor Rabbis, as there were very rich ones, and that poverty prevented goodness was never dogmatically asserted. The truth is that the Rabbis were acute and sensible enough to see that both wealth and poverty had each its own special moral danger. It may, however, be true to say that the *ideal* condition was supposed to be prosperity rather than adversity, and moderate riches rather than immoderate poverty. Intensely as the Rabbis esteemed the virtue of charity, so keenly did they also deplore and dislike a lack of independence or a life of beggary. So, too, though they recognised the disciplinary character of bodily suffering,—and it is curious how often they seem to limit the conception of suffering to *bodily* suffering—they yet had an intense and peculiar dislike of it. For three, they say, life is no life : for him who has to look to the table of his neighbour, for him who is ruled by his wife, and for him whose body is burdened by sufferings.

On the whole, the Rabbinic religion may be said to urge moderate enjoyment, with a vivid consciousness of the Author of the enjoyment, rather than asceticism. To abstain from an innocent pleasure

for the sake of abstention is not commended. Pleasure as pleasure is not denounced, but it must be innocent pleasure sanctified by gratitude to God. It must never interfere with a higher duty. Material pleasure is only then good when it is associated with the Law ; if it hinders study, or if it hinders good works, if it is frivolous, boisterous, or licentious, then it is severely rejected and reproved. Temperate pleasure in, and with, the service of God is the right pleasure, as, for example, the pleasure of a pleasant Sabbath meal, because such a meal, and the pleasure it affords, do honour to the Sabbath, and are a sanctification and glorification of God. One must have no enjoyment for which God cannot legitimately be thanked. A man is forbidden to enjoy anything of this world without a benediction, and whoever does so commits sacrilege. Or again: to enjoy without a benediction is as though one robbed God. The usual and predominant Rabbinic view about the pleasures of the senses is indicated in a well-known passage from the tractate *Taanith*. Samuel (the Rabbi) said : Whoever practises frequent fasting is called a sinner. Such was the view of R. Eliezer Hakappar bar Beribbi, for he interpreted the words of Numbers vi. 11 to mean that the Nazarite had sinned by abstention from wine. But if a man is called a sinner who abstains from wine, how much more he who abstains from everything ! (So Rab said that he who has not eaten of everything which his eye has seen will have to give an account of his abstinence in the world to come !) But R. Eleazar, on the contrary, said that the Nazarite was called "holy," and he argued that if a man was called holy because he abstained from wine, how much

more should *he* deserve to be called holy who abstains from everything ! Yet did not this same R. Eleazar say that a man should always regard himself as if holiness were within him (and therefore he must not neglect his body by abstinence) ? The difficulty is then sought to be solved by the view that all depends upon whether a man can endure abstinences or not. (Which again means, I suppose, that for some abstinence or asceticism will be a road to holiness and for some it will not.) Resh Lakish said that a Rabbi or Rabbinic student must not fast voluntarily because he thereby diminishes his capacity for the work of heaven (*i.e.* the study of the Law). We are told that after the Temple was destroyed, the number of ascetics increased who would not eat meat or drink wine. They did this because the sacrifices and libations had ceased. R. Joshua argued with them that to be consistent they should abstain from bread or fruit or even water, for all these were used in the Temple services. They were silent. He said : My view is that mourn one must, but not more than is reasonable, because one must not ordain a decree for the community which the community is not able to endure. Rightly or wrongly, the Rabbis do not, upon the whole, appear to have approved of works of supererogation, or of establishing an ideal of ascetic practices which only a small minority could reach. The ideal must be more or less within the reach of all. A man may distinguish himself from the community by the number of hours a day which he gives to study of the Law, but apparently not by outward rigidity. The commandments of the Law are for all. And for the mass, the bow must not be stretched too tightly. It is

better that the Israelites should sin in error than that they should sin deliberately by infringing a decree. There were, however, individual Rabbis who were ascetics, and who for particular purposes accomplished great ascetic achievements. Thus we hear of a R. Zera who, when he left Babylon for Palestine, fasted for a hundred days in order to forget the Babylonian method of Talmudic teaching! He then fasted another hundred days, so that R. Eleazar should not predecease him, and that he should not thereby have to take upon himself the affairs of the community; and he finally fasted another hundred days that the fire of hell should have no power over him. Such stories as that one of Chanina, for whom a measure of coarse bread was enough food from week to week, seem to me to show that the Rabbis were not the tiresomely moderate and golden-mean sort of people whom, in opposition to Christian asceticism, some of their modern apologists would wish to make them out. They knew what fervour meant, and they knew something of the passion, the exaggeration, and the paradoxes of true religion. If a man makes himself contemptible for the words of the Law, eats dried dates, wears dirty clothes, and stands as a doorkeeper at the houses of the wise, so that every passer-by calls him mad, all the Law will be with him in the end. Nevertheless, it is true that enjoyment rather than abstinence is their keynote: the enjoyment of sanctification. As Patmore says: "They found in nature's common food, nothing but spiritual joy." "Appetite, subjected to observances, to banquet went with full delight." If R. Simeon b. Jochai, in his unmeasured enthusiasm for "the Law, the whole Law, and nothing but the Law,"

declared that he who is studying out of doors, and interrupts his study to say, How beautiful is that tree, is guilty of death, yet the code itself has drawn up blessings on smelling fragrant plants or on seeing trees blossoming for the first time in the year. One can imagine Jesus using this blessing with every satisfaction, but Paul might have been too immersed with his new message to do so, too convinced that the glory of this world was about to pass away. Thus it runs: "Blessed art thou, O Lord our God, King of the Universe, who hast made Thy world lacking in nought, but hast created therein goodly creatures and goodly trees wherewith to give delight to the children of men." It is a marvellous thing that the Rabbis in the midst of persecution and trouble never lost their faith in God's justice and goodness, never hesitated to allow that earth was God's world and creation as well as heaven, and that, at bottom, joy rather than sorrow was the diviner life. A sentence like: The righteous do not rejoice in this world; the wicked rejoice in it, is exceptional. At any rate, the world is specially out of joint when such a contrast is inevitable.

We have seen that one of the great difficulties for the Rabbis was the over-pressed doctrine of measure for measure—no suffering without guilt. The doctrine was, however, modified in two or three directions. First, by recognition of the mystery of evil and its absolute insolvability by man, as in the famous sentence of Abot (if that, indeed, be its meaning): "It is not in our power to explain the sufferings of the righteous or the prosperity of the wicked." It is, however, very remarkable how seldom this recognition that the problem is un-

solvable seems put forward. Vastly more frequent is the second modification that suffering is purificatory or disciplinary ; or the third, which may be regarded as a variety of the second, that as no man is wholly sinless, the " righteous " are punished for their small measure of sinfulness in this world in order that they may receive the unrestricted and unpostponed delights and rewards of the world to come.

When the famous utterance of R. Ammi, No death without sin, no suffering without iniquity, is discussed, the result, though rather incidentally observed than greatly stressed, is obtained that there *is* a death without sin and there *is* a suffering without iniquity, which categoric statement is a distinct advance upon Old Testament conceptions outside Job. R. Eleazar b. Pedath said that of a hundred deaths ninety-nine are due to the gall (*i.e.* the course of nature) and only one to the hand of God. Rabba went so far as to say that long life, children, and nourishment depend not on merit, but on a lucky star, or, as we should say, on chance: in other words, they are not the reward of righteousness. And, it is added, Rabba and Rab Chisda were both pious Rabbis, and for both rain fell in answer to their prayer. Yet Chisda lived till 92, and Rabba died at 40. In Chisda's house sixty marriages were celebrated, in Rabba's house there were sixty deaths. In Chisda's house bread of fine meal was given to the very dogs, in Rabba's house there was often not barley meal enough for men. The finest thing in the Talmud as to the impenetrable nature of the problem, more especially for those who regard every separate event as the direct decision of Deity, is the story that Moses was told by God about the wonderful

knowledge of R. Akiba and how he would promulgate heaps upon heaps of injunctions (Halachoth : decisions and ordinances). Moses asks to see him, and is vouchsafed a vision of Akiba and his students. After some further conversation Moses says to God, Thou hast shown me his knowledge of the Law; show me now his reward. Then the vision changes, and Moses sees Akiba being tortured, and his flesh being weighed in the butcher's shop. Then Moses says, For *such* knowledge is *this* the reward ? Silence, replies God, so I have determined.

Much more usually the pathway of suffering is regarded as the necessary road through which one must travel in order to reach the beatitudes of the life to come. "Thy rod and thy staff they comfort me." The rod is suffering. The staff is the Law. "Make known to me the path of life." God replies : Look upon sufferings. It is in a sense only the good who receive sufferings, or whom God finds it worth while to discipline in this way. Here, again, sufferings mean only bodily pain, and it seems amazing how the Rabbis accentuate bodily suffering, and seem to ignore those far more acute and terrible forms of suffering which have nothing to do with the body, or which depend upon our love for others. The suffering which is caused to one man by the shame or the sin or the sorrow of another is never (so far as I can see) alluded to. Here, therefore, while we can use the Rabbinic sayings about "suffering," we have greatly to enlarge and spiritualise their reference. God, then, sends His discipline of suffering only to those whose hearts are soft as the lily. If a man has two cows, one weak, one strong, with which does he plough ? With the strong. God does not "try" the wicked,

for they could not endure it. So the flax dealer beats only the soft flax. The hard flax would unravel. The good flax becomes only better by beating. So the potter does not beat common ware. He beats good vessels, which, however much he beats them, never break. Sufferings must be received in love and without murmuring. So far as they prevent a man from studying or from prayer (I suppose public prayer is meant), they are a discipline; so far as they do not have these results, they are chastisements of love. Sufferings bring forgiveness of sins, for which they are an atonement. A man should rejoice in sufferings rather than in prosperity; for through them, and not through prosperity, does he win forgiveness. Beloved are sufferings, for only through them were the three good gifts of the land, the Law, and the world to come given unto Israel. He who has sufferings in this world will have his share in the world to come. Like the sacrifices they cause atonement, but they are a more powerful and acceptable atonement, for sacrifices affect a man's money, sufferings his body. Here, again, the poor and limited conception of suffering is to be noted. If sufferings come upon a man, let him scrutinise his deeds; if he has done so and can find nothing wrong, let him attribute his sufferings to neglect of the study of the Law; if, however, such neglect is not the cause, let him be sure that his sufferings are chastisements of love. In other words, the more apparently causeless the sufferings, the more they are due to God's love: they are a purification and a preparation. Over and over again is the statement made that God punishes the righteous for the few bad deeds which they have committed in this world in order to give them their

full reward in the world to come, while the wicked are rewarded for their few good deeds in this world in order that they may be punished the more completely in the world to come. There is a certain outwardness and mechanical cheapness in such an utterance: one has the feeling as if God would laugh at so clumsy, poor, external, "scale-and-balance" way of estimating His rule; nevertheless, it paved the way for something higher, and enabled the average man to bear suffering with cheerfulness. And not only ordinary suffering, but martyrdom. Akiba found the difference between the pagan and the Israelite in that the former, when sufferings came, cursed his gods, while the Israelite was enjoined to thank God both for the good and the evil, both for weal and for woe, both for happiness and for suffering. Though there are absurd discussions or statements about the limits and nature of suffering—and minute inconveniences are reckoned as sufferings, for legalism lays its rather coarsening and vulgarising hands upon every conception in heaven and earth—yet there is also a fine sense of the necessary and inevitable part which suffering has to play in the education of man. Indeed, the paradox is uttered that he who passes forty days without suffering has already received his "world": he cannot expect the recompense of the hereafter! And sufferings are not merely to be received with resignation, but with joy. Constantly is the famous saying repeated, "Those who are oppressed and oppress not, who are reviled but reply not, who act from love and rejoice in their sufferings, these are the lovers of God, who are as the sun when he goes forth in his might." How unmechanical! How fervent! How impassioned! Rabbinic

Judaism is the oddest mixture. You never know where you have it.

I pointed out that the doctrine of the judgement and the life to come had, or could have, a double effect. It could cheapen earthly prosperity and earthly sufferings. Neither became, or could be, so important as it was when earthly life was all in all. From this point of view, too, it made for cheerfulness. But if the stress is laid upon the judgement and the requital, the effect might be the reverse. For earthly life is more or less known, and death was its close and its end. But what might befall in the hereafter was unexperienced and dark. If the joys could excel those of earth in intensity and duration, so also could the sufferings. How, then, ought a man to feel about the future? Should he be confident or afraid? One source of fear the Rabbis had not to encounter. No predestination doctrine disturbed them. Nor were they worried by any doctrine of the slavery of the will. We have seen how they treated the evil inclination. Man was frail, and liable to sin, but yet could obey the Law as well as violate it. He could be good as well as bad, and while God helped him to be good, no superhuman force or power "helped" him to be bad. His will was not enslaved, but free. All was in the power of heaven but the fear of heaven. That was within the choice of man. What, therefore, was in the minds of the Rabbis when they came to die was not any theoretic trouble as to whether they were in the category of the lost or the saved. Nor did they adopt any theory of "conversion." How often do they say man is judged by his condition at the moment, and like Ezekiel they were rather too inclined—at any rate theoretically or dogmatically

inclined—to suppose that man could pass easily from righteousness to sinfulness, and from sinfulness to righteousness. The terrors which afflicted the writer of the Fourth Book of Ezra, or the agonies which, on the common, but possibly erroneous, interpretation of Romans vii., afflicted the soul of Paul before his conversion, were entirely foreign to them. They knew them not. For these terrors and agonies were of the dogmatic order. In spite of the occasional outbursts against the power of the Yetzer ha Ra, the Evil Inclination, the Rabbis do not appear to have been much bothered or moved by such dogmatic considerations. The powerlessness of the unredeemed will, of human effort unassisted by divine grace, did not present itself to them as an awful problem and burden. They believed that God *did* help towards goodness, but they did not make any strong, theoretic opposition between the “natural” and the “regenerated” will, or between the *state* of “grace” and the *state* of “nature.” We may, I think, say that their minds were filled by the following considerations. On the one hand, there was the conviction that the future life, the life of bliss and beatitude, was the assured reward of Israel. Only *very* desperate sinners would fail to secure it. Doubtless the Rabbis believed—so at least I gather—that most persons, including themselves, would receive some purifying or disciplinary punishment after death or at the judgement, but such punishment would be purgatorial and temporary. One finds sentences such as this: All who go down to Gehenna come up again, except those classes who go down but never come up, and these are they: the adulterers, they who make their neighbour blush in public, and

they who give to their neighbour an insulting nickname (cp. Matthew v. 22). Such sayings must not be taken too literally, but the tendency is clear and the conviction plain. God is gracious and compassionate; He does not deal with man according to his sins; He is forgiving and remembers human frailty, and does not expect from man more than average man can be expected to perform. The examiner passes a candidate who has done reasonably well: even the candidate who is placed in the first class makes mistakes; he does not get full marks. So the kingdom of heaven may be obtained from imperfection. All this, then, on the one hand; on the other hand, purgatorial punishments, even though temporary, may be, for all we know, exceedingly disagreeable, unpleasant, and long. And when the Rabbis were not engaged in contrasting Israel with the nations, they were humble enough, and their faults and frailties rose vividly into their minds. Moreover, the complementary doctrine (whether consistent with the preceding or no) that God requited every one according to his works, and that He was the righteous judge, was no less a conviction than the belief in His compassion and forgiveness. And that there *was* to be a judgement, that the deeds of every Israelite *would* be weighed and tested and punished or rewarded, that there *was* a future both of beatitude and of pain (either temporary and purgatorial, or eternal and merely retributive)—all this was for the Rabbis as certain as that the sun would rise to-morrow. It was not, as for so many of us, a hope, but a conviction. It was not merely a feeling that this life cannot be all, but it was a definite conviction both that another life is *absolutely* assured, and that no one could be

absolutely certain what his position in that life was going to be. I am inclined to think that there is still something to be gained by us from this Rabbinic point of view. It seems sensible and sane. If there is to be a future life which has any relation or connection with the earthly life, there must, one would surmise, be some sort of judgement. It may be an immanent, rather than an external, judgement. It may be development and necessary sequence much more than punishment and reward. But that sin here can have *no* effect upon existence "there" seems absurd. On the other hand, character is mysterious, and love is supreme. Thus the Rabbinic attitude of hope and fear seems to me by no means foolish, obsolete, or slavish. It seems almost common sense. For fear one would, indeed, substitute solemnity. The idea of retributive punishment is passing away, except in so far as it may still be rightly regarded as a preventive of sin or crime. But "punishment" as necessary sequence, or as disciplinary, is sensible enough. For either there is another life in relation with this life, or there is not. If there is not, there is an end of the matter; if there is, one cannot look forward to it without solemnity, responsibility, and even awe. One may also be hopeful, one may also confide whole-heartedly in God's love, one may also desire the unimaginable joys and developments, one may also long for the rest or the peace or the reunions, but I do not think that one reasonably can, or religiously should, omit the solemnity and the awe.

The death-bed scenes in the Rabbinic literature, and its remarks and reflections upon the subject of death, may be utilised in the light of what has just been said. By the critics of Rabbinism the very familiar utterances of R. Jochanan b. Zakkai

are usually given as a striking example of Rabbinic anxiousness and fear. It forms one of the regular *pièces justificatives* of the usual criticism. Legalism could only produce terror: one could never satisfy God on a legalistic basis. To be confident and happy in the hour of death one needs the faith which Paul after his conversion was to introduce into the world. Faith in the redemptive work of Jesus can destroy that very fear which Jesus himself bade his disciples show. "Fear him," said Jesus, "who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell. Fear him who, after he has killed, has power to cast into hell; yea, I say unto you, fear him." Precisely so R. Jochanan b. Zakkai, when his disciples visit him as he lies upon his death-bed, and he weeps, and they ask the reason, replies: If they were about to bring me before a king of flesh and blood, who is here to-day and in his grave to-morrow, whose wrath, if he be angry with me, is no eternal wrath, whose bonds are no eternal bonds, whose death, if he kill me, is no eternal death, whom I might soften with words and bribe with money, nevertheless I might weep: but now that they bring me before a King who is the King of kings, who is eternal, whose wrath, etc., should I not weep? Moreover, two ways are before me; one leads to Paradise, and one to Hell, and I do not know along which way they will make me go—should I not weep? What is remarkable in the story is not that the Rabbi weeps—or, as we should say, feels a certain awe—but that the contrast is between Paradise and *Hell*, between eternal happiness and *eternal* punishment (or annihilation). Punishment is here regarded as retributive, and not as purgatorial. Nevertheless,

except for grave and hardened sinners a purifying, and not a perpetual retributory, punishment seems to have been regarded as the usual lot. The classical passage in the tractate *Rosh ha Shanah* distinctly says: It was taught in the school of Shammai that in the Judgement Day there would be three classes of men: the completely righteous, the completely wicked, and the in-betweens. Now, clearly the great mass of Israelites must belong to class three. Of them it is said, "They go down into Hell (Gehinnom) and howl (through pain), but come up again." The justifying verse is Zachariah xiii. 9, which clearly shows that the punishment is regarded as purificatory. There is a special mysterious class of Israelites who sin "with their body." These are punished in the fire of hell for a year, and then annihilated, body and soul. Who they are seems doubtful: Rab said, They who wore no Tephillin.¹ Lastly, there are the "completely wicked." These comprise: the heretics, the informers, the apostates, those who deny the divinity of the Law or the resurrection of the dead, they who dissociate themselves from the community, they who bring terror upon the land, and they who sin and cause others to sin in the manner of Jeroboam—these are punished for ever in hell. In view of the frequent statement that the Rabbis were only strict as regards moral deeds, and were tolerant as regards opinions, it is amusing to notice that most of the eternal denizens of hell are precisely the men of false opinions and false beliefs.

It is noteworthy that the Rabbis, like Jesus and the author of the Fourth Gospel, show no compunc-

¹ Dr. Abrahams writes: "The commentaries on the Talmud find this explanation itself much in need of explanation."

tion for the lot of the wicked. The unrepentant sinner deserves hell or annihilation, and he gets what he deserves. "Depart into the fire," says Jesus to the wicked, and he does not seem either to pity their fate, or to worry and puzzle about the constitution of a world, or the character of a God, that has brought about so tragic a consummation. "Few," said Jesus, "find the small gateway. Broad is the path which leads to destruction, and many pursue it." The Rabbis shared the same insensitivity, except that they seemed disposed to consider that a very large percentage of Israelites would attain eternal bliss, while a very large percentage of Gentiles would be doomed to annihilation or Gehenna. It is to the eternal credit of the author of the Fourth Book of Ezra that he, a solitary exception, is seriously concerned with the future fate of the wicked. It is to him a subject of pain and horror. He cannot, indeed, rid himself of the dread doctrines of his circle. He is far less optimistic than the Rabbis as to the proportions of "saved" and "lost." Even of the Israelites few would reach the goal of everlasting bliss. He cannot indignantly upset the odious doctrine as grossly inconsistent with the character of a loving God. But, unlike Jesus and the Rabbis, he cannot consign a number of people to hell without pity and anguish. He is harried by a terrible dilemma. His feelings of pity and justice pull him one way; his inherited and orthodox doctrines pull him the other. Orthodoxy has to triumph; the reasons given are feeble in the extreme; but the notable thing is that the inward conflict took place. He *did* feel sorry. Gunkel calls this new sensitiveness the mark of a weak nature. It seems rather the mark of a new

insight which we may hail with joy. What a gulf separates him from those who could find in the torments of the lost an extra satisfaction for the saved ! He feels bound to submit to the supposed decrees of God, but at all events he questions them. He does not realise how infinitely superior he is to the supposed God at whose judgements he must not cavil. He feels sure that his doubts are wrong, whereas these doubts, so isolated, so exceptional, so unparalleled, do him really the highest credit. I am not aware whether he had any successor till quite modern times. Let us, then, love and honour this old Jew, born so many ages before his time. At last he has come to his own ; at last he has won glory and recognition. How, he asks, can God be rightly called compassionate if the major portion of the souls whom He creates are to live or perish in misery ? “ If Thou art going to destroy him who was fashioned by Thy command, to what purpose was he made ? ” “ Better is it with the beasts than with man. For they have no judgement to look for, neither do they know of any torture or of any salvation promised to them after death.” “ The coming age shall bring delight to few, but torment to many,” and the heart of the writer is wrung, even though the torment may be called deserved because of sin. And yet such is the burden of the orthodoxy to which he feels compelled to do homage that he thinks he must make this divine fashioner of hell and torment declare : “ Thou comest far short of being able to love My creation more than I ” ! Surely such a God, one would suppose, loved it far less !

To return, however, to the Rabbis. By no means all of them, on their death-beds or beds of sickness,

felt as R. Jochanan b. Zakkai. Thus, in the case of R. Eliezer, it is recorded that Akiba, on visiting him and perceiving his suffering, laughed. On being questioned by the other disciples as to his strange conduct, he said, So long as I saw that the master's wine did not become sour, or his flax did not crumble, or his oil become putrid, or his honey rancid, I thought perhaps, which God forbid, that the master had received his "world" already, but now that I see the master in pain, I rejoice. Then Eliezer said to Akiba, Have I been wanting in anything of the whole Torah? Akiba replied, Master, hast thou thyself not taught us, "There is no man upon earth who is always good and never sins." Here the great anxiety of Jochanan b. Zakkai seems exchanged for the too great confidence of Eliezer. Again, when R. Joshua was dying, he bade his disciples bury him in white garments, because he was not ashamed of his deeds and was worthy to receive the presence of his Creator. R. Simeon b. Jochai was more conceited still. He is reported to have said that however few the children of the "upper chamber" who stand before the Shechinah might be, he and his son would certainly be found among them. If there were but two, those two would be himself and his son. Such a whimsical paradox as this must have had some peculiar reason. R. Jochanan bade his disciples bury him in clothes which were neither white nor black, "so that if I stand among the righteous I need not be ashamed, and if I stand among the wicked I need not blush." The following story, which only partially bears upon the subject before us, is too quaint not to be given in full. R. Eleazar was ill, and R. Jochanan went to visit

him. He saw that he was lying in a dark room, so he bared his arm and a brightness was radiated therefrom. He noticed that R. Eleazar was weeping. He said to him, Why do you weep? Is it because you have not applied yourself enough to the study of the Law? We have learned that it matters not whether a man does much or little, so long as he directs his heart to God. Is it because of the lack of food? Not every one has the merit of two tables. Is it because of your childlessness? See here is the bone of my tenth son! R. Eleazar replied, I weep because of your beauty which will decay in the earth. R. Jochanan said to him, Well dost thou weep on that account. And they both wept. After a while he said to him, Are your sufferings dear to thee? He replied, Neither they nor the reward they bring. He said to him, Give me your hand. He gave him his hand, and R. Jochanan raised him up (healed him). Here R. Jochanan presents a moderate point of view, removed alike from over-confidence and over-anxiety. So, too, when R. Gamaliel read the verse in Psalm xv., "He who does these things shall never be moved," he wept. Must *all* be done in order to gain the hereafter? Who can do *all*? But Akiba comforted him, for he pointed out that what the passage really meant was that he who does even only *one* of these things shall never be moved! Moreover, no limit was placed to the power of repentance. A man could be a lifelong sinner and repent on his death-bed, and find forgiveness, and there is more than one such story recorded in the Talmud. Of such tardy repentance and its result the saying of "Rabbi" is recorded: There are those who acquire the world to come with labour in years upon years;

there are those who acquire it in an hour. And this saying became familiar. Yet R. Mattai the Arbelite said: Grow not careless of retribution. The love of God must not wholly drive out fear. A man should fear every day. He is to say, Woe is me, perhaps punishment may reach me to-day or to-morrow. When he is prosperous, he is not to say, Because I have deserved it, God has given me food and drink in this world, and the "capital" awaits me in the hereafter; but he is to say, Woe is me, perhaps only one single "merit" has been found in me. He has given me food and drink here that He may deprive me of the world to come. On the whole, however, it would seem that the thought of divine mercy was never really far off. Two great intercessors plead for every man: repentance and good works, and the Talmud goes on to say, Even if nine hundred and ninety deeds declare him guilty, and only one declares "merit," he is delivered (based upon Job xxx. 23). Moreover, death itself was regarded as a great atonement. The formula for a death-bed confession (which the Talmud enjoins upon all), now printed in the orthodox Prayer Book, though post-Talmudic, is in complete accordance with its spirit. "If my death is fully determined by Thee, I will accept it from Thy hand in love. May my death be an atonement for all the sins, iniquities, and transgressions of which I have been guilty against Thee." Even for a criminal who was to be put to death, confession and death were adequate atonement. Every one who confesses (his sin) has a portion in the world to come. Thus Joshua bade Achan confess, and if Joshua said to him, "The Lord shall trouble thee this day," the passage means, On *this* day thou shalt be

troubled, but *not* in the world to come,—a fine and happy instance of Rabbinic exegesis ! If the criminal does not know how to confess, they bid him repeat these words : “ May my death be an atonement for all my sins.”

In the orthodox Prayer Book the dying man prays : “ Vouchsafe unto me of the abounding happiness that is treasured up for the righteous. Make known to me the path of life : in Thy presence is fullness of joy ; at thy right hand are pleasures for evermore.” This is quite Rabbinic, for though, as we have seen, earthly life and its joys were not despised, yet the joys of the hereafter were set high above them, and the joys and rewards which the Psalmists and other Biblical writers often picture or describe are constantly interpreted by the Rabbis (as in the last quotation) to mean the joys and rewards of the world to come. Sufferings were “ very good,” because they were the God-appointed pathway to this goal: they were the key which opened the gates. The words of the sick Rabbis who, in answer to the question: “ Are thy sufferings dear to thee ? ” reply, “ Neither they nor the reward they bring,” must be regarded as whimsical and unusual. They do not represent the usual Rabbinic point of view. The life to come and its joys are the final and adequate reply to the puzzles and troubles of earth. The famous bird’s-nest story is thoroughly characteristic. “ Honour thy father and thy mother,” runs the fifth word, “ that it may be well with thee, and that thy days may be prolonged in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.” And in Deut. xxii. 7, where there is a prohibition against taking the mother bird with its eggs and its young, the promise of the same reward in almost the same terms is appended to the

command. Now one day a father said to his son, Climb that tree, and bring me the young birds. The son climbed the tree, and took the young birds and let the mother go. But as he came down the tree, he fell and was killed. Where was the well-being, and where the prolongation of his days? Therefore the promise of the reward must refer to the world which is altogether good and altogether long! In the discussion which follows one recitation of this story, one Rabbi goes so far as to say that there is no reward for *any* command in *this* world. Yet that, again, is not the prevailing impression one gains; it is not the usual point of view. There is, indeed, a famous passage in the Mishnah which enumerates the virtues the fruits (*i.e.* rewards) of which a man enjoys in this world, while the stock or capital is reserved for him in the world to come. This list, which elsewhere is quoted with variations, comprises the virtues of honouring father and mother, charity, making peace between man and man, and, above all, the study of the Law. Thus here the very virtue, the doubt as to the earthly reward of which was suggested by the bird's-nest story, is singled out as one of the four special virtues for which reward is to be expected upon earth as well as in heaven. In any case, however, the greater reward in Rabbinic judgement is always reserved for the world to come. And the ultimate theodicy is always there. "What hope of comfort or redress? Behind the veil, behind the veil." In this explanation of evil the Rabbis and the Victorian poet are at one.

In the details of their eschatology the Rabbis do not give us much help. The distinctions which they draw between the Messianic Age and the world to come, between the life on a regenerated

earth and the life after the judgement in heaven, are not always clear, and in any case of no present-day value or interest. They are only of interest to the historian or the compiler of eschatological ideas. In themselves they are obsolete. We find in the Rabbinical literature a double strain, just as we find it in the New Testament. According to the first, the dead sleep in their graves till the day of resurrection. According to the second, they enter Paradise or Hell at once. The two strains are never clearly and consistently combined. The resurrection life appears to be conceived as a life with a body and soul, like the present life on earth, though the "body" was doubtless supposed by most Rabbis to be other and purer than the body of "this world." So far as the two strains can be harmonised with each other, it would seem as if the notion was that the spirit after death lived on by itself, receiving a preliminary dose of either punishment or reward. At the resurrection the body rises, and each spirit is joined to its body, and the personality of reunited body and soul receives its judgement, and remains reunited for ever. There are many entirely obsolete materialistic and superstitious conceptions in the Rabbinic teachings about the resurrection which need not concern us. They belong to the theological lumber-room ; and what a huge room that is ! Nevertheless, it would be unfair to suppose that the Rabbis conceived of the life of the world to come, and more especially of the happy life *after* the judgement, as a mere copy of this world, and that they revelled in a material heaven with material and sensuous joys. That is not so. For them, as for Jesus, there was no marrying nor giving in marriage in the world to

come, and it is not a mere apologist's partiality when the famous words of the fourth-century Rabbi are continually quoted as the common view of at least the higher and better Rabbinic opinion. "Not like this world is the world to come. In the world to come there is neither eating nor drinking ; no procreation of children or business transactions ; no envy or hatred or rivalry ; but the righteous sit enthroned, their crowns on their heads, and enjoy the lustre of the Shechinah." In that world too, as Jesus also taught, the conditions of this world will also in other ways be reversed. Those above here will there be below, and those below here will there be above. Those in high places here will there be despised, and those despised here will there be honoured. This world is transitory : that world is abiding. This world is a mere hotel or caravan-serai : that world is a house or home. The finest thing about the hereafter in Rabbinical literature is that saying by R. Jacob, which I fear I have quoted almost *ad nauseam*. Yet it bears much repetition. It should be very familiar to Jewish readers, because it is included in the Sayings of the Fathers, that short treatise of the Mishnah which forms a portion of the orthodox Prayer Book (p. 137). "This world is like a vestibule before the world to come ; prepare thyself in the vestibule that thou mayest enter into the hall." Then follows the wonderful paradox : "Better is one hour of repentance and good deeds in this world than the whole life of the world to come ; but better is one hour of blissfulness of spirit in the world to come than the whole life of this world." Mr. Singer's rendering of the Hebrew by "blissfulness" is, perhaps, not sufficiently literal. The word means

literally "cooling," hence appeasement, or calm, or satisfaction, or refreshment of spirit. The Hereafter is the life of peace, yet not the life of stagnation, but of that peace which is satisfying and fully conscious.¹ It is the peace which, in the words of Paul, "passes understanding."

It may be asked how far in ethical matters does the Rabbinic literature supplement or go beyond the Old Testament? The reply would, I think, be that while the virtues it inculcates are pretty much the same, there are some fresh touches, some new emphasis, and some refinements, delicacies, and distinctions. In passion and paradox it seems to stand between the, at first sight, rather pedestrian morality of the book of Proverbs on the one hand, and the ardour and fervency of the Gospels upon the other. Jesus expected the end of the old world order to come soon; the Rabbis did not. Jesus could teach: "Sell *all* that you have and give it to the poor," at least as a counsel of perfection. Examples of such a complete "giving" are known to the Rabbis. R. Yoshbab did so. The case of King Monobaz was famous, and the reasons which he gave are closely similar to the reason suggested in Matthew vi. 1. Yet the Rabbis preferred upon the whole that a large regular *percentage* of a man's income should be used for charitable purposes. At one time the amount was fixed at a fifth. For they desired that the rich

¹ It appears to me to be doubtful whether the Rabbis had any conception of the modern idea of development and progressive activity in the hereafter. Dr. Abrahams writes: "The idea was certainly known to them, for they speak of the righteous as 'going from strength to strength' in the heavenly realms until the very presence of God is reached." This, however, is not (it seems to me) the same thing as the modern idea of the future life comprising action and production as well as contemplation, and an increase in righteousness as well as in knowledge.

man should act in such a manner that every year, for twenty, thirty, or forty years, he might give a considerable portion of his income to the poor. Or even that he might make loans,—loans, *bien entendu*, without interest. For to lend, in certain circumstances, was better than to give. The point of view is different. The Rabbis were not blind to the effect of charity upon the giver, but they thought still more of its utility to the recipient. As very much the greater part of the Rabbinic literature is later than the fall of Jerusalem or than the Hadrianic revolt, so one seems to perceive in their ethics, and in its social implications, that the beginnings of the small Jewish communities of the Middle Ages are foreshadowed. “Rich and poor meet together ; the Lord is the maker of them all.” All belong to Israel, and all form part of one “bundle.” There is no “submerged tenth,” and the masses who know not the Law, the outcasts and the despised ones of the Gospels—so far as they actually existed in the days of Jesus (the precise nature and extent of these classes are disputed)—have disappeared, or are gradually disappearing. Among the Jewish communities from the second and third centuries onwards there was probably much less occasion and opportunity for that missionary and redemptive enterprise which may have been requisite in the first half of the first century, and which was so ardently demanded, and so graciously carried out, by the Prophet of Nazareth. Poor and rich were now less separated from one another, and the number of outcasts who belonged to the fold, but yet, through poverty and anguish of spirit, disobeyed the Law, and were neglected and despised because they did so, was probably

very small. A common suffering had drawn all classes closely together, and no one could remain a Jew who had not a certain moral fibre or a certain religious attachment. Meanwhile, the virtues of benevolence and charity became more and more deeply ingrained in the Jewish character. They form one of the finest chapters in the ethics of Rabbinic and mediaeval Judaism, and in depth and delicacy and development go beyond anything that we find in the Old Testament, nor are they behind what we find in the New. But it is not possible to do more than allude to the subject in this place.

It is an interesting fact that the Rabbinic word for almsgiving is the Biblical word for righteousness. The Hebrew word *Zedakah* came to mean beneficence, and from beneficence it was not a large step to almsgiving. Whatever praise is given by the Biblical writers to righteousness is quoted by the Rabbis in favour of almsgiving. It delivers from death and is an atonement for sin. It is greater than all sacrifices put together. It hastens the advent of the Messiah. He who gives only a small gift to the poor is worthy to receive the face of the *Shechinah*. But the Rabbis make distinctions. One must give wisely, one must give joyfully, one must cause others to give, and above all, one must give delicately. He who gives alms in secret is greater than Moses. And even here there may be a delicate difference. Sometimes the right thing may be to know to whom one gives, but that the recipient should not know who is the giver, and sometimes it may be the right thing that the recipient should know who has given, but that the giver should not know who has received. The highest rank of benevolence is attained when

neither side knows. He who in his almsgiving causes his fellow-creature to blush is severely condemned. But the rule is laid down that, though almsgiving "weighs" as much as all the other commands put together, the man who begs from door to door is not to be relieved. Nevertheless, there are limitations to the limitation. A wandering beggar must be given food and money for a night's lodging. If he remains over the Sabbath, he must be given food for three meals. And when one Rabbi objected that the rule not to give to the beggar might, if strictly followed, end in his death, another replied that the rule only meant that he was not to receive a large gift, but only a small one! It seemed to the Rabbis as if God had created rich and poor that the former might gain "merit" by helping the latter. Thus, the benefit which the poor confers upon the rich is far greater than that which the rich confers upon the poor. Has not the poor enough in his poverty? To withhold the gifts that are their due—the "tenth," the gleaning, and so on—is robbery. God tests and tries both poor and rich. He tries the rich, if he will be generous to the poor; he tries the poor, if he will accept his poverty without murmuring against God. If God had so devised His world that all were equal, what opportunity for goodness would there be? Yet, as we have seen, the Rabbis did not think lightly of poverty, and many of them had experienced it. "All sufferings in the one scale and poverty in the other; the scales are balanced"—such is one of their sayings. No wonder then that they esteemed the virtue of benevolence very highly.

Yet almsgiving is, after all, only the lesser portion

of charity. It does not say, remarks one Rabbi, Blessed is he who *gives* to the poor, but, Blessed is he who *considers* the poor. To almsgiving in the narrower sense they opposed the doing of loving-kindnesses, or, as we should say, charity or love. The familiar passages about *gemiluth chesadim*, or the practice of love, are perhaps almost too familiar to quote, and yet it would be unfair not to quote them ! For they have sunk deep into the Jewish consciousness, and it is through them that Jews of to-day, even though they may not know their wording, have really learnt to believe in the importance of charity and loving deeds. I am the last person to deny the beauty of the New Testament passages about love. But, in a sense, Jews need them very much less than they need the emancipating sayings of Jesus about defilement. They have their own Rabbinic passages, which have stimulated to fair and loving actions, no less than Christians have *their* passages in the New Testament. Each line of development is independent of the other. If Akiba said of the command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," that it was the injunction of the Law which included all the others, the Kelal, or norm, for them all, such a saying from such a man had the most far-reaching influence. Then there is the familiar *a fortiori* saying about love and sacrifice. Almsgiving is greater than all the sacrifices, but love is greater than almsgiving. Perhaps most influential of all has been the exceedingly familiar saying : Love and almsgiving are as important as all the other commands of the Law put together. The value of almsgiving is only perfected by, or proportionate to, the love which accompanies it.

The distinction between "love" and "pity" is not always clearly maintained. Doubtless pity would often be used as a synonym for love, as in the saying : He who withholds pity from his neighbour is reckoned as an idolater ; he throws off from himself the yoke of heaven. The yoke of heaven, or the yoke of the kingdom, is often combined with love. The Law in its wisdom declares : Receive upon you the yoke of the kingdom of God's name, and make one another walk in the fear of heaven, and habitually practise loving deeds towards each other. Charity is greater than almsgiving, for charity is not limited to money, and may be extended and shown to the rich as well as to the poor. There were certain special and constantly recurrent actions which appeared to the Rabbis to be especially necessary and desirable exhibitions of charity. Such were to visit the sick, to accompany the wayfarer on his journey, to attend weddings and funerals, and to help in the dowry of poor brides and in the burial of the poor. To redeem the prisoner was also a work of love, and hospitality was another. Bring the poor into thine own house, runs the Rabbinic adage ; hide not thyself from thine own flesh. To clothe the naked was also a work of love. And that is why the saying went that the Law begins with a deed of love and ends with it, for God made unto Adam and Eve coats of skin and clothed them, and he buried Moses in the valley of Moab. In the world to come man will be asked : What was your occupation ? If he replies, I fed the hungry, they will say to him, This is the gate of the Lord ; enter in. And the same will be said to him who has given drink to the thirsty, clothed the naked,

nurtured the orphan, or done any other "action of love." The truest kindness, *chesed shel emet*, was that shown to the dead, for they could make no return. The famous verse in Micah is interpreted as meaning to give alms and to do loving deeds, while to walk humbly before God is also made to signify charity. For whereas usually the burial of the dead and giving a dowry to the bride (and thus enabling her to marry) are regarded as examples of charity, here they are named as examples of walking modestly before God. And it is added : As the Law (note that here Torah includes the Prophets) prescribes modesty in matters which are usually done in public, how much more does it urge modesty in things which are done in secret ? The stories of Rabbinic delicacy in almsgiving and charity are numerous and touching, but they cannot be mentioned here.

It is interesting to note that with childlike methods of almsgiving the Rabbis also combined quite modern ideas upon the subject. Thus, on the one hand, we hear of a rich Rabbi who was wont to wrap gold pieces in bits of cloth, and to throw them behind him. The poor picked them up, and he knew not who received them. Or we hear of others who gave costly and delicate viands to impoverished persons, because before their impoverishment they had been accustomed to such fare. Yet these very Rabbis were aware that their charity could be abused. It is true that they said that we must be grateful to the deceivers, for if it were not for them, we should sin every day (in refusing to give, Deut. xv. 9), but they judged deception pretty severely all the same. He who shams blindness or commits other similar tricks will not die before

a real calamity has befallen him. It is true that he who refuses to give alms is as if he worshipped an idol, but yet he who takes alms before he needs them will not die before he needs them really. And to lose one's independence seemed to the Rabbis one of the worst of evils. *Any* occupation rather than begging ! Not to require the gifts of men or their loans is one of the requests included in the daily grace after meals. And though we are told of the Rabbi who gave away his pieces of gold by that curious method, it is stated by another (and more distinguished) Rabbi that to lend is better than to give, while to give in order to set up a man in business, or to go into partnership with him in business, is the best of all methods of relief. He who gives to the poor and lends to them without interest, exclaims the Midrash, with the usual oriental exaggeration, is rewarded by Holy Writ as if he had obeyed all the commands. The hatred of interest on money was as marked with the Rabbis as with the Greek philosophers. He who lends on interest is regarded by the Scripture as if he had committed all the evil and all the sins of the world. The usurer is as bad as one who denies God. He is even worse. For he falsifies the whole Law and makes out Moses a fool, and says, If Moses had known what profit we make, he would not have forbidden usury ! See, say the Rabbis, how the creatures of God lend to and borrow from one another. Day borrows from night and night from day. Many other fanciful examples are given. And God says : See how much I lend, and I take no interest, and how much the earth lends, and she takes no interest. I only take back my capital (the soul), and she only takes back her capital (the body).

Woe to him who exacts interest. Nor were the Rabbis entirely averse to, or ignorant of, the art of making "inquiries" before giving "relief," though they perhaps had more primitive ideas about such inquiries than the C.O.S. There is a discussion in the Talmud on the subject of inquiries as to clothing and as to food, one Rabbi maintaining that inquiries should be made as to requests for clothing and not as to requests for food, while another Rabbi holds the opposite. One must not inquire as regards the clothing, argues the one Rabbi, because there is an indelicacy in examining as to a man's clothing, but not as to his food. One must not inquire as regards the food, argues the other, because a hungry man suffers pain. The spirit of these discussions is still of value for us to-day.

The love and loving deeds which the Rabbis demanded from their disciples, or which they held up as an ideal, were illustrated and particularised in all sorts of ways. Pity, gentleness, sympathy, forgiveness were all strongly inculcated, just as their opposites—including the giving of pain in word or deed, and any lack of consideration and delicacy—were severely reprobated. Hence the constantly quoted injunctions to be of the persecuted and the oppressed rather than of the oppressors and the persecutors. It is pointed out that the very animals appointed for the sacrifices illustrate this preference, for God says, Sacrifice to Me from the persecuted and not from the persecutors. Better be the cursed than the curser. Call the oppressed happy rather than the oppressors. Show pity, and God will show you pity. Learn to endure sorrow with patience and to pardon offences. As God repays evil with good, so do thou. Why does the Law say, "Thou

shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart ? ” Because a man might think that he must not inflict any bodily harm upon his neighbour, or not curse him, but the Law declares that even in the heart no hatred is to be felt. The injured party must forgive even as the injurer must beg forgiveness. So the Law stands codified in the Mishnah. Even though the injurer pays the injured party a compensation, he is not forgiven till he seeks his pardon, but if the injured does not then forgive, he is called savage. For the sin of a man against his neighbour the Day of Atonement works no forgiveness till he has become reconciled with his neighbour. I do not think that much need, or can legitimately, be made of the saying of R. Jose bar Chanina, who, playing upon the words of Genesis i. 17, declares that a man is not to ask forgiveness from his neighbour more than three times, though I freely admit that the saying exists, and that I was in the wrong when, some years ago, I contended that Canon Charles was inaccurate in contrasting this Rabbinic utterance with the famous utterance of Jesus.¹ I venture to think that very little importance must be attached to the saying of R. Jose, though very much importance must be attached to the saying of Jesus. I doubt whether R. Jose meant what he said to be taken very strictly. If you ask, Then why should the fine things be taken strictly, if the less fine things are not to be taken strictly? I can only reply that no rule can be laid down. It is a question of tact. Some of the less fine things, some of

¹ Dr. Abrahams writes : “ I think what you say here, as well as what you say at the end of the paragraph, is largely irrelevant. The reason why, according to the Rabbis, you need not ask for forgiveness again and again is that the man who refuses to forgive becomes himself the offender. Culprit and injured change places.”

the ugly things, in the Rabbinical literature *are* to be taken strictly, and mean what they say, but *this* saying of R. Jose is not (as I think) one of them. In any case it stands (so far as I know) alone. Elsewhere the Rabbis do not appear to put qualifications upon the duty of forgiveness. And the story is told how one Rabbi went on the eve of thirteen successive Days of Atonement to win the forgiveness of another Rabbi whom he had annoyed, but without success !

I have not included in this little book any observations about the Apocalyptic literature because I do not think that Liberal Judaism has learnt, or can learn, anything from it. But there are undoubtedly some fine things in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs about forgiveness and love which are well worth noting, and which deserve the praise which Canon Charles has lavished upon them. "Love ye one another from the heart ; and if a man sin against thee, cast forth the poison of hate, and speak peaceably to him, and in thy soul hold not guile ; and if he confess and repent, forgive him. But if he deny it, do not get into a passion with him, lest catching the poison from thee he take to swearing, and so thou sin doubly. And though he deny it, and yet have a sense of shame when reproved, give over reproving him. For he who denies may repent so as not again to wrong thee : yea, he may also honour thee, and be at peace with thee. And if he be shameless and persist in his wrongdoing, even so forgive him from the heart, and leave to God the avenging." "Beware of hatred ; for it works lawlessness even against the Lord Himself. For it will not hear the words of the commandments concerning the loving of one's neighbour, and it

sins against God. For if a brother stumble, it delights immediately to proclaim it to all men, and is urgent that he should be judged for it and put to death. For hatred works with envy also against them that prosper. For as love would quicken even the dead, and would call back them that are condemned to die, so hatred would slay the living, and those that had sinned venially it would not suffer to live. For the spirit of hatred works together with Satan, through hastiness of spirit, in all things to men's death ; but the spirit of love works together with the law of God in long-suffering unto the salvation of men." But when all is said and done, does this passage go further than Sirach, who though, like so many other teachers, by no means consistent, is yet able to rise on occasion to noble heights ? "He that takes vengeance shall find vengeance from the Lord ; and he will surely make firm his sins. Forgive thy neighbour the hurt he has done thee : and then thy sins shall be pardoned when thou prayest. Man cherishes anger against man ; and does he seek healing from the Lord ? Upon a man like himself he has no mercy ; and does he make supplication for his own sins ? He being himself flesh nourishes wrath ; who shall make atonement for his sins ? " At any rate this teaching goes a good bit beyond that of the book of Proverbs.

There is certainly no lack of delicate consideration for others in Rabbinic ethics. R. Janai saw a man giving alms to another man in public. Better, he said, that you had given him nothing than that you had put him to shame. For he who causes shame to his neighbour is as if he had committed a murder. It is better for a man to cast himself into

the middle of a fiery furnace than to cause the face of his fellow-creature to blanch in public. Elsewhere it is said that the adulterer deserves death, but will be admitted to the hereafter, but he who puts his neighbour to open shame will have no share in the world to come. It is forbidden for a man to work at night for himself, if he works by day for another, for he cannot then do justly to his employer. A teacher may not impose upon himself a voluntary fast. The Mishnah states that there was a chamber in the Temple in which gifts were secretly placed, and from which the poor of good families were secretly helped.

Delicacy in words is even made a matter of the actual code. The passage in the Mishnah is very striking. As there is fraud in buying and selling, so there is an injury in words. (The Hebrew term is the same in both cases : Onaah = fraud, unfair advantage, injury, insult.) One must not ask the price of an article if one does not intend to buy it. If a man has repented, one must not say to him, Remember your former deeds. If a man is of proselyte descent, one must not say to him, Remember the deeds of your ancestors. On these injunctions of the Mishnah the Gemara makes some reflections and comments. If a proselyte desires to study the Law, one is not to say to him, What ! A mouth which has eaten creeping things and other abominations now desires to learn the Law ! If sufferings or sicknesses come to a man, or if he buries his children, one is not to speak to him like the friends of Job (Job iv. 6, 7). One must be gentle and courteous with all men. Good manners are constantly preached. If one has no money, one must not look at the goods in a shop. Such things,

says the Talmud, are delivered over to the heart, and of all such things it is said, Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God. There are also actions, say the Rabbis, which the human court of law has to pronounce unpunishable, but which God will severely punish. Among such cases is the one of a man who, having promised to buy and having paid for an article, but not yet having taken it away from the shop, desires to get out of his bargain. He *can* legally do so, but God will severely punish those who do not keep to their word. Another case is that of a man who could be a favourable witness for somebody in a lawsuit and does not come forward. R. Meir said that a man is not to press his fellow to dine with him if he knows that he cannot ; or to beg him to receive a present if he knows that he will not receive it. Any deception of this sort, even if to an idolater, is a grave sin, while the worst of thieves is he who filches from his fellow his good name.

If compassion and delicate consideration were praised by the Rabbis, justice was also. One of the "legs" on which the world stands is justice, the other two being peace and truth. Like charity, justice, too, is superior to all sacrifices. He who steals from his neighbour the value of a farthing—the Scripture regards it as if he had killed him. The just judge is regarded as if he shared with God in the work of creation : he helps to maintain the world. He causes the Shechinah to shine and dwell in Israel. There must be no false sentiment or misplaced compassion in the administration of justice. In the spirit of Exodus xxiii. 3 Akiba said, No pity in justice. On the other hand, the Rabbis understood the higher justice which is equity. When the workmen of one Rabbi broke his wine

jars, he took away their clothes. But another Rabbi bade him return them. He said, Is this the Law? and was convinced by a saying in Proverbs. Moreover, the workmen said, We are poor and hungry, and have laboured all day for nothing! Then the same teacher bade the reluctant Rabbi give them their proper hire, and the second half of the same verse in Proverbs (ii. 20) was his justification. There are pretty stories about the scrupulous honesty of R. Chaninah b. Dosa and R. Pinchas b. Yair (which, from another point of view, may be also used as an illustration of the parable of the Talents). When a man left some hens at R. Chaninah's house, the Rabbi refused to allow his wife to eat their eggs; the fowls increased in number, and became a nuisance. Thereupon R. Chaninah exchanged them for some goats which he presented to the owner of the hens when the latter came to inquire for his property. Two men deposited some barley with R. Pinchas; he sowed the barley and reaped the harvest, and when the men came for their deposited barley, the Rabbi bade them bring asses and camels and remove the entire produce of the harvest.¹

The Rabbis coined a curious phrase for duties which lie outside the strict letter of justice. The word *Shurah* means line, row; hence the straight line of right, or the strict letter of the Law is *shurat ha'din*, while *within* (we should rather say *without*) the strict letter of the Law is what we should call equity: *lefanim meshurat ha'din*. Thus Exodus xviii. 20 is interpreted as follows: "Thou shalt show

¹ Büchler, *Some Types*, p. 89. For two other cases of strictness see p. 144 of the same book. The second is of a man who would not return the greetings of those who had come to deliver a message, because he was working as a hired labourer in the field and would not waste time by doing so.

them," *i.e.* show them the house of their life (the house of study and prayer); "the way," that is, visiting the sick; "they must walk," that is, the burial of the dead; "in it," that is, the deeds of piety to the dead; "and the work," that is, the strict letter of the Law; "that they must do," that is, "within the strict letter of the Law," or *equity*. It could also mean a finer justice, as in the simple story of the Rabbi who, on being asked by a woman whether a certain coin was good, told her it was. The next day she came and told him it had been declared bad. Then he said to his colleague, Go, take it from her and give her a good one in exchange. He was not compelled to act so. It was *lefanim meshurat ha'din*.¹ One Rabbi went so far as to utter the paradox that Jerusalem was destroyed because they judged only according to the letter of the Law, and never went beyond it. Or again, there are cases when a man is guiltless before a human court of law, but guilty before the court of heaven; as, for instance, if he could give evidence in an accused's favour, and does not do so. The intention, and the way in which a thing is done, count heavily. If a man gives his fellow the finest present in the world in a churlish manner, it is as if he had given him nothing; if he receives him kindly and pleasantly, it is as if he had given him all the good gifts of the world. The conduct of Job is contrasted with that of Abraham. The former received all travellers in his house, and gave them the fare to which they were accustomed. Abraham sought out wayfarers and brought them back to his house, and to those who were *not* accustomed to wheaten bread or meat or wine he gave it.

¹ For the general point of view see also Büchler, *Some Types*, pp. 36 and 37. Some good examples are there given.

Similarly the Rabbis knew the worth of thoughts and intention and motive. Sinful thoughts, they say, are worse than sinful deeds. The Rabbi whose inside is not as his outside is no Rabbi. R. Gamaliel issued a proclamation: A disciple whose inside is not the same as his outside may not enter the house of study. On the other hand, they realised that the right deed, done from an imperfect motive, might end in the right deed done from the best motive. Hence the saying, repeated endlessly, that a man is always to study the Law and to fulfil its commands, even if this be not done for their own sake, for the very practice will lead from the external to the internal motive. So fear will lead to love. It is of divine mercy that a good intention, which was prevented from issuing in deed, is regarded as a deed accomplished, while a sinful intention, similarly prevented, is not reckoned as a committed sin. We cannot go to the Rabbis for the pure unadulterated prophetic teaching of Hosea or Isaiah, and yet even with them there are many sayings which are invested with a certain prophetic character. The heart must be made as clean as the hands. Then only can we return unto God. One can become an adulterer through the eye as well as through the body. He who steals with one hand, and gives alms with the other, shall not remain unpunished. The man is mocked and reprehended who, having paid the harlot her hire, meets a beggar as he leaves her door, gives him money, and says, If it had not been God's will to forgive my sin, this beggar would not have met me. If you sin with one hand, and do a pious deed with the other, the second deed does not atone for the first. If a man swears one thing to his neighbour with his mouth,

but rejects it with his heart, shall he go unpunished ? One lie begets another. The Rabbis are exceedingly sensitive to anything approaching deceitfulness and untruth. Truth is God's seal. Hypocrisy is a profanation of the Name. Never let a man say one thing with his mouth, and think another with his heart. He who changes his spoken word is accounted an idolater. "Man should ever fear God, confess the truth, and speak the truth in his heart," are words which we all know from the Prayer Book. The sin of "false measure" is almost worse than unchastity. To pour out a glass of beer so as to make a foam was to be regarded as fraudulent. Bribery is abhorred. A Rabbi was going over a narrow bridge, when a man came up to him, and gave him his hand to support him. He then told the Rabbi that he had a suit to bring before him. I cannot hear your case or be your judge, answered the Rabbi. In accordance with their insistence upon the purity and importance of justice is the Rabbis' horror of perjury. The exhortation to the witnesses who were about to take an oath in a trial is solemn and impressive. "Know that the whole world was shaken when God spoke the third Commandment"; so it begins, and then follows a series of statements as to the terrific punishments which God inflicts upon the perjurer and all his family. Very marked, too, is the stress laid upon the sin of slander. He who utters a slander is as one who denies God. God declares that He and the slanderer cannot exist together in the world. To sin with the tongue is the worst of evil deeds. Slander is as great a sin as idolatry, incest, and murder, and so on. How far these volleys against slander were due to its frequency I have no knowledge. Three kinds of people are

hated by God : he who speaks one thing with his tongue and thinks another in his heart ; he who could give favourable evidence for his neighbour, and does not do so ; he who knows something discreditable of his neighbour and reveals it. (It is the more dishonourable because no one can be condemned by a single witness.) Such lists are fairly common. Thus, four sorts of people cannot see the face of the Shechinah : mockers, slanderers, hypocrites, and liars. Another bad four are they who keep back the wages of the labourer, they who repress his wages, they who take off the yoke from their own necks and put it on their fellows, they who are proud. The second temple was destroyed, it is in one place declared, because of "causeless hate" ; for "causeless hate" is as grave a sin as idolatry, unchastity, and murder combined. Other sins specially castigated are : anger, causing another to sin (which is worse than to murder him, for murder robs him of this world, while sin robs him of the next), unchastity, and revenge. There is a certain psychological insight in the distinction made between revenge and grudge. A asks B to lend him a scythe, and B refuses. Next day B asks A to lend him an axe, and A refuses on the ground that B had refused the scythe. That is revenge. But if A lends his axe with the words, "Here it is ; I am not like you who would not lend the scythe," that is grudge. Another bad three are the angry, the drunkard, and the unforgiving. He who is forgiving, says one famous Rabbi, has all his sins forgiven him. The Talmud, which can be pithy on occasion, comments in the following brief words upon the Biblical injunction, "Thou shalt not bear a grudge or avenge." The matter is like as if a man carving

meat were to let the knife slip and cut his hand. Shall he then let it cut the other hand? In other words, the one wicked action is bad enough. Do you better it by adding to it another? Or, perhaps: You are injured by your neighbour's wrongdoing. Is it not folly to injure yourself still further by your own?

Among the censured sins perhaps the one most frequently censured is pride, just as one of the virtues most often praised is humility. Pride is as bad as idolatry. The Shechinah weeps over the proud. As with the slanderer, so of the proud; God and he cannot dwell in the world together. The humble, on the other hand, is regarded as if he had offered up all the sacrifices of the Law. Those shall inherit the life to come who are modest and humble, who study the Law continually, and ascribe to themselves no merit. The world, said one Rabbi, is maintained for the sake of those who account themselves as naught. Of all the virtues, humility is the greatest. If wisdom is a crown for your head, let humility be sandals for your feet. There is much more to the same effect.

It is often said that God gave three gifts to Israel, pity, loving-kindness, and shame, for right shame is often referred to as a virtue. Shame is a good indication; it leads to the fear of sin. Who has no shame, his father stood not before Sinai. It might, perhaps, be fair to say that the Rabbis are most insistent on the virtues which can be practised by every man and every day. It is true they say: The words of the Law are only fixed and sure in that man who is ready to die for them, but they think habitually less of heroic requirements than of customary or daily needs. So far is their ethic from being an

ethic for the scholar only that it might in some respects be rather regarded as an ethic for the man in the street. This must not be taken to mean that it only asks that modicum of sacrifice and effort which a *very* average person might be willing to render, but only that it is an ethic for people engaged in all the ordinary avocations of life. Such virtues as hospitality or honesty, as alms-giving and pity, as self-respect and parental honour, are obviously virtues for all men at all times and seasons, and it is on these and similar virtues that the Rabbis love to dwell. The faithful and honest trader, for example, is accounted as one who has fulfilled all the words of the Law. To practise hospitality is greater than to receive the face of the Shechinah. A man had better skin a beast in the street, and take pay for it than say, I am a proud or a great man, and the job is unworthy of me, and so become a burden to his fellows. Make your Sabbath into a work day, *i.e.* do without festive meals, rather than ask the help of others. And the praise of labour is constant. R. Eliezar urged that the fourth word was as much an injunction to labour on six days as to rest on the seventh. He who does not labour on the six days will end by having to labour on the seventh. The Shechinah did not rest upon Israel till they had done some work. The stories as to the extent to which the honour of parents must be and was actually carried are very numerous. Some of them are quaint and beautiful. In fact the Rabbinic attitude in this matter may be summed up in the saying : If a man honours his father and mother, God declares that He looks upon it as if He Himself were honoured. The reverence of parents is equal to the reverence of God. So far as compassion is concerned, further

sayings need not be quoted. It may, however, be noted that this pity was extended to the animals. Cruelty to animals was a detested vice, and in the slaughter of oxen and sheep according to the methods of the Rabbinic law immense meticulousness and detail were exhausted upon the rules and regulations for slaughtering from a desire that, within the limits of the Law, the utmost care should be taken that the animal should suffer as little as possible. That religion and piety became so terribly mixed up and confused with such sheer externalities as food and slaughtering, and "milk and meat," and dishes and plates, is indeed one of the grave weaknesses of Rabbinic Judaism, but that all this outwardness and ritualism did not extinguish the spirit of pity and love is also abundantly clear. So far as the animals are concerned, I have noticed one curious parallel to Paul's saying in 1 Cor. ix. 9, but this parallel can be offset by others of a different character. Very famous and familiar is the story of the Rabbi to whom a calf, which was being led to the slaughter, ran up for protection. The Rabbi drove it back to the butcher with the words, Go, for thereto wast thou created. Thereupon the heavenly voice said, Because thou hast shown no pity, therefore sufferings shall befall thee. And he had bodily suffering for years, till one day his housemaid was sweeping the house, and was about to sweep and throw away a brood of young weasels. The Rabbi bade her leave them, "for God's mercies extend to all His works." Then his pains left him, for the heavenly voice said, Because he showed pity, pity shall be shown him. When Moses was tending Jethro's sheep, a lamb ran away. Moses found it a long way off drinking water from a pond. He

carried it back upon his shoulders. Therefore God said, Thou hast had pity upon the sheep of a man ; thou shalt lead the sheep of God (the Israelites). For cruelty to animals the Rabbis coined a special phrase, and the general view was that it was a Biblical, and not merely a Rabbinical, prohibition. It is laid down that a man must not eat his own meal before he has fed his beasts.

There is a curious passage in the Talmud in which many aged Rabbis are asked why it was that they had attained so great an age. The answers are very quaint and childlike. The main virtues stressed are those of humility, gentleness, and a willingness to forgive. An impression is given as if these old Rabbis were simple, good, and pious souls, with a restricted outlook, doubtless, and enmeshed in a study the great mass of which was of very doubtful advantage to the world, but yet kindly and charitable men, and gifted with a remarkable delicacy of moral insight. Perhaps their meticulousness in legal subtleties and ritual details made them also clear-eyed for those small ethical differences and delicacies, which yet possess a fragrantcy and an aroma of their own. Their ethical teaching can still be helpful to us to-day.

Nor must it be thought that they could not speak well of virtue in general as well as of the virtues in particular and of the small change of goodness. They recognised the pounds as well as the pence. They perceived that the love and fear of God and the imitation of God were at once the root and the crown of goodness. They realised, I think, that love to man was the real fulfilling of the Law, and that all the little details, of which so many examples have been given, were but instances

and manifestations of love. I need hardly quote Hillel's reply to the man who was willing to become a proselyte if he could be taught the whole Law while standing on one leg: What is hateful to thyself do not to thy fellow. This is the whole Law; the rest is commentary—the Golden Rule in its negative form. R. Jehuda b. Tema said, Be bold as a lion, quick as a stag, to do the will of thy Father in heaven. Love and fear God. Rejoice, and yet fear, in the execution of the Commandments. Have you done your neighbour a small injury, let it be in your eyes great; have you conferred on him a great benefit, let it be in your eyes small; has he shown you a small kindness, let it seem to you great; has he inflicted upon you a big injury, let it seem to you small. There are great discussions whether Job served God from love or from fear, and these discussions start in the Mishnah itself. It is argued by R. Meir that Job's fear and Abraham's fear were really prompted by love. The service of God from love is regarded as superior to His service from fear, but the reasons given are not always very satisfactory, and it would seem as if the Rabbis were sometimes inclined to think that the same results could be achieved from both. Yet it is only the love, rather than the fear, of God for which (as we see in the famous story of Akiba's martyrdom) a man will give his life. There is a Torah with love and a Torah without love. The Torah with love is the Torah which is practised and followed for its own sake, or which is learned for the sake of teaching it to others. The words of Hillel sank deep into the Rabbinic heart and found many an echo: Love peace and pursue it, love mankind and bring them near to the Law. A

man should love his fellow-men and should not hate them. A man must not say, I love the teachers, but hate the disciples ; or I love the disciples, but hate the ignorant, but he must love all, excepting only the heretics, the informers, and the apostates. These he must hate, even as David said, " I hate those who hate Thee." Here we see again the perfect undress frankness of the Rabbinical literature. As the limitations are real, so, too, are the inclusions. We may note, too, the burden of Scripture. David hates ; therefore we, too, *may* hate or even *must*. But real as is the hate, so real, too, is the love, and we who are happily free from the burden of Scripture can absorb the good and reject the evil, whether in the Old Testament, the New Testament, or the Rabbinical literature. With a great oath, says R. Simeon b. Eleazar, was this word said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. I the Lord created him : if thou love him, I will faithfully reward thee ; if not, I will be thy judge for punishment. If Hillel's praise of love was remembered, not less was the praise of peace. The prototype of the peace-maker was supposed to be Aaron. His deceitful method of appeasing a quarrel is recorded to have been that he used to go to one of the parties to it and say, Listen, my son, to what thy fellow is doing. He is beating his breast, and tearing his clothes, and saying, How can I raise my eyes to look my fellow in the face ? I am ashamed before him, for it was I who began the quarrel. Aaron stayed with him till he had removed all anger from his heart. He then went and repeated the same words to the other party, so when the two met, they embraced each other and were reconciled. If a man, said a Rabbi, stays

quietly in his place, how can he pursue peace? He must go about in the world and pursue it. Surely no punishment shall befall him who makes peace between man and man, between a man and his wife, between city and city, people and people, family and family, state and state. Great is peace, says the Midrash, and then proceeds to give all kinds of quaint and fanciful proofs. Peace is the fairest of God's gifts. Even the angels need it, for God makes peace in His high places. Beloved is peace, for only with peace is the Law compared. The whole law is peace, and it is the blessing of blessings. If the Israelites become addicted to idolatry, but peace reigns among them, God says, I have no power to punish them. The daily prayer of the Israelite ends with peace, and so does the blessing of Aaron; it contains in itself the sum of all benedictions. Peace weighs as heavily as all creation. The very name of God is peace.

The Rabbis ever connected morality with religion and religion with morality. Goodness is pre-human and superhuman. The pattern of all goodness is God. Any philosophic idea such as that what we call goodness is merely human, and that it is as anthropomorphic to ascribe goodness to God as it is to ascribe to Him a body was certainly unknown to them. Man only knows, or has come to know, goodness because he is a creation of God, who has formed him, as they say, half of the lower world and half of the upper world. Man has only come to know goodness because God is good. In the last resort we agree with the Rabbis. Hence they regarded the pursuit of righteousness as the imitation of God. "Ye shall walk after (or follow) the Lord your God," says the Law. But how can

man walk after the Shechinah? Is not God a "consuming fire"? What is meant is that man is to walk after, that is, to imitate, the attributes of God. As God clothes the naked, visits the sick, comforts the mourner, buries the dead, so do thou. In each case quaint Biblical proofs or instances of the divine loving-kindness are adduced. There was a famous saying of Abba Saul: Resemble God: as He is gracious and compassionate, so be thou gracious and compassionate. So elsewhere the same thing is said about God's righteousness and His love. As God is loving and pitiful, so be thou. This is to "walk in all His ways." To imitate God is the same thing, therefore, as to love Him. This love is ever the goal and ever the motive. One must not study the Law so as to be called wise, or to have a fine seat in the college, or to obtain the world to come; one must study the Law for the love of God.

Considering that the Rabbinic literature was intended for scholars and students to read, even as it was compiled by them,—a literature for the learned and by the learned, even as regards the Midrash and the Haggada no less than as regards the Pilpul and the Halacha—it is remarkable how suitable its ethical teaching is for the average person as well as for Rabbis. The just judge, the careful keeper and disposer of communal alms-giving, the faithful school teacher, are all appraised at the same high rate. The Rabbis thought much of the children, though, oriental like, much more of the boys than of the girls. The world, according to one famous saying, is only maintained because of the breath of the school children; for the breath in which there is sin cannot be compared with the

breath in which there is no sin. Among the reasons given for the destruction of Jerusalem is that the children were prevented from attending school ; for every city in which there is no school will be destroyed. Great as was the importance attached to the study of the Law, it was recognised that it was not good for any one to withdraw himself too completely from human affairs, so that he never performed " deeds of love." Many of the Rabbis were artisans or field-workers ; none of them lived by their learning as a profession. R. Huna said, He who only occupies himself with the Law is as if he had no God. When two Rabbis were arrested at the time of the Hadrianic revolt, one said to the other, You will be acquitted, and I shall be condemned, because I have done nothing but study the Law, while you have studied it and also practised loving deeds. The saying in Aboth goes further : Excellent is Torah study together with worldly business, for the practice of them both puts iniquity out of remembrance ; and all Torah without work must fail at length and occasion iniquity. Again it is said, Whosoever works are in excess of his wisdom, his wisdom stands. Not learning, but doing is the groundwork. On an earlier page was noticed the long discussion on the theme whether learning or doing was the greater : if the final decision was for learning, it was only on the ground that it led on to doing, for doing depends on learning, and not learning upon doing (a saying in which there is much more truth than meets the eye). Whosoever wisdom is in excess of his works is like a tree whose branches are abundant and its roots scanty ; the wind comes and uproots it. This is the predominant note. The unrighteous Rabbi

is an abomination. He is a craftsman without tools ; he is useless. The " favourite saying " of the Rabbis of Jabneh is also in point : I am a creature of God, and my neighbour is also His creature ; my work is in the city, and his in the field ; I rise early to my work, and he rises early to his. As he cannot excel in my work, so I cannot excel in his work. Dost thou say, I do great things ; he does small things ? We have learned that it matters not whether a man does much or little if only he directs his heart to heaven. Somebody came to Rabba, and said to him that the governor of the city where he lived had bade him kill a certain man, or if not, he should be killed. What was he to do ? Rabba said, Let him kill thee. Thou shalt do no murder. Who told thee that thy blood is redder than his ? Perhaps his blood is redder than thine.

This is not the place to ask how far the Rabbis actually practised what they taught. It would seem that after the Hadrianic persecution and purgation, just as there was little *wilful* neglect of the main ritual commands of the Law, so was there little haughty despising of the unlearned. " He who fears God, and acts according to the commands of the Law, has all wisdom and the whole Torah in his heart." How deep was the gulf between learned and unlearned in the days of Jesus is a very vexed question. There are most bitter sayings against the Am ha' aretz in the Talmud ; there are also some sayings of a tenderer and more charitable kind. There is also some dispute as to who the Am ha' aretz actually was. Most of the references to him are considerably later than Jesus. There is a story as to the conduct

of a rich Rabbi in a famine towards the Am ha' aretz. He opened his granaries freely for the learned and for students, but refused admittance to the Am ha' aretz, for he said, Punishments only come upon the world because of the Am ha' aretz. Then a Rabbi came to him disguised, and pretended to be an Am ha' aretz. So the rich Rabbi refused him, saying, In virtue of what shall I feed you? Feed me, replied the other, as a raven or a dog. The Rabbi fed him, but he grieved, saying, Woe is me, I have given my bread to an Am ha' aretz. Then some one said to him, Perhaps it was your disciple, Rabbi X, who came to you, for he always refuses to gain a benefit from the Law. On inquiry it was found that it was he. Then the rich Rabbi said, Let *all* enter who will. There is certainly no lack of passages concerning the dignity of labour in the Talmud, though the Rabbis had their strong prejudices against, and preferences for, certain particular avocations. Greater is he who enjoys the fruit of his labour than the fearer of heaven, for the Scripture says, Happy is he who fears the Lord, but of him who eats the fruit of his labour it is written, Happy shalt thou be,—in this world—and it shall be well with thee—in the world to come. Let man love labour, for as the Law was appointed with a covenant, so labour was appointed by a covenant: the fourth commandment illustrates both.

Parallels have often been set up between the religious and ethical teaching of the New Testament and of the Rabbinical literature. I do not propose to make any comparison. I believe we do better to let each speak for itself, and to gain such benefit as we can from each. So far as inwardness is

concerned, both authorities teach it, and it is perhaps not a little remarkable that with all the Rabbinical stress on outwardness, there is no lack of inwardness as well. Much that has preceded would illustrate this assertion. And if the beauty of hidden virtue, without the knowledge of others, or their honour or their rewards, is fully recognised, so, too, is the ugliness of secret sin. He who commits a sin in secret is to be regarded as if he pressed against the feet of the Shechinah. Secret sin, said one Rabbi, means that a man dishonours God, and he who does not heed the honour of God had better never have been born. Is it a contradiction to this that another Rabbi advises that a man, if the evil inclination is about to overpower him, should go where no one knows him, and put on black clothes, and yield to his desires? Only let not the name of God be openly profaned! The Talmud notices the apparent contradiction, and suggests that the second Rabbi gave only a "second best" advice. Another solution is that he meant that the very journey, the exercise, and the black attire would break the power of the evil inclination, and so prevent the sin from taking place. We notice in both explanations the curious combination of idealism and realism.

One or two more direct parallels to the teaching of the Gospels may be mentioned in this connection. The constant adage, Much or little makes no difference so long as the heart is directed towards God, has already been noticed. The adage is illustrated by the Midrash story of the woman who bought a handful of meal as a sacrifice which was looked at with derision by the priest. But in a dream it was said to him, Account not the gift as

little, but reckon it as if she had offered herself. And God says : A free-will handful from the poor is more acceptable to Me than a heap of incense from the high priest. A man has a patron : if he bothers him too much, the patron complains. God is not so ; whoever is importunate, He accepts ; how often, or however much, a man importunes God, God accepts him. Better that it should be said to you, Come up, come up, than that it should be said to you, Go down, Go down. Hillel used to say, My humiliation was my exaltation, and my exaltation was my humiliation. The yea of the pious is their yea, and their nay is their nay. The Sabbath is given over to you, ye are not given over to the Sabbath. Desecrate the Sabbath for him whose life is in danger, so that he may observe many Sabbaths. R. Tarphon said, I should be surprised if, in this generation, there were any one who can rebuke his neighbour (as the Law orders, Lev. xix. 17), for if one were to say, Take away the splinter between your teeth, the other would reply, do you first take away the beam between your eyes. Correct your own faults before you correct those of others. Alexander of Macedon asked the wise men of the south what a man should do that he may live ? They answered, Let him kill himself. Then he asked, How does a man kill himself ? They replied, By keeping himself alive. Have you ever seen that rain fell upon the land of one who was righteous, and not upon the land of one who was wicked ? Or that the sun shone upon Israelites who are righteous and not upon the wicked ? For the sun shines upon Israelites and the nations of the world alike, for God is good to all, and His mercies are upon all His works. According to the camel is

its burden (*i.e.* from those who have much opportunity or endowment much is demanded). The finer the linen, the worse is any black mark on it. Who is the foolish man of piety? He who, when a woman falls in a stream, says, It would not be proper for me to jump in and save her, for I should have to look at her. God will punish those who wrap themselves in their big mantles (to appear more pious). (In the famous but obscure enumeration of the seven classes of the Pharisees, which occurs with interesting variations both in the Babylonian and the Jerusalem Talmud, so much is, at any rate, clear that many of the "hypocrites" censured by Jesus are included and ridiculed by the Talmuds. They also seem to ridicule and censure those who are self-righteous, calculatingly and ostentatiously scrupulous, or pious from hope of divine reward or fear of divine punishment.) If you understand once, you will understand more; if you heed not once, you will end by not heeding at all. Man's way is to fill the empty vessel; the full vessel he cannot fill: God's way is to fill the full vessel yet more; the empty vessel cannot be filled. God gives wisdom only to him who has wisdom. He who debases himself God exalts; he who exalts himself God debases. The next world is a topsy-turvy world. The high are the low, and the low the high. Some other parallels have already been incidentally indicated.

Perhaps it is only as regards universalism and the mission of Israel that for us to-day the Rabbinic literature yields little fruit; yet even here, as also more specifically in the matter of proselytes and proselytism, passages of value and thoughts of dignity occur. Thus quite suddenly, in fantastic

explanation of a verse in Leviticus, which has nothing whatever to do with the matter, the Midrash says : " If ye do not proclaim My Godhead to the nations, I will punish you." And once in the Talmud it is stated that the object of Israel's dispersion was, or is, the making of proselytes. Yet the idea of Israel's mission occurs very rarely, and the great thoughts of Isaiah xl.-lv. suffer comparative neglect. It is said more than once that as oil gives light to the world, so the words of the law give light to the world. Or, again, as Noah's dove brought light to the world, so Israel brings light to the world. As the dove atones for sins (Lev. xii. 6), so Israel atones for the sins of the nations. The world cannot exist without the winds, and like the winds Israel is scattered through the world, because the world cannot get on without Israel. Israel prays to God : Count it to me for good that I have made thee known in the world. It was said that the seventy bulls sacrificed during the first seven days of Tabernacles corresponded to the seventy nations of the world, and were offered up as an atonement on their behalf. R. Jochanan said, Woe to the nations ! They do not know what they have lost. So long as the temple stood, it atoned for them ; but who atones for them now ? But mostly the nations are the enemies of Israel and of God, and their punishment, or their exclusion from the life to come, is much more often alluded to than their conversion and salvation. Once or twice it is said that God waits for the nations of the world, if they will repent, and draw nigh to, and come under, the wings of the Shechinah. Once we even read : Let every Israelite seek, like Abraham, to bring his fellow-creatures under those same divine wings. We

hear also that loving deeds are an atonement for the nations. What shall a man do, asked R. Eleazar of R. Joshua, that he may escape hell? Let him practise loving deeds, was the reply. If that be so, said R. Eleazar, the nations could escape hell. The words of the Law, said R. Joshua, were given, not to the dead, but to the living. He meant that the nations *could* indeed thus escape the doom of hell. R. Jochanan b. Zakkai specifically stated that if Israel had the altar, the nations had alms-giving and charity as a means of atonement. Another R. Eleazar once declared that all the nations would in the future—in the Messianic Age—be converted to Judaism. Famous has become the dictum of the Tosephta: “The righteous of all nations shall have a share in the world to come.” But that such righteous would be many is certainly not the prevailing Rabbinic opinion, though a few heathen are specifically mentioned for their virtue. On the other hand, the wider Messianic hope of the prophets was never extinguished, and it found an eloquent expression in the liturgy. The famous Alenu prayer which concludes every public service of the synagogue is quite “universalistic.” Prayer is offered for the coming of the time “when the world will be perfected under the kingdom of God, and all the children of flesh will call upon Thy name, and thou wilt turn unto Thyself all the wicked of the earth,” when all men “will accept the yoke of Thy kingdom, and Thou wilt reign over them speedily and for ever and ever.”

The varying attitude of the Rabbis towards proselytes has historical reasons which cannot be alluded to here. For my present purpose I need only mention some of those passages which speak

in their favour. These passages are fairly numerous, but any sign of a desire or of a duty to *go out* and *seek* proselytes soon became wanting. Such a desire was always keener among the Hellenistic Jews than either among the Palestinian Jews, or among those Jews who, though non-Palestinian, were yet not touched by Hellenistic influences. Again, the success of Christianity (and we may gather that many converts or semi-converts to Judaism became converts to Christianity) biased the Rabbis against proselytes, while the Church, when triumphant, persecuting, and powerful, forbade all Jewish proselytism by the most severe and rigorous prohibitions and punishments. For all these reasons the attitude of the Rabbis to proselytes became mostly either cautious or even hostile ; yet there are not wanting more generous and affectionate estimates, especially when the conversion was believed to be sincere. The names of proselytes, it is said, are as dear to God as wine which is poured upon the altar. And again : He who brings one heathen over to Judaism is to be regarded as if he had created him. Playing upon Genesis xii. 5, the Midrash frequently declares that "the souls which they had gotten in Haran" were the proselytes, for Abraham converted the men, and Sarah the women. Abraham received them hospitably in his house, and was gracious to them, and brought them under the wings of the Shechinah. He is thus the prototype of all right proselytising. It was he who began the great work of making the true God known to the world, and God declared that He regarded it as if he had taken part in the work of creation. R. Judah said that every proselyte could justly regard himself as of the seed of Abraham. He could therefore say "God of our fathers" no less than

the born Jew. "God loves the stranger in giving him food and raiment" (Deut. x. 18). As in Rabbinic Hebrew the word *Ger*, which in Biblical Hebrew means stranger or resident alien, means proselyte, all the passages in the Pentateuch about the *Ger* can be, and mostly are, used by the Rabbis about the proselytes, and thus there is direct Biblical authority for God's love of the proselyte. The second clause of the verse in Deuteronomy is the theme of a story about Aquila, the famous proselyte, which is told in many places in the Midrash. Aquila remarks to R. Eliezar that to say that God will give the proselyte just food and clothing does not show much love. Eliezar replied that Jacob had prayed to God for no more than this. Then Aquila, unsatisfied, put his doubt to R. Joshua, who declared that bread meant the show-bread, and clothing the priestly raiment. Or, again, bread meant the Law and raiment the prayer shawl. Thus Aquila was appeased. Moreover, he who becomes a proselyte from pure motives is accounted worthy: his daughters may marry priests, and his sons may become high priests. Elsewhere, in a long section on proselytes, the Midrash asserts that to wrong a proselyte is as wicked as to wrong an Israelite, for they are equal. A man cannot become a priest or a Levite, however much he may wish to. It is a matter of descent. But he can become a righteous man, even if he be a heathen. The Psalmist says: "Ye who fear the Lord, praise the Lord." These are the proselytes, who of their own accord have come to love God. Them God loves. The proselytes have left their own house and family and nation, and joined themselves to Israel. Therefore Israel must specially protect them and love them and let

them suffer no injury, even as God loves them and protects them, so that they fall not back into their former ways of error. Beloved are the proselytes, for they are always made by Scripture the equals of the Israelites. God loves those who love Him and draws to Him both the near and the far. He rejoices in the far as well as the near, and even offers peace first to the far and then to the near (Isaiah lvii. 19). God draws to Himself even those who do not become proselytes from pure purpose ; how much more those who do ! “Thou eatest the labour of thy hands” : that is, the proselyte who cannot appeal to the merit of his forefathers. Therefore God says that he shall enjoy by his own merits both this world and the next ! A heathen who becomes a proselyte, and occupies himself with the study of the Law, is to be accounted as equal to the high priest. He who injures a proselyte is as if he injured God. God regards no one as unworthy ; the gates are open for all ; who would draw nigh, let him enter. Beloved are the proselytes, for Abraham only circumcised himself when he was ninety-nine, for had he done so when he was twenty or so, none would have become proselytes above that age. Therefore God put off the covenant till Abraham was ninety-nine, so as not to close the door upon any one who may wish to draw nigh, and to increase the reward of those who do His will. Rabbi Jeremiah said, Wouldest thou know whence we may infer that a heathen who does (*i.e.* follows) the Law is equal to the High Priest ? Because it says, “Which *if a man* do, he shall live in them.” And it does not say, “This is the law of the Priests, or the law of the Levites, or the law of Israel,” but it says, “This is the

law of *man*, O Lord God ” (playing upon 2 Sam. vii. 19). And it does not say, “ Open ye the gates, that the Priests and Levites and Israelites may enter in,” but it says, “ Open ye the gates that the righteous heathen may enter in ” (Isaiah xxvi. 2). And it does not say, “ This is the gate of the Lord, the Priests and Levites and Israelites shall enter therein,” but it says, “ This is the gate of the Lord, the righteous shall enter therein.” And it does not say, “ Rejoice, ye Priests and Levites and Israelites, in the Lord,” but it says, “ Rejoice in the Lord, O ye righteous.” And it does not say, “ Do good, O Lord, to the Priests, to the Levites, and to the Israelites,” but it says, “ Do good, O Lord, unto *the good* ” (Psalm cxxv. 4). Hence we may know that even a heathen who does the Law is equal to the High Priest. Perhaps the prettiest passage about proselytes is the following : The Holy One loves the proselytes exceedingly. To what is the matter like ? To a king who had a flock of sheep and goats, which went forth every morning to the pasture and returned in the evening to the stable. One day a stag joined the flock and grazed with the sheep, and returned with them. Then the shepherd said to the king : There is a stag which goes out with the sheep and grazes with them, and comes home with them. And the king loved the stag exceedingly. And he commanded the shepherd, saying : Give heed unto this stag, that no man beat it ; and when the sheep returned in the evening, he would order that the stag should have food and drink. Then the shepherds said to him, My Lord, thou hast many goats and sheep and kids, and thou givest us no directions about these, but about this stag thou givest us orders day by day. Then the king

replied : It is the custom of the sheep to graze in the pasture, but the stags dwell in the wilderness, and it is not their custom to come among men in the cultivated land. But to this stag, who has come to us and lives with us, should we not be grateful that he has left the great wilderness, where many stags and gazelles feed, and has come to live among us ? It behoves us to be grateful. So, too, spake the Holy One : I owe great thanks to the stranger, in that he has left his family and his father's house, and has come to dwell amongst us ; therefore I order in the Law : " Love ye the stranger."

As to the actual rules and regulations of Rabbinic Judaism about proselytes this is not the place to speak. There was undoubtedly a certain feeling that the mere renunciation of idolatry, the mere belief in one God, brought a man very near to Judaism. It is repeated several times : The sin of idolatry is so great that to renounce it is equivalent to accepting the whole law. He who abandons idolatry is regarded as a Jew. But this was only a generous paradox. The full proselyte had to obey all the ritual laws, and undergo the regular initiatory ceremonial. A woman, that is to say, had to submit to complete immersion ; a male, immersion and circumcision. It was debated among the Rabbis whether, in the case of a man, baptism alone or circumcision alone could be accepted as adequate. Though we hear of one Rabbi who apparently maintained that baptism was adequate without circumcision, this view was isolated, and the general and official judgement was that the one was as needful as the other. How gravely such a decision must have impeded the admission and inflow of proselytes is obvious. Liberal Judaism, whatever its views

about circumcision for the babies of Jewish parents, no longer requires the rite from adult proselytes. Of great historic interest, and not without its pathos, is the passage about the reception of proselytes "at the present time." Its date must be comparatively early. It runs thus : The Rabbis have taught, If any one at the present time desires to become a proselyte, they say to him, What is your reason that you have come to be made a proselyte? Do you not know that the Israelites at the present time are persecuted, humiliated, oppressed, and that sufferings come upon them? If he says, Yes, I do, and I am not worthy, they accept him at once, and make known to him some light commands and some heavy commands, and they tell him of guilt respecting gleaning, the forgotten sheaf, the corners, and the tithes. And they tell him the punishment for transgression of the commands, and they say to him, Know that before, if you ate forbidden fat, you did not incur the penalty of being "cut off," if you profaned the Sabbath, you did not incur the penalty of stoning. But now you would. And just as they tell him of the punishments, so they also tell him of the rewards, and they say to him, Know that the world to come is only made for the righteous, and in this world the Israelites can endure neither an excess of prosperity nor an excess of punishments. But they do not say too much to him or enter too much into details. If he agrees, they circumcise him at once. Elsewhere it is stated : God has said, Am I God near at hand, and not also a God who is far off? It is I who brought Jethro near, and did not reject him. So, too, if a man approaches you to become a proselyte, and he comes for the sake of heaven (from pure interest), do you bring him near and do not

reject him. Hence, learn that a man should drive away with his left hand and bring near with his right, and not act as Elisha did with Gehazi, who drove him away for ever. Fine, too, is the report of the three heathen who were made proselytes by Hillel after being rejected by Shammai: Shammai's harshness would have driven us from the world, but Hillel's gentleness has drawn us under the wings of the Shechinah.

Looking back upon these various Rabbinic utterances, I do not find it easy to compress into a few words what we owe to the Rabbis, or what precisely it is in this particular form of Judaism from which we may still draw help and inspiration. How profoundly our Liberal Judaism differs from the Judaism of the Rabbis is obvious. We are free from many of their difficulties; we have difficulties of our own from which they were either free, or which had not risen upon their more limited horizon. Some of their very excellences, some of their very strength, some of their very beauty, depend on beliefs which are for us impossible. But much remains over which we can use, and much which, rightly admiring, we can adapt, if not adopt. There is something, too, in the spirit of the whole literature which we may appreciate and find helpful. Profound ideas were sometimes enunciated by the Rabbis; even philosophic conceptions. Thus it has been pointed out that the idea of the autonomy of morality is incidentally mentioned by the Rabbis. If you keep My commandments, says God, I account it as if you had made them. And again: He who maintains the Law and truthfully fulfils it has, as it were, himself decreed it and given it from Mount Sinai. But it is rather the extreme

simplicity of the Rabbinic religion, coupled with its variety, which specially appeals to us. There is no lack of ideas, and these ideas are conveyed in very simple words and forms. And this strange simplicity seems to be connected with another strange point about it, namely, its odd combination of professionalism with the attitude of the common man. The literature was written by Rabbis and for Rabbis ; by the learned and for the learned ; by a class and for a class, and yet, so far as its religious and moral teaching is concerned (apart from its laws and its legal discussions), it might largely be written for everybody. On the whole, its attitude is sane and simple and broad. It does not give religious and moral teaching for a class ; on the whole, its teaching is for everybody. On the whole, the very virtues which it expects the student of the Law to bring to, and to get from, his study are the virtues which all men ought to seek for, and which all men may practise. On the whole, the study of the Law ought to unite you with your fellows in humility and service rather than to separate you from them in pride and the spirit of caste. The Rabbis were very keen that the Law should be honoured, and so, too, God, by the good conduct of those who studied it. The name of God is to be made beloved by you, they say. If a man studies Torah, and is upright and is gracious and polite in his dealings with his fellows, these say of him, Such a one has learnt Torah : see how comely are his ways, how upright his actions ! It is an injury to the Law and a profanation of the name when a Rabbi's conduct causes his fellows to say the reverse. There is a long passage in the " Sayings of the Fathers " which speaks of the qualifications needed for learn-

ing, and of the virtues which learning gives. The study of the Law helps a man to meekness, fidelity, and charitableness ; it keeps him far from sin, and brings him near to virtue ; he ought to become a lover of God and of mankind, modest, long-suffering, and forgiving of insults. The study of the Law demands (as we have noticed) a measure of endurance and asceticism ; and, for the rest, reverence and cheerfulness, contentment and resignation ; the student must be long-suffering and claim no merit ; he must love God and man ; he must not boast, he must judge his fellows favourably ; he must accept reproofs willingly ; he must bear the yoke with his fellows. Thus, what the Law leads to, that the Law demands. And the virtues are gentle human virtues, tending to unite and not to separate. Moreover, these gentle human virtues did not, when occasion demanded, exclude the heroic virtues as well. The Rabbis were ever ready for martyrdom. They say repeatedly : The words of the Law are only established in him who is ready to die for them.

The religion of the Rabbis is an odd mixture of idealism and of everyday detail. It is, at any rate, a mixture of delicacy and everyday practicality. This we have noticed by actual quotations. But I think it is also fair to call it a mixture of idealism and practicality. Its details, its simplicity, its practical applications, are hardly ever without a touch of distinction, which seems to lift them above the commonplace. They are rarely what some men call " philistine." The famous story of Elijah and the men who would enjoy the Hereafter seems to illustrate the point. R. Beroka lived in a certain street, and Elijah used to visit him. R. Beroka once asked Elijah, Is there any one in this street who will

inherit the world to come ? Elijah said, No. Then they met a man, and Elijah said, *He* will enjoy the world to come. The Rabbi asked him his occupation : he replied, I am a gaoler of a prison, and I keep the men to themselves and the women, and I sleep between them that they sin not. If I see that gentiles have their eye on a Jewess, I take my life in my hands and deliver her. One day a betrothed Jewess was with us ; I poured wine dregs upon her skirt, and said that her period was upon her. Then two men passed them, and Elijah said, These two men will also enjoy the life to come. The Rabbi ran after them and asked them, What is your occupation ? They said, We are buffoons, and we amuse the sorrowful, and when we see men quarrelling, we try to make peace between them. I think this distinctive, this idealistic, touch of the Rabbis is due to the fact that religion and morality are so genuinely united with them that for them God is always in their thoughts. It is the idea of God, the nearness and reality of God, which prevent their details becoming petty. He is the bond which unites, the light which irradiates. And as His service demands all the little duties and kindnesses of every day, so it may at any moment demand something much greater. The love of God demands faithfulness in little things. I suppose that for most of us it is almost all little things and everyday details. I suppose it was so also with the Rabbis. But sometimes the love of God demands faithfulness in big things. And then it gives the power. "What are we ? What is our strength ? What our wisdom ? What our righteousness ?" So runs the familiar daily prayer of the Rabbis still preserved in the orthodox Prayer Book. It is humble, and without assertion

of merit. But the love *of* God brings strange strength *from* God. And, somehow,—here is, perhaps, the most essential feature about the Rabbis—it seems as natural when one reads about the martyrdoms in the Hadrianic revolt as when one reads of some little story of everyday kindness or charity. The death of Akiba is doubtless exceptional; it stands alone in its sombre beauty. Yet it does not seem unlikely. It does not seem unlikely that the same Rabbi who said that a man who eats food which does not agree with him debases himself, debases the food, and says an unsuitable blessing over it, should also be the man who, from the midst of his acute physical torment, should laugh as he said the Shema, and should reply to the question why he laughed by the retort, All my life when I read the words, And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy might, I was grieved, for I said to myself, When will all three be within my power? I have loved Him with all my heart and with all my might, but to love Him with all my soul (=life) was not assured to me. But now that “with all my soul” has come, and the hour of saying the Shema has arrived, and my resolution remains firm, should I not laugh? It was God, and the thought of God, which made all this possible, Akiba’s death and the simple moralities alike. The thought of God, His unity, His nearness, His goodness: between Him and the Rabbi there was no gulf. No angels, no mediators, were needed to bring those two together, and to keep the relation between them strong and fresh and keen. Hear one more quotation: The man in trouble who has a grand human friend does not approach him all at once: he goes to

his door, calls his servant, and gets him told that his poor friend is at his door, for he is uncertain whether he will be admitted or no. Not so with God. The man in trouble need not call upon Michael or Gabriel ; he has only to call upon God, and God will hear him. It is, perhaps, this simple directness, this pure and constant piety, this hallowing of the manifold details of life, which we can still most of all make use of in the Rabbinical literature.

NOTE

IN a small book which I wrote some years ago, called *Judaism and St. Paul*, I had occasion to deal very briefly with some aspects of Rabbinic religion. A distinguished Christian scholar draws certain conclusions from what I there said which appear to me to be rather erroneous or only partially true.¹ The fault is doubtless mine. I wrote unclearly. As I may have committed the same fault again, it may be well to enumerate those conclusions and to criticise them.

(1) Rabbinic Judaism "rested on the fact achieved, refused Hellenism and refused progress."

It certainly refused Hellenism, but that it "rested on the fact achieved and refused progress" is, I think, only partially true. It is true if the statement implies no more than that the Rabbis believed that all religious truth was contained in the Old Testament and more particularly in the Pentateuch. It is not, I think, true if it means that, *as a matter of fact*, the Rabbis did not go beyond the Old Testament in their religious teaching and their religious practice. I wonder whether a similar inconsistency might not be predicated of most Church Fathers? Would not they have said that all religious truth was contained in the New Testament? Yet they "progressed" beyond it, as the Rabbis progressed beyond the Old Testament, though they were unconscious of the fact.

(2) Rabbinic Judaism "escaped the harassment of thought it would not wrestle with problems." This statement again seems to go somewhat too far. The Rabbis were not systematic philosophers. It would be useless to deny that the lack of philosophical training, and the absence of philosophic dealing with "problems," are not a deficiency and a weakness. But it would hardly be accurate

¹ T. R. Glover, *Progress in Religion* (1922), p. 310.

to hold that the Rabbis consciously said to themselves or to their disciples : " We will not, and you need not, wrestle with problems." I believe that they *did* think about " problems " a good deal ; the results appear, not in reasoned treatises, but in flashes of insight, in isolated sayings. I do not believe that they *deliberately* shut their eyes to the problems, or *deliberately* thrust the problems away from them.

(3) " It was contented with an easy-natured, parochial God."

Here we have two very different accusations, which have to be taken separately.

(a) That the Rabbinic God was " easy-natured " is, I think, erroneous. How often do we find the saying, " God is long-suffering, but He exacts what is due " ? The fact is that Rabbinic Judaism, like any other noble theistic religion, could never reach complete theoretic consistency. The infinite mercy and compassion of God, on the one hand ; the claims of justice, on the other, could never be theoretically harmonised with each other. The Middah of mercy is greater than the Middah of justice ; God's pity prevails over His wrath. And yet He will not acquit the guilty. He punishes much, but He forgives more. What is there in this that can justify the use of the depreciatory epithet " easy-natured " ? It is odd that the harshness of the " Judaic " God has up till now been the usual charge. He was just, but not loving. Now when the inaccuracy of this description has been exposed, He is apparently to be criticised in another way. He is not loving, but only " easy-natured." I honestly believe that neither charge can be sustained.

(b) Was the Rabbinic God " parochial " ? If this view is an inaccuracy, it is, at all events, half a truth. The Rabbinic God *was* too much the God of Israel. If that constituted part of His strength, it also constituted part of His weakness. He was *not* absolutely impartial. In that sense He *was* " parochial." But He was not parochial in the way that, in old days, Chemosh or Bel was parochial. He was the God of the whole world, and was not without interest in its present and its future. So far as the inhabitants of the world had prosperity and happiness, they received such prosperity and happiness from God, though they knew Him not. When the Rabbi was not thinking about the foes of Israel, he was able to speak of God's relation to the world and to man in a very unparochial way. Again, he believed that in the future a considerable proportion of the inhabitants of the world would be converted to the true faith. In the noble Alenu prayer he prayed for this conversion. The Rabbi who felt thus can hardly be said to have worshipped a parochial God.

(4) "It dismissed the great world to damnation." Not, I think, entirely accurate. The Rabbis did, I fancy, believe that a certain proportion of the gentile world would be condemned to Gehenna, and either annihilated or maintained there. But this harsh view was not the mere result of easy-going indifference; it was not mere off-hand "dismissal." In one sense it was worse. The desire for revenge, after long-sustained and appalling persecutions, played a part. The old co-ordination of idolatry and sin played another part. And we have also seen that the "dismissal" was never complete. There were exceptions: charity was an atonement for the gentiles, and some among them were righteous, and therefore saveable. It might be argued that the Church believed that the vast mass of the heathen world would be "lost," and in that sense it, too, dismissed this great mass to damnation. If it held that heathen, infidels, heretics, and Jews were almost all to enter into a hell from which there was no escape for ever, did it not, in that sense, too, teach and worship a "parochial" God?

(5) "Israel and his God moved about on the surfaces of things, content to compromise on an easy-going morality." But in what way did Israel and his God move about on the surfaces of things? It is unclear. Is it meant that the Rabbis took fidelity lightly? That they took sin lightly? That they took the love of God lightly? But then how explain their martyrdoms? How explain the yearning and ardour of their love? How explain their passion for the sanctification of the name? How explain their intense horror of its profanation? How explain the *extreme* strictness of their moral teaching, the *extreme* delicacy of their moral sense? Of all adjectives for Rabbinic morality "easy-going" seems to me about the least appropriate. What, perhaps, may be in the author's mind is the fact that the Rabbis did certainly teach and emphasise a *forgiving* God, who needed no other sin-offering than repentance, and that they showed a great reluctance in putting limits to the forgiving capacity or the forgiving desires of God. They found it hard to believe that any Israelite would be annihilated or remain eternally in hell, except the very worst and most abandoned sinners. To-day most Jews—I think all Liberal Jews—so far from thinking that the Rabbis went too far in this direction, believe that they did not go far enough, but because we are convinced universalists, we should challenge the idea that we worship an easy-natured God, or that either we or He, "moving about on the surfaces of things," are "content to compromise on an easy-going morality"!

CHAPTER IV

HELLENISTIC CONTRIBUTIONS

THE meeting of Hebrew and Greek thought is one of the big and important things in the spiritual history of the world. I do not think that there has ever been written an adequate account and appreciation of it from the Jewish point of view. It would need large knowledge and large sympathy; it would need a fervent admiration both of the Greek and the Hebrew genius, together with a recognition of their limits. The present writer possesses, as he hopes, the sympathy and the admiration, but not the knowledge. Therefore both here and elsewhere he has offered, and offers, but fragmentary and imperfect contributions to a perennially fascinating and delightful subject. Some day, doubtless, the master will come, and the needful book will be written. But the importance of the whole matter lies partly in this, that the combination of Judaism with Hellenism is a living problem, and not merely a story of the past. We have it now, and we need it more, and we need more of it. It is a combination which, it may be, each generation of Judaism must fashion in its turn, with differences and variations. For both Greek and Hebrew spirituality are immortal, yet neither can exist with fullest potency without the other.

Yet it would, I suppose, be correct to say that only now in modern times, only to-day, can Hellenism and Judaism meet together in a perfectly conscious and satisfactory way. Only now, and only, I think, by Liberal Judaism, can a fusion be effected in a perfectly free way, with independence and an open mind. Twice before did Jewish and Greek thought meet together and bear fruit. First, in Alexandria, just before and just after the beginning of the Christian era. And then, again, many hundred years later in the Middle Ages. Philo is the record or embodiment of the earlier meeting; Maimonides with many others is the record and embodiment of the second. Nor can the imperfections of either Philo or Maimonides be rightly used to constitute an argument against the need and propriety of the meeting. In no wise do their imperfections show that Hellenism and Judaism, or rather Hellenic and Jewish spirituality, cannot be combined, and from that combination some fresh spiritual creations cannot be achieved. We need not be discouraged. The conditions for us are far happier than for them. It is true that Philo had the possibility (how far he availed himself of it is another question) of reading certain Greek books which we can never read, but this was but a poor set-off to his disadvantages. His attitude towards the Pentateuch; his odd ignorance or neglect of the Prophets; the necessities of his allegorical interpretation of the Pentateuchal text; his defective knowledge of Greek philosophy in the higher, more historic, and also more philosophic manner in which we know it to-day: all these, and several other limitations and imperfections, contributed to the limited and imperfect result. It is needless to

catalogue the very grave, though very different, limitations of that meeting of Greek and Hebrew thought which spoiled and crippled the philosophic and spiritual efforts of Maimonides and the other Jewish schoolmen. Neither group of imperfections affects us. Therefore Liberal Jews to-day, and, far more truthfully, Liberal Jews of to-morrow, though much lesser men than Philo or Maimonides, have the power and possibility of achieving much more satisfactory results. Judaism and Hellenism are both revealed to them. They possess the sources. They can catch and learn the spirit of both. They can stand above the sources, and possess that true detachment, combined with that reverence, humility, and appreciation, which are the condition of all fruitful religious work of this particular kind. May such men, equipped also with the adequate knowledge, large, sane, comprehensive, very speedily arise!

My little book will only deal with the earlier meeting, and of that most cursorily and imperfectly. The second meeting I must leave altogether to others. I wanted the greatest living Anglo-Jewish scholar to write a chapter about it, but he would not.

It has seemed most advisable to confine my remarks about Hellenistic contributions almost exclusively to Philo. There is little to be found elsewhere in Jewish-Hellenistic literature—that is, for my purpose—which is not also found, and found more elaborately, in him. In themselves, and from a more general point of view, there are many points of interest in the Jewish Sibylline books, or in Pseudo-Phocylides, or in the Letter of Aristeas, or in the Fourth Book of Maccabees, or in others, but for our particular purpose we may safely neglect

them. Their contributions would be small. We may, however, notice in the Letter of Aristeeas how strong is the stress laid upon God's part in all human effort and achievement. The highest good is to know that God is Lord of the universe, and that in our finest achievements it is not we who attain success, but God, who by His power brings all things to fulfilment, and leads us to the goal. Wisdom can be obtained only through divine help, and so with every virtue. In fine, "the efforts of men are fulfilled by the assistance of God." "God draws all men to Himself by His goodness." It is for man to imitate him, so far as man can. A certain tenderness towards man as man is also discernible, for "human life is made up of pains and penalties," and "all men are appointed by God to share the greatest evil as well as the greatest good." A famous adage is anticipated in the words, "If you understood everything, you would be filled with pity, for God is pitiful. This constant reference to God as the "starting-point" and the model, as well as the source of all and the giver, is also characteristic of Philo. It is interesting also to note the Platonic teaching that "God rules the whole world in the spirit of kindness and without wrath at all." One of the most curious of the questions and replies is : "What is it that resembles beauty in value? Piety, for it is the pre-eminent form of beauty, and its power lies in love, which is the gift of God." Like Philo, the author regards the Pentateuchal Law as the perfection of wisdom and righteousness. He is anxious to justify the ceremonial enactments by supposing them to have an ethical bearing and influence. This view he specially illustrates by the example

of the dietary laws. Thus there is deep reason why some animals are forbidden and others are permitted. It was not "out of regard for weasels and mice and other such things" that they were prohibited! So, too, the birds which may not be eaten are fierce and cruel, and the prohibition to eat them is a sign that righteousness and gentleness are to be practised. Chewing the cud and dividing the hoof are given symbolical and spiritual interpretations. All the rules of purity are to remind us of, and to prevent, moral abominations, and for the sake of maintaining clean bodies as well as clean souls. The "whole system aims at righteousness and righteous relationships between man and man." The Israelites are separated from other nations by all these ceremonial walls and ramparts that they may "remain pure in body and soul, free from all vain imaginations, worshipping the one Almighty God above the whole creation." It is, however, *not* distinctly taught that this separation was for the sake of the world, or in order to execute the better a religious mission.

The author of the Fourth Book of Maccabees owes as much to Greek philosophy, and especially to Plato and the Stoics, as Philo himself, and though his long-winded sermon as a whole is rather turgid and tiresome, there are some happy phrases in it which mark the influence of Greece. Like Philo and the Wisdom of Solomon, the book preaches the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. "They who with their whole heart make righteousness their first thought, these alone are able to master the weakness of the flesh, believing that unto God they die not, but that they live unto God." Religion, if followed faithfully even unto

martyrdom and death, "saves unto eternal life." Thus all those seven youths "hastened to the death by torture as if running the road to immortality." Rhetorical though our author is, he yet makes us feel something of the sublimity of the martyrdom of Eleazar, of the seven sons, and, above all, of the heroic mother. "For God's sake ye came into the world and enjoyed life : therefore ye owe it to God to endure all pain for His sake : the contest is noble." "Sweet is death for the sake of the righteousness of our fathers." The Rabbinic doctrine of the atoning efficacy for others of the death of the righteous is clearly taught. "Be merciful unto Thy people," cries the martyr, "and let our punishment be a satisfaction on their behalf. Make my blood their purification, and take my soul to ransom their souls." The words of the dying Socrates are recalled in the phrase, "My soul ye cannot reach, not if ye would."

The one familiar example of the meeting of Greek and Hebrew to the "general reader" is the Wisdom of Solomon, of which the date may be about 100 to 50 B.C. For this book was happily included in the Apocrypha, and is thus available for all, more especially now in the excellent Revised Version. It is most desirable that nobody should read it in the very faulty and inadequate rendering of the older version. But with regard to this book, notable and extremely interesting as it is, I do not propose to enter into any detail, for those of its teachings which are of special interest and value for our purpose reappear, though not exactly in the same form, in Philo. Its conception of Wisdom will be compared by the most casual reader with that in the early chapters of Proverbs. It shows

the kinship between Hebrew and Greek that Greek influence has been predicated of the sublime representation of Wisdom in the eighth chapter of Proverbs, and also vehemently denied. In the work of the Alexandrian sage the influence is obvious, but how well it accords with, and fits on to, the Hebrew basis. How noble is the result. "For wisdom is more mobile than any motion ; yea, she pervades and penetrates all things by reason of her pureness. For she is a breath of the power of God, and a clear effluence of the glory of the Almighty ; therefore can nothing defiled find entrance into her. For she is an effulgence from everlasting light, and an unspotted mirror of the working of God, and an image of His goodness. And she, being one, has power to do all things ; and remaining in herself, she renews all things ; and from generation to generation passing into holy souls, she makes men friends of God and prophets. For nothing does God love save him that dwells with wisdom. For she is fairer than the sun, and above all the constellations of the stars : being compared with light, she is found to be before it. For to the light of day succeeds night, but against wisdom evil does not prevail." Such a passage is a possession for ever, and its value is undiminished even to-day. There are also phrases here and there which still appeal to us. As, for instance, "Thou hast mercy on all men, because Thou hast power to do all things, and Thou overlookest the sins of men to the end they may repent. For Thou lovest all things that are, and abhorrest none of the things which Thou didst make ; for never wouldest Thou have formed anything if Thou didst hate it. And how would anything have

endured except Thou hadst willed it? Or that which was not called by Thee, how would it have been preserved? But Thou sparest all things, because they are Thine, O Sovereign Lord, Thou lover of men's souls; for Thine incorruptible spirit is in all things." Just as God is "the lover of souls," so the righteous must be "a lover of men." Whom the gods love die young, said the Greek poet, and our sage gives a peculiar turn to the same thought. "A righteous man, though he die before his time, shall be at rest. For honourable old age is not that which stands in length of time, nor is its measure given by number of years. But understanding is grey hairs unto men, and an unspotted life is ripe old age. Being found well pleasing unto God he was beloved of Him, and while living among sinners he was translated. . . . Being made perfect in a little time, he fulfilled a long time, for his soul was pleasing unto the Lord; therefore he hastened him away out of the midst of wickedness." But the great glory and beauty of the book is its doctrine of immortality. Here Greek and Hebrew make a noble product. "To be acquainted with Thee is perfect righteousness, and to know Thy dominion is the root of immortality." By this conception the problem of calamity is solved. We no longer think of "the wicked" in the same way as our sage: we are no longer content that they should be merely destroyed or merely punished, whether in this world or the next; we want their redemption. Yet no one can fail to be moved by the striking speeches of the wicked in chapters two and five of Widsom, chapters which one might be tempted to quote from, if they were not too well known and so easily available. Nor is the doctrine

concerning the righteous impaired in value or vitality because of the inadequacy of the doctrine concerning the wicked. "The righteous live for ever, and the Lord is their reward, and the care for them with the Most High." We, too, may still in faith condemn the false arguments of the wicked and their scorn of the righteous. For still we "vaunt that God is our Father." Still do we believe that the wicked "know not the mysteries of God," nor "judge that there is a prize for blameless souls." Still do we believe that "God created man for incorruption and made him an image of His own proper being." And our faith, too, can be still expressed in those wonderful words: "The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God, and no torment shall touch them. In the eyes of the foolish they seemed to have died, and their departure was accounted to be their hurt, and their going from us to be their ruin: but they are in peace. For though in the sight of men they be punished, their hope is full of immortality. And having borne a little chastening, they shall receive great good, because God made trial of them, and found them worthy of Himself. As gold in the furnace He proved them, and as a whole burnt offering He accepted them." How teaching such as this, had it been known to him, would have soothed the tortured spirit of Job!

But let us now pass on quickly to Philo. It is not so very difficult now to write about him and his teaching, because the books and essays about him are increasing in number. We have a modern critical edition of his works, and the beginning, at any rate, of an adequate translation. But to find out and state what is his precise contribution to

Judaism is a much less simple task. What rough edges of Old Testament teaching did he smooth? What did he add that has proved of permanent value? What can we learn from him to-day? What more especially has Liberal Judaism to learn from him? To these questions the answers are by no means easy or obvious. First of all, perhaps, we may say of Philo, as most readers of the Wisdom of Solomon would, I think, say also of it, that every now and then there is in him a certain new flavour or aroma which reveals the Greek influence. But this very flavour or aroma is just something which cannot be set down in words and paragraphs. It is not a definite contribution of a particular piece of doctrine. It is something more volatile and unassessable. It is the touch of the spirit. Philo is cumbrous and tedious, and (for us) often frosty and obsolete; he is rhetorical and turgid and awkward, but yet in him, every now and then, we have this flavour and this aroma; in him we have a certain new spirituality, near enough to Hebraism to be organically fusible with Hebraism: akin to, though distinct from it.

We may, perhaps, employ the analogy of a translation. A literal translation of a great work of art gives the meaning of the original. The sense is the same, but the spirit is different. Something is lost. So, though inversely, when the same things are said about God or some religious doctrine by Philo as you might find in the Old Testament or in the Rabbinical literature, yet just because of the flavour and aroma of the Greek and of the Greek spirit, something is added. The doctrine is the same, and yet the two statements in which the doctrine is contained are not entirely identical.

The spirit of the second is different from the spirit of the first. And this intangible, scarcely describable, spirit is the addition, the extra, the novelty.

The actual and definite additions of value made by Philo, and still usable by, and of value for us to-day, are, perhaps, not very numerous. Moreover, these additions are mainly couched, and conveyed to us, in philosophical terms which have become obsolete, and as part of a system which was never fully or consistently worked out which was always artificial and often absurd. Its artificiality, obsolescence, and imperfections all add to the trouble. Yet in spite of all these hindrances, some additions, expansions, and fillings out there undoubtedly are. I shall not deal with them, however, at any great length, because, in actual substance and intention, if not in form, there is often an odd parallelism between them and those additions and expansions of the Rabbis which have already been considered. Yet it would be a very interesting and even profitable subject for a separate essay to consider the Philonic and Rabbinic expansion in their agreements with, and differences from, each other. And in this connection it may be noted that the same thing applies in the case of Philo as in the case of the Rabbinic literature, and often, too, in the case of the New Testament. The additions to the Old Testament of which we may legitimately speak in all three cases are by no means always, or necessarily, additions in the sense that they give or contain something which is wholly new, and is entirely absent from the Old Testament. We may legitimately speak of additions (or of expansions, fillings out, or completions) where the teaching exists indeed in the Old Testament,

but not prominently or much. If the teaching is more prominent in these later writings than in the Old Testament, if it is more central, if it is more vigorously and insistently pressed, then we may properly regard it as an expansion or filling out, or even as an addition and a "smoothing." In the strictest sense, however, a rough edge of the Old Testament is often not first corrected by Rabbis, New Testament, or Philo. Most of the Old Testament rough edges are corrected, as we have seen, by the Old Testament itself. But the corrections may be incidental or occasional, and the tenor of their teaching may not have prevailed. If the corrections are more central and prevailing in those later books and authorities, then we may legitimately speak of expansions and smoothings, even though it be the Old Testament itself which has led the way, and made the suggestion for its own improvement.

It is a strange thing that, as I have already indicated, the Hebrew Bible is for Philo practically the Pentateuch only. Thus his whole outlook is different from ours. The most precious things in the whole Old Testament are ignored by, or unknown to him. The grand universalism of the Babylonian Isaiah, his great doctrines of the servant and of Israel's witnessing, he seems never to allude to. And if we can find in Philo fine statements about the inadequacy of outward worship, it would almost appear as if these were suggested to him rather by Greek sayings and Greek philosophers than by the Prophets of his own race. Philo has his difficulties about the letter of Scripture, or rather of the Pentateuch, but these difficulties are only partly the same as ours, and his method of solving them—by

allegory and symbolism—is wholly different from our own. His main difficulties are the anthropomorphisms, the ascription to God of human parts and limbs, of human actions and limitations, of human feelings and emotions. It can hardly be said that these worry us much to-day. Some we recognise as due to early or crude conceptions of the divine nature, but Philo knows nothing of any religious development. For him Moses is the supreme and perfect prophet, law-giver, and sage, and the Pentateuch—the work of Moses—is the supreme and perfect product of revelation. Any apparent imperfection is apparent only. Penetrate beneath the letter to the spiritual or allegorical meaning within, and all becomes right and wise and true. Other Pentateuchal anthropomorphisms are for us merely the necessary ways in which human beings have to talk about God. “The Torah speaks in the language of men.” This Rabbinic saying explains for us a good deal, as it explained a good deal also for the Rabbis, though doubtless to the Pentateuchal writers these anthropomorphisms were less consciously metaphorical than they are to us. And being most of us less philosophic and metaphysical than Philo, and less worried by the impossibility of knowing the nature and essence of God, as He truly is in His own being, to Himself and for Himself, we have no difficulty about those anthropomorphisms which ascribe to God a human character. The only question with us is : What is the *sort* of character that they ascribe to Him ? What *we* worry about, what *we* regard as Old Testament rough edges, are rarely, if ever, alluded to directly by Philo : to wit, the particularism ascribed to God and His partiality, His ethical imperfections, His fierceness,

His cruelty, and the fierceness and cruelty of the laws or the deeds enjoined by Him, the methods and examples of His punishments, and so on. The mere anthropomorphisms as such bother us much less acutely, though we like the passages in which God's ubiquity and "immanence" are asserted or implied, and we use them to smooth the rough edges of anthropomorphic limitations as to "place," or of undue and one-sided "transcendence." Philo does, in fact, correct some of our troubles, but he does so incidentally, and not by way of direct allusion and discussion, as in the case of the anthropomorphisms to which he himself takes exception or in which he himself finds a difficulty.

Philo is a philosopher, and we must not expect to find in a philosopher the same religious uplifting and inspiration as we find in a prophet or a psalmist or in a great religious teacher such as Jesus or Paul. Comparisons sometimes made between him and such as these seem to me to be almost of necessity unsatisfactory. Moreover, because he is a philosopher, he is unsuited for the general reader; and though one can make a *catena* or *florilegium* of his fine sayings or easier utterances, such a series of extracts can hardly do him justice. And while he is a philosopher, he is also a philosopher in chains. By hook or by crook he has to extract all he wants to teach out of the words of the Pentateuch, while these very words, which are necessarily perfect and profound, lead him on to subtlety after subtlety, and to one bizarre explanation after another. Again, philosopher as he is, his philosophy is no consistent whole. He is an eclectic, and he has not completely assimilated all he knew and had read. Depending most of all, as is now, I believe, generally agreed, upon Posidonius, the

platonising Stoic, who died some time about 50 B.C., and whose works have perished (though his teaching can be, and is being, reconstructed from surviving fragments and from those later writers, such as Cicero, who borrowed from, and were influenced by him), Philo is by no means confined to any one school. Like an impartial bee he culls his honey from many flowers. This eclecticism makes him more difficult, and it also makes him frequently inconsistent. But though there is hardly a sentence in Philo which could have been written except by a man conversant with, and immersed in, Greek philosophy, and though there is any amount of him which would not have seemed strange or foreign to Greek philosophers, if many of them might sometimes have also added: "Yes, quite so; so say the Stoics, or so say the Platonists, or so say the Pythagoreans, but a little differently," yet there is also a large amount of him (and the two amounts often overlap) which in substance, if not in form, would not have seemed strange or foreign to a Palestinian Rabbi. I do not know whether his words would have seemed stranger and more foreign to a Rabbi of the first century, his own contemporary, than to a Rabbi of the third or fourth, but I feel confident that my statement is true of the Rabbi of the third or fourth century (of whom we know so much more), even if it be not so true of the Rabbi of the first. The reason is that the higher mind of Judaism has affinities with the higher religious thought of Hellenism. They were sufficiently alike for the Alexandrian Jew to be able to drink deep of Hellenic thought without being false to his Judaism, either consciously to himself or even actually and positively. Philo could not have so drunk of Indian thought, and remained

unconscious of the conflict. A Jewish Indian would be an impossible combination: a Jewish Hellenistic philosopher is not. In Greek garb, in Greek terminology, breathing Greek aroma, containing Greek thought, Philo's words would, nevertheless, have often appeared to the Rabbi (if he could have understood them) to be full of the highest Judaism.

What has just been said might well be illustrated by much of Philo's teaching about God. And hence a difficulty in dealing with Philo for my present purpose. From one point of view, a great deal of what Philo says about God might be quoted here as being new—not a correction, not a “smoothing” or an expansion, but yet something new in the sense that the *form* is new, the wording is new, and, therefore, in some respects, the spirit is new. For a new wording means, to some extent, a new spirit. And yet, in another sense, it would not be, and is not, new, not new, sometimes, even if a Philo chapter were made to follow immediately upon an Old Testament chapter, still less new if it follows upon a chapter about the Rabbinical literature. Thus, for instance, Philo's teaching about the divine omnipresence is not a correction or expansion of the Old Testament, for the Old Testament has, as we know, here corrected and expanded itself. It is still less a correction or expansion of the Rabbis. Nevertheless, as the ordinary man reads it, he would, I think, be conscious of a new fragrance, a new way of putting the thing, a new form for the old thought. “Not even the entire universe would be an adequate home for God, for He is a place to Himself, and full of Himself, and sufficient to Himself, filling and containing all other things, which are deficient and desert and empty, but Himself being contained by

nothing else, as being Himself one and the whole.” “He reaches everywhere, He looks to the ends, He fills the universe, and of Him not even the smallest thing is empty.” “God is both nowhere and everywhere; nowhere, because He generated place along with the bodies which occupy it, and we may not assert that the Maker is contained in anything of the things made; everywhere, because having stretched His powers through earth and water, air and heaven, He has left no part of the universe desert, but, having collected all things together, made them fast with invisible bonds that they might never be dissolved.” “He is not in time or place, but above them both, for having all created things under Himself, He is contained by nothing, but is outside of all. And yet, though above and outside creation, He has, none the less, filled creation with Himself.” If the reader recalls certain Rabbinic utterances about the divine ubiquity, he will be, I think, ready to confirm what I have said: here, so far as Judaism is concerned, is something both old and new.

If we were to compare Philo with certain Psalmists—the authors, for example, of Psalms xxiii., xlii., xxxvi., lxxiii.—a man might be inclined to argue: “Philosophically, Philo may have something to say and to add; religiously, he has nothing. What *can* be added to the certainty, the assurance, the intimacy, the passion, of these Psalmists? Especially when to these qualities of theirs we add their simplicity. Their appeal is universal; never obsolete; fully adequate.” In a sense this is true, but it is not the whole truth. Philo is not a mere philosopher in the sense of a man who has a mere intellectual curiosity to know the truth. He has, he is filled with, a profound yearning for God. The

search for God is in his eyes the one truly desirable, the wisest and most proper, occupation of man. To know God, so far as God can be known by man, is for him a consuming passion. He cannot express that passion in words of the same beauty and simplicity as the Psalmists, but it is none the less real. Secondly, he is possessed with the most intense conviction of the reality of God: God is, indeed, in the deepest sense of the word, the only reality; He is much more real than the things of sense, than the things we see and feel; Philo believes in God much more intensely than he believes in them. And thirdly, Philo, like the Psalmist, has had living actual experience of God. He has communed with Him; he has enjoyed Him. He has been conscious of His presence, of His nearness. Philo is not, what many of us are sadly conscious of being, a man who merely talks about God, or who even believes in God as an intellectual, moral, and spiritual necessity, as the ultimate and eternal source and fount of knowledge and goodness in whom he therefore feels bound to put his credence. I do not say that Philo had as *much* first-hand knowledge as the finest Psalmists, but he was on the same plane with them; his knowledge of God is of the same *kind* as theirs. He is both a philosopher and a man of religion. Hence his utterances, though couched in turgid, rhetorical, and very unattractive language, are yet often full of a deep religious fervour and conviction that give to them a peculiar force and a peculiar value. And when to all this we add his intellectual capacity and his absorption of Hellenic thought, it is not surprising that he should be a figure of unique interest in the range of Jewish literature. Jews must be profoundly grateful to the Christian Church for

having preserved him to us. For it is only by the work of Christian copyists and by reason of Christian interest that his writings have come down to us. Through Christian hands has this ardent Jew been given back to Judaism.¹ For ardent Jew he was, and in spite of the profound differences which separate his Judaism from the Judaism of the Rabbis, in spite of all his Hellenism in form and in thought, in spite of all his borrowings from, and obligations to, Greek philosophy, Philo was not merely an ardent Jew in his own belief and feeling: his words, his teachings, are in their inmost substance, in their most essential portions, in their deepest spirit, profoundly Jewish. Not least is he Jewish in the most fundamental portion of his teaching — his doctrine of God. It is true, as I have said, that a Greek reading him might say, "I find nothing entirely strange or repellent," but it is not the whole truth. The extra part of the whole truth may be more subtle, but it is not the less real. There was hardly a Greek before him, I think, who spoke about God with the same tones and fervour and passion as Philo. To any previous Greek philosopher was God so personal, so near, so gracious, as to Philo? It is not the impersonal divine Reason to which Philo is constantly seeking to draw near, which he yearns to understand, for which he feels reverence and love, but it is the living God, the Ruler and the Creator, the Father of the universe and of man, not *τὸ θεῖον* but *ὁ θεός*. Was there a Greek philosopher before him who had the same sort of conception of God's relation to man and of man's relation to God,

¹ It is pleasant to see this fact frankly acknowledged by Dr. Baeck in his fine book *Das Wesen des Judentums*, 2nd ed., p. 280 (1922). I do not remember seeing the acknowledgement in any other Jewish work.

so intense a conviction of God's providence, grace, and goodness, of man's dependence, lowliness, and createdness? Philo has this passion for God, though his philosophy teaches him that God can never be comprehended by man in the fullness of His being, though he realises that God can only be known through His works and His powers, by that side or aspect of Him which is turned towards man and towards the world, which is inferred by man from man's own nature, which is disclosed by God's relations with man, and by the divine revelation to man, so far as man is capable of receiving the revelation of God. *What* God is, man can never fully know; it is a great distinction for man to know *that* He is. "That which is better than the good, older than unity and purer than one, cannot possibly be discerned by any other: He can only be apprehended by Himself. One would have to become God to comprehend God. Hence Scripture says: 'My face shall not be seen.' God cannot be understood by the creature in His essential being." There are a number of such passages. We, too, should surely agree with them. We, too, should not presume to imagine that we can understand or know God as He truly is, in the fullness of His being. Nevertheless, while convinced that the search for God is a fruitless and presumptuous search, if the goal sought is completion and fullness of knowledge or vision, Philo is constantly straining to know more and more, to get further and further, to penetrate the impenetrable, to reach up towards the unattainable. The search is glorious and full of joy. "The nature of God is hard" (he means "impossible") "to comprehend: nevertheless it must be sought after as far as possible. For there

is nothing better than to seek for the true God, even if finding Him transcends human power. For the mere zeal and desire to seek bring in themselves unspeakable pleasures and joys." And though God is in His fullness unknowable, there is yet much of Him which can be known. One can know that He is perfect, and this very perfection implies a great deal. One can know that He has none of the weaknesses and imperfections of all that perishes and changes, that comes and goes. Above all, one can know that He is perfect reason and perfect goodness, and that reason and goodness are fundamental features or aspects of His Godhead. His goodness is the source of creation, and His reason is the instrument whereby it was created. How it is that all this can be known about God must be read in Dr. Drummond's excellent book on Philo, or in Bréhier's book, or elsewhere.

It can hardly be said that all that Philo states about God's perfection, His goodness, and His reason greatly adds to what we hear and learn about God in the Old Testament. Yet as put in other terms and more systematically, there is in it a kind of novelty. The conception of God's "grace" adds a new nuance to His goodness. Grace (*χάρις*) as used by Philo is not *quite* the same as any Hebrew noun. It is not quite the same as *Chesed* (loving-kindness), or as *mercy*. Grace is the cause of creation. "Creation can give nothing, for it owns nothing. To God alone grace is native. To those who ask the origin of creation, one could most rightly reply that it is the goodness and grace of God, which He bestowed upon the race which is after His image. For all that is in the universe, and the universe itself, are the gift and bounty and

grace of God. All is due to God's grace, though naught is worthy of it; but God looked to His own eternal goodness, and considered that to do good befitted His own blessed and happy nature."

Philo was no more able to explain the existence of evil than Plato or the Stoics, than the Psalmists or the author of Job. Nor are his contributions towards a theodicy of any value or originality. But perhaps his debt to Plato, even more than his higher Judaism, compelled him to believe that God was the author of good only and in no wise of evil. The famous statement of the Second Isaiah, "I create evil (or calamity)," could hardly have been accepted by him. He would have had to explain it away. Philo is of value to us in his passionate belief that goodness—the perpetual will to give and to benefit—is closely woven in the very texture of the divine being. Philo's goodness or grace as applied to God is, in this respect, akin to the love of the Fourth Gospel and the Chesed of the Pentateuch. Moreover, in Philo the world is not divided into sheep and goats in the same rigid way as to the author of the twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew, or into children of light and children of darkness as to the author of the Fourth Gospel. Love is a more beautiful word than goodness, but Philo has a wider and more inclusive view of God's redemptive mercy than the Evangelist. The fierce features of the divine character which we still find in the Psalmists and the Prophets—God's wrath and anger, His denunciations of the wicked, and His hardly concealed satisfaction in their destruction either actual or foretold (the wicked being for the most part the enemies of Israel, or the violators of His commandments, or the rich oppressors of His needy and pious servants)—

have all disappeared in Philo. And the value for us, as it seems to me, of Philo's teaching lies in having attained this purity, in having reached this assurance that, however difficult the facts of human existence may be to reconcile with the divine goodness, that goodness must be stuck to through thick and thin, and that nothing must be allowed to diminish it, least of all our own human passions and predilections. Philo's ways of dealing with suffering and evil may be ineffectual and obsolete or a little childish, his ways of looking at human wickedness and its punishment may not be ours, but at least we can admire in him his conviction that God is good and nothing but good, and that our belief in this goodness must not be impaired or lessened by ascribing to Him such inconsistent conceptions as wrath or anger, or indeed any activities which (with the attributes or qualities from which they spring) are not to the moral benefit and improvement of those to whom they are directed. Philo is not entirely successful in his efforts, and not always consistent, but the efforts are there, and it is these efforts which are of value. His partial failures are due to three causes. First he, as a philosopher, had to try to explain everything; it was not in his line, or congruent with his method, to say as we can say, "The problem of evil is insoluble; but if God exists, and is good, He is perfectly good, good to all and not only to some, good to the wicked, and not only to the virtuous, the redeemer of all men, and not only of a minority or a majority." We can say that; he could not. Secondly, Philo was encumbered and entangled by the text of the Pentateuch; however much he might allegorise and explain away, there was a stage beyond

which his special point of view did not allow him to go ; certain statements and stories had to be taken as literally true as well as containing higher spiritual meanings, and these stories and statements do speak of punishments and evils happening to men (wicked men, if you please) that were certainly not to their benefit, and were not intended for their benefit. Thirdly, Philo, like some people even to-day, was less sensitive to the inconsistency of certain actions with the divine goodness. There are theologians even to-day who think that the belief that " God is love " is yet perfectly consistent with eternal hell, or at any rate with eternal exclusion from full spiritual development and beatitude, for a *small* number of very wilfully naughty persons, and who even hold that determined universalists, such as the present writer, are philosophically and religiously feeble, foolish, and flabby. How little surprised, then, should we be if Philo does not draw all the inferences from the pure goodness of God that we Liberal Jews draw from it to-day. The great point is that he *does press* the purity, presses it definitely and consciously beyond the Old Testament limits, and even beyond the Rabbis. (Obviously I do not mean that *he* was conscious of any religious inadequacy in the Pentateuch. On the contrary. He regarded it as perfect, and was only concerned to bring its perfections to the light and to explain its difficulties.)

This is not the place in which to give any account of Philo's doctrine concerning angels or the divine powers or the Logos. The object of my very elementary essay is not to set forth Philo's philosophic system or his religious teaching, but merely to consider how far this teaching goes beyond

that of the Old Testament, and is of value for us to-day.

God as He is in Himself and to Himself is unknown to, and unknowable by, man. But He is known by His operations in the world and in man; He is known by His revelations of Himself which in His grace He has vouchsafed to certain Jewish heroes of the past, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, and above all to Moses. He is known by those aspects of His nature and His activity which are turned outwards, which He allows and wishes to be known, and which even average human nature is, to some extent at least, capable of knowing and understanding. Among these powers there are two which are for man of supreme importance; they stand closest to God in His relation to the world, and reveal for us most of His nature in respect of that relation. "In the One and truly existing God there are two great and primary powers, goodness and authority: by goodness God created the world, by authority He rules it, while a third power uniting and mediating between both is reason (Logos), for by reason God is both ruler and good." The two primary powers Philo equates with the two divine names "God" and "Lord." "God" represents the divine being as creator and as good, "Lord" (*κύριος*) represents Him as ruler. It will be remembered that to the Rabbis the word Elohim represents God's justice and severity, while "the Lord," or rather the unutterable tetragrammaton (Yahweh), represents His mercy and loving-kindness. With Philo the symbolism is reversed, but it has to be remembered that for Philo the Greek *κύριος* means just Lord and nothing else. The tetragrammaton itself is distinct from it, and that *κύριος* is a

mere rendering of Adonai, which was *read* wherever Yahweh was *written*, is not considered or known. Yet just as the Middah of mercy is to the Rabbis higher, and nearer to the very essence of the divine nature, than the Middah of justice, so too with Philo the creative power, which is also the power of goodness, is nearer to God, or "older," than the power of rule. Now, so far as the divine being is ruler, He has the power both to do good or ill (or perhaps "to benefit or to injure"), "acting in accordance with the principle of proportionate requital." (Philo is not wholly free from the shackles of the doctrine of tit for tat.) But so far as He is a benefactor (*i.e.* so far as He is "God"), He wills one of these possibilities only, namely, to benefit or do good. God, therefore, has the *capacity* to do ill. But He is, as we have heard, ever the cause of good. Nevertheless, He does apparently punish and destroy and kill. Of such actions the Penta-teuch is fairly full. What, then, are we to say about them? It is clear that Philo is uneasy in the matter; he has no one consistent theory about it, and his explanations, such as they are, are no longer of much help or value. First of all, he adopts the Old Testament conception that whom God chastises He benefits. Punishment is not injurious, for it is both a prevention and a correction of sins. Perhaps, he says elsewhere, "we should include the punitive among the beneficent powers, not merely because punishments are parts of laws (for law is made up of two parts, the honour of the good and the punishment of the wicked), but because punishment often admonishes and makes temperate the sinners themselves, and if not them, at least their associates. For the punishments of others make ordinary people

better, for fear lest they should suffer the like." Yet he has to admit that punishment, even when it is a good, has in it some resemblance to evil, and also that some punishments are hardly to be regarded as good, even though they may be justly inflicted, because of the greatness and intensity of the human wickedness of which they are the retribution. For such cases Philo adopts the (as we should think) desperate and wholly unsatisfactory expedient of supposing that these punishments are not carried out by God, but by certain delegated and subordinate angelic ministers and agents. "It is not becoming," says Philo, "for God to punish, as He is the first and the best legislator, but He punishes through the ministration of others, not through Himself. For it is suitable for Him to extend favours and gifts and benefits, as He is by nature good and a lover of giving, but to inflict punishments (not, indeed, without His own command, for He is King) through the agency of others who are adapted to such services." Who these others are, and how far they are intended to be angels (as Dr. Drummond thought), wholly different from the divine powers in the stricter sense of the word, need not be discussed here. For the same reason Philo explains the famous plural in "Let *us* make man" as due to man's composite and special nature by which he was free to choose the evil as well as the good, and was often to do so. The formation of "the mortal part of the human soul" God assigned to others—to those agencies and powers to whom He spoke—so that He might not have part in the making of that which was to do evil, and so that the good actions of man might alone be ascribed to Him and the sinful ones to others. For God is the cause of

good things only, and of nothing evil at all. It is fitting for Him who is purely and perfectly good to fashion and to do only what is good. "The domain of evil has been entrusted to angels, though even they have not an absolute power of punishment, in order that His saving power should not originate anything tending to destruction. Wherefore He says, 'Come, let us go down and confound them.' For the ungodly deserve to meet with such penalty, namely, that God's gracious and beneficent and generous powers should be associated with punishments. Knowing, however, that punishments are beneficial to the race of men He ordained them through others. For it was right that mankind should be deemed worthy of correction, but, on the other hand, that the springs of His ever-flowing mercies should be guarded from all mixture of things evil, not real only, but imaginary also."

Philo ought to have realised that the maxim *qui facit per alium facit per se* is as valid in theology as in law, and as true for God as for man, but, nevertheless, we can admire, and even learn from, his intense desire to keep God free from being the cause of evil, and, still more, from his passionate conviction that God is goodness and only goodness, and therefore impossibly the author of anything which is less, or other, than good.

In his views and teaching as to the relation of God to man and of man to God, Philo, in one essential and fundamental point, differs widely from the Rabbis, and this difference gives him a special value for *us*. There are many Rabbis, but there is only one Philo. He is unique, and, so far as we are concerned, he had no successors. Now Philo is a Jew, and a conscious Jew, proud of his religion

and his community, and also, I think it may be said, of their religious mission. The special relation of God to Israel in the past is very real to him, nor does he, in theory, disbelieve in such a special relation both in the present and in the future. But in his writings, and as religion presents itself to his own mind, Philo is a teacher of pure religious individualism, and his philosophy applies to all men, and not merely to Israel. The two poles are not, as with the Rabbis, God and Israel, or God and the Israelite, but God and man. God's relation to man is not even mediated by His relation to Israel. The human soul and God ; these are the two terms of Philo's religion ; these are the two great counters with which he plays. That human soul might belong to any race and to any time. It is, indeed, independent of place and race and time. This pure humanism is in itself something in Judaism which is comparatively new. It gives to Philo's writings a special importance and value entirely their own. Moreover—and this is also of much significance—though, as we have seen, the sacred Scriptures are for Philo little else than the Pentateuch, and though the Pentateuch is to him, no less than to the Rabbis, the perfect word of God, yet Philo's attitude towards the Law is very different from the attitude of the Rabbis. Philo, as we shall hear later on, was an observant "orthodox" Jew, and deprecated any neglect of the outward observances. Nevertheless, the motive of his fidelity to these outward ordinances was very different from the motive of the Rabbis : he had no passion and joy and absorbing interest in the execution of the laws, or in their elaboration, or in endless casuistical discussions concerning their

observance. He observed the letter, but he had small interest in the letter. What absorbed him was the spiritual teaching, the allegorical lessons and revelations, which, as he believed, lay beneath the letter, and were the letter's ultimate intention and value and significance. He observed the Passover, but what he cared about was the spiritual Passover, as he calls it, the Passover of the soul. The ordinances and prohibitions, the positive and negative commands, were not for him the supreme glory and distinction of Israel and of every Israelite. They were not given for Israel's glory and delight and adornment and reward ; they were given for the lessons they reveal to the soul, for the teachings they convey as to the relation of the soul (*every* human soul) to God, and of God to the soul. So far as their mere outward observance goes, they bring reward when duly fulfilled, and cause punishment when neglected or violated, but outward reward and punishment are for the uninitiated, for the lower rungs and ranks of humanity ; they fall away into insignificance for the true lover of God, and still more for the higher seeker after the full vision of the supreme. The Law as a series of positive and negative commands is not the revelation of God in the highest aspect of Him which man can grasp and reach, but rather the revelation of God in His lowest aspect, in that aspect which the lover and the mystic should and can transcend.

God's highest specific relation to man is that of benefactor : His creative and beneficent powers are one ; it is they which are reflected and implied in the very word "God" itself. That aspect of Him which relates to His rule and to His authority is, as we saw, "younger" in thought, though not

in time, and this "younger in thought" means less essential, less adorable, in nature. The two "powers" of goodness and authority are also often conceived as united in the higher power of thought or reason — the divine Logos — of which there will be a little more to say later on. Now in one important passage Philo makes another division of the divine powers into six. He supposes that these six powers are symbolised in the six cities of refuge. The "oldest" and best of these cities or powers is the Logos. "The Logos is the metropolis. The other five are, as it were, colonies of the Logos. The first is the creative power, the second the kingly power, by which the maker rules what has come into being. Third is the propitious power, by which the artificer pities and has compassion on His own work. Fourth is the legislative power, by which God orders what man must do; fifth is that portion of the legislative power by which He forbids what must not be done." It will be observed that the legislative powers are the lowest two in the scale! What would the Rabbis have said to such a division? In the first three powers the heavens and the whole universe share. "But the last three powers are near to us, and have relations with the race of men, who alone sin. For who of those who are not going to do wrong needs prohibition, or who of those who are not liable to stumble needs command, or who of those who will never sin needs pity? But our race needs all three, because it is by nature inclined both to voluntary and involuntary sins." The Law is no longer a sort of divine good, pre-existent before the world was created, which God Himself rejoices in and studies. It is support and

restraint for frail and erring humanity. The better you grow—such is the inference—the less is the need for law ; the more capable will you become for realising and worshipping those divine powers, those higher aspects of God, which are above the preceptive and the prohibitive. It is true that the Rabbis also speak of the Law as existing for the use of men and not of the angels, but then the angels almost envy man because of his possession of the Law. For us, however, the more interesting and valuable feature in this difference between Philo and the Rabbis is to be gleaned, not so much in the relation of God to man, as in the relation of man to God. And here it is that Philo's Hellenism again comes in. To the Hebrew spirit of the Rabbis the great privilege and duty of man is to know and to do God's will as revealed in the Law. To the Hellenised spirit of Philo the great privilege and duty of man is to know and contemplate and adore God Himself. This, rather than doing certain actions, whether moral or ceremonial, is His true service.

The two main and fundamental human attitudes or relations to God are to Philo, as to the Rabbis, fear and love. (It is noticeable that Philo uses the term "love" for man's attitude towards God, but never, I think, for God's attitude towards man : here goodness is used, and not love.) The two primary powers of God suggest the two primary attitudes of man. As creator and benefactor we love God, as ruler we fear Him. The powers which are below the first two, more especially the preceptive and the prohibitive (the two subdivisions of the legislative), ought logically to suggest an attitude which is below that of fear, but Philo is

unable to make clear what such an attitude could be. Perhaps we might say that the fear which befits our realisation of God as ruler is the higher fear which we call reverence, while the lower fear, which goes with the anticipation of punishment, is the attitude suggested by the sixth or prohibitive power, and that the hope of reward is the attitude suggested by the fifth or preceptive power. But this is an inference: Philo does not say so definitely.

God, says Philo, "does not demand from us anything hard or complicated, but something very easy and simple. It is to love Him as a benefactor, or, if that be too much, at least to fear Him as our ruler and Lord." Philo is not entirely consistent upon the subject of love and fear. While always putting love above fear, he sometimes finds the highest and best attitude towards God in a sort of conscious combination of love and fear, sometimes, on the other hand, in a pure love which has dispensed with, and cast out, fear. Thus, in one passage, he goes so far as to say: "Of bad men the Deity claims to be called ruler and king; of the improving and advancing, God; while of those who are best and most perfect, God and Lord at once. We must seek to realise *both* the goodness *and* the authority (or rule) of God, for then we shall also learn the union and combination of these undefiled powers, wherein, by the manifestation of His rule, God seems also to be good, and by the manifestation of His goodness, He seems to be ruling. So shall we acquire the virtues born of these conceptions, a love and reverence of God. Then in prosperity we shall not talk big, remembering the greatness of God's mighty rule, and in adversity we shall not despair, remembering God's gentleness and love

of giving." We must learn that God is supreme, and is raised above His powers, and is seen without them, while He also manifests Himself in them. Thus shall we receive within our souls the impression (or stamp) both of His power and of His goodness. But Philo sometimes declares that the more perfect disposition is one which has removed from the soul the fear which is felt towards God as a master, and which needs goodness or grace only. "It is not bettered by admonishing rule, for it possesses the good by nature, and from the gifts showered from above, it is good and perfect from the start. What can be a greater good than to reach pure and unmixed beneficence? Much less good is it to have the mixture of gift and rule. That is why Jacob prayed that the Lord might become for him God: he wished no longer to fear Him as a ruler, but only to honour Him lovingly as a benefactor."

It is interesting and noteworthy that Philo associates the lower attitude towards God with a lower theoretical conception of Him. He constantly quotes the Biblical saying, "God is not as man," and contrasts it with the frequent phrases and utterances which imply that God *is* as man. He realises that "we cannot get out of ourselves, and so we have to form our conceptions of the uncreated God from our own attributes." The Biblical anthropomorphisms, which go much beyond such general necessity, and ascribe to God human shape or parts or passions, were deliberately introduced as an accommodation and as a concession for weaker intelligences, and also for purposes of education. The two go together. Some people are so dull by nature that they simply cannot think of God at all unless they think of Him as having a

body. These are also the very people who need restraining from sin through fear. Thus the fear of God goes together with a low anthropomorphic conception of Him ; the love of God with that higher conception of Him which knows that human shape and bodily parts and all human passions (that depend upon, and are interconnected with, the body) are utterly absent from God. Wrath and threats are educational instruments for the foolish and the evil-doer, and for them alone. The passions and diseases of the soul are both intellectual and moral ; they are both in one. Thus with the two fundamental assertions, God is as man, and God is not as man, two other fundamental principles seem closely interwoven and akin : fear and love. For all the exhortations to piety by means of the laws depend either upon the fear or on the love of God. "To those, then, who do not in thought ascribe to God either part or passion of man, but worthily honour Him on account of Himself alone, love is most appropriate, but to all others, fear."

When I was studying Philo nearly thirty years ago, it appeared to me as if this teaching of Philo's was a confusion (characteristic both for the Greeks and, perhaps, in a certain measure, for the Rabbis) of low intelligence with low morality. Do we not all know many gentle, humble souls of small intelligence and meagre knowledge, who probably *think* of God as a very wise and very good old gentleman, with intensely acute ears and eyes, sitting in heaven upon a high and splendid throne, but who yet love Him purely with all their heart and strength ? But while this is undoubtedly true—that such persons do exist and have for long generations existed—I now seem

to see that there is more in Philo's view than at first sight meets the eye. There is and must be an ultimate and natural correspondence between our intellectual conception of God and our emotional attitude towards Him. In the long run the two tend to agree. It is true that the intellectual conception tends to lag behind the emotional attitude. But a connection exists between the one and the other. Even the dumbest person to-day could not love God if he believed Him to be a monkey or a fish or a stone. Our personality tends to become a harmonious unity, and the fitting emotion tends to become wedded to the fitting thought. Beneficence or righteousness as a permanent attribute, as part of the very essence of His being, seems harmonious with the conception of God as "spirit"; wayward wrath, vindictiveness, passions which come and go, do not. Purify your conception of God's nature, and you must also purify your conception of His moral attributes. Purify your conception of both, and you necessarily purify your own emotional attitude towards Him. Why should you fear (in any lower sense of the word) Him who is *only* good and *only* loving, who is free from passion and hatred and wrath, who *can* only desire your moral redemption and development, be you sinner and saint, who *can* only grieve over your failings, who *can* only rejoice over your success? The impure conception of God may for a long while coexist with a pure emotional attitude; but the pure conception will bring with it the pure attitude, and the pure attitude will be all the readier to appreciate, understand, and appropriate (for love opens the doors of the mind and quickens it) the pure conception. Therefore Philo's views and

theories do not, it now seems to me, indicate mere confusion ; they are not either completely inaccurate or completely valueless—not even valueless for us to-day. For must we not still try to purify and vivify our conceptions of God, and to purify and vivify our attitude towards Him ? Must we not think about Him as well as feel about Him ? Must we not, so far as in us lies, attempt—must not each generation attempt—a harmony between conception and attitude ? If so, Philo's words and views have still some bearing upon what we, or at least some of us, ought to do, and they contain both warning and suggestiveness. For we must not allow either conception to lag behind attitude, or attitude behind conception. Both are possible incompletenesses which may be true of different sorts of people. Like Philo, we should seek for harmony.

Philo has need to speak of the necessity of the Biblical anthropomorphisms and of the fear of God, for (like his teachers the Stoics) he is pessimistic about the number of bad men and the paucity of the good. And it is curious how, in spite of this pessimism, he never seems to have any difficulty in keeping God clear from the imputation of having created so doleful a race of beings with whom sin was innate or inevitable and virtue so occasional and rare. Omar's, or rather FitzGerald's, famous forgiveness of God for the creation of man from " baser earth " would have seemed to Philo the height of impiety. Man must sin, but God the creator is guiltless. Hard it is to find one wise man, but the number of the bad is countless. It is a finer thing to do good than to avoid evil (Philo would be quite in agreement with the modern laudation of " do " over " don't "), but for mortal man to avoid wrong

is not by any means to be despised, and is even regarded as equivalent to doing right. "Innumerable are the things which stain the soul, and to wash them all away is impossible. Who would seek for a perfectly just or good man? Be content if you find one who is not altogether bad! Of the common herd none partakes of true life at all, and few share the life according to virtue, even of those who would wish to shun human interests and live for God alone." All this is, perhaps, little more than the customary rhetoric and exaggeration of the philosopher of Philo's day. More interesting is his view that potentially, at least, every man can become good, and that every man is potentially, at least, the child of God. There are no differences in kind, predestined children of evil, as seems to be the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel. "Every man," says Philo, "as regards his mind is related to the divine reason, for he is an impress or fragment of that blessed nature." Once assume, as Philo does, that God was not to be blamed for creating a creature so fragile as man, that human freedom and goodness, rare as they are in their perfection, are worth the price, and you can with Philo go on to praise God for His mercy and gentleness. God loves to give; He has made no soul without the capacity of goodness, even if the use of the capacity be to some impossible. "In every man there is an instinctive passionate hatred of vice—even in quite ordinary persons!" Again, "Who is there so without reason and soul as never, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to conceive a notion of the Highest? For a sudden apparition of the good frequently flits past even the wickedest, but they cannot retain or keep a hold on it." Philo

admits that virtue is sometimes "obscured by unfavourable circumstances, and again revealed by opportunity, the servant of God." There are, indeed, many who are born with excellent capacities or endowments for wisdom or virtue, but "the beauty of the images in their minds they are unable to reveal through their poverty or obscurity, or through bodily disease, or some other of the many misfortunes which attend upon the life of man. The good they have is, as it were, cabined and confined." Philo anticipates the elegy. Fine and valuable are his words about the innumerable powers of God which, as it were, adapt and suit themselves for the small as well as for the great. "The powers of God are ubiquitous, not merely for the benefit of pre-eminent men, but also of those who seem to be insignificant. To them, too, God gives what harmonises with the capacity and measure of their souls, for He measures out with equal rule what is proportionate to each." He seems to mean, by his use in this passage of the divine powers, not so much the general idea that God gives to each man what is suitable for him, but more specifically that God allows each man to perceive that aspect of Himself which the man is capable of apprehending. The powers or aspects are many and various: each man can learn to know God up to a certain point or in a certain way, and though the amounts of knowledge vary, and are differently compacted together, all may be true, though not all equally true, and none of them anything like the fullest truth to which a great saint and philosopher could attain, which fullest truth itself is far removed from the whole truth as it is in God and for God. The divine being is, therefore, in different measures

and ways gracious and compassionate to all. Even as Ezekiel taught, so also Philo teaches that God does not desire the death of the wicked; even as the Rabbis taught, so Philo teaches that God meets more than half-way the repentant sinner, and helps the sinner to repent. In fact, it may, perhaps, even be said that Philo is sometimes inclined to emphasise God's share in the work of repentance and redemption even more than the Rabbis, as if the very process was often started by the prevenient grace of God. This thought would be part of his general intense desire to regard every virtue, every power, every achievement of man as due less to himself and to his own capacity and effort than to the gift and grace and influence of God. "What soul ever put out of sight and annihilated wickedness, save that soul to which God was revealed? It is God alone who can open the womb of the soul, and sow virtues in it, and make it pregnant and bring forth the good." How great is the grace of God, "who anticipates our hesitation (or intention) and comes to meet us, to the great benefit of our souls." How, asks Philo in one place, can a thoroughly wicked soul return to goodness? What length of time could bring it back? "No time," he answers, "but God alone, to whom what is to us impossible is possible." It would be absurd to suppose that men are able "without divine wisdom to wash and cleanse a life which is full of stains." Perhaps the most significant passage in which Philo reveals his belief that, as with all other good movements and capacities of the soul, the change from evil to good is due to God's grace and not to our own power (even though we may seem to have made the change ourselves, because we desire to make it), is one in

which he recounts his own experience. "Often when I wish to think something seemly, I am overwhelmed with floods of what is unseemly, and on the other hand, when something ugly comes into my mind, I can wash it away with thoughts, which the grace of God bestows upon me, pouring sweet water instead of salt into my soul." Clearly, Philo regards the unclean thought as due to his own creatureliness, the clean thought which drives it away as due to the grace and goodness of God. Through His ubiquitous and redemptive powers God is constantly operative for good.

It would sometimes almost seem as if to Philo man did nothing and God did all. One tries to realise what he meant by the doctrine, and why he was so tremendously in earnest about it. He is anxious to emphasise the dependence and derivative-ness of man: he appears to regard it as enormously important to character for man to be constantly conscious of his createdness, of his innumerable and perpetual obligations to the divine giver and creator. Moreover, he really and honestly believes that, in one sense or other, it is God from whom all our knowledge and all our goodness—all our intellectual, moral, and, I suppose, also all our aesthetic achievements, are derived, and to whose aid and inspiration they are due. He does not, any more than Ezekiel, desire to prevent effort. Indeed, like Ezekiel, he (as Windisch notices) urges man to work at and achieve his own moral regeneration and redemption, deliverance and development. But he also believes, and he is intensely keen to make others believe, that both the effort itself and the results of the effort are due to the grace of God, to the divine powers within the soul, to the kinship

between man and God, and to the fact that God is, as it were, constantly stirring up that kinship, those powers of His within the soul, to do their work. He seems to hold that if man humbly recognises his indebtedness to God and his dependence upon God, then only true advance and improvement are possible. If, however, man refuses to acknowledge this indebtedness, if he thinks that he is the sole cause of his own actions and achievements, then these very actions and achievements will be feeble or corrupt. For every good thought and action, as well as for all excellence in endowment, man must thank God the giver. "It is not I, but God in me." It is as if a dog were to recognise that all his virtues, whereby he is raised above the fox and the wolf, were due to his contact and life with man. And it is more. For the constitution and nature of man are divine, or contain a divine element. This element only works for good and for truth if it recognises its origin. Moreover, the doctrine appears to be that the divine element within man is sustained by, and can be in vital connection with, the omnipresent Deity of the universe. It is as if the windows of the soul can be opened more widely, or kept more clean, for the sun and air to enter. If you refuse to recognise the windows, if you deny the light and the air, your condition must clearly deteriorate. But the very opening of the window itself, or the very cleaning of it, are themselves due to something more than your own effort. They, too, are partly due to the giver of all. Acknowledge God's work, and help yourself to receive it: such would seem to be the whole duty of man. How far should all this be the doctrine of Judaism to-day?

God helps man both as being without him and

within him. In what senses may God be said to be within man ?

In one sense God may be said to be within every man because God "breathed into him from above something of His own divineness." By virtue of his mind every man contains an impression, or fragment, or ray, of the divine nature. How could the mind be able to embrace the vastness of heaven and of the universe "unless it were an undivided fragment of that divine and blessed soul"? As divine reason is omnipresent, it might be said, perhaps, on Philonic lines that we are in God just as well as that God is in us. Thus, man's body is the "sacred temple of a rational soul." Man is "a relative and kinsman of God because of his reason." On the moral side, reason, the divine image, "made real and stamped by the seal of God, the impression of which is the eternal Logos," is the source both of good and evil. Man's mixed nature makes him unlike beings both below and above him. The one are capable of good, but not of evil; the other are capable of neither.

Nevertheless, there is a sense in which God is said to dwell within the good, but not within the bad. There is no more fitting dwelling-place for God "than a completely purified soul." How difficult are the image and the thought. Philo expressly declares that a local sense is not intended, for "God contains all things and is contained by none." Yet it would appear as if something more were meant than mere metaphor. It is not merely that God may be said "to exercise special forethought and care" for the good. There must be some sense in which Philo supposes that the good man does contain more of God than the bad, in

which the good soul reveals and expresses and possesses more of Him than the bad. The soul of a man who is at peace with himself and a lover of true philosophy—here is the earthly city of God: it is not built of wood or stone. God is most immanent in the wisest and the noblest, or, as Philo would put it, lesser men receive some more or less occasional and partial divine thought, a higher group may receive the divine thought or reason generally, or as a whole, while the truly inspired and most perfect man may be said to receive God Himself. "In the understandings of those who are perfectly purified the God and sovereign of the universe walks about noiselessly, alone and invisibly; but in the understandings of those who are still undergoing cleansing, and have not yet entirely washed away their defilements, angels,—the divine Logoi, or Thoughts,—walk, making them bright and clean." Always the notion is much the same. Any change in man from worse to better, from sin to virtue, from ignorance to knowledge, from less good to more good, must somehow be due to God. Especially any sudden inspiration would be regarded as from God. He "sends his own Logoi, or Thoughts, to help the lovers of virtue: they treat and completely heal the sicknesses of the soul, giving sacred admonitions in the form of immovable laws, and calling to the practice of these laws, they, like trainers of gymnasts, implant strength and irresistible power." The apprehension of a divine thought is the same thing as the immanence of that thought within the soul. The apprehension of the Logos as a whole is also its immanence. It is the highest stage of divine indwelling which a good and wise man may hope for, even though he constantly

strain and struggle beyond it. The apprehension of the Logos is correspondingly the highest stage in the knowledge of God which such a one can reach. It appears to imply and include every aspect of God which anybody may attain to, short of specific, direct, and special inspiration. Most of us have to be content with very much less; we are able, in other words, to catch a glimpse of God, now in one aspect and now in another; few men, and that rarely, can realise Him in that harmonious combination of many aspects which, in their unity and completeness, are expressed and symbolised by the Logos. "The soul of the perfect man is nourished by the whole Logos. We must be content if we are nourished by a portion of it." Philo often strains metaphor and language to express the idea that the divine reason is both the source and the goal; it is without and within; without the soul in God and within the soul as the immanent divine guest; it is the cause of man's highest knowledge and it is that highest knowledge itself. "Who can pour out the sacred cup of true joy to the blissful soul which holds out the most sacred cup, which is its own reason, except the Logos, the cupbearer of God, the master of His feast? And the Logos is not cupbearer only, but is itself the pure draught, itself the joy and exultation, itself the pouring forth and the delight, itself the ambrosial philtre and potion of happiness and joy."

It is of much interest that one evidence and expression of God in man is, to Philo, the human conscience. Philo borrowed the conception of conscience and the word for it from the Stoics, and writes about it with frequency. It is the "convicter" (ἐλεγχος) and the judge within the soul. It compels

men against their will to confess their sins. It is witness and accuser and judge. It is unerring and incorruptible. It gives the consciousness of rectitude as well as the consciousness of sin. It is born with the birth of the soul, unsusceptible of wrong, by nature ever hating the evil and loving the good; it not only accuses and convicts, but teaches, persuades, exhorts, and if its owner yields, it rejoices and is reconciled, but if he resents, it wages an endless war with him, both day and night, till his miserable and accursed life is ended. Now, just as we speak of conscience as the voice of God, so Philo identifies it with the divine Logos. In one sense, it is, as it were, the cause of sin, as well as the cause of right-doing, for without its presence in the soul no erroneous action could be deserving of blame, and sin would therefore be impossible. The Logos is the root of sin, but not its strength. "As long as the divine Logos has not entered our souls, all our actions are blameless." But when the true priest, conviction (*i.e.* the Logos), enters within us, like a purest ray of light, we see the guilt of actions done previously in ignorance. The Logos comes to us as an angel guide, removing the stumbling-block before our feet. Conscience is the undefiled High Priest, for whose perpetual life within the soul we shall do well to pray. But this High Priest is only another name for the divine Logos.

Let us pause at this stage for one or two general observations. In reading Philo we may often be repelled by his form. His language and method are wearisome; his allegories and symbolism are obsolete; his philosophy is eclectic and borrowed, not wholly harmonious in its constituent parts, while in much of its terminology and in many of its

doctrines it is superseded and out of date. Yet it is desirable to notice how, beneath all that is obsolete and tedious, some essentials of Judaism, and even of modern Judaism, are clearly and strongly taught. Both the right agnosticism and the right knowledge of God (as we believe) are found in Philo. None can know God as He truly is in the infinite wealth of His divine nature, and yet even for us the conception of the divine perfection means something and means much. From the existence of the world and from our souls we infer rightly the divine goodness and rule, and we unite them into the Logos, the divine reason. These affirmations of Philo respecting God are our affirmations to-day. And we may also notice how Philo, while emphasising quite as much as any polemically minded Jew could desire the unity of God, yet knows how to teach the divine immanence in the world and in man, as well as the divine transcendence. God is both far and near, without and within. Philo is no more afraid than the author of the eighth chapter of Proverbs or of the hundred and thirty-ninth Psalm, or of the Wisdom of Solomon, to use terms which seem to make of certain aspects of God, or of God's self-manifestations, semi-independent divine agencies, which almost seem to stand and mediate between the world and the Godhead. He is not afraid to do this, because there was no other monotheistic and yet non-Jewish religion for him to combat; there was no one to question his orthodoxy or to impugn his attachment to the doctrine of the divine unity. Hence, he had not to concentrate his emphasis upon the transcendence of God: he had not to concentrate attention upon His withoutness. He could talk as much as he pleased upon His withinness, upon His

self-revelation in the world and in the soul of man, and he was under no fear of being regarded as a semi-Christian or Trinitarian. (Yet he, too, it must be admitted, does occasionally, when he touches on this very point, insist that he is teaching a mystery which must not be too carelessly revealed to the uninitiated and the profane.) In view of what was to happen in the history of theology, it is very interesting to find Philo teaching a triple representation of God. The goodness and power of God are often regarded as His attendants which form with Himself, for the apprehension of man, a representation now of one, and now of three. "In the middle is the father of the universe, the self-existent, on each side His oldest and nearest powers, the creative and the regal (His goodness and His authority)." To see God as one is truer than to see Him as three, but it is not given to all. The soul has a vision of a unity, when, "being perfectly purified, and having transcended not only multiplicity, but even the duad which adjoins unity, it presses on to the Form (or idea) which is unmingled and uncomplicated, and entirely self-sufficient; it has a vision of three, when, unable from itself alone to apprehend the self-existent in its absoluteness and purity, it can only apprehend it through its effects as either creating or ruling (or as goodness and authority). This, then, is a 'second best,' but none the less partakes of opinion dear to God. But the former method does not partake, but is itself the opinion dear to God, or rather it is truth, which is 'older' (*i.e.* more primary and weighty) than opinion." The highest conception of God is to know Him as one, not, however (I think), a bare one, but a *rich* one; it may, however, be that we can only appreciate God's

richness by holding apart His goodness and His authority from His existence, that is, by viewing the manifestations and revelations of His being as semi-distinct from Himself. God can be seen both in the powers and without them. The powers and the Logos, which is the combination of the powers (for the divine reason is the essential constituent of them all), symbolise God's infinite fullness and richness, and symbolise especially His self-revelation in the soul and in the world: neglect them and concentrate upon the unity only, and you impoverish the conception of God; concentrate only upon the powers, and you fail adequately to appreciate the unity. What we have to strain towards is an apprehension of richness in unity and unity in richness. In such words we may interpret and employ for our own time and needs the thoughts and symbolisms of Philo.

“To be filled with a spiritual love of God is the best definition of immortal life.” “A life according to God is a life that loves God.” Yet just as God is greater than and above the Powers and the Logos, so there is apparently an adoration of God which is even above and superior to love. It is perhaps a question of words. Love often seems to Philo to be closely connected with gratitude. Because we are filled with a sense of God's goodness, and think of Him mainly as the good Creator, to whom all our knowledge and happiness are due, therefore we love Him. But God is above the powers and above His works. Philo constantly seeks to press forward and to get flashes of insight into the hidden Deity who is beyond the Logos and the powers. There are a few who have received a vision of God from Himself; light gives light. Not from His works do they

know God ; not from below do they work their way up : but God, by direct inspiration, reveals Himself to them. The soul by immediate intuition knows its God. This is the mystic's vision : the consummation of human longing. Inspiration, if given by God, must be prepared for by man. It needs the complete abandonment of bodily desires, the absolute consecration of mind and soul to God. Without a wish or a thought that is not concentrated on truth and virtue and God, " a man must pour forth his soul's blood as a libation, and sacrifice his whole mind to God the Saviour." He must break the bonds which the cares of mortal life entwine around him, and, with the utmost strain of his soul, press forward to the glorious vision of the uncreated. So pressing forward he may reach the goal. The goal can be described as an ecstasy, when (the words are obviously suggested by Plato) the mind " is no longer under its own control, but maddened and agitated by heavenly love is drawn up towards God." Or, again, we may regard the state as one in which the human mind receives in expectant passivity the impresses of the divine spirit ; " when the divine light shines, the human light sets. At the coming of the divine spirit the human mind retires." Such a one is then half man, half God. The words are daring. But no more is meant than that the mystic is filled with " divine love," and forgets himself and all things in his rapture towards God. To many of us such words and thoughts as these mean little, but they are good to possess, and to some they mean much. We need our Jewish mystical literature for those who can appreciate, or have need of, mysticism.

When thus the mind has this vision of the self-

existent one, it adores Him for Himself and for Himself alone, and not for anything which he does or gives. Philo does not say that the feeling generated by this adoration is beyond love, but he half implies it. And in the odd way in which, like the Stoics and other Greek philosophers, he mixes up intellectual and moral virtues, he appears to hold that the very desire and capacity to realise God as the self-existent, and to worship Him for Himself, are only possible for the very good, who are also the most purely religious. Such people honour God for Himself alone, and not as a benefactor or a ruler: not in hope to receive good or in fear of punishment. On the other hand, just as the Rabbis said that to fulfil the commands from a lower motive might lead to fulfilling them from the highest motive, so Philo declares that "God accepts both those who serve Him from desire of reward and those who serve Him from fear of punishment; for both will become not worse but better by the constant practice of pure piety. Even if the motives from which men perform their service differ with their characters, there is no need to find fault with them, for one end and aim is common to them all, the worship of God." The mystic and the visionary is also possessed of common sense: he appreciates the humbler service and worship rendered by those who cannot mount up to the highest. This, too, is Jewish.

How is man to make the journey towards the knowledge and the service of God? What have we to learn from Philo as regards the conditions for the quest? He is not specially original as regards the first condition—the right attitude to, and depreciation of, the body and the things of sense. The body is a plotter against the soul. It is, if not the cause,

at least the condition, of sin. And all material things, just because, like the body, they belong to the world of the transitory—of appearances, of coming and going—are also hindrances to the true life, which is life in the service of the incorruptible and the permanent and the spiritual. Pleasure and desire are of the material and the things of sense. So the less one needs and desires, the better. So only can one draw near to God. The measure of truth in all this requires no arguing, and it is well that we get it from a Jewish source. But Philo is, perhaps, more interesting, though probably not more original, when he urges that there is a false, as well as a true, temperance. As superstition is to piety, so is the false temperance to the true. The right thing to do as regards the things of sense is to use them, but to be above them; let them be servants, not masters. “If you see any one refusing to eat or drink at the customary times, or to wash and anoint his body, or neglecting his clothes, or sleeping on the ground in the open air, you should pity his delusion, and show him the path by which self-control may really be attained.” The right thing to do is to use sensuous material for noble ends. Thus from this point of view “money, honours, possessions, office, and the various beauties of colour and form” may all be enjoyed by the virtuous seeker after God. The inconsistency is obvious.

Quite similar is his inconsistency as regards social life and solitude. On the one hand, he urges that the lover of God must be a lover of solitude; he must fly from home and kinsmen and friends, or he must shut himself up at home, and hardly ever cross his threshold; on the other hand, he insists that if the service of God is not identical

with the service of man, the second must, at any rate, be the prelude to the first. First become a good citizen and householder, and only then "emigrate to a better and higher life." We must work our way through "practical" life before we can approach and tackle the life of contemplation. "It is necessary that they who would concern themselves with things divine should first of all have discharged the duties of man." And this apparently for two reasons. First, because selfishness produces impiety. It is therefore wise while "cultivating religion not to neglect human duties." "Man is a social animal by nature. He must not only live for himself, but for parents, brothers, wife, children, relatives, and friends; for his country, his race, and for all mankind. He must love the world and God, that of God he may be beloved." "He must not deem all the world an appendage to himself, but himself an appendage to the world." Secondly, the practical life is an actual preparation for the harder life of religion. It is clear that Philo really means what he says. The philosopher's life must be lived austere. The search for, and service of, God means hard thinking and uncompromising assiduity. It is by no means, I fancy, mere rhetoric when Philo says: "If with inadequate purification, thinking we have washed off the defilements of life, we advance to the court of the divine service, we spring back from it more quickly than we came, unable to endure its austerity, the sleepless devotion, the unwearying toil. For the present, then, we should avoid equally the worst life and the best." Perhaps his most suggestive remark for us to-day on these matters is to be found in his treatise on the Decalogue.

“ Some people, attaching themselves to one portion of the Decalogue, seem to neglect the other. For filled with the unmixed draught of religious yearning, they have bid farewell to other occupations, and have dedicated their whole life to the service of God. But those who suppose that there is no good beyond well-doing towards men, care only for human intercourse, and by their social zeal share their possessions with their fellows, and seek to alleviate distress to the utmost of their powers. Now both the exclusive lovers of man and the exclusive lovers of God we may rightly call half-perfect in virtue. The perfectly virtuous are they who excel in both.” This is excellently said, and as true to-day as when it was first uttered. There is a service of God which is over and above the service of man. But that service tends to become poor and cheap, if it is not accompanied, or has not been prefaced, by the service of man. The love of man must lead to the love of God ; the love of God must inspire the love of man.

The other condition of the search for God and the finding Him is a particular kind of humility which is both moral and intellectual in one. The sin of sins, the source of all evil, is self-love (*φιλαυτία*). But self-love does not mean merely moral selfishness, though it results in it. It is much more specifically pride and conceit. The form or manifestation of it which appears to be especially attacked by Philo is what he usually calls *οἷσις* or conceit. Philo did not coin this word, but he uses it so often and gives it so special a meaning, and is in such deadly earnest about the sin which it denominates, that we may regard the word as peculiarly his own, just as the vice signified by it is a peculiar feature

of his religious teaching. For *oiesis* (οἴσις) in earlier writers means just simply conceit, and is specially applied to a false pride in, and false estimate of, one's own knowledge or virtue. It is the great hindrance to progress. The first thing a philosopher has to do is to get rid of conceit, says Epictetus, for how can a man begin to learn when he thinks he knows? But *oiesis* (οἴσις) in Philo means much more than this. It is a false relation of man to God, a false attitude intellectually, and therefore also morally. It is the error of thinking that our knowledge and our goodness are our own; that anything we have and do is our own possession and product; that we are the real owners of our own powers and the true authors of everything which, by their help, we may accomplish. The true owner of everything is God. As the creator and ruler of the world, He is the only true citizen: man in the Biblical phrase is but a sojourner and a guest. Moreover, God is not only owner, but cause. Man is but the instrument. This does not mean that man's will is not free. But this very freedom, like every other good, is a divine gift, and till man recognises the source of his freedom, he cannot become free. Till you are grateful to God for all that you do and are, what you do and are will be evil. Independence in the false sense, the false conceit of independence, Philo conceives as producing every sort of badness. He seems to suppose that if you think your senses are your own, you will use them lawlessly: instead of controlling them, they will control you. If you think your mind is your own, you are a slave to your mind, which apparently means that you are bound to remain ignorant. It would seem as if οἴσις or

conceit involved a double disqualification. For first to be ignorant of so great a truth (the truth that everything you have and every power you possess is a divine gift) is itself a terrible evil ; it is a " lie in the soul," and secondly, till you recognise the need of divine aid to virtue or knowledge, such aid cannot be given you. Philo exhausts language, and uses all kinds of paradoxes or antitheses, in his denunciation of conceit. " When Abraham knew most, he most completely renounced himself : he who renounces himself, comprehends God." " You must remember your own nothingness in everything, so that you may remember the greatness of God in all." The descent of the soul is its ascent in *oiesis* (οἴησις). Flee from your own mind to take refuge in the mind of God. Regard yourself as the cause of anything, and you flee from God. It was presumably certain forms of Stoicism, which tended to press the independence of the wise man and his equality with God, which provoked the indignation of Philo. But he honestly seems to believe that this profound sense of man's dependence and creatureliness is an absolute condition *sine qua non* of any true and valuable religion. You cannot know or love God (and till you love Him you cannot know Him) unless you realise what position He holds towards you, and what position you hold towards Him. He is the ruler, and you are the subject ; He is the father, you are the child ; He is the giver, you are the recipient. All you have is His and from Him : all you do is by the powers He gave you ; all the higher possibilities of knowledge and action can best be attained by His aid. As the Rabbis said that man can only win freedom through the Law, so Philo said,

“What is the surest freedom? The service of the wise and only God.” “Nothing so completely liberates the mind as to become a servant and suppliant of God.” “*Deo parere libertas est*” (Seneca). “In Thy service is perfect freedom.” Man is not the measure of all things. Above all, God is the cause of all things; man is the cause of nothing. “To God alone it befits to say ‘Mine,’ for all things are His.” The teaching of 1 Chronicles xxix. 14, “All things come of Thee, and of Thine own have we given Thee, for we are strangers before Thee and sojourners,” is precisely Philo’s; he makes it a corner-stone of his religious philosophy. Hence it is that man must out of gratitude dedicate his life’s work to the glory of God. “The wise man should dedicate his sagacity, the eloquent man should devote his excellence of speech by the praise of God in prose and verse; and, in general, the natural philosopher should offer his physics, the moralist his ethics, the artist and the man of science the arts and sciences they know. So, too, the sailor and the pilot will dedicate their favourable voyage, the husbandman his fruitful harvest, the herdsman the increase of his cattle, the doctor the recovery of his patients, the general his victory in fight, the statesman or the monarch his legal chieftancy or kingly rule.” Why they should all do this is given in the words that follow. “He who is no lover of self will regard God as the true cause of all the powers of body and soul and of all external goods.” Hence: “Let no one, however insignificant he be, despairing of a better fortune, scruple to become a suppliant of God. Even if he can expect nothing greater, let him give thanks to the best of his power for what he has already received. Immense are

the gifts he has : birth, life, nurture, soul, sensation, imagination, desire, reason (λογισμός). Reason is a small word, but a most perfect and divine thing, a fragment of the world, or, as for the disciples of the Mosaic philosophy it is more pious to say, a true impression of the divine image." In a much truer sense of Philo than of Spinoza (as theists must think) could it be said that he was a God-intoxicated man. Belief in God, with all which that belief involved, made all life different to him, and of necessity coloured or determined all his actions ; it gave to all things their value or cheapness ; it was constantly present in the mind : it gave hope or courage or resignation or joy as the occasion might demand. Yet it did not crush or overwhelm : it gave lightness, expansion, freedom. It determined his way of life and his outlook upon life. It made him what he was. Such was faith in God to Philo.

It may also be observed that the ascription of all good to God not only prompts to gratitude (εὐχαριστία), but also destroys the possibility of "merit." I do not find in Philo anything corresponding to the doctrine of Zechuth. God is gracious from His own goodness : not because of the Zechuth of the Fathers. And any merit in ourselves is utterly denied, just because it is not we, but God, who is the real "cause" of any human goodness or worth. For only less bad than the sin of *οἴησις*, looking upon ourselves as the authors of the good which has befallen us, is the sin of those who, though they acknowledge God to be the author of the good received, yet declare that they justly received it ; for they are wise and brave and temperate and righteous, so that they have justly been accounted

to deserve these benefits. Against such false reasoning Philo quotes Deuteronomy ix. 5 very appositely. The covenant is a symbolic expression for God's gifts of grace, and these supposed virtues of ours are not virtues, but are *His* gifts and not *our* achievements. "Not I, but 'Thou in me.'" To Him, then, the gratitude and the glory.

Thus faith in God is the condition of virtue and itself a virtue. And in its perfection faith is not merely the condition of virtue, but its crown. Faith in God is trust in God ; it is not in Philo's sense opposed to knowledge, because the better you "know" God, the more fully you trust Him. Above all, faith in God the Creator implies unfaith and mistrust in all that comes and goes, in all *γένεσις*. One learns faith in God if one realises that all else changes and is unstable, but that God alone is changeless and immovable. Faith in God means unfaith in self. Faith and conceit (*οἷσος*) cannot live together in the same soul. Faith gives confidence. It brings men near to God. It is the most perfect virtue. And so on in many passages of praise and glorification. We have, however, to recognise that faith is a somewhat more intellectual virtue to Philo than for us. That we believe in God's goodness and in His existence, even though we do not understand how the divine goodness is consistent with the existence of evil, is not how Philo would express the matter. The less we understand, the more we cling to God in faith, the profounder our trust. To Philo it is just the other way on. We can only believe in God, so far as we understand him. How can you have faith in an X, of which you know nothing at all ? The better our knowledge, the better our faith.

Abraham, who, first of men, possessed a stable and secure conception of God, was also the first man who really believed in Him. And rightly was his faith reckoned as righteousness, for true faith is not easy. "It is not easy to believe in God alone without the addition of aught beside, because of our affinity to those mortal things to which we are bound fast. So we are persuaded to trust in money and reputation and power and friends, and in health and strength of body, and in many other things. Now to cleanse our minds of these; to distrust the created world which is wholly untrustworthy; to trust in God alone, who is solely and truly to be trusted—this is the work of a great and heavenly intelligence, which is no longer ensnared and enticed by any mortal thing." Fine as all this is, and helpful up to a point, we feel that Philo does not wholly meet our own difficulties of to-day. There are many of us who, in Philo's sense, do not trust the created world, who do not trust money or reputation, but who yet, for reasons which Philo sometimes skirts, but never seems quite to grapple with, find it very hard to believe in God. But, perhaps, we cannot expect a philosopher of the first century to understand and tackle all our problems of the twentieth century. There must be provinces in which, for our own puzzles and burdens, we must find our own solutions and alleviations.

It has been told how Philo holds that no one can completely understand or know the full nature or being of God. Most persons have to be content with knowing the Logos, the divine thought, wisdom, or reason, which sums up in itself all the divine powers, and more especially the two fundamental and primary

powers of goodness and rule. It has also been indicated how, in spite of this limitation, Philo is always alluding, and even urging all who can to press forward, to that higher knowledge of the uncreated, of the self-existent, which yet can only be revealed by the direct inspiration of God. Here the purified soul, completely purged of all self-conceit and of all links with the creature-world that comes and goes, overleaps and neglects the created, and, without inference or steps, "receives a clear manifestation of the uncreated, so as to grasp Him directly from Himself." It is not God's goodness or rule or even reason which is then apprehended, but the God who is behind. It is not necessary here to pursue this matter in detail, and to make further quotations. But the Jew or Jewess who is drawn at all towards mysticism would do well to make a study of Philo. Whatever be the source of that mysticism, however much it owes to Hellenism, the product is Jewish in the sense that the borrowings have passed through a Jewish mind and soul, and have been absorbed and readjusted to fundamental Jewish monotheistic requirements. The mysticism of Philo is as Jewish as the mysticism of the Fourth Gospel is Christian. And it would be well for Jewish students to start their study of mysticism from this early and undoubtedly Jewish mystic, who, although he may occasionally speak of the prophet (for him the mystic *par excellence*) as "akin to God and truly divine," yet never oversteps the limits of Jewish theism, never supposes the human soul to be capable of a complete fusion with God, never forgets the difference of the divine from the human, never imagines that, even in its brief moments of highest rapture, the spirit of man becomes essentially, and not only

in submission and love and self-forgetfulness, one with the divine.

Throughout, therefore, as was mentioned before, it is the human soul of which Philo speaks, not the soul of the Israelite or of the Gentile. Except in one or two special treatises, his words and teaching apply for all men, and he has before his mind not Israel, but man. God is for him not primarily, as He is to the Rabbis, the God of Israel, but the God of the world and of man. Thus, in a sense, he denationalises Judaism, and it might appear as if he was specially valuable to Liberal Jews because he does so. Yet he does not do so consciously and of set purpose. In his time, and in the circumstances of his age, it was hardly possible for him to think of the Jews purely as a religious community and not as a nation. Nevertheless, there is an approach to this conception, as we shall soon see. Nor, as was indicated before, is Philo exactly to be regarded as a herald of Liberal Judaism in his attitude to legalism. He stands here upon his own peculiar legs, which are the legs neither of orthodoxy nor of liberalism. Like the Rabbis he knows and teaches the valuelessness and emptiness of sheer ceremonial and ritual observance apart from morality. "If a man practises ablutions and purifications, but defiles his mind while he cleanses his body; or if, through his wealth, he founds a temple at a large outlay and expense; or if he offers hecatombs, and sacrifices oxen without number, or adorns the shrine with rich ornaments, or gives endless timber and cunningly wrought work, more precious than silver or gold—let him none the more be called religious. For he has wandered far from the path of religion, mistaking ritual for holiness, and attempting to bribe

the incorruptible, and to flatter Him whom none can flatter. God welcomes genuine service, and that is the service of a soul that offers the bare and simple sacrifice of truth, but from false service, the mere display of material wealth, He turns away." "Let them who seek to show honour and gratitude to God cleanse themselves of sin, washing away all that defiles life in word and thought and deed. For it is folly that while a man is forbidden to enter the Temple unless he has cleansed and washed his body, he should pray and sacrifice with a soiled and sullied mind. Shall the lifeless body not touch a building of lifeless wood and stone, unless it be piously washed and purified, and will any man, with impure soul and with no intention to repent, dare to approach the most pure God?" "The only true sacrifice is the piety of a God-loving soul." "The grateful soul of the wise is the true altar of God." "God regards as the true sacrifice, not the animal, but the mind and willingness of the worshipper." "God takes no delight, even if hecatombs are offered to Him. For though all things are His, He needs nothing. He takes delight in minds that love Him, and in holy men, from whom He gladly receives barley cakes and cheapest offerings as if they were most precious, and indeed prefers them. And even if they bring nothing visible at all, yet, bringing themselves in all the fullness of perfected virtue, they offer the fairest sacrifice to God. They honour God, their saviour and benefactor, by gratitude and hymns, the latter through their vocal organs, the former (without tongue and mouth) through the bare soul going forth and pouring out its spiritual invocations which the divine ear alone can hear." "Sacred rites and sacrificial worship are a very fair plant, but an evil

grows up beside them, namely superstition, which it is well to eradicate before it spreads. For some have thought sacrificing oxen to be piety, and they give a portion of what they steal or get by plunder or lying or cheating to the altars. They think thus to pay for not suffering punishment for their sins. But the tribunal of God is not to be corrupted by bribes, so that those who have guilty minds, even if they sacrifice a hundred oxen to-day, will be rejected, and the innocent will be received even if they never sacrifice at all. For God loves those fireless altars round which the virtues circle."

Philo's conception of God made him, as we saw, look at the Law very differently from the Rabbis. Yet we may justly believe that this very conception and theory could not have been evolved unless he had *already* looked at the ceremonial laws, and indeed at all laws, very differently from them. Otherwise he could not have come to a conception in which the "legislative power" was a lower and secondary and derivative aspect of the Deity. The legislative power, in its two subdivisions of injunction and prohibition, corresponds only to the two last of the six cities of refuge, the city of the power which enjoins what is right, the city of the power which forbids what is wrong. Nevertheless, the laws of the Pentateuch are perfect, the ceremonial no less than the moral. For the ceremonial laws symbolise profound spiritual meanings. The "perfect" man, therefore, fulfils them by his own inclination; they are consistent with wisdom and with his own nature and the nature of God. Therefore he fulfils them. "The perfect man is impelled of himself to virtuous deeds; the man under training (ἀσκητής) is impelled to them by reason, which

orders him what he ought to do." Like Jeremiah, Philo recognises that the ideal is to do right from the heart and from desire. But till this ideal is reached, law is needful, though decreasingly needful. It was Stoic teaching which prompted him to say: "Command was given to the earthly man (Adam) but not to the (heavenly) man created after the divine image and idea. For he possesses virtue from his own knowledge without being impelled, but the earthly man, without teaching, would not gain wisdom. There is a distinction between (1) injunction, (2) prohibition, and (3) exhortation. Prohibition is concerned with sins, and is directed to the bad, injunction has to do with actions which ought to be done, while exhortation is directed to the in-between people who are neither (perfectly) bad nor good. Such a one does not sin in a manner to need mere prohibition, nor does he (always) do right according to the command of right reason, but he needs exhortation which teaches him to refrain from the bad and to strive towards the good. For the perfect man there is no need of injunction or prohibition or exhortation, but the bad man needs injunction and prohibition, the immature needs exhortation and instruction. Just so he who is perfect in grammar or music needs no teaching of the rules of these arts, while the bungler needs injunction and prohibitions, which are, as it were, the laws of those arts, and the learner needs instruction. Therefore to the earthly mind which is still neither (perfectly) good nor bad is rightly given command and exhortation." In agreement with the Rabbis Philo urges that the good must be preached for itself, *lishmah*, for its own sake. "The good for the sake of the good and for no other thing. For this is the divine law

to honour virtue for itself." But Philo appears to have less desire for reward than the Rabbis. "The deed itself is its own complete reward," or, as the Rabbi said, "The reward for a precept is a precept." The punishments which attend the transgression of the first five (and greater) commandments of the Ten can be clearly set forth. "But the rewards are only indicated metaphorically. Not to think that there are other gods, not to make idols, not to swear falsely, need no external reward. The mere practice of these commands is itself a complete and most perfect guerdon. Wisdom is the prize of wisdom, and justice and all the other virtues are their own rewards. Similarly, let him who honours his parents not seek any further reward. For if he reflect, he will find in the honouring the reward." Yet (adds Philo, remembering the Biblical text), "since the fifth commandment is less great than the first four, for they are concerned with what is divine, but this one with what is mortal, God has added to it two rewards, one the possession of virtue, for to be 'well' means virtue, or is impossible without virtue, while the other—'length of days'—means immortality, that blessed and long life which you can lead even in the body if you live with cleansed soul in complete purification." In another passage Philo, on the other hand, stresses the absence of any mention of penalties in the Ten Words as a sign of their perfection, for they alone were directly delivered by God. For God, as the author of good, must not have directly to do with punishments, which are of the nature of evil. "He found it most congruous with His nature to order what conduces to salvation pure and unmixed with punishment, so that no one, led by irrational fear and unwillingly, but only with

rational judgement and willingly, might choose the best." The more glorious the subject matter of a command, the less need for external reward.

In spite of all this, it would not be fair to claim Philo as a forerunner of Liberal Judaism. Indeed, both Conservatives and Liberals could quote Philo for their own side. The love of innovation and change is often referred to with disapproval. On the other hand, he makes Lot's wife symbolise "custom" (*συνήθεια*), the enemy of truth, which, when any one attempts to lead it forward, "lags behind, and looks around at its old and familiar ways, and like a lifeless pillar of stone, remains behind." And he looks down on those "who have received their notions of God's existence rather by habit than reason from those who brought them up, who are pious by a kind of good guess, and whose religion is mingled with fear." Nevertheless, as regards observances, Philo is a strong Conservative. He entirely dissociates himself from, and rebukes, those extremers and more "liberal" allegorists who, because they had discovered the spiritual significance of the ceremonial laws, thought themselves dispensed from observing them. But we may gather from the highly interesting passage in which Philo sets forth his own attitude, that his own reason for observance and "orthodoxy" was much more to avoid criticism, and to keep a good reputation and "a quiet life," than because he thought that the observance of the laws was a perpetual part of true religion or of Judaism. Of this, however, let the reader judge for himself. "If to be good is noble, to seem good is profitable. Truth is better than reputation, but happiness consists in their union. For there are many thousands who are purely and

unselfishly devoted to virtue, and admire its native beauty, but who, having no care for their reputation among the multitude, are much attacked; though truly good, they are thought wicked. . . . He, then, to whom God has granted both to be and to seem good, is truly happy and truly renowned. And we must have a great care for reputation, as a matter of great importance, and of much value, for our social and bodily life. And almost all can secure it, who are well content not to disturb established customs, but diligently preserve the constitution of their own country. For there are some who, looking upon the written laws as symbols of intellectual things, lay great stress on these, but neglect the former. Such men I would blame for their levity. For they ought to give good heed to both—to the accurate investigation of the unseen meaning, but also to the blameless observance of the visible letter. But now, as if they were living by themselves in a desert, and were souls without bodies, and knew nothing of city or village or house or intercourse with men, they despise all that seems valuable to the many, and search for bare and naked truth, as it is in itself. Such people the sacred Scripture teaches to give good heed to a good reputation, and to abolish none of those customs which greater and more inspired men than we instituted in the past. For because the seventh day teaches us symbolically concerning the power of the uncreated God, and the unproductiveness of the creature, we must not therefore abolish its ordinances, so as to light a fire, or till the ground, or bear a burden, or prosecute a lawsuit, or demand the restoration of a deposit, or exact the repayment of a loan, or do any other thing which on week-days is

allowed. Because the festivals are symbols of spiritual joy and of our gratitude to God, we must not therefore give up the fixed assemblies at the proper season of the year. Nor because circumcision symbolises the excision of all lusts and passions, and the destruction of the impious opinion, according to which the mind imagines that it is itself capable of production, must we therefore abolish the law of fleshly circumcision. We should have to neglect the service of the Temple, and a thousand other things, if we were to restrict ourselves only to the allegoric or symbolic sense. That sense resembles the soul, the other sense the body; just as we must be careful of the body, as the house of the soul, so must we give heed to the letter of the written laws. For only when these are faithfully observed, will the inner meaning, of which they are the symbols, become more clearly realised, and, at the same time, the blame and accusation of the multitude will be avoided." It would almost seem as if there must have been Jewish newspapers even in the days of Philo. Nevertheless, Liberal Jews do still maintain the observance of Sabbath and festivals, although for deeper and nobler reasons than those of Philo.

Though intensely proud of his religion and his "nation," and very keenly conscious of their exceptional position in the world—of their religious superiority to the "heathen," of their election by the One True God and of their mission—Philo, nevertheless, shows comparatively little originality or advance when he comes to speak of specifically Jewish questions. Though he alludes to the Messiah and to the Messianic age, he does not do so as if his heart were fixed upon these hopes, or as if he were greatly interested in them. He never quotes

the great passages from Isaiah about the Servant, as, indeed, his entire acquaintance with the canonical prophets seems extremely small. Yet he regards the Jews as occupying, in a sense, the function of Priests and Prophets for all mankind. "They are that nation most dear to God, which seems to have been given the office of priest and prophet for the entire human race." He constantly refers to the prayers and sacrifices in the Temple for the benefit of humanity at large. The Jews are the nation who were ever to offer prayers for the whole human race. The High Priest utters his prayers and thanks for all mankind, and indeed on behalf of all the universe, which he regards, as in truth it is, as his fatherland, and for which he asks its Creator to give of His grace and His goodness. "I wonder," says Philo, "how some men dare to charge that nation with a hatred of mankind whose friendship and goodwill for all people go so far that it offers its prayers and sacrifices for all, and not only for itself. The Jews are a sort of first-fruits offered up to God for the entire human race." The object of the whole law is to bring about harmony, peace, and happiness among all mankind. Such harmony, peace, and happiness will ultimately prevail. Philo is historically of interest in his remarks about the observance of the Sabbath and the services in the synagogues, and the wide attraction of the Jewish customs, ordinances, worship, and religion. But from the Liberal Jewish point of view his best contribution here is what he says about proselytes, and more especially his persistent and very marked and peculiar depreciation of race and blood as the right test of belonging to a community or a religion. In the praise of proselytes, in asserting God's affection for them, and in urging his fellow

Jews to show kindness and consideration to them, he does not add much to what we have already heard from the Rabbis, but his attacks upon race and blood are all his own, and are extremely pleasing and valuable. "The most potent love-charm and the indissoluble bond of goodwill that makes for unity is the worship of the one God." "Let there be one bond of affection and one password of friendship, devotion to God, making piety the motive of every word and deed." Proselytes become united to born Jews by a kinship which is nobler and holier than race (*σεμνοτέρα καὶ ἱεροπρεπεστέρα συγγένεια*). "Agreement as to justice and virtue is a closer relationship than blood" (*συγγένεια οἰκειοτέρα τῆς πρὸς αἵματος ἢ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ὁμολογία*). Philo goes out of his way almost to attack those Jews who pride themselves on the purity and pre-eminence of their blood, as if blood rather than virtue or the knowledge of God constituted nobility. Right relationship to God is a much more genuine sort of kinship than the kinship of blood (*συγγένεια πολὺ γνησιωτέρα τῆς ἀφ' αἵματος*). Proselytes therefore are to be regarded in a special degree as our kinsmen (*φιλτάτους καὶ συγγενεστάτους ὑποληπτέον*). Righteous parents are of no benefit to unrighteous sons. Even the laws are of no avail for those who transgress them. If God fashioned nobility in human form, she would address her unworthy descendants thus: "Kinship is not merely measured by blood, but by sameness in actions and by seeking for the same ends" (*τὸ συγγενὲς οὐχ αἵματι μετρεῖται μόνον, ἀλλὰ πράξεων ὁμοιότητι καὶ θήρᾳ τῶν αὐτῶν*). "Nobility consists in the possession of virtue" (*ἐν ἀρετῇς κτήσει τίθεται τὸ εὐγενές*). And virtue and righteousness, and all such terms, in all such

passages as these, are used by Philo to mean the Jewish religion. All these passages mean one and the same thing. The good proselyte is the blue-blooded Jew. Abraham, the prototype and "patron saint" of proselytes to Philo, no less than to the Rabbis, was the most nobly born of men, for he sought to obtain relationship with God. (He was *εὐγενέστατος, τῆς πρὸς θεοῦ συγγενείας ὀρεχθείς.*)

It is of no value for our purpose to say anything about Philo's ethical teaching. It is elevated and honourable; it adds several terms to the ethical vocabulary of Judaism, but these terms are purely Greek, and just reflect, as they are borrowed from, Plato and the Stoics. Philo's value for Judaism and for us does not lie here. Nor have the ideas which I have thought to be of value for us in Philo had much direct reference to the rough edges of the Old Testament. Philo's contributions have been rather additions than smoothings. He is so possessed with his own conceptions, on the one hand, and so convinced that all truth is contained in the Pentateuch, on the other hand, that the difficulties we find in that book were for him mostly invisible. His absurd allegorical interpretations supplied the key to any awkwardnesses which forced themselves upon his attention. And some things which worry us did not worry him. Thus he is not bothered by any excessive punishments or fiercenesses, attributed to God or to God's injunctions. The slaughter of Exodus xxxii. 27, 28, the plague of Numbers xvi. 49 or xxv. 9, the deed of Phinehas in Numbers xxv. 8, the extermination of the Midianites in Numbers xxxi. 7, seem to him quite reasonable and proper. He is not in the least perturbed by the summary execution of the stick gatherer in Numbers

xv. 36. Even stranger is his justification and approval of the semi-barbaric and objectionable law of Exodus xxi. 21. One would have thought that it would have been far more desirable to allegorise this law than some such innocent anthropomorphism as God planting a garden or walking in it "in the cool of the day." But while the notion of taking either of these literally fills him with horror, he finds no ethical difficulty in accepting Exodus xxi. 21 at its face and literal value! Nor is he worried by tit for tat. He never discusses how far measure for measure is the highest principle of justice for man and for God, or whether it should not often be put aside for one more noble and pure. On the other hand, as we have seen, he is really far removed from particularism: his God is, in no illegitimate or even special sense, the God of Israel. He has his own theories of reconciliation between immanence and transcendence, between fear and love, between the inward and the outward. No one could accuse him of being inadequately spiritual, or of eudaemonism, or of a lust for reward, or of only appreciating the mere deed, and not the motive or the intention. If these defects are sometimes visible to us in the Pentateuch or in any other portion of the Old Testament, they are invisible to him: he does not refer to them, because he does not see them. Nor while he presses the perfection of the Pentateuchal laws, both ethical and ceremonial, and in their literal as well as in their spiritual or allegorical sense, is he really a legalist. He moves on a plane where the troubles, as well (I think) as the joys, of legalism are unknown to him. To him to do a law unbidden is higher than to do it by order, whereas to the Rabbis the ordered act is higher than the

other. To do is for him nobler than to refrain from doing; the positive command is grander than the negative command; to the Rabbis "don't" is as important as, if not more important than, "do." The very conception of God as legislator is for Philo a somewhat low conception or aspect of Him: to the Rabbis it is the very proof and exhibition of His grace. To Philo the perfect man is his own law; he needs no outward command. To the Rabbis the laws, as an outflow of God's love to Israel, are a glory and a delight to fulfil consciously and deliberately. The more laws, the more happiness, the more distinction. To Philo the laws are, indeed, very wise and very good, conducive to a happy life and a prosperous polity, but the rapture of fulfilling them for their own sake, just because they have been commanded, in grateful love to the giver, and in pride for the distinction of having received them, is entirely absent. Legalism, in the low sense of the word, is transcended by Philo in one way; it is transcended by the Rabbis in another. The one has overcome legalism by volatilising and spiritualising it away; the other by the very excess and glorification of it.

Perhaps the least satisfactory feature in Philo is his treatment of the problem of evil. We cannot blame him that he did not solve it, but he does not seem to appreciate its gravity, and he certainly makes no original contribution towards any palliative or alleviation. Epictetus, on the one hand, the Psalter and Job on the other hand, are far more helpful. He makes, however, one curious remark about suffering, in which brave endurance of hardships and troubles is brought in by a sort of pun and side wind. He is harping upon his favourite theme that

God is the only true creator and producer. To Him alone may creation be ascribed ; for man it is fitting to suffer. If, then, we once can realise " that ' suffering ' is proper and necessary to man, we shall easily endure whatever befalls us, however grievous and burdensome it may be." Then shall we " resist and set ourselves in battle against calamity, by fortifying and barricading our minds with patience and endurance, most potent of virtues." And twice does he use the same odd illustrations to explain his meaning more clearly. The first is taken from shaving. A creature can be shaved in two ways, either purely passively like a sheep, or like a man, when the " sufferer " actually helps the shaver to perform his work, putting himself in the right attitude, and so on. Such a one combines " suffering " with " doing." So, too, in the case of being beaten ; a slave when he is whipped, or a freeman stretched on the wheel as a punishment for crime, is purely passive, but a boxer parries the blow. We are not then to endure our calamities like the shorn sheep, or the beaten slave, but to react on destiny, since suffering is necessary for us all. " So shall we not, like effeminate persons, be broken and weakened utterly by the faintness and relaxation of our souls, but braced and strengthened in mind, we shall be able to mitigate and lighten the onset of impending ills."

Like the Rabbis, Philo was able to bring to the problem of undeserved calamity the solution of a blessed life of happiness beyond the grave. But it is remarkable that he does not use the dogma of immortality, in which he is a convinced believer, in the same way as a modern preacher might, for the comfort of the perplexed, the weary, the doubting,

or the miserable. He does not say as we might expect him to say, "Here is the key to the great problem." For the fact is that he hardly confesses to himself or to his readers that the problem exists, and therefore he is not troubled to point out a solution. But immortality he definitely teaches, not the resurrection of the body, and not the clothing of the spirit with a new and spiritual body, but just simply the immortality of the soul. He obtains this doctrine from Greek, and perhaps, too, from Hellenistic-Egyptian sources, and not from Judaism. Nevertheless, it fits in perfectly with Jewish teaching. Our true life, if we are righteous and seek humbly for God, avoiding and discarding all self-conceit, will, in one sense, only begin after death. For, like Plato, he is ready to declare that the body is the tomb of the soul. When we die, "the soul will live her own proper life, having then got rid of the evil and dead body to whom she had (in this earthly life) been bound." "The wise man who seems to have died as regards this corruptible life, lives the incorruptible life." Abraham at his death received "immortality" (*ἀφθαρσία*) and "became equal to the angels," for the angels, the "hosts of God," are "bodiless and blissful souls." Commenting upon Genesis xv. 15, Philo says that "with full intention does the Scripture speak of the good man not as dying, but as departing, in order to show that the wholly purified soul is inextinguishable and immortal, and that it merely journeys from here to heaven, and does not undergo that dissolution and destruction which death appears to bring." And though he speaks of "the fully purified" soul, it does not appear as if he thought that a blissful immortality was reserved as the privilege of a few

elect and supereminent souls. He hints that there is perpetual exclusion from bliss for the very bad, but he never definitely states that immortality is a reward for the specially and peculiarly good. Thus Philo accepts and promulgates with full intention the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and of a blissful life for the soul after what we call death has been undergone. But this is not the whole of his teaching. Like a true mystic he starts both immortal life and spiritual death on earth, and enunciates the doctrine that there is even here a life which is death, even as there is a death which is life. There is, at any rate, a life which, though still in the body, may already be regarded as immortal. For "goodness and virtue are life, while evil and wickedness are death." This, then, is the "finest definition of immortal life—to be possessed with a (fleshless and bodiless) love and friendship for God." (The words in brackets ought, perhaps, to be omitted.) For "eternal life is the flight to the self-existent, while death is a running away from Him." "Thus," as Prof. Kennedy says, Philo, like Paul and the Fourth Evangelist, "regards the possession of divine (and eternal) life as a *present* possibility, and not something to be reached only in a new order of being."¹ Similarly there can be a death in life. "Some men, even while alive, are dead, and some having died, live; the wicked, even if they live to extreme old age, are dead, for they are bereft of life with virtue, but the good, even if they have been separated from partnership with the body, live for ever, having received an immortal lot." "There are two kinds of death, one the mere separation of soul from body, but the other kind is

¹ *Philo's Contribution to Religion*, by Dr. H. Kennedy (1919), p. 135.

the death of the soul, which is the ruin of virtue and the reception of vice. And this death is the true punishment, and where God says in Genesis ii. 17, 'ye shall die the death,' this is the death which He means, the special death, death *par excellence*, when the soul is entombed in passions and vices. This is the death which is a divine punishment, not the death which comes in the order of nature." Here we have the noblest of platonic teachings grafted into Judaism. And why should we not keep it there? Noble it is in both respects, first, that "natural" death is no punishment; secondly, that the true death is the death of the soul, or the life to sin. The punishment of Cain is elsewhere described as "living in a continuous death, enduring, in a sense, a death which is immortal and endless. For there are two kinds of death. The one is the state of being dead, which is either good or indifferent; the other is the state of dying, which is altogether bad, and the more grievous to bear the longer it lasts." Philo does not state that one can start or attain to true or eternal life while still in the body so plainly as he states that one can start or attain to true or eternal death, yet this is what he means by the passage, quoted by Prof. Kennedy, in which he says that "when the immortal type of being (*τὸ ἀφθαρτον εἶδος*) arises in the soul, the mortal forthwith suffers destruction. For the origination of worthy pursuits means the death of those that are base; since, when the light has once shone, the darkness disappears."¹ The highest class of men, men of God, prophets and priests, are they who, "turning their back on the world of sense, journey into the 'intelligible' world (*τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον*) and

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 137.

dwell there, enrolled in the commonwealth of immortal and incorporeal ideas." Those who are true philosophers "are ever practising how to die to the life of the body that they may partake of a bodiless and immortal (ἄφθαρτος) life with Him who is uncreated and immortal." Here the life, though continued after death, is yet conceived as having begun before death. Doubtless, however, "the happy life in God," the life for which Nadab and Abihu "died that they might live," is only attained in all its plenitude and fullness of bliss beyond the grave. Therefore, while it may justly be said that Philo "emphasises the endowment of the soul with eternal life, apart from the division of experience into present and future," it is, perhaps, going a little too far when Prof. Kennedy elsewhere remarks that "the remarkable stress laid" in the Wisdom of Solomon "on the hope of immortality, belongs to a province not specially cultivated by the later thinker" (*i.e.* by Philo).¹ Nevertheless, it is true that there is nothing in Philo which for simple directness and beauty comes up to the wonderful passage: "The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God; their hope is full of immortality."

With one more quotation let me close this chapter, a quotation which was, perhaps, more rhetorical for Philo than it is for us, but which still indicates how a new conception of Judaism, and the merging of political nationality into religious community, were on their way. "One country cannot contain all the Jews because of their large number; for which reason they are spread over most parts of Asia and Europe, both on the mainland and on islands. They regard Jerusalem, in which lies the Holy

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 9.

Temple of the Most High God, as their mother city; but the various countries in which their fathers, grandfathers, and ancestors have dwelt, they regard as their fatherlands, for in them they were born and bred."

Imperfect as Philo's writings undoubtedly are, fettered and hampered as he was, there is yet much in his work which we can ill afford to neglect and pass by. He gave to Judaism a certain broad and elevated humanism, a certain spiritual and mystic touch, a certain intellectual distinction, which were special to him and peculiar. And if we can profit from a philosopher who wrote under such strange limitations, what might we not gain from a Liberal Jewish philosopher of our own day who could be unshackled and free? If some competent student of Philo were fired to do for us what Philo did for the Jews of his day (and he could do even more, for while the need is no less great, the opportunity is greater), the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher would have contributed more by such instigation even than by any of his actual words to the progress and enlargement of Liberal Judaism.

CHAPTER V

WHAT LIBERAL JUDAISM HAS SOUGHT AND IS SEEKING TO ACHIEVE

SOMETHING has now been said of the contributions, actual or possible, of the Rabbinic literature, of Philo, and of the New Testament, to the building up of Liberal Judaism upon the firm and broad basis of the Hebrew Bible. But how many chapters ought to be inserted before this, the last one! The mediaeval philosophers, the earlier and the later mystics, the Kabbalists, the rationalists, the Chassidim—surely Liberal Judaism could cull flowers of truth and value from them all. But these chapters must be left for others, possessed of wider knowledge than I. This little book is only intended to point the way. The sooner it is superseded by a complete survey the better.

Doubtless Liberal Judaism to-day is the richer for all these various phases of the Jewish past. But it is richer unconsciously. It is not as rich as it should be and could be. It is *conscious* enrichment which is required. There is inadequate knowledge, and therefore inadequate appropriation. The sort of appropriation that is needed must be on the same lines as the appropriation which I have suggested as regards Philo, the Rabbis, and the New Testament.

The appropriators must be Liberal Jews who, in happy and serene freedom, stand above the facts and above the sources, ready to pick and choose, to accept and reject, to adapt and adopt, to expand or modify, to purify or universalise. On the Old Testament basis, or rather, on the basis of the Old Testament best, Liberal Judaism has to build up, with the aid of all these later manifestations of the Jewish spirit, its own fabric. It must be a fabric, like the much-advertised bookcase, always more or less complete, yet never finished.

What Liberal Judaism has so far done, the phase and type of Judaism which it has constructed, the religious ideas and doctrines which it has put forward and woven together, can be set forth in definite words. But what remains to be achieved can be only very partially and inadequately indicated. The future developments must, for the most part, be hidden in darkness. Who can say what Liberal Judaism will look like a hundred or five hundred years hence? We certainly would wish it to be a richer and grander religion than it is now; we would also wish that some of its present difficulties should then be overcome, and that some of its present problems should be solved. And yet it is also possible that, could the future Liberal Judaism be described to us, could we know what its actual doctrines and embodiment would be two hundred years from now, we should neither entirely approve them nor even entirely understand them. For the revelations of God are according to the capacity of those through whom they are made and of those who receive them. Nevertheless, though, if its content could now be written down, that content might now be misunderstood, this future religion will yet be

Liberal Judaism, and even a purer and grander Liberal Judaism than the Liberal Judaism we know and teach and love to-day.

This is not the place to give the smallest or shortest sketch of the origin, growth, and history of Liberal Judaism. The purpose of this small book is quite different. Yet it may be desirable to point out that, as is so often the case, the origin of Liberal Judaism does not reveal its nature. It began one way; it developed in another. Outward matters started the Liberal, or, as it was then called, the Reform movement; matters concerning order, decency, reverence, propriety, beauty in the services of the synagogue. But these things are only a very small part of Liberal Judaism. Orthodox Judaism can also appropriate them, and it has done so. *Its* services can also be orderly, decent, reverent, and beautiful. Whether they can answer to or satisfy the demands of the modern, spiritual, and informed western mind is a very different matter. I do not think they can, for the services of Orthodox Judaism are too dominated by the Law, and too hampered by irremovable elements, to be satisfying either to modern piety or to modern knowledge. But order, decency, reverence, and even beauty they can possess. For Liberal Judaism, however, all synagogue services, all public worship, are merely the outward manifestation, or expression, of spiritual truths and affirmations. Liberal Judaism is not an externality. In one aspect it is a religious system, a harmony of ideas; in another aspect it is a certain attitude or condition of mind and soul. It is the background, or, better, it is the key, or best, it is the spirit, of a life. Yet here we may, perhaps, add one qualifying observation. Beauty, no less than truth and goodness, is an end in itself,

and in some strange, yet real, sense God is for us the source of beauty as well as the source of goodness and of truth. Now Liberal Judaism "stands above" the rites, and if a rite seems for us to-day ugly and inexpressive, we claim the right to modify or abolish it. We possess a large measure of freedom, and this freedom is of the essence of our religion.

Later than the outward questions of order and decency, but at that period rapidly and inevitably mixed up with them, came the conflict with, or the attitude towards, the Rabbinic Code, the Hedge to the Law. In London, and in one or two early, exceptional, and ephemeral instances in Germany, the conflict with the Rabbinic Code assumed a "Karaitic" form; that is to say, the authority and divinity of the Pentateuch were emphasised, the authority and divinity of the Rabbinic Hedge were denied. This was a very unfortunate attitude, and was liable to lead either to an even worse stagnancy and fossilisation than the stagnancy and fossilisation of existing orthodoxy, or to a hopeless identification of Reform and Liberalism with a few useful externalities and external changes. On the other hand, it has to be remembered that the Talmud is less fundamental a book in Judaism than the Hebrew Bible, and it is much less the Pentateuchal law which causes conflict with modern ways of living and with practical life than the Rabbinic Hedge. It is, for instance, of little social importance and of little social difficulty if a man chooses to keep the Biblical dietary laws as laid down in Leviticus or Deuteronomy. The social trouble only comes in if he observes the cumbersome Rabbinic additions.

The third driving force in the evolution of Liberal Judaism was modern Biblical criticism,

together with comparative religion, the doctrine of evolution, and so on ; modern knowledge, in short, was the third driving force. Upon this force it is unnecessary to dwell. Its gigantic effects we know. Now, combined with all these influences and agencies, stimulating them and increasing their potency, came the emancipation movement. No Zionism was then in existence, and the idea grew up and became firm (please God, to remain unbreakable), that the Jews constituted, not a people or a nation, but a religious community, the members of which could rightly become the citizens on equal terms of every nation and people among whom they dwelt, and who, because they could, and desired to, discharge the full *duties* of citizenship, claimed its privileges and its rights.

These ideas partly grew out of religion and partly influenced religion. In the first place, externalities were somewhat affected. Purely national rites or ceremonies became unimportant or disregardable, or, perhaps, I should rather say, those rites and ceremonies which were no longer provocative, or expressive, of existing religious ideas or of the ideas consonant with Liberal Judaism, and could now only be celebrated from a narrow, particularistic, national point of view. Again, such religious ideas as seemed antagonistic to, or incompatible with, the universalist doctrine, or with the doctrine of the Jews constituting a religious community and not a nation, had to be dropped or modified. They were opposed to the spirit both of Liberal Judaism and of the emancipation. The two spirits, the two movements, were wholly congruous with each other. They played into each other's hands. Liberal Judaism desires to make Judaism, and claims that Judaism can be, and

essentially is, a universal religion. And to belong to a national religion is no longer possible for one who claims citizenship in another nation. If I am a full and true Dane, I cannot legitimately belong to a national religion which is not Danish. I must belong to a religion which rises above nationhood. There must be nothing in my religion which is antagonistic to my citizenship. And as the emancipation took place in the countries of the west, Judaism was not only universalised, or not only tended towards fuller universalism, in doctrine and in rite, but it also tended to occidentalisation. The doctrines were influenced in their development by western knowledge and western thought, and the rites tended to be modified in the direction of becoming rites in which a citizen of the west could find religious meaning, beauty, and satisfaction. In these ways the emancipation movement aided the more purely religious development to advance more rapidly along its own proper pathway.

The Jews and Judaism have been affected several times by the outside world. Persian thought has affected them and Greek thought, the latter more than once. After the attainment of emancipation, and when the Jews entered the full stream of European civilisation, and took their part in the various sides and aspects of European life, it was inevitable that European thought would affect them much more largely still. They were bound to absorb it, and to be affected by it, in a dozen different ways, often unconsciously, and sometimes even denying an influence which was active and potent notwithstanding. But European thought is a combination of Christian thought and Greek thought, and Christian thought is itself a product of Greek thought

and Jewish thought. Judaism was able to receive because it so largely had given. There was kinship between Judaism and Europe. There was kinship between Judaism and Christianity. There was also kinship between the higher thought of Greece and the higher thought of Judaism. Even when Jews contrasted and contrast Judaism with Christianity (to the disadvantage of Christianity), and even when they protest that there is nothing in modern Judaism which is not purely Jewish, and that in no religious or ethical matter have they been affected by any non-Jewish influences, even these very Jews, in the height of their protest, are greatly affected by the very influences which they deny. And this is true both of Orthodox Jews and of Liberal Jews. For the doctrines of Orthodox Judaism have undoubtedly been influenced by European thought and European environment; they have been thus influenced, so far as was consistently possible with the fundamental teachings of orthodoxy, and sometimes even more. An orthodox Jew of Frankfurt may observe the same rites and ceremonies as an orthodox Jew of Teheran, but his religious ideas are by no means the same. He may deny this, he may even say that if there be a difference, it is only because his Persian brother has contracted certain superstitions and anti-Jewish ideas, from which he is free, and that his Judaism, therefore, is not only not less purely Jewish than that of the Jew of Teheran, but more. He may *argue* thus, and the premiss about the superstitious accretions of the Persian Jew may be correct, but for all that the final deduction would be false.

Yet it is only Liberal Judaism which can use all these new influences to full and conscious advantage. For only Liberal Judaism possesses liberty—

conscious, reasoned, and deliberate. Only Liberal Judaism has nothing to fear. Only Liberal Judaism can stand above the facts, and examine its own house reverently, tenderly, lovingly, but freely. For by the conception of progressive revelation, by the conception of the spirit of God giving light to all generations and to all mankind, so that no one religion, and no one stage of that religion, are in possession of perfect truth in all its fullness and completion—only by these conceptions Liberal Judaism has won its power to smooth the “rough edges,” to fill in the gaps, to strengthen the weak points, and generally to expand and to modify, to adapt and to adopt, to curtail or to reject. It has won the power and the capacity to do this in happy freedom and in the full light of day. It is a grand and solemn power, a power to be made use of in all soberness and caution, in all reverence and care; it is a power in the exercise of which some mistakes are bound to be made, and some ephemeral conclusions to be drawn, but it is a power which, in spite of its dangers (and what high gift of God has not its dangers?) must yet be used, and in the use of which a distinctive feature, privilege, and glory of Liberal Judaism are to be found. Liberal Judaism need not explain away: it need not turn molehills into mountains, or mountains into molehills. It need not regard the exceptional as usual, or the usual as exceptional. It need not make a single saying mean more than it really meant, or less. In a word, it can be honest, historic, and free. If it is to make the best use of its freedom, it must and dare not be anything *but* honest.

These new conceptions and this new freedom constitute a tremendous advance. They suffice to

make Liberal Judaism, while preserving a true historic connection with all the phases of Judaism which have preceded it, yet enormously different from any of them. Neither Hebrew Bible nor Rabbinic Talmud is immaculate or complete in doctrine or institution, in morality or in religion. We distinguish between the divine and human elements in both these books, and we are not disconcerted because those very words "divine and human elements" are a rough and inadequate expression for a truth too profound and subtle for our full and clear comprehension. They are, at any rate, more true than false; they serve. We distinguish between the impermanent and the permanent; between truths which appear to us eternal, and the transitory and imperfect expressions of those truths. We distinguish doctrines and institutions which we desire to maintain for their truth and their value from doctrines and institutions which we desire to put aside or to abolish; we distinguish between the living and the obsolete.

Expanding what has just been said a little, we may, perhaps, affirm that Liberal Judaism makes use of its freedom in four or five main directions or ways.

(1) It modifies or enlarges the doctrines of the past—the doctrines which it inherits and finds—so as to make them consistent with each other and in harmony with the highest conceptions of truth to which it can attain. And some ancient doctrines may have to be dropped altogether, and some doctrines may have to be added. It further seeks to make the private and public institutions of religion the purest possible manifestations and expressions of its doctrine.

(2) Liberal Judaism deliberately aims at universalism and universalisation, though the goal may be distant and the pathway long. It would not merely desire to possess and teach only such doctrines as may be fervently held by all races, and as are fully consistent with the fundamental dogma of the One God who is the impartial father of all mankind, but it would desire that its religious rites and institutions should, as far as possible, harmonise with its universalist doctrines. It would wish to magnify and exalt the purely religious elements in Judaism, and to depreciate and minimise the purely national elements ; it would wish, so far as practicable, gradually to disentangle the first from the second, and, so far as any national rites and institutions are retained, to clothe and suffuse them with new spiritual and universalist values and meanings.

(3) Liberal Judaism sets out to emphasise the "prophetic" elements in Judaism, and to minimise or negate the "priestly" elements. Thus it abandons priestly conceptions of clean and unclean ; it rejects the idea of "holiness" as attaching to things as well as to persons in a real, serious, and outward sense ; it gives up all praying for the restoration of the Temple and of animal sacrifices.

(4) Liberal Judaism tends to exalt the "prophetic" elements in Judaism, and to depreciate, though not to abandon, the purely legal elements. It sets the Prophets above the Law. It desires to make Judaism no longer a predominantly legal religion, though it does not desire to deny or ignore the place of Law and of the Law (*i.e.* the Pentateuch) in the Jewish religion as a whole.

(5) Liberal Judaism seeks to construct a Judaism which is independent of the dates and authorships

of the Biblical books, which is free to accept the assured conclusions and results of Biblical criticism, and which does not require any belief in the "miracles" of the Pentateuch.

It is in these ways that Liberal Judaism seeks to deal with what I have called the rough edges of the Old Testament. But it seeks to do all this in reverence, and so as to preserve historic continuity and a real connection with the past. It seeks to get at the true genius of Judaism, and to set it free from all obsolete dross. The conceptions of the One God, perfectly wise and perfectly good, of the interconnection of religion and morality with each other ; of social justice, pity, and love ; of the love of neighbour and stranger ; of the mission of Israel as the witness and the teacher : it is these conceptions, and such as these, which it seeks to maintain and to emphasise, and, where necessary, to purify and to develop. The work is long ; the goal is far. Much has been accomplished. Much that we can see remains to do. Much that we cannot see the future will disclose. We re-echo the words of the old Rabbi : " It is not thy duty to complete the work, but neither art thou free to desist from it." It is clear that for a considerable time embodiment must lag somewhat behind doctrine. We can set forth a doctrine which we believe to be universalist, prophetic, consistent, independent of dates, authorships, and miracles, though here, too, there is yet work to be achieved ; but to wed this doctrine to forms and institutions which entirely suit it and express it must be a longer labour, where some steps may be wrongly taken, and many tentative efforts may be required. And as it is difficult to

reintroduce what has once been abandoned, it is well to go slowly.

As regards the nature and character of God, and His relation to the world, to man, and to Israel, Liberal Judaism has achieved its goal in one direction, though not in another. Its doctrine—and the same may be said of modern Orthodox Judaism—has been purged of every trace of particularism. That God is the impartial father of all men is now taught and believed on all hands. Here the rough edges of Hebrew Bible and of Talmud have been entirely removed. The only difference between Liberals and Orthodox is that we smooth the edges openly and avowedly, while they smooth them, if I may say so, furtively and evasively. *We* openly admit the particularism of Bible and Talmud, and openly acknowledge the large difference in this matter between our teaching and the more prevailing teaching contained in these ancient books; *they* attempt to argue that the difference does not exist, or seek to ignore and wrap it up.

Apart, however, from impartiality, there is still much to be done. We need philosophic theologians who shall neither be afraid of Christian doctrine on the one hand, nor be on the constant search for contrasts upon the other. Problems connected with transcendence and immanence, with omnipotence and creation, with the relation of God to suffering and evil, still need much examination; Jewish teaching on these subjects needs development and expansion. So, too, as to the divine character; as to wrath and love, righteousness and love, holiness and love; here, too, there is much work to be done, and much room for theologians and philosophers, who will not wish to impoverish

Judaism by insisting on differences and contrasts, but will rather seek to enrich it by finding out what the great minds of other religions have thought and taught, and how much is consistent with Judaism, and valuable and worthy of adoption and incorporation, and how much must be rejected ; how much can be translated into Jewish terminology (for, after all, what a large amount *is* a question of terminology !), and how much is untranslatable, undesirable, and untrue. We need theologians who do not want to sit in corners and erect peculiar systems of their own, but who are willing to profit and learn even from those whose traditions and accents and terminologies are other than their own. We have done a good deal, but much remains to do.

Besides other points we have to re-examine and set forth afresh the doctrine of the divine unity. It will be needful for Liberal Jewish theologians to consider the new modern interpretations of the doctrine of the Trinity, and to discuss how far these are, and how far they are not, in accordance with Jewish views of the unity. It might, for example, seem as if there were little in Dean Rashdall's interpretation of the Trinity which a Jew could not accept. But it will have to be pointed out how the Dean appears to allow that many forms of popular Trinitarianism at any rate have been somewhat tainted with Tritheism, and that the new teaching seems to us nearer to Judaism than to many manifestations of Christianity. What I am concerned about is that Jewish theologians shall make it clear that the Jewish doctrine of the unity does not tend to impoverish the divine nature, but only to emphasise its complete harmony and self-consistency. God may have as many aspects as you please so

long as there is no opposition between the one and the other, so long as the pure unity of the one self-consciousness is rigidly maintained. The same argument would apply to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Here, too, there is work for Jewish theologians to accomplish within the limits of Judaism. Much may be said of the operation and nature of the divine spirit which need not in any way conflict with the doctrine of the unity. So, too, as regards the relation of God to the natural world. It is quite possible that that relation, which will include references to the doctrine of the divine spirit and of the divine ubiquity, may need restatement and fresh development. This can well be done if the otherness of God from the world (as from man) be soberly maintained. His self-conscious reality and distinctness, in spite of all obvious metaphysical difficulties, must, I think, be insisted on. No less must it be insisted on that the metaphors of Father and King are not untrue, if they are also inadequate. The truth includes, but reaches beyond them.

In God's relation to man there is also achievement to be recorded and progress to be made. The crudities of tit for tat have been overcome. We take our stand upon the divine goodness, which is inconsistent with the ultimate unsaveability of any human soul. We reject the doctrine that God arranged for any *such* measure of human freedom as must inevitably give to man in this brief space of earthly life the possibility of continuous and eternal alienation from God. We reject even the refined eternal hell of certain modern theologians, and if we are simple to the verge of folly in our rejection, we rejoice and are glad in our simplicity. If this new elegant hell be tenanted by very few,

its horror is for us none the less horrible ; its inconsistency with the divine love none the less inconsistent. God the Father is for us also God the King. We are His subjects no less than His children. We are at work upon an ever fuller harmonisation of those two conceptions, which require also the harmonisation of the principles of autonomy and obedience, of reverence and love, of liberty and law. Then, too, there is yet work to be done as regards divine punishment and reward. We do not reject these conceptions altogether, but they mean to us something different from what they meant to the men of the Biblical and Talmudic age. With the rejection of tit for tat, with the rejection of the doctrine that calamity implies sin and prosperity righteousness, with the pressed and conscious distinction between material and spiritual evil, and spiritual and material good, it becomes necessary to overhaul the whole doctrine of God's dealings with mankind and man. It cannot be said that complete consistency and harmony have as yet been achieved. So, too, about the help rendered by God in the conquest of sin and the attainment of goodness. Further development is required. Forgiveness, too, and atonement are conceptions in which such portions of old doctrine as are still serviceable and seem still true need to be fitted on to new ideas, and welded with them into a finer whole.

In these matters, as in certain others which are alluded to in the third section of Chapter I., Liberal Judaism has to accomplish, and, to some extent, has already accomplished, a double task. It has to develop Jewish theology on subjects which are not specifically connected with Liberalism as well

as with those that are. It has to do the first as well as the second, because it is so free and unhampered, and is therefore more qualified to do it than orthodoxy and traditionalism. It can go ahead more easily, and move forward without impediment. Thus, on such a subject as the idea of creation in its relation to God, involving such questions as whether we are still to regard God as the creator of the world "out of nothing," or as to the purpose of creation, or as to the divine glory, and how far, and in what sense God acts for the advancement of His glory, and how far we men are to make the divine glory the motive or the purpose of our actions, and as to the meaning we are to assign to such phrases, Liberal Judaism is not more called upon to give an opinion than is Orthodox Judaism, nor, so far as I can see, is there anything in the specific doctrines of orthodoxy which would necessarily make the answers of orthodoxy very different from those of liberalism. Nevertheless, it is only Liberal Judaism which, while using Biblical and Talmudic material, is yet entirely free to move beyond Biblical and Talmudic conclusions. We have, therefore, to shoulder an extra burden because of the unfortunate entanglements and difficulties under which our orthodox and traditional brethren must always labour. So that here, too, there is work for Liberal Jewish theologians to do. And it has to be confessed that they have not, so far, always taken full advantage of their own freedom. They, too, have not unfrequently been too inclined to apologetic and "reading in"; they, too, have been too frightened by, or too hostile and prejudiced towards, the spiritual products of Christian thought.

On the subjects of sin, retribution, and forgiveness the peculiar differences between liberalism and orthodoxy begin to show themselves more clearly. To begin with, sin and goodness are conceived less legally by liberalism than by traditionalism. We are perfectly able to avoid all legalistic inadequacies. Goodness is not to us simply definable as the execution of the definite commands of God as written down in a code : sin is not simply definable as their infraction. We have a more inward and spiritual conception of both. Goodness has a relation to deed, but a still closer relation to character. Goodness requires the right deed ; it also requires the right motive. Liberal Judaism can hold the balance even between deed and motive, between deed and character. Above all, it holds the balance even between autonomy and heteronomy in morality, holding that the ideal is neither one nor the other, but a fusion which is both. " In thy service is freedom." The laws of God are also the laws of man. Perfect obedience would be perfect liberty. *Deo parere libertas est.* The moral law is given by God, and yet discovered and built up by man. God is the inspirer and the source. There is still a place for " don't " and " do," and there always will be a place, but the " don't " and the " do " are no less within man than without him, and till they are recognised as within, they are not fully understood as without. Till the human side is appreciated, the divine side is not fully appreciated likewise. Liberal Judaism is the harmony of the " Law " and the " Gospel." It knows how to admire and to accept both the Ten Commandments and the Beatitudes.

Again, Liberal Judaism is able to develop the doctrines and the conceptions of atonement and forgiveness. Much has been done already in this regard, but obviously there is room for indefinite advance. We have to use the Talmudic "chastisements of love" and expand them. The outward has to be, in one sense, more depreciated than it was by the Rabbis. Its connection with the lot of the individual has to be loosened; that is, still less stress has to be placed, in any individual case, upon any correspondence of outward circumstance with inward desert. We have to wage a yet fiercer war upon tit for tat. It is neither the principle of God's dealing with us, nor should it be the principle of our dealings with our fellows. Here, too, Liberal Judaism represents a revolt from legalism. But it does not go so far as to condemn any and every correspondence between virtue and prosperity, or between the deed and its results. It holds a certain balance between the prevailing view of the Old Testament and the prevailing doctrine of Stoicism. It does not say that it entirely suffices if a man be "good." It does not say that there is, and need be, no other happiness than the "good will." It does not say that all efforts for social well-being lie outside the sphere of religion. It does not hold that there is not some God-approved and God-designed correspondence between inward righteousness and outward felicity. In spite of the puzzle of the ephemeral world, which must ultimately become icy cold and no longer the seat of human habitation, it still believes in human progress, and regards this "progress" as a religious conception, and to work for it as a religious duty. And in all human deed and work it insists on keeping a place both for man's

effort and for divine help. "Teach me to do thy will" is a prayer which was not meaningless when the Psalmist uttered it, and is not meaningless to-day. "Create in me a clean heart" is a valid exclamation, but so, too, is the appeal: "Make you a new heart." In ways too subtle for man to apprehend, but in spite of their subtlety not unreal, man achieves by his own struggle, and *also* by the grace of God.

In these matters there is, however, no reason why Traditional Judaism should not also speak in much the same strain as Liberal Judaism. For Orthodox Judaism, too, seeks and contends for a harmony of human power and resolve with divine assistance and grace. But as regards the relation of God to Israel, Liberal Judaism is able to speak with a much clearer and less hampered voice. We can come out into the open, and say exactly what is in our minds. Our universalism is naked and unashamed. Whatever partiality and particularism can be detected in Old Testament and Talmud are for us as obsolete as for the Christian. The mission of Israel is purely religious, and if that mission were over and concluded, the mere *people* of Israel would have for us—those few Liberal Jews who are also Jewish nationalists excluded—no interest whatever. Israel is a religious community, and not a nation. No nationalistic predictions have any meaning or value for Liberal Judaism except when transmuted and transfigured into terms of religion. The Jews are the guardians and the inheritors of a particular type of ethical monotheism, of a religion which, with its roots stretched far and deep into the past, is yet growing and developing to-day. Scattered over the world they are to find in that very dispersion the chosen

means for the fulfilment of their charge. As Europeans and as Americans are they to take their part in the spiritual development of Europe and of America. Not segregated in Asia, but as free citizens of Europe and America are they to execute their task. Such is the pure Liberal Jewish point of view ; such is our doctrine, our conviction, and our hope. And that is why to nationalistic schemings in Palestine we are unalterably opposed. How in the future "the mission of Israel" may develop, what forms it may assume, we cannot tell. We live in faith, and work in faith. Liberal Judaism is to act as a beacon, a leaven, and a ferment. If people ask us, with ill-concealed disdain, "Do you expect Liberal Judaism to become the world religion?" we may reply, "In one sense, yes ; in another sense, we cannot tell." We do believe that the doctrines of Liberal Judaism, purified and developed, will win their way more and more to larger and larger acceptance. They may do that without even assuming a Jewish name. There are thousands of persons to-day who would call themselves Christians; in one sense Christians they are, and Christians they have every right to be called, even as Christians they feel themselves to be. But, in another sense, these men are nearer to Liberal Judaism as it is, and as it will be, than they are to *that* Christianity against which Judaism has been bound to offer its protest for so many generations in the past. And their descendants will, as *we* believe, be nearer still. We do not mind about the name. Meanwhile, Liberal Judaism will attempt very gradually and historically to universalise its embodiment as it has already universalised its doctrines. It will remove obsolete obstacles in the

way of proselytes. It will not seek to win adherents by unworthy means, but it will not make the approach difficult or ugly for those who would wish to enter the fold. The gates are freely open, and what is seen and heard within shall become increasingly intelligible and attractive. Meanwhile, Israel still spells sorrow and trouble ; persecution and disdain ; contempt and prejudice. We accept the burden. Israel still spells these things, but one thing it no longer spells : privilege. It spells service ; but spelling that, it spells also all the joy and humility and obedience and devotion which service can stimulate and arouse.

The very fluidity of the conceptions regarding the relations of man to God in the Old Testament prevent much roughness of edges. Pretty well all we need is there, unsystematised and incidental. We have but to take the best, and drop whatever is inconsistent with it. We have to unite and harmonise what is sporadic and casual. There is, indeed, more of harmonising to do, or of development, than of actual dropping. Thus, while we shall enlarge the conception of God as a father, and use in our enlargement the contributions of the Gospels, we shall not discard the conception of God as the king. " Our father *and* king " we shall say with the Rabbis, not " our father " only. Hence our relation to God is one of obedience and reverence as well as one of liberty and love. The laws of righteousness are both ours and His. Free obedience to them, and to Him as their source and giver, is our ideal. And all this we find indicated, though not always fully developed, in the Old Testament. What the love of God can reach to may be shown more powerfully in the martyrdom of Akiba than in

any Old Testament story, but Jesus and Akiba only develop what the Old Testament proclaims.

So, too, with God's service. We still would hold that this service is for God's sake and man's sake. The diffusion and increase of the divine glory has a meaning for us, though possibly not quite the same meaning that it had for our remote Biblical ancestors. It is possible that we may add to it a touch of mysticism which it did not have for them, but which it certainly already had for some of the Rabbis. For they had already framed the daring conception of man's assistance to God in the diffusion and increase of goodness, in the intensification of the divine glory, in the augmentation of the *amount* of divineness in the universe, in making God all the more God. On the other hand, that man's service of God, or man's obedience to God's laws, is not for the sake of any advantage to God, in any lower, ordinary sense of the word, also goes back very plainly to the Old Testament, and is also a truth to be maintained in all its purity.

The same happy and useful fluidity we have also noticed in the Old Testament conceptions of sin and of righteousness. There is no theory of sin and no theory of body and soul. There is just a wholesome acceptance of certain obvious facts, such as that all men are frail and erring and sinful in different directions and degrees, and that though neither body nor soul is sinful by nature, or by hereditary curse and pollution, the constitution of man, being what it is, leads inevitably to some yielding to temptation, to some infraction of the moral law ; in other words, to sin. The evil impulse, the Yetzer ha-Ra, is hardly yet marked out and defined in the Biblical period, but the doctrine is well on the way. This

Yetzer ha-Ra is due neither to body nor to soul exclusively, but to that combination of the two which makes man lower than the angel and higher than the beast. Our doctrine of sin may, doubtless, need expansion and development, but it will, I think, still be true to its Biblical basis ; it will still be the Old Testament doctrine purified and enlarged. It will still oscillate between two sets of poles : it will still, in Dr. Baeck's favourite words, be constituted by a certain paradox and tension. " I cannot help sinning ; I am frail ; I am human " ; all this on the one hand ; " I can and must help it ; I am bound to help it ; it is my human glory that I can help it," upon the other. Or, again, " I am frail ; I am sinful ; I fall," upon the one hand ; " God assists me ; God gives me power ; God enables me to win through," upon the other. The same tension will be apparent in the theory of repentance. On the one hand, " I must repent, and can " ; on the other, a supplication to God that He may grant me both the power to repent and the result of repentance : the clean heart and forgiveness. For forgiveness is also regarded as something won and something given. It is like the new heart, the issue of endeavour and of the grace of God. Does man start the process, or God ? Who can tell ? Liberal Judaism is free to spiritualise the conception as much as it pleases. It can frankly state that it has broken with much of the older ideas about the subject, whether Biblical or Talmudic. To our Biblical or Talmudic forefathers divine forgiveness meant primarily to be let off a consequence of sin, to be let off a punishment which was to come. It is well to be perfectly plain and open on this matter. God was largely looked upon as the Judge, and as the dispenser of punishments

and rewards, and though He was looked upon in many other more spiritual ways, and though these very rewards and punishments were themselves often spiritually interpreted, yet God as judge filled a great part of the canvas: the judge of the nations and the judge of Israel on the one hand, the judge of every individual upon the other. But God as judge has ceased to play this predominant part. It is not because we do not believe in retribution—in the results of sin, whether in this world or in the next. But it is because we hold that if God be perfectly wise and good, it is absurd to suppose that these very results can be other than wise and good, for our benefit and not for our harm. Whether as sinners or as righteous, we surrender ourselves to His will. Forgiveness, then, for Liberal Judaism must mean that reconciliation or atonement with God which can only follow upon our own moral regeneration. “Forgive me, O God” can hardly mean anything else than, “Create in me a clean heart.”

One further point about the new heart (or the clean heart) may also be noticed here. Liberal Judaism will be ready to recognise the two ways in which, as from the human end, it can be imperfectly achieved. I add “imperfectly” because no man’s heart is clean completely. The two ways are both recognised in the Talmud, though the second way is more associated by us with Pauline doctrine and with the Christian doctrine of conversion than with Judaism. The first way is by gradual advance and retrogression, in which the advance slowly gets the better of the retrogression. If you move forward seven steps a year, and fall back four, you have in thirty years moved forward ninety steps net. Each year you sin, each year you repent; each year you

conquer a little more ; each year your character grows a little stronger and fuller ; each year your heart may be truly said to become a little cleaner. But there is another method in which the new heart is sometimes won, a method by which the ninety steps that the one man takes thirty years to achieve may be achieved by the second man in a bound. A new passion, a sudden inrush of faith, a sudden awakening of love, a fresh hope or devotion, a sudden bursting away from an habitual frailty or sin, may flood a man's soul with new light, and give him a power for good which was impossible to him before. His faith has saved him. His love has saved him. His sins, which were many, are forgiven him, for he has felt the passion of love, and has loved much. His love cleanses and purifies his heart. His love gives him the power to go in peace, and to sin no more. His love makes his heart new, and the new heart assures his "forgiveness." He is once more, and more fully than ever before, at one with God. Such was, I think, the teaching of Jesus. The Talmud, I think, only knows the leap from sin to righteousness as a deathbed repentance, but it is notorious that the leap has been and can be taken in life, which is far more important and far more interesting. Liberal Judaism must be ready to admit, and reckon with, and account for, and make use of, and find place for, all the various pathways by which a man may be led towards God, and all the various methods by which he may overcome sin. There is no reason why Judaism should be limited to any particular one.¹

¹ A friend who read my book in manuscript observes that there is a not infrequent "third method" which seems to be a combination of the first and second. The "new inrush of faith," the "sudden awakening of love," the new experience in fine, makes the man become aware for the first time, in a sudden

One of the dangers which Rabbinic Judaism ran in becoming a predominantly legal religion was in the externalisation of righteousness and sin. I am not thinking about the fact that so many of the laws, the due performance of which constitutes righteousness according to Rabbinic doctrine, are ceremonial and non-moral, but I am thinking about something more general and fundamental. In the last resort there is, and can be, no sin in an *action* ; the sin is in the doer, not in the deed. The very same deed done by an absolute maniac is not regarded as sinful, and the reason is that sin is sinfulness, and resides in the person. As with uncleanness, no *thing* is unclean in a religious sense: only persons and souls are unclean, so, too, a deed is really a thing ; it is neither masculine nor feminine, but neuter. The doer is the seat of sin, not the deed. The sinful heart is not only the source of sin ; it *is* the sin. A legal religion tends to put the essence of sin into the actual deed ; the law knows and enumerates so many hundred wicked deeds and so many hundred good deeds. The wicked deeds are either the actions which the laws say are not to be done, or they are the actions which constitute a violation of the laws which are to be done. The stress is laid upon the outward deed, whereas virtue and vice are states of the soul, or exercises of the will. Liberal Judaism has to assign due value to these considerations, but, on the other hand, it has also to maintain a stress upon action. To call a deed sinful may not

flash of illumination, of the existence of a good, a glory, a star, which, once having seen, he must for ever seek. But, thereafter, his experience is the same as that of the first man. He, too, begins where the first man begins. He also does his seven steps forward and his four steps back : three only to the good at the cost of much effort and some failure ! He, too, has the same weary "grind," beginning at the bottom, and he, too, only conquers very slowly.

be entirely and strictly correct, but it is a use of terms which is justifiable and convenient. Righteousness resides in character, in the will, the mind, the feelings ; but righteousness is only proved and assured and developed by deed. Judaism has to be on the watch against any antinomian heresy, which may assume a complicated variety of forms. "The deed, the deed," as sings the modern poet. Upon the deed we still lay tremendous stress ; the foolish and sinful deed, even though the adjectives are partly metaphorical, cannot be excused on the plea of a well-intentioned heart. If we are judged by our deeds, "if the Lord will render unto every man according to his works," such sayings must be interpreted to mean, not that character is less important than action, but that action, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, is the index and evidence of character.

We saw that whereas to Paul the Law was the strength of sin, to the Rabbis it was the sovereign medicine for sin. To the one the Law was a task-master which said continually: "Do ; refrain," and it was the strength of sin, because, while it terrified by its threats of punishment, it increased the desire to act in the precisely opposite direction. To every "do" there was opposed the desire to refrain from the doing, or to act just otherwise ; to every "don't" there was opposed the desire to do. To the Rabbis the Law was the strength of righteousness. It was this because, instead of being merely feared, it was passionately loved, because while the human frailty and temptation were the same for the Rabbis as for Paul, there existed, in the case of the Rabbis, a special longing and desire to fulfil the "do's" and the "don't's" as well as, doubtless, the temptation,

in some cases, to violate them. The forces which pull a man to violate the Law were, doubtless, existent both in the Rabbis and in Paul, though it has to be remembered that the famous seventh chapter of the Romans must probably not be regarded as a faithful transcript of Paul's own experience before his conversion. Both Rabbis and Paul were human beings; both frail. But the forces which drove the Rabbis to execute and fulfil the Law were absent from Paul; they were peculiar to the Rabbis (and to all Jews who felt towards the Law as they felt). The *love* of the Law, the *delight* in the fulfilment of it, a delight both anticipated and experienced, overcame the desire to violate. Though the Law was the *source* of sin (because if there were no injunctions not to eat rabbit, there would not only be no sin in eating it, but, in some cases, not even a desire to eat it), the Law was also the means whereby to overcome sin. It supplied to the Rabbis the motive force, the passion, the love, which the death of Christ and the risen Christ supplied to Paul. The great question for Liberal Judaism is: Can God supply the place both of Christ and of the Law? What the Law was and achieved for the Rabbis, that it cannot be and achieve for us; that which Christ was and achieved for Paul, he cannot be and achieve for us. For us God must be all in all. Let us hope that the love of Him may suffice for us. But it must needs be a difficult task. The Law for the Rabbis and Christ for Paul: these were great forces, though what was so potent to the one was, to the other, foolishness. Can we do without the "Third Party"? It will need all our strength, our prayer, our love.

I will not dwell here upon the *content* of righteous-

ness, except, perhaps, to say again that Liberal Judaism is free to take what seems good and new, whether from the Gospels or the Talmud. It can find place for both. And it can develop isolated teachings of the Bible, such as that of Isaiah liii., with perfect freedom. The doctrine of self-sacrifice, and of vicarious suffering and atonement, so far as these doctrines are true, can be incorporated into the ethical teaching of Liberal Judaism. That the suffering of one person is sometimes the result and the cure of the sin of another, is a truth which *we* can teach as well as others. It is a human truth, which *any* religion can appropriate. Where Liberal Judaism will hold the balance even is in its appraisal of the outward and the material, in its recognition of the fact that man is a combination of body and soul, and in its belief that body as well as soul, outward world as well as spiritual values, are the gift, or even the creation, of God. The sanctification of the outward, the sanctification of the bodily instincts—this remains a characteristic and fundamental Jewish conception. It is this which remains over from the stress laid by the Old Testament upon earthly life and earthly prosperity. A life beyond the grave has been taught by Judaism for two thousand years, but it has never ceased to interest itself in this life as well. It has never ceased to teach that this life, too, must be brought within the jurisdiction of religion, that this life, too, may be, and ought to be, the scene for the revelation of God's glory, the theatre of His kingdom. Hence its stress upon social righteousness and the abolition of social wrongs. Hence its belief that neither in this life nor in the next should there be an eternal and necessary connection between goodness and

infelicity. For Judaism as for Aristotle, the ideal is happiness; for Judaism as for Aristotle, complete happiness for earth, while nine parts out of ten spiritual, is one part material. And because it is one part material, the necessity arises for the sanctification of the material. Eating and drinking; the satisfaction of the sexual passion; all to the glory of God. Not the cutting out of the instinct, but its transfiguration. Not virginity, but motherhood is the greater and holier state; not monkish abstention, but sanctified use, is the ideal. By such doctrine we still keep our historic connection with the past. Nor can such teaching be turned against us as if it proved that our insistence that holiness was of persons, not of things, was hereby abandoned. That is not so. "The sanctification of the material" is, I admit, a metaphor. It is a shorthand expression for the theory that *man* is sanctified by the use which he makes of the material, by the use which he makes of his body and its instincts. It is not bringing in priestly conceptions by a side wind. The dietary law of Liberal Judaism is, not to abstain from rabbit and lobster because *these* foods are *in themselves* unclean, but it is to eat and drink in moderation and for the attainment of health, to avoid luxury and gluttony, to offer thanks to God the giver. Or, again, to follow the injunctions of the wisest dietetics of your own age and country is the dietary law of Liberal Judaism, not the priestly taboos, even though they may have had *some* sanitary basis or infiltration, of two thousand five hundred years ago.

It is not wonderful if Liberal Judaism, while seeking to smooth the rough edges of Biblical and Talmudic Judaism, should yet reveal several of its own. For it is still so young. It is in the making.

And it is so free. It has escaped from the bondage of the Law, and it has not had to fall, and has not fallen, into the worse bondage of creeds. It rejoices in a divine freedom, but it has also to suffer from the dangers of freedom. And yet these very dangers are also privileges. Our fluidity, conscious and prized, may prevent a rounded harmony, the harmony of a written system, but it gives us the happy inconsistency of life. It gives us the possibility of growth, of movement, of sensitive adaptability. It is doubtless true that the Judaism of the Rabbis was different from the Judaism of Nehemiah, and the Judaism of Akiba different from the Judaism of Maimonides, and that of Maimonides from the Judaism of any representative and leading Rabbis of the generation immediately preceding Mendelssohn. But I am inclined to think that the difference between the Judaism of A.D. 150, or even the Judaism of 400 B.C., and the Judaism of A.D. 1750 was much less than the difference between the Judaism of A.D. 1750 and the Liberal Judaism of 1923. We press, and justly press, the point that our religion is Judaism, and we claim, and justly claim, that it is a legitimate development of the Judaism of our forefathers. We maintain with pride and care our historic connections, in faith and ceremonial, with the past. But it would be idle to deny the greatness of the difference. And the difference lies in our freedom and in our changed relation to the Prophets and the Law. In a sense it would be true to say that we take up the thread of the story at the point where Jeremiah laid it down. It is not possible here to indicate the actual teachings of Liberal Judaism in regard to all the various religious and ethical topics and subjects which have been

touched upon in previous chapters. In an earlier work, now out of print, but a new edition of which will, I hope, soon appear, I have ventured, in rough and inadequate outline, to sketch out the elements of Liberal Jewish doctrine. It is undesirable to make this book trench unduly upon the province of the other. But the meanings and implications of our freedom have, even yet, perhaps, not quite sufficiently been made clear.

Great stress is often laid by Jewish apologists upon the progressiveness of the Rabbinic legislation and point of view. The mobility of the Rabbis is contrasted with the sterility and the stagnation of the Karaites. The very doctrine of an inspired Oral Law is often spoken of as a principle of progress. It is alleged that the Rabbis often altered the Pentateuchal Code to suit the changed circumstances of their own age. And it is suggested that the Oral Law meant that the Rabbis accepted the principle of continuous, if not of progressive, revelation. God spoke through them no less than He spoke through Moses. And sometimes Liberal teachers, who try to glorify the past, and to assimilate themselves to it as much as they can, go so far as to say that the trouble was that this principle of continuous revelation, which the Rabbis held, and of which they drew the practical consequences in their own legislation, was not maintained, but that at the close of the Talmudic period the era of codification set in, bringing along with it sterilisation and stonification, stagnation and immobility. No longer was the spirit of God supposed to move Jewish teachers. The chain of tradition was broken. Sheer obedience to written codes ; mere reflection and commentary upon past efforts, were all that was

henceforward to be allowed. According to this way of looking at things the Reform teachers took up the interrupted task of the Pharisees and the Rabbis!

There is a grain of truth in this theory, but not so very much more. The attitude of the Rabbis towards the Pentateuch and the Old Testament was very different from the attitude of Liberal Judaism. To them the Pentateuch was sheer perfection from beginning to end. It was Mosaic, homogeneous, divine. The developments in the Pentateuchal Law, which they introduced, the changes and the modifications, were sometimes no doubt courageous, even though they had to be justified by perverse and casuistic methods of exegesis and interpretation. Most frequently they were developments in the direction of drawing out what was unclear or implied, or, again, in the direction of adding endless details to a simple rule, or of piling restriction upon restriction, of prohibition upon prohibition. Though there may have been some rather dim idea of *continuous* revelation, there was no idea whatever of *progressive* revelation. Of our modern Liberal attitude of freely criticising the injunctions and teachings of the Law, and of appraising them as "good, better, and best," or as good and not good, or as temporary and obsolete, or as "human" and "divine," there is obviously not a trace. It is unjust to regard Liberal Judaism as Rabbinic Judaism in a slightly modernised form. We, too, continue tradition, but with very different weapons and from a very different point of view. Immense is the gulf between us, even though immense, too, is our debt. Freely do we gather from the Rabbis all that seems to us true and precious in their teaching, but no less freely do we differ from them, and freely do we reject much

which they held dear, much which they passionately believed, much which they joyously practised. Much do we add which to them was unknown, or which, if they had been told of it, they would have rejected. The doctrine of revelation is a very different thing for us from what it was for them. It is, perhaps, a profounder and more definitely inexplicable problem to us than to them, but be that so or not, the difference is enormous. For to us the limits of revelation are far wider, and far less rigidly marked and visible, than to them. On the other hand, the content of revelation is far less pure and perfect. Truth and falsehood; permanent and temporary; ore and dross, are for us strangely mixed up together. When to this difference in theory we add the enormous differences brought about by historical criticism and comparative religion, the greatness of the gulf which severs us from them becomes still more clearly apparent. *We* "stand above the facts"; *they* did not, and could not.

Nor was there any real deep change between A.D. 700 and A.D. 1700. It is true that a certain stonification did begin and increase in these thousand years. It is true that in the Rabbinic period there was a certain movement and adaptiveness, one might even say with justice, a certain development and advance. But the fundamental attitude towards Pentateuch and Bible was the same in 1700 as in 700, and in 700 as in 1700. The conception of progressive revelation was unborn; the results of criticism and history and comparative research were still to come.

But it is not only the doctrine of progressive revelation which causes the newness of Liberal Judaism, and marks and makes the measure of its

difference from all the Judaisms which have preceded it: there is yet more. Much as we reverence the Law, we reverence the prophets more; much as we recognise that the soul of religion needs a form or an embodiment, and that doctrine requires a "cult," we yet look upon the "ceremonial law" with other eyes than those of all our forefathers from A.D. 100 till our own day. We have, in fact,—if the words could be permitted,—largely delegalised and largely deceremonialised it. To our forefathers Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah were all later than the Law in time, and inferior to the Law in greatness and authority. To us they are all earlier in time, and superior in greatness and authority. The difference is far-reaching and profound. Then as to ceremonial. We know more accurately the nature of the old conception upon which so many of the ceremonial laws rested: the priestly doctrine of clean and unclean attaching to things and bodies. This doctrine, with the Prophets, with Jesus, and with Theano, we reject. Secondly, we take the prophetic doctrine of the secondary value of outward rites and ceremonies very seriously. Thus, we use towards them canons of criticism and tests, which have never been used towards them in Judaism before. Over and above our general freedom, we apply these specific tests, and while insisting on the necessity of rites and institutions, we hold it our right and duty to change, drop, modify, and add, as circumstances and the "canons" may suggest and demand. So here, too, we differ of necessity very widely from all who came before us.

If we now look back to the five main directions in which Liberal Judaism has made use of its

freedom, and view them in relation to the Old Testament, we shall perceive how many are the changes and developments which have been effected. Under the first direction or way would fall the various Old Testament doctrines which have been dropped altogether. Such would be (1) many conceptions concerning God's wrath or His destructive or retributive violence, which conflict with His unity and His Righteousness, or (2) doctrines which, putting Israel and the Israelites in a position of vantage and superiority towards God, whether in the past, the present, or the future, conflict with the divine impartiality, or (3) teachings which rest on taboos, or on priestly ideas concerning religious cleanness and uncleanness as attaching to bodies and things. Much more, though not wholly dropped, is modified. Thus, the doctrine of rewards and punishments, so characteristic of the Old Testament, has been, as we have seen, largely modified and spiritualised. The same may be said about outward prosperity and calamity, about physical and moral evil, and to a less degree about righteousness and sin. Our "theodicy,"—our attitude towards the problem of evil—is very different from that of almost all the Old Testament teachers. It is profounder and purer, as after so many centuries it ought to be. But, perhaps, it also more vividly recognises the insolubility of the problem. In some respects the problem is far worse for us than for our Biblical ancestors, for we are aware of, and are passionately concerned about, forms and phases of evil which had not appeared to, or were not recognised by, them. In some ways it is more bearable for us than for them, because the lack of correspondence between goodness and earthly prosperity, or between wickedness and

earthly infelicity, is less a worry and an anguish to us than it was to them. Another large modification is our conception of the future and of the Messianic age. We retain and cherish, we enlarge and purify, the religious visions and aspirations of the Prophets. But we entirely separate these visions and aspirations from the national form in which they are expressed, and which, we freely admit, formed to the Prophets an essential feature of them. We cleanse them from particularism and nationalism. Zion and Jerusalem are for us terms of purely spiritual significance. Whether Jews, as a body of settlers, prosper and multiply in Palestine or not, their future, for the great majority of Liberal Jews, is wholly distinct from the future of Judaism. The Jews are for us a religious community; not less, but not more. Judaism is a religion, and Liberal Judaism looks to a future in which Judaism will become yet more purely a religion, and a universal religion, than it is now. How great the change is from the prevailing attitude of the Old Testament teachers and seers needs no showing.

Should we call the hope of immortality an expansion or an addition? If the former, what is just intimated in two or three very late and exceptional passages has now become central and spiritualised. So one might continue. Treasures and truths which occur sporadically and occasionally in the Old Testament—periphery gems—have become the “captain jewels in the carcanet.” They have been expanded and centralised. Prominent, for example, among such truths and treasures is the doctrine of the Servant, the light to the nations, who suffers for the healing and enlightenment of others, whose “call” is for service and not for privilege. And

yet here, too, even in Isaiah liii., even in the very noblest of the Servant Songs, we have to modify and to spiritualise. Not for us, except in a modified and spiritual sense, is the prediction : " I will divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong." " With his stripes we are healed," yes ; a truth for the individual, for society, and for the world, a truth for the Israelite and for Israel, a truth *about* Israel and about the world. But " spoil and portion," no. We have got beyond this national outlook and these materialistic compensations.

And if great are the changes which Liberal Judaism has effected in the teachings of the Old Testament as a whole, no less great and far-reaching are the changes which, as we have seen, it has effected as regards the separate portions of the Old Testament in their relations to one another, and to all the phases of Judaism which lie between the Old Testament and ourselves. For Liberal Judaism, as we have already heard, has made the Law secondary and the Prophets primary ; it has put ritual into its proper place ; it has rejected priestly, primordial conceptions of clean and unclean ; and while it has distinguished and disentangled the conception of Law from the actual Pentateuchal Code, it has sought to give to Law its right place in religion and in Judaism.

Corresponding to these immense changes in doctrine are the changes in form. We have maintained the festivals, but how different is our way of celebrating them, and how different are the conceptions which we put into them ! Even the Sabbath is not quite the same for us as it was for the authors of the Pentateuchal codes. Greater still is the change

as regards Passover and Pentecost, and greatest and most remarkable of all is the change in the greatest of all the festivals, the Day of Atonement. I have so often laid stress upon the gulf which separates the priestly ceremonies described in Leviticus xvi. from the prophetic and spiritual Day of Atonement of our Liberal Judaism to-day that I need not dwell upon the matter further in this book. But what is no less to be emphasised is that the second is the lineal descendant of the first. The historic connection is unbroken.

This historic connection reminds us that, however great and significant the changes in Liberal Judaism from many of the doctrines, or even from the prevailing doctrines, of the Old Testament may be, still more remarkable, perhaps, is the fact that Liberal Judaism still finds in the Old Testament both its spiritual ancestry and its nourishment. It may be that, as I have shown, we have made the secondary primary, and the primary secondary, that we have put what was occasional and sporadic into the forefront and into the centre. It may be that we have expanded and curtailed, modified and spiritualised. But our very inspiration to do all this has been, in some measure, the Old Testament itself. We have had Amos and Isaiah for our teachers; they have pointed out to us the way. There is hardly a conception or a doctrine of ours which does not go back, even if only in germ, to the Hebrew Bible. It is true that we have to abandon certain prevailing doctrines, but we do not abandon, we only expand and deepen, strengthen and confirm, the most fundamental doctrines of all. God's unity and righteousness, the inseparable union of religion and morality, the election of Israel for a

religious mission and service, the joy of communion with God—these doctrines, the essence of our Judaism to-day, are all found in the pages of the Hebrew Bible. The supreme revelations of the Hebrew Bible constitute the core of our Judaism, the core of our own religion, the core, as we believe, of the future religion of all mankind. We, too, can say of this book, as the gentile proselytes are to say of Zion, "All my fountains are in thee."

Large and important is the work which Liberal Judaism has accomplished. If we recognise that its own edges are still rough, though less rough than the edges of the Old Testament, we yet believe that it is capable of smoothing them. Much we can see which remains to be done; much doubtless will be done which we cannot see. That which remains and which we can see is mainly to complete what has already been achieved, and to do so on the same lines. We have gradually to let our ideas shine forth more perfectly from our institutions, to let our forms reflect our doctrines more completely. That must be a long and difficult task, in which it is better to go too slow than too fast. It is not easy, though sometimes the attempt may have to be made, to retrace a false, or even an inexpedient, step. We may, however, be fairly satisfied with the work, all imperfect though it be, which has already been achieved. Liberal Judaism has taken up again, on distinctively Jewish lines, the teachings of the Prophets. It has, we may truly say, put Prophets and Law in a new position and relation to each other. It has religiously emancipated women, and in this respect, as in some other respects, it has become a religion suited to, and fitted for, the western world. It has

attempted to denationalise Judaism and to universalise it. It has fashioned or adopted new ideas of much moment and significance concerning revelation and inspiration, as well as new ideas concerning authority and freedom. It has boldly and openly faced the new conclusions of history and criticism, and sought to find new adjustments to them. It has attempted to fashion a Judaism which can look Science in the face without flinching, which is independent of the dates and authorships of the Biblical books and of the miracles recorded in them. It has sought to free Judaism from obsolete priestly conceptions. It has abandoned the Talmudic theory of the *ukas* as applied to the ceremonial enactments of the Pentateuchal Code, a theory which, while, as must gladly be admitted, it largely got rid of superstition, yet rested upon the hypothesis that, for various good reasons, the perfectly wise and perfectly good God had directly ordained and commanded all these enactments, whether one could find parallels for them in many other races in certain stages of civilisation or not. Liberal Judaism has deliberately restricted the idea of religious purity and impurity to states of the soul, in other words, to virtue and to sin. Physical ailments and bodily conditions are, religiously, neither pure nor impure, and the physically clean is to be distinguished from the religiously clean : in other words, *ritual* cleanness or uncleanness is abolished. Yet Liberal Judaism no less than Traditional Judaism, and with greater success and efficacy for the modern world, seeks to make religion coterminous with life. It gives to cleanliness—even physical cleanliness—a religious value, but a value very different from the priestly ideas of

cleanliness which have hitherto prevailed. Liberal Judaism seeks to fashion a Judaism which shall be broad enough and humble enough to believe that its own truths, its own treasures, can be enriched and added to from the truths and treasures which may have been vouchsafed to other than Jewish teachers. It does not attempt to fashion a Judaism which shall be a mere medley of pretty notions gathered from every source. But it attempts to make its own doctrines still richer and fuller, and no less harmonious and consistent, by *selected* garnerings from without. One set of garnerings, however, can hardly be rightly held to come from without. So far as we can learn from Jesus and even from Paul, we learn from Jews, and not from aliens. While Liberal Judaism must not hesitate to differ from these illustrious men, it need not hesitate also to learn from them. From their teaching, too, it may adopt and adapt what suits it, and what appears to it to be true. Free in respect of the Old Testament, it may claim a similar freedom as regards the New. Fearless it is and unperplexed "what weapons to select, what armour to indue." So does it go forth into the battle of life, in hope and joy, trusting to truth and to God.

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